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INTRODUCTION

Most discussions of Karl Marx's e.nd Friedrich Engels' s
views on the Polish question consist of short articles in
historical magazines

o~

chapters in books concerning some other

problems, except for a few recent publications in the Polish
People's Republic.

A considerable part of these discussions is of

a polemical nature.

The Polish socialists and communists have bee

repeatedly involved in controversies over the right interpretatj_on
of Marx's and Engels's statements on the Polish question.
At the turn of the nineteenth century, when the socialist
movement was rapidly gaining ground among the Poles, the heated
discussion centered around the question as to whether the Polish
socialists ought to continue the fight for national independence in
order to assist in the destruction of the reactionary governments
Prussia, Austx·ia, and Russia.
statements, the PPS

Drawing on Yiarx' s and Engels' s

(Polsl~artia

Socialisteczna (Polish Socialist

Party J ) maintained that the two communist leaders had never
avered in their· support of the restoration of Poland.

Consequent-

ly, the PPS continued to fight for a strong and independent Polish
1

2

state.

But Rosa Luxemburg, the leading Polish Marxist, rejected

the policy of the PPS as "patriotic socialism. 11

She insisted that

although Marx and Engels had favored the restoration of Poland
in

the 1840's, they had turned against it later on.

Moreover, in

v.iew of the rap.id economic changes, which would soon bring about
the liberation of the oppressed classes, it was no longer necess
to fight against national oppression.

Restoration of Poland had

become a mere ":p_etit-bourgeois utopia. 11
The controversy was .intens.ified through the .intervention
of the Russian Marxist Vladiinir Iliich Ulianov (Lenin).

He

condemned the policy of the PPS as narrowmindedly nationalistic.
1

However, he also r.idiculed Rosa Luxemburg for having rejected the

r.ight to national self-determinat.ion which Marx had favored .in the
interest of the revolution.

But he praised her support of a

revolutionary collaboration between the Polish communists in the
Polish Kingdom and the Russian communists.

In the tradition of

Russ.ian radicals s.ince the 1820' s, Lenin hoped for the realizat.ion
of a close Polish-Russian aliiance.

Although this alliance failed

to materialize at the t.ime of the Russ.ian Revolut.ion of 1917, .it
was finally reaiized with the creat.ion of a Polish People's
Republic under communist rule in 1945.
S.ince 1945 the Polish communists have maintained that the
Polish question has definitely been solved.

They no longer seek

answers to the problem of Polish political .independence in Marx's

3
and Engels's writings.
problem-~to

But they have been faced with a different

defend the viewpoint of the Polish Communist Party

which maintains that only a close collaboration with the Soviet
.Union guarantees the territorial i:rltegrity of Poland and Polish
independence.

After the Polish unrest of 1956 Polish Marxist

historians even endorsed the teachings of the realist school of
Polish historiography which condemned the nineteenth century
uprisings against Russia as a foolish disregard of Polish-Russian
power relations.

Marx's and Engels's writings have also been

searched for evidence in support of Polish-Russian collaboration.
In 1954 Celina Bobi£ska, a leading Polish Marxist
historian, published a study on Marks i

Eng~ls

a S;erawy Polskie

("Marx and Engels and the Polish Question") in Warsaw.

Her

intention was
to illustrate the fundamental problems from the Polish
point of view--for example, the development of the
left-wing splinter groups of the Polish national liberation movement towards an uyderstanding of the high
demands of Marx and Engels.
On

ti1e basis of her studies she concluded that since the 1850' s

Marx and Engels had welcomed the first signs of a closer PolishRussian

collaboratio~,

while after the Polish insurrection of

1863-64, they had definitely become convinced that "the future of
Poland lies in the common revolutionary collaboration with Russi •
1celina Bobinska, Marx und En els ueber
trans. by Rudolf Fabel (Berlin:
2

Ibid.J!, :p. 203.
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According to Bobi£ska, Lenin adhered faithfully to Marx's
and Engels's concept of Polish-Russian collaboration.

Ile prepared

its future realization during his leadership when the Russian
proletarian party became the only strong defender of Polish
liberation.

But Bobinska indicated that the Polish communists had

their share in making the contemporary Polish-Russian alliance
possible.

They relinquished Polish pretensions to the former

eastern territories of the old Polish Republic White Russia and
the Ukraine.

According to Bobi~ska this complied with Marx's

and Engels's wishes.

However, she refrained from asking whether

the present-day western Polish border was also envisioned by Marx
and Engels ..
Bobinska's arguments helped to bolster the official Polish
communist viewpoint that the Polish People's Republic has truly
achieved national independence through the generous support of the
Soviet Union.

Her arguments also served as a warning to the Polis

socialists who are strongly opposed to the contemporary Polish
solution.

From Bobifiska' s vie'\vpoint the opposition of the Polish

socialists is futile and reactionary because even Marx had
considered Polish-Russian collaboration as the only means to
achieve liberty.
The Polish social democrats have fought this contention.
On January 23, 1962 Adam Ciollrnsz, a leading Polish social

democrat in the post-war emigration, published.a lengthy article
in the Polish newspa.per Orzel Bialy y SyreJ.!£ (White Eagle and

5
Siren [London] ) in which he charged the Polish communists with
having misinterpreted Marx's and Engels's statements on Poland.
Since the two men had a true understanding of a "democratic
policy," they hoped Poland would become a strong and completely
independent state between Germany and Russia.
In Ciolkosz's opinion only the PPS had rightly understood
Marx's and Engels 1 s wishes for Poland because it fought for a
strong and -independent Polish state.

Bobinska, instead, has

followed in the path of Rosa Luxemburg.

She denies the Polish

people the right to become the "master of its own history."
Ciolkosz insisted that, contrary to Bobinska's opinion, the
present day Polish solution has net secured national independence
for the Poles.

Poland has become a mere "outpost" of the Soviet

Union, that is, a negligible member of the Russian bloc.

It

exists by the grace of the Soviet Union.
Over the years three major contentions have emerged from
the Polish controversy concerning the rj.ght interp:r.etation of
Marx's and Engels's statements on Poland:

(1) that Marx and Engels

never gave up their hope for the creation of a strong and independent Polish state; ·(2) that after an initial phase of enthusiarri
for the restoration of a great Polish state they finally lost
interest in the Polish national question; and, (3) that Marx and
Engels believed that the Poles could only secure for themselves an
independent national life by close collaboration with the Russians.

6
In the author's opinion, the variety of interpretations

i~

partially due to the willfulness of the interpreters to select
only those statements of Marx and Engels which have suited their
purpose.

This procedure has been facilitated by the following:

(1) many statements of Marx and Engels were intended to fight
political opponents, and as a result their statements were
contradictory; (2) Marx

~nd

Engels never wrote a comprehensive

study on the national question, the question of minorities, the
peasant question, or the organization of the state--problems which
have a bearing on the Polish question.
Such shortcomings have also influenced the interpretation
of Marx's and E:ngels's Polish views in the western world.

Western

interpretations range from an emphasis on Marx's and Engels's
enthusiasm for a restoration of Poland, to a recently more
pronounced trend to differentiate, as Rosa Luxemburg did, between
an initial phase of great interest in Polish national independence
and a second phase of a gradual decline of this interest.

Western

interpreters in general seem to be more interested in the antiRussian views of Marx and Engels.

Consequently, there is a

tendency to interpret their Polish views in the light of their
Russian views.
It is sµrprising that modern historians have not asked
to what extent Marx's and Engels's views on the Polish question
were a result of thei-r preoccupation with the German question

7

which in turn had a bearing on their attitude towards Russia.

In

the author's opinion, this omission has greatly impeded a complex
insight into the views of Marx and Engels.

Therefore, it is the

major aim of this dissertation to examine the relations between
Marx's and Engels's concern with Germany and their attitude on the
Polish question.
It is true that Marx and Engels were in the first place
social revoiutionaries.

Their foremost aim was the overthrow

of the old political, socio-economic European order and the
establishment of a communist society.

Consequently, their interest

in national, territorial,and foreign political questions was
subordinat~d

to that final aim.

These questions were often

as a convenient means to agitate for the final communist

treate~

revolutiD~

Although Marx and Engels spent the greater part of their
lives outside their mother country, the German question was of
major concern to them.

While they agitated for a German social

revolution, they also supported the demand for the creation of
Q.rossdeutschla!l.,q, of a German state with strategically safe
box·ders and including the Habsburg territories.
regretted German weakness.

Marx and Engels

Their intense concern with the question

of power caused them to admire historical figures like Napoleon I
and Peter the Great.

But they were also convinced that a German

communist revolution would definitely overcome German weakness and
would secure for Germany a strong position in Central Europe.

8
Because of Marx's and Engels's concern with German
strength, they opposed the concept of a Slavic union which the
Russian political exiles Michael Bakunin (1814-76) and Alexander
Herzen (1812-70) had propagandized ·since the 1840's.

In the

opinion of these Russians a Polish-Russian alliance would be an
initial step towards the liberation of all the Slavs from Turkish
as well as German rule.

Marx and Engels were quite aware of the

consequences of a Slavic power bloc for Germany.

They hoped that

the Poles would not collaborate with the Russians.
It was not without justification that Slavic leaders,
foremost among them Michael Bakunin, maintained that Marx's and
Engels's statements on Poland and the Slavic problem were dictated
by their interest in Germany.

\Vhen Marx and Bakunin fought over

the leadership of the First International, they were also involved
in a controversy over the future reorganization of Central
Eastern Europe, that is, after the socialist revolution.
Since the 1860's Marx and Engels had become convinced
that the German workers would be the leaders of a future revolution
which in their opinion would make an end to Slavophile dreams.
But the actual historical development was far different from their
expectations.

It we.s Russia which staged the first communist

revolution in 1917, and at the end of World \Var II it was the
Soviet Union which emerged as the leading European power.

It

extended its sphere of influence over Central Eastern Europe and

9
Eastern Germany.

It was also instrumental in the demarkation of

the new Polish western border, the Oder-Neisse line.

Indeed, the

present-day situation coincides to a large degree with the early
political hopes of Bakunin, but it has nothing to do with Yarx's
and Engels's political calculations.

CHAPI1ER I
THEORY OF REVOLUTION:

GERMANY

Kar.l Marx and Friedrich Engels grew up in the postNapoleonic era in the Rhineland when German dissatisfaction with
the anachronistic political and economic structure of the Gorman
Confederation was steadily increasing.

Since 1815 Germany had

been composed of thirty-nine large and small political units
surrounded by customs barriers.

Political decentralization had

its counterpart in the lack of an economic union vvhich presented
tho greatest obstacle to the development of Germany into a
modern stace.
Since the twenties the manufacturing bourgeoisie
petitioned the German governments for the removal of the customs
barriers which had been prom1sed in the Vienna treaties of 1815.
At the time of the revolutionary upheavals of 1830-31, the more
radical demand for the political unification gained momentum for
the first t:Lme.

A few years later Prussia partially met the

10
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demand for changes with the founding of the Zollverein in 1833
which marked the beginning of the economic union of Germany.3
Even before 1833 Prussia had held an influential position
in Germany because Prussia possessed the best military organization as well as the largest territory scattered across the five
parallel rivers which flow through Northern Germany.

The founding

of the Zollverein considerably strengthened Prussia's position
in Germany and enabled Prussia to take the lead in the economic
development of Germany.

As the years passed by,·more and more

members of the influential circles in the German states were
attracted to Prussia.
The· manufacturing bourgeoisie of- the Rhineland, which had
been annexed to Prussia in 1815, became the foremost supporters
of the extension of the Zollverein to all of the German states.
The bourgeoisie advocated political unification under Prussian
leadership.

Yet, at the outset of the mid-nineteenth century, it

was not so certain that the completion of the economic union would
prepare the way for German unification by the House of Hohenzollern.
It was still possible that Austria might unite Germany.

Besides,

many of the liberals, predominantly in Southern Germany, were anti3The founding of the Zollverein was largely due to the
conversion of the Prussian enI""igf.it"ened bureaucrats to economic
liberalism after 1815. Cf. William Otto Henderson, The State and
ih~ Inftu~~ial Revolution i~ Prussia (Liverpool: Liverpool
University Press, 1958), pp. 7b-95.

12

Prussian, and the radical movement, which was still in its infancy,
agitated for a revolution of the masses to achieve German
unification.
When Marx and }Jngels reached adulthood, the Zollverein
had contributed to the expansion of manufacturing.4

In spite of

this progress Germany was still predominantly an agricultural
country in which two thirds of the population were peasants.5

Yet,

there existed differences in the level of the social and economic
development.

The most 'backward conditions

preva~led

in the

territories east of the Elbe river where town life was far less
developed than west of that river.

Even Berlin, the capital of

Prussia, was rather provincial and poor.
East

Pr~ssia,

The peasant masses in

Silesia, Pomerania, etc. were ruled by a small

privileged class of aristocratso

Except for some areas in Silesia,

where manufacturing had made progress, these conditions had more i
common with the Eastern European countries, Poland and Russia, tha
with the rest of Germany.
--"41n 1839 an English observer of German economic condition
reported to his government that since 1833 Germany had made
immense p.cogress in all the protected branches of manufacturing,
particularly in the production of woolen and cotton goods which
were no longer imported from England. Fredrick List, 1'Iatiopal
-~s~em ?f.-~£.t:tti.£.a...3=..~~onon'!.I, trans. by G. A. Matile (Phil"aaGIPhia,
Pa~:~pincott & Co., 1856), p. 467.

5Rudolf. Stadelmann, Soz,iaJ-~.~~litische G_eschic.h_te der
Revolution von 1 f2l1¥- (2d. ed.; Darmstadt: WissenSC11a:ffIIC'110
ifo"cngeseTI.schaft, 962), pp. 9-28.
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Southern Germany was as yet untouched by the industrial
revolution.

It presented a different picture with its mass of

burghers, artisans, and peasants which made for social homogeneity.
In comparison, the social and economic order was much more
differentiated in the Rhineland.

The Prussian province was

economically the most advanced part of Germany.
manufacturing were thriving.

Commerce and

Cologne, the most important commer-

cial center. of Northwestern Germany, had a wealthy bourgeoisie.
Although the Rhineland ·held a preeminent position in the economic
life of Germany, even this region had very little which resembled
modern industry.

Nor did the Rhineland own an industrial center

comparable to Manchester in England.
The differences in the level of socio-economic development
led to differences in political outlook.

In the mid-forties, when

Marx and Engels had entered the ranks of European revolutionaries,
conservatism prevailed in Eastern Germany and liberalism in
Western Germany.
divided.

The opposition to the reactionary governments wa

The moderates were willing to make concessions.

But the

radicals were convinced that the existing conditions could only be
changed through a complete reconstruction of Germany.6

The

Rhineland was the center of opposition to the obstructive policies

of the smaller and larger German governments.

Though social

and poli tice.l motives played a certain role in this fight, economic
motives prevailed.?
The most powerful politico_.economic German thinker in
the forties was the Southern German liberal Friedrich List.

In

the twenties he had emigrated to the United States for political
reasons.

This was a docistve experience in his life which

mae;nified his awareness of the anachronistic economic and
political conditions iri his mother country after_ his return in
the early thirties.

Until his death in 1846 he continued to

agitate for the promotion of German industrialization through the
extension of the

~11 ver..£:_in

to all of Germany.

List opposed the propaganda of the .German radicals for a
German revolution in order to achieve German political

unificatio~

He claimed that a revolution was neither feasible nor practical
because the masses were too backward to have nationwide interests.8
Only the development of a large middle class through the extension
of manufacturing would create national feeling.

As long as

Germany remained a predominatly agricultural country, political
7:F'ritz -c.;b"on, .Der rote Handschuh (Frankfurt am Main:
Athenaeum Verlag, 1961},p. 7t:-8Tho German philosopher Georg Hegel had expressed the
same idea in bis Philosophy of History. He was convinced that the
predominance of o.grTCil:rtU.:c"e"" impedecrthe grovrtb of self-consciousness and oi' an interest in the political life., The Ph_ij._osoph;y: of
!~E:e.1_, trans. and ed. by Carl J. Friedrich (New York:
Random
House, Inc., 19~-5), p. 125.
.

1

·~....1a'll'm;~~~y=m:;li.l..'!IB:="!l:~~~.....,.~~~::.~~~~i::::ftW~i!2£.'$-7.~=~-r~~---=:c.,,..~tat:-...-....c.:><~"fir~1~~
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unification would not save Germany from being exploited or
threatened by its neighbors.

Therefore, List concluded that

polj_tical unification should come about through an evolutionary
process leading to the economic union and the creation of a
modern economic order.
Zoll~erein

The Prussian state which had initiated the

was predestined to take a leading role in the

unification of Germany, including the Habsburg territories.9
Possessing a strong industry, a considerable population,
and a large territory extending from the North Sea and Baltic Sea
to the Adriatic Sea and from the Rhine to the borders of the Polish
Kingdom, the new Germany would become a truly independent and
powerful nation in European politics. 1O List 1 s interest in Germe.n
economic_ progress was intimately connected with his concern over
__ German political weakness in Europe.
power political considerations.

It was largely dictated by

Yet, his concern with social evils

and his desire to raise the living standard of the people should
ot be overlooked.
The theories of List were particularly welcomed by the
Rhenish manufacturing bourgeoisie.

It could hardly have been

expected that List's demands for the industrialization of Germany
Friedrich List, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by Ludwig
Hausser (3 vols.; Stuttgart ana ~uebingen: Cottascher Verlag,
1850-51 ) , II, 4L1-6.
lOList, Hc:-.:l~.onal System, pp. 26Li--65.
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would impress the small bourgeoisie which represented the core of
the democratic movement and fought for its survival in a changing
world.

But in the revolutionary theories of :V.1arx and Engels,

which were elaborated in the mid-forties, the demand for
industrialization found a foremost place, although for reasons
which were very different from those of List.

Industrialization

was regarded as the preparation for the final liberation of man.
Consequently, Marx and Engels were as much conerned as List with
the political and economic backwardness and disunir,y of Germany. 11
Their acquaintances with the economic and political conditions of
the Western European countries had increased their consciousness
of German backwardness.

11 Evide1;t°1y :Viarx and Engels became acquainted with List's
ideas in the forties. According to the German historian Fritz
Cahen "List v1as JvT.arx 1 s unsuccessful competitor for the leftist
press in Cologne du.ring a brief period in 1842. 11 Fritz M. Cahen,
_Qp. cit., p. 77. In the winter o:r 184Li--li-5 En.gels wanted to VTrite
a critique of List's economic theory. In 1847 he stated that
List he.d produced the best bourgeois economic literature. Cf.
Franz Mehring, Karl Ma~e Stor_Y. of His Life, trans. by Edward
Fitzgerald, Annitt~PaperbacR:s "(Aiin A.rbOr, Mich.: The
University of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 106, 130. Cf. also the
repeated references by Marx and Engels to List in their
discussions on protectionism and free trade, in Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe: Vler~±
Schrif~gn., Briefe, ea. 15y 15avid Boi·-isovich Goldenach on be a f of
°{he Marx-£~nstitute in Moscow, Vol. I: 7 Parts; Vol. III:
4 Parts (Frankfurt am Main: Marx-Engels-Archiv, Verlagsgesellschaft, GmbH, 1927-31), I/4, 38Li-, 385; I/6, 311, 428, 432.
On the following pages the Gesamtausgabe \'Till be ref erred to as
MEGA.
·

-
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Since 1844, when their l.ifelong fr.iendship began, Marx
and Engels agreed that a true revolutionary must be interested in
the problems of the day and study them in detail in order to
criticize .intell.igently actual political and social conditions.
But a true revolutionary must also be intensely interested in
history.

An understanding of the past revealed the truth about

contemporary conditions and helped to formulate the answer to the
future task· of solving the social questions. 12
Marx and Engels delved repeatedly into the German past
and compared it with the more fortunate history of the Western
. European countries in order. to find an answer to the present ills
of Germany.· They .insisted that .in France and England the
bourgeoisie had performed a histor.ical mission because .it had
helped to destroy feudalism and to develop both countries .into
modern states.

France was praised as the model of political

development which led to the pol.i ti cal centralization and to the
creation of a unified nation in the French Revolution.

But Marx

12 cr. Marx's critique of the Young Hegelians for their
lack of interest in a "detailed treatment of actual cond.itions"
late in 1842. Mehring, .212• cit., p. 46. Cf. Marx's cr.itique of
the French socialists in the Deutsch-Franzoesische Jabrbuecher
(a German radical journal) in'""'J?ebruary, 1844. Marx stated that
their ideas were too abstract and that they studied neither the
discrepancies .in the "political state" which revealed social truth
nor the histor.ical development of society. MEGA, I/1 , 573-75.
Cf. also Marx and Engels's insistence on the need for an understand.ing of historical phenomena. Marx and Engels, Die heilige
.E?.milie, in~' I/3, 294-300.
•

18

and Engels had an even greater admiration for England as the model
of economic development which brought about the industrial
revolution in the mid-eighteenth century.

Both the French

Revolution and the English industrial revolution gave birth to
modern bourgeois society which meant historical progress over
feudal society. 1 3
Marx and Engels pointed out that the German Empire had no
made any political or economic progress since the Middle Ages.
They blamed the decay of the German Empire on the German
/

bourgeoisie.

Because of a preoccupation with local affairs, the

German bourgeoisie had failed to become an active agent in largescale political measures and economic enterprises.
failed to develop Germany into a modern state.

It also had

Germany's

- backwardness was fully exploited by the powerful English and
French bourgeoisie.

Even when _the French bourgeoisie staged "the

most colossal revolution 11 in the history of the world and
conquered Europe, and when the English bourgeoisie effected the
industrial revolution and

11

the commercial subjugation of the

world, 11 the German bourgeoisie VTas unable t1to develop into a class
with common national :i.nterests. 111 4

175.

Summing up their contemptuous

l3Marx a~d Engels, Die de~tsche Ideolo1ie, in ~' I/5,
Cf. also Die heili~e Famili~, in l"fEGA, I/ ~298-99.
14Die deutsche Id~ologie, in MEGA I/5 175.
-

_,

'
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critique of late eighteenth century Germany, Engels stated that a
mean, sneaky, miserable, and shopkeeping spirit" marked the whole
German people. 15 To him their lack of initiative and daring was
11

appalling.
When Engels was an old man, he still lamented the
"wretchedness" of German history.

In a letter to the German socia

democrat Franz Mehring of July 14, 1893, he stated:
In studying German history • • • I have always found that
a comparison witb the corresponding French periods produces
a correct idea of proportions because what happens there
is the direct opposite of vrhat happens in our country • • •
There, a rare objective logic during the whole course of
the process; with us, more and more dismal dislocation.
Engels regretted that the German Empire could not prevent "the
plundering of German territory on a large scale" because it did
not develop into a centralized state like France.

But he was

relieved to note that
Since our workingmen have placed Germany at the head
of the historical movementl it is easier to swallow
the disgrace of the past.lo
In the 1840 1 s Engels and Marx had studied with a similar
feeling of relief the French conquest of Europe at the turn of the
eighteenth century.

They argued that the beginning of a

regeneration of Germany was due to the French revolutionary wars
f5Engels,., "Letter I to Northern Star," October 25, 1845,
I/IV, 462.
~
16 Engels, De~ deutsche Bauernkriep;, ed. by Franz Mehring
( Berlin: Buchhandlung·-vor:waerts;-'T9b1f),___p •. 14~

in~'
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and to a foreigner Napoleon I.
admirers of this man.)

(Marx and Engels were great

They claimed it was Napoleon's historical

mission to usher Germany into the modern age and to prepare the
way for a centralized German state.

He had liberated the Germans

from the rotten German Empire, created modern communications, and
reduced the great number of smaller states, vestiges of the
.
17
medieval German political structure, by creating larger ones.
had

Engels criticized the Germans because they did not
understand Napoleon's mission to destroy outdated forms of
European life.
use power.

Napoleon was the "great conqueror" who knew how to

But the Germans judged him on moral grounds.

They

·called him ·an "arbitrary despot" although he was "the representative of the revolution in Germany • • • [where] his so-called
reign of terror was badly needed. 1118

Engels condemned the Wars of

Liberation of 1813-11+ as an "act of insanity" because they
strengthened reactionary forces in Germany.

From the historical

viewpoint the Germans had no right to revolt against the French
occupation and Napoleon because the French nation had initiated the
French Revolution, and Napoleon was its symbol and its executor.
In Engels's opinion neither individual suffering, nor national
17Die de~tsche Ideologie, in MEGA, I/5, 176-77.
18 Engels, "Letter I to Northern Star," in ~' I/Li-, 1+84.
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oppression, nor the partition of a nation's territory justified
a revolt against the forces which represented progress.
When Marx and Engels turned their attention to the
German situation in the post-Napoleonic era, they admitted that
a new Germany was in the making.
England and France.

But it was still far behind

Although the German bourgeoisie had finally

acquired an .interest in nat.ion-wide political and economic
problems, it was still confronted vri th the task of overthrowing
the old social order

and

creat.ing a centralized national state,

a. task which the French bourgeo.isie had performed .in 1789.

The

question which both Marx and Engels asked was whether the German
bourgeoisie· would carry out that revolution.
Before Marx began to collaborate closely with Engels, he
had elaborated a revolutionary theory for Germany which rejected
the possibility of a bourgeois revolution.

It is quite probable

that Marx's experiences in the Rhineland during his collaboration
with the liberal newspaper ,F]l.einische Zeitun,g (Cologne) in 1842-43
supported his doubts regarding the revolutionary initiative of the
German bourgeoisie~ 1 9
-19The ~:isc.~e. ~ei
we.s founded in Janu~ry, 1842 ~Y
the weal thy Rheni11h '6ourgeoisie in order to further 1 ts economic
interests, particularly the extension of the _&ollver~ to all of
Germany. In the beginning Marx was only a contributor to the
newspaper, but from October, 181+2 to March, 1843 he was .its editor.
It is noteworthy that the office of an editor was first offered to
List whose ideas the weo.l thy Rhenish bourgeoisie favored. But he
declined the of fer because at that time he collaborated vri th the
~11E.e_~}Be .AugE?_l?,.l]]'J::;er._J-!f"~s the leading liberal German newsp.a.pa."'r"l'

t™
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Through his involvement in the political and economic
questions of the day, Marx became convinced that even in the
Rhineland, the most progressive part of Germany, feudal conditions
were still prevalent.
lando~ners

The Diet was· not truly representative; the

held a strong position in it and were able to use their

legislative powers to further their own interests.

Marx was

exasperated because the bourgeoisie did.not firmly oppose the
attempt of

~he

landovmers to deprive the peasants of their

customary rights.

The ·bourgeoisie did not press _hard enough for

the right of the public to attend the sessions of the Rhenish Diet,
and it acquiesced too easily in the tightening Prussian
.

20

In

18L~3

censors h ip •.

Marx's thoughts centered around the problem of

how to achieve the true liberty of man. His increasing antagonism

to the bourgeoisie coincided with his rejection of Hegel's ideal
state and of French revolutionary principles as a means to achieve
that endo
Hegel had taught that man was intended to be free and
tha.t his freedom would be realized in a state in which "justice
and law • • • were conceived as appertaining to every free man, 11
and in which all citizens wouJ:.:1 collaborate for the attainment of
the common good--the realization of the moral law. 21 In the

20 Cf. MEGA, I/1, 18Li--85, 228, 271-76, 300, 303, 328.
21
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Heg~\, pp. 65, 284.
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review Deutsch-:.Franzoesisch£ Jahrbuec_her (Paris), on which
Marx collaborated after bis emigration to Paris in November, 1843,
he argued that the Hegelian ideal state was merely the fully
developed "political state. 11

It wo-uld not liberate man.

This had

been proven by the development of the modern political state
since the }!'ench Revolution.
Although Marx praised the French Revolution as a most
significant. historical event, he held that it had made serious
mistakes which ought to be avoided in the future.

The French

Revolution merely achieved the partial emancipation of man because
it aimed at political liberation. 22 It failed to abolish private
property, the basis of individual ego:Lsm and social ante.gonism.
The modern political state, follovdng the French revolutionary
·- principles, granted freedom of property, of trade, and of religion
instead of abolishing these three evils.

This permitted the rise

of a bourgeois society and of anarchic conditions in the social
sphere.
According to Marx the Jewish situation, in particular,
proved the shortcomings of the modern political state.

Although

they 1aere politically emancipated, the Jews remained enslaved to
Judaism, the embodiment of the capitalist spirit--of self-interest,

=::---;-zur

-2'2 ~vr
i1arx,

Kri. t i_,_
. k der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie"

( 18h4) , :i.n MEGA, I/ 1 , 61 7.
in ~' Ifl;--5°96-98.

Cf'. also Marx,

11

Zur Judenfrage" (1844),
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profit-making,and the rule of money, evils in which the Christian
bourgeois society equally indulged.

Only by rejecting Judaism

and supporting the abolition of private property would the Jews
liberate themselves and simultaneously work

11

for the emancipation

of humanity itselr. 112 3
Convinced that the modern political state failed to
liberate man fully, Marx concluded that the German revolution must
aim at more· radical changes and transcend a mere political
revolution.

Besides, in his opinion the Germans.would be unable

to follow the example set by the French Revolution.

The success

of that Revolution was due to the close collaboration between the
bourgeoisie- and the lower classes.

However, the German bourgeoisie

lacked both the generosity to identify itself with the "popular
_ mind" and the capacity for leadership.

Marx even doubted that the

German bourgeoisie had the courage "to conceive the idea of
emancipation from its own standpoint."

Moreover, the concept of a

bourgeois revolution had become "antiquated or at least
problematical" because of the "development of social conditions
and the progress of political theory. 1124
11

Zur Judenfrage, 11 Ibid., pp. 601-060

24 11 zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, 11 in

I/1 , 617- 1 8.
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While Marx questioned the possibility of a German
bourgeois revolution, he passionately believed that Germany was
predestined to make a social revolution which would initiate the
final liberation of man, including the Jews.
Marx argued that in spite of the political and economic
backwardness of Germany the German people were the equals of the
English and the French because of their achievements in the
philosophical criticism of state and law.

This criticism vn1ich

culminated in Hegel's philosophy also led the Germans to the
burning question of the modern age, the question of returning to
man his dignity.

It was merely a question of turning German

philosophical theory into revolutionary action in order to achieve
11

univers_al human emancipation."
Marx argued that the essential precondition of the future

German revolution was
the formation of a class with radical chains, • • • a
class which is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere
of society which has a universal character because its
sufferings are universal, and claims no particular right
because the wrong committed against it is not a
particule.r v.rrong but wrong as such.25
x practically admitted that a German proletariat did not yet

exist.

It was merely in the process of development as a result of

the industrial expansion.

But he expect9d that, as the proletariat

grew, it would furnish "philosophy" with the "material weapons"

'5- . ..
~

Ib:id., p$ 619.
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required to overturn the existing order because the proletariat
was prepared to reject the whole social order.
"Philosophy," said Marx, "is the head of this emancipation
and the proletariat its heart. 1126 He meant that the radical

.

intellectuals who interpreted philosophy were destined to become
the new revolutionary leaders--a generous element which would
identify itself with the popular mind.

Vlhen their radical ideas
~

had penetrated the masses, the German proletarian revolution would
transcend the partial revolution of the French Jacobins.

The

German proletariat would emancipate itself and thereby the whole
of humanity. 11 The emancipation of the German is the emancipation
of man, 112 7 -proclaimed Marx. The German proletariat would bring
about the total transformation of society.

The conceptual image

__ of perfection presented by philosophy would become reality.

The

implication was that Germany could leap with a salto

mor.!_§.]-~

the necessary stages of its historical development.

The German

revolution would be both political and social.
the old powers and dissolve the old society.

over

It would overthrow
Marx's revolutionary

expectations went far beyond the modest hopes of the German
democrats, including Arnold Ruge, the editor of the DeutschFranzoesische Jahrbuecher, for the creation of a German republican
democratic state.

-2bll?.1:£.'
27~.

p. 621.
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When the Silesian weavers revolted in the summer of 1844,
Marx interpreted this event as proof that the revolutionary ardor
of the German proletariat was superior to that of the Western
European proletarj_at because the German proletariat had already
acquired "the consciousness" of being a separate class.

Therefore,

it was the theoretician of the European proletariat just as the
English proletariat was the economist and the French, the
politician. 28
In the following months under the influence of Engels,
Marx receded from his utopian expectations regarding the German
revolution.

He accepted Engels's view that the first proletarian

revolution would take place in England.
Ever since the winter of 1842-43, Engels had had the
__ opportunity to study social and economic conditions of large-scale
industry in England.

He became convinced that economic factors

represented a decisive historical force, a.nd that they formed the
basis of the development of existing class antagonisms.

In 1844

he declared that England's salvation from the appalling social
conditions lay with the modern English working cle.ss which had
become the slave of the factory ovmers.
arbeitenden Klasse

in~,

In his book Die Lage der

published in Leipzig in 1845, he

2 CSMarx, "Der Aufstand der schlesischen Weber," Vorwaerts
(Paris), Summer, 1946, quoted in Mehring, op. _£it., p. 84.
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maintained that England was on the brink of a revolution because
class antagonism was rapidly deepening with the extension of largescale industry.

The English revolution would enable the Chartists,

the organized :E.'nglish workingmen, to take over political power
and to precipitate a social transformation through the overthrow
of the bourgeois Oi·der based on private property. 2 9
In 1846 Marx with the assistance of Engels developed the
decisive factors of historical materialism.

He maintained that

the economic production in each historical epoch determined the
social structure as well as the political and intellectual history
f

the period, and that the class struggles of the past had now

eached a stage at which the industrial proletariat was destined
o free the whole society from exploitation by freeing itself· from
exploiting bourgeoisie.30
This revolutionary theory was further elaborated in the
ommunj_st
f

Manife~.

It was largely derived from the observation

conditions in Western Europe, particularly in England.

It did

ot apply to German conditions, and it assumed that England, the
ost industrie.lized country, would become the leader of the
proletarian revolution.

I/4,

7-71.

9Die Lag.e der arbettenden Klasse in Englan£1, in

222-23-;-24t7~

™'

30cf. in particular Die d~utsche Idea~~' in~' I/5,
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The question is ·what d.id the revolution mean to Marx and
~ngels

on the eve of the Revolution of 1848.

And here it has to

be noted that the two friends were primarily concerned with
This has been too often overlooked~3 1

Germany.

Yet, it

influenced their idea of the revolution.
In the pre-March period Marx and Engels frequently
discussed German contemporary conditions e.nd problems in newspaper
articles.

This was one means of agitating for a German revolution.

Before 184.8 Marx and Engels had an outspoken preference
for Prussia.

They were typical Northern Germans with a superiority

complex towards the Southern Germans who were regarded as backward
and who were often treated with contempt.
At the time that Marx collaborated with the Rheinische
Zeitung, he supported the pro-Prussian course of the paper.
Thereby, he did not commit any noticeable violence to the
convictions he held at that time.

Although he loathed "Prussian

despotism," he was convinced that Prussia was the most advanced
part of Germany:

Prussia had initiated liberal economj.c policies,

and in Prussia German philosophical development had reached a
climax with Hegel's critique of state and law.

Thus, Marx's

pr·o-Prussian sympathies expressed themselves chiefly in a defense

3'1cr. George Lichtheim, !i,arxism, an Historical and Critical

fil]_c!;[, Praeger University Series ~N'ew York:
Inc., 1962), p. 51.

__________
,

Freaer"":LC'K"""~~raeger,
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of Prussian economic policies and in repeated references to North
German science as against the superficiality of French and South
German theories.
The preference for Prussia· was an important element in
Marx's and Engels's revolutionary calculations.

In 1846 Engels

pointed out that the Prussian bourgeoisie, particularly in the
Rhineland, was the most progressive German bourgeoisie.
the greatest interest in the unification of Germany.

It had

Therefore,

Engels considered Prussia as "the center of modern German
history • • • and the battlefield on which the future fate of
Germany will be determined. 1132 Neither Southern Germany nor
Austria wou·ld have any decisive influence on the future German
revolutionary movement.
11

In Engels's opinion Austria was still a

half-barbarian country" because its "paternalistic despotism"

had not yet encountered any opposition.

The German revolution

would be initiated in Prussia.

In 1847 Engels was definitely convinced that only a
bourgeois-democratic revolution was possible in Germany at that
time.

In his pamphlet per

Sta,t~?- g~o

in Deutschland, written in

March, 184?, he stressed the progressive character of a capitalist
development in Germany and promoted a bourgeois revolution for the
-. 3'2Engels, "Letter III to the !1Qr.thern Star, 11 April 5,
1846, in !J!<3!, I/Lh 492.
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sake of German national development.

The revolution was an

urgently necessary and inevitable event.

Therefore, Engels

rejected any fight against liberal measures, and he condemned the
"anti-capitalist and anti-liberal tirades of the true socialists",
in particular, Moses Hess and Karl Gruen.

It was the duty of the

communists to support a successful bourgeois rebellion against the
absolutist regime in Germany.33
Marx went along with Engels's belief in the necessity
of a bourgeois revolution although he never seems to have been
convinced that such an outcome was likely on German soil.
In 1847 Marx and Engels discussed in the Bruesseler
Zeitung (Brussels), a radical newspaper, the events in Prussia
and particularly in the Rhineland.

They advised the German

_ proletariat to support the agitation of the German bourgeoisie for
protective tariffs.

In the long run bourgeois interests would

serve the interests of the proletariat.

Protective tariffs would

further the expansion of German industry and strengthen the
bourgeoisie for her fight against feudalism and absolutism.
The development in Prussia in the spring of 1847 seemed
to confirm Engels's hope that a German revolution would soon

~'

-

33Engels~ "Der Status Quo in Deutschland 11 (1847), in

I/6, 231-49.

Cf. also Engels 1 s animosity against the true

socialj.sts in "Die wahren Sozialisten" (1847), in MEGA, 73-116.

(Both manuscripts remained unpublished at the

time~
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develop.

At that time pressing financial needs compelled the

King of Prussia William IV to call together the United Diet, a
feudal body along corporative lines.

The situation was

reminiscent of the spring of 1789 in France when Louis XVI had
called a similar body under similar pressures.

Marx and Engels

advised the proletariat to support the Diet if it demanded- trial
by jury, equality before the law, abolition of forced labor,

freedom of -the press and of association, and the convening of a
truly representative body.
right to convene regularly.

But the Diet merely asked for the
There the matter rested.

In the .£9D11.aunist Manifesto, which Marx and Engels began
to prepare ·late in 1847, they stressed again the progressive
character of a capitalist development in Germany and fought the
_ reactionary nature of all countertendencies, including socialist
;nes.34
Although the prognosis of the near advent of a radical
revolution was entirely derived from the development in Western
Europe, Germany was tacitly included as being a member of the
progressive West.

This was in keeping with Marx's and Engels's

earlier statements.
In the Deutsch-Franzoesische Jahrbuecher, Marx had
·nsisted that the Germans, although politically and economically

33
backward, vmre the equals of the French and English people in the
philosophical field.
In August, 1841+ Engels declared proudly:

"I may assume

that it is generally admitted that Germany, France, and England
are the three leading countries of contemporary history. 11 35
Engels explained that leadership in Europe belonged to these three
countries because each one of them had gone through a significant
revolution.

France had made a political revolution, Germany had

achieved a philosophical revolution, and England had passed through
a social revolution since the mid-eighteenth century.

From a

world-historical viewrioint the English revolution was of the
greatest importance.

Although social oppression existed on the

continent, it had become a decisive factor in the historical
development only in England.

Engels said that in England "the

misery and poverty of the working classes • • • has national and,
more than that, world-historical significance. 11 36

While the

working classes of France and Germany had not yet succeeded in
exercising any significant influence on the development of their
countries, the advanced English industrial proletariat was rapidly
moving towards a radical social revolution.

in~,

3'5 11 Die Lage Englands, 11 Vorvraerts, August 31 , 18L1.L1-,
I/4, 29;5.
36Ibid., p. 296.
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Although Engels ascribed the greatest significance to the
ocial changes in England, his implication was that all three
evolutions were interdependent.

As Marx had observed, there was

o social revolution without a political revolution nor without a
hilosophical goal--the restoration of the dignity of man.
onsequently, Germany was not to be excluded from a preemi11;ent
osition in revolutionary Europe.
Engels's insistence on Western European leadership forethe rigid East:..west anti thesis which cha.racterizes the
ommunist Y.ianifesto. Already Hegel had drawn a dividing line
between Western Europe_ which had developed a high concept of
individual liberty; and Eastern Europe which was still apathetic
because of the predominance of agricultural activities.

Although

there existed gradual transitions from Western to Eastern Europe
in the level of economic development, the Manifesto maintained that
the difference between the two parts of Europe was absolute.

The

exaggeration of Western European superiority was in tune with
Marx's and Engels's contempt for the peasants and their supposedly
reactionary character, and it corresponded to the prevailing
superiority complex of the Western European educated classes.
In the

~'

Marx and Engels again stressed the role

vhich the ·western European bourgeoisie had played in tho overthrow
of the medieval feudal structure characterized by particularism,
he lack of political

c~mtralization,

and the prevalence of

35
agriculture.

Since the sixteenth century the immense expansion

of world trade and manufacture under the leadership of the
Western European bourgeoisie shattered the

11

old local and national

seclusion and self-sufficiency" and rescued many people from the
"idio.cy of rural life. u37

The uninterrupted economic expansion

promoted the rise of a new class, the industrial proletariat,
predestined to destroy the old reactionary classes--the nobility,
the bourgeqisie, and the landovming peasantry--to abolish
private ovmership of the means of production, to end nationalism,
and to create a just world order.
The Manifesto excluded any possibility that the revolutionary inttiative for man's liberation from oppression could
come from Eastern Europe, an idea which at the time was favored by
the revolutionary Russian emigrant Michael Bakunin vlith whom Marx
and Engels had collaborated on the
Jahrbuecher in 1844.

The

~festo

p~u~~ch-F~anzoesi~~

made it quite clear that the

development of Eastern Europe had been prevented bece.use it had
remained outside the main currents of historical progress.
Eastern Europe had not participated in the great age of discoveries
nor in the industrial revolution.
overcome medieval conditions.

Consequently, it had failed to

Because of its backwardness

Eastern Europe had fallen under the leadership of the Western

36
European bourgeo.isie:
Just as .it [the bourgeo.isie]
dependent upon the towns, so
and semi-ba.rbar.ian countr.ies
ones, the peasant nations on
East on the West. 3 b

has made the countryside
it has made barbarian
dependent on the civilized
bourgeois nat.ions, the

The Manifesto impl.ied that the coming proletarian
revolution would continue Western European leadership.

In the

Deutsche Ideologie Marx and Engels had already explained that a
communist revolution could never proceed from the rural areas but
only from the cities.39
Communist Manifesto.

Thia allegation was repeated in the

Consequently, from the viewpoint of Marx

and Engels any revolutionary movement in Eastern Europe, where
1 ~ l~gc

majority of the people were still

have a relative signif.icance.

peasants~

could only

It might at best serve as an

instrument in furthering the communist revolution.

So the

Manifesto announced the readiness of the communists to collaborate
\Vith the most advanced revolutionary group among the Poles, that
is, the left wing of the Polish democrats.40
The quest.ion was whether at that t.ime the Polish radicals
were willing to collaborate with the communists.

Indeed,

38Ibid.

-

39MEGA, I/5 50. Cf. also Engels, 0 Die.Kommunisten und
Karl He.inzen~" Deutsche Bruesseler Zeitung, October 3, 1847, in

~'
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the ideas proclaimed in the Manifesto created a precarious
situation for the realization of such collaboration.

Polish

radicals supported the traditional concept of international
solidarity which was propagated by the European Left and which
stressed the fraternization of peoples on the basis of equality.
Many of the Polish radicals wero also in favor of the Slavic idea
according to which the Slavs would play·an important role in the
regeneratioµ of Europe.

The Ma.nifesto challenged both ideas.

It

defended the concept of leadership of the most advanced and most
revolutionary people, and it stressed the importance of Western
Europe in the future radical revolution.
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CHAPTER II
THE POLISH QUESTION

Relations

b2,_tyzee_~

Poles and Western Europeans after 1815

In November,

18!~7

Marx and Engels made their first public

statements on the Polish question as participants of an international meeting of radicals in London.

By that time a long-

establishetl tradition of revolutionary contacts existed between
Western European ci.nd Polish radicals. 1
In the post-Napoleonic era, when the underground
Carbonari movement spread from Western to Eastern Europe, hope for
a European-wide uprising against the political and territorial
arrangements of the Vienna treaties of 1815 stimulated collaboration among French, Italian, German, and Polish Carbonari. 2

---~-·

1For a gene~al survey on the European Left see David
Caute, Jhe ~et_~n ~oEe ?inse 1z89, World University Library
(New York ana 'l'oronto :McGraw 'I-f:LII"l3ook Co., 1966).
2Marian Kukiel, "Lelewel, Mickiewicz and the Underground

Movement of European Revolution {1816-33)," The Polish Review,
V (Summer, 1960), 59-77.
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But the European insurrections of 1830-31 did not develop into a
European-wide revolution.

The Polish uprising against the

Tsarist government, which broke out in the Polish Kingdom on
November 20, 1830, remained isolated.

The insurgents aimed at the

restoration of the Polish borders of 1772.

But they did not

receive any help from outside.

Within a few months the Tsarist

government crushed the revolt.

Subsequently, Nicholas I deprived

the Polish f(ingdom of all the constitutional rights granted by
Alexander I.
The fate of the Polish uprising called forth an immense
reaction of sympathy for the Poles among all the Europeans who
desired cha.nges.

The conviction was widespread that the Polish

revolt had prevented Nicholas I from realizing his plan to invade
France, suppress the Paris uprising, and restore the
The

~:U.?

.9E2·

enthusiasm for the Poles was accompanied by a tremendous

spread of Russophobia in Europe which had earlier been restricted
to Fra.nce.3
Suddenly a large number of Europeans became convinced that
the Russj_an :E.."npire had emerged from the Napoleonic Wars as a

3For a s:.rvey. of European Russophobia see Raymond T.
McNally, "The Origins of Russophobia in France, 1812-30, 11
Amer:b£?1L}~.1f2:.~2..Y2:£!, XVII (April, 1958) 173-90; Oscar J.
R'arnm(;m, 11 li're0 1''.Alrope versus Russia 1 1830-1B5lr," Th? An_!_e_ri~Qan
S;J.a_Y2-c ~ Th:..st European Review, XI (February, 19;2) ~·27-Zi-~
J(onn ~wos"l:rreason, 1·~ of Russo12h2.P.ia _?.n Great Britain
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U"ni verstty Press, 195'0).
=
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power to be reckoned with in European affairs.

In fact, within

one century, since Peter the Great had turned the face of Russia
towards the West, the Russian Empire had made a formidable
westward advance due to the progressive dismemberment of the
Polish Republic (Rzeczposp2lita Po~) since 1772.4

The Fifth

Partition of Poland, dictated by the Vienna treaties of 1815, had
turned Poznania and West Prussia over to Prussia, and Galicia to
Austria.

The Russian Empire retained Lithuania, White Russia, and

the Eastern Ukraine,
Polish territories.5

83%

(about 239.000 sq. mi.).of the former

Since 1815 the western border of the Russian

:E}npire had extended from Finland to the Black Sea.

Moreover, with

the creation of the Polish Kingdom ruled by the Russian Tsar the
:E}npire had acquired a western outpost which was driven like a
wedge into Central Eastern Europe.
The expansionist drive of Russia filled European liberals
and radicals w:Lth great apprehension for the future fate of

Ghe Rzecz:Bospol:i. ta Polska which originated from the Union
of Lublin in 13b9 iS-aiso calfecf"'Ifistorical Poland, or Polish
Commonwealth, or Polish-Lithuanian State. For general information
on Polish history see the standard nork: .'fll_~.§lmbr:Ld_ge Hi,stor;L.2.!
Po1~ 2 from .A.~i.?.'lJ:..~tus II to P=k..lsur!B}):i (169'7-1935), ed. by Wo 1'~
e daway, J.1!. '15enson~ o. ttalecki, TI. Dyboski. (Cambridge: The
University Press, 1941;, and Oskar Haleck.i, A History of Poland,
trans. by Monica M. Gardner (rev. ed.; New tort::' lloyFUb"frsliers,
1966).
.
5wilhelm Feldman, Q_~schichte der p,2.l~ischen Id~eR~in
eit ~esse2l..J..eilun~~n (1722::1.2TIT (PiuniCii: l<. tfiaeri'6ourg, 191
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European liberty and civilization.

Although Prussia and Austria

collaborated with Russia for the preservation of the

~j;atus

guo

in Europe, Russia was considered the worst enemy of progress.

It

was stigmatized as the center of Etiropean reaction and as a
barbaric country.

Both liberals and radicals agitated for the

dissolution of the Russian Empire and the restoration of Poland.
But only the radicals were unanimous iri their demand for a
revolutionary war against Russia waged by the revolutionary
European people.6
The agitation for a war against Russia and European
revolutionary solidarity was supported by the radical Polish
emigrants who had participated in the Polish uprising, among them
Joachim_Lelewel (1786-1861), the former head of the Polish
Carbonari in the 1820 1 s; Karol Stolzman (1793-1854); and
Stanislaw Worcell (1799-1857).
After their arrival in Western Europe, these men
contacted former members of the Carbonari movement (which had
-bAithough the Rnglish and French liberal bourgeoisie
regarded Poland as a welcome ally against the Russian pov1er, it
had no interest in European wars and did not wish to rush into a
war for the Poles. Among the leading German liberals the
Southern Germans becrune the foremost champions of a war against
Russia.. But their interest in the Poles was largely determined by
their opposition to Prussia., Cf. Georg w. Hallgarten, Stud=b.!€:!!
ueber die deutsche Polenfreundschaft in der Periode der""11a'erz-

TeVO!iif:r~-Tf.1Unfcnand~denoourg-:

i928T;""pp;

~T1
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disintegrated in 1831) and particularly the Italian radical,
Giuseppe Mazzin:i (1805-72).

In the following years Mazzini

became the foremost defender of Polish liberation.

Mazzini was

convinced that a future European revolution would only be
successful if it transcended the goal of the French Revolution,
the realization of individual liberty.

It must proclaim. the right

to national liberty because in a large part of Europe it did not
yet exist. 7.
In a letter to Lelewel of June 25, 1832, Mazzini expressed
his belief that a revolutionary reorganization of Europe, which
would include the restoration of Poland, could only be the result
of the

11

uniyersal association of the nations. 11 8

In Switzerland

on April 15, 1834, Lelewel's compatriots Stolzman and Ludwik
Mieroslawski (1814-78), together with Italian and German emigrants,
helped Mazzini to found the organization Young Europe.

Mazzini

was convinced that Poles, _Germans, and Italians were predestined to
initiate the movement for European unification because they had not
yet achieved a unified national state.

Young Europe was conceived

-fG'iuse:ppe Mazzini, "Sulla iniziative rivoluzionaria
d'Europa 11 (1835), in sg.gti .s~_elt~;J ed. by Giuseppe Sati:tonastaso,
Scrittori politici itab..anl,Vor. XLII (Bologna: Nicola
Zanichelli, Edi tore, 1 9L~8), p. 187.
8Adam Lewak, "Giuseppe Mazzini e 1 1 emigrazione polacca,"
Il Ri~~1rn.epto J_~alian~, XVII (1924), 125, quoted in Guenther
yck, 11 Nazzini 1 s Young Europe, 11 Jotu"nal of .Qentral Europ2211. A.ffag_eJ
VII (January, 1958), 358.
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as the vanguard of that movement.

The statutes of the organization

proclaimed that "nationality is sacred."

They condemned national

oppression, stressed the right of each nation to liberty and
equality, and demanded the founding of a European republican
federation in order to protect the liberated nations from any kind
of overlordship in the future and in order to realize the
"brotherhood of mankind. 11 9
From the beginning the organization Young Europe was
weakened because it did not succeed in bringing together all the
major revolutionary groups within a given nation.
Democratic Society

(TO\'p.rz~stwo pemokram~e

The Polish

Polskie), which was

founded in·1832 in Paris, was unwilling to support Young Europe
although the Polish members felt that it was an excellent
_ instrument "to fortify the cause of Polish democracy • • •
to ensure the collaboration of foreign democrats." 10 The

and

organization was dissolved by order of the Swiss government in
1836.

It was the first important international of revolutionaries

in the fight against the monarchic order in Europe.

During the following years members of the left wing of the
Democratic Society continued to associate with Mazzini and his
-9Giuseppe Mazzini i Seri tt:L edi ti ed inedi ti, ed. under the
direction of Mazzini (9 vols .. ; MiTano: G. 158.'elTI";"-Editore,
1861-77), v, 34;
10 Cf. Stolzman 1 s letter of April, 1834, quoted in Eyck,
"Mazzini's Young Europe," p. 362 ..
:wwn
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Untj_l his death in 1857 Stanisl'aw Vlorcell, the "father
of Polish socialism," was a close friend of Mazzini. 11
followers.

Mazzini's ideas were especially attractive to the Polish
democrats because he stressed the right to national selfdeter~ination.

Moreover, Mazzini never wavered in his support of

the restoration of a democratic Poland from "the Baltic to the
Black Sea and from the mouth of the Nie·men to that of the Dnieper"
as a bulwax:-k against Russia.

A restored Poland would prevent the

Russian Er.apire from forcing all the Slavs into a "monstrous
unitary empire which would impose its dictatorship upon all of
Europe. 11

It would enable the Poles, the "most Westernized Slavs,"

to spread Western European ideals among the more backward Eastern
Slavs and to continue their ancient civilizing mission among
them. 12
The political concept of a restored Poland as a European
bulwark against Russia corresponded to the traditional Polish
propaganda in Western Europe ever since the late eighteenth
century.

This propaganda was now taken up by the Polish Democratic

-1·1
·Willi.am James Linton, ~1ropean Republicans. Recollect:i.ons of Mazzini and His Friends (London: '.Lawrence and ""'Till"llen,
1]92), .PP• 311.1--42.
12

Giuseppe Mazzinj_, Lettere slave, with a Foreword by
Fabrizio Canfor~ (Bari: Giuseppe Lat·er-za & Figli, 1939),
pp. 73-?Li··

Society. 13

The political program of the Society outlined in the

--

Manifesto of 1836 called for the restoration of Poland "from the

Oder and the Carpathian mountains to the Borysthenes and the
Dwina, [and] from the Baltic to the Black Sea. 111 4
The political program also included a demand for the

liberation of the peasants.

This was largely due to the influence

of the left-wing democrats led by Lelewel.
the social

~evolution

Their insistence upon

led to contacts with the Chartist movement

in England, and even with the communist German Workers Educational
League (Deutscher

.Arbeiterpildun~verein)

in London,and with the

secret communist League of the Just, the precursor of the
Communist L~ague. 1 5

Yet, these contacts were much less enduring

than those with the Hazzinians.
13For information on Polish anti-Russian propaganda see
Feldman, Geschichte der Polj.tischen Ideen, pp. 43 ff.

l4~Ianifesto, p. 16, quoted in R. Fe Leslie, Reform and
Insl.!££~~.ion inHll§S;LQ.p. Po1tnf 18_26-1 ~.2. (London: Un"ive'i-si ty of

toiiCion,

~~e-i.:>ress,

4

9 3), p. 12.

.

·i5StanisJ:aw Worcell was acquainted with the Chartists
George Julian Harney, William James Linton, and James V/atson. Cf.
Celina Bobinska, 1.-ra~~.~l~eber polniscl}_e, Prob_;!.~ P: 73.
Worcell, Kurol St'Olzman, and <lozef~e in con-cact with the
German Workers Educational League and the League of the Just. Cf o
Engels, On the History of the Communist Lea{£ue, in Marx-Engels
iele,s;tr::.flVor!:t's~TlTos·co\vr - FOre-ign~l'.:anguage Pl10I:Lshing!l'Ouse;l951 ) ,
I, 31 o. '.Cudwik Oborski collaborated nith the Chartists and the
German Workers Educational League. Cf. Helmut Krause, Marx und
En 'els und da2-zeit~}l.C?.e.?_~~.}l,S§land, l1arbu:ger Abhan~Tungen
zur Gesc1ic te und-Y~ultur Osteuropas, Vol. I (Giessen: Wilhelm
Schmitz Verlag, 1958), p. 18.

---

~
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In the thirties and forties the aforementioned revolutionary groups, including a variety of others like the Fraternal
Democrats and the exiled Societe Democraj?j.gue Frangaise, maintainec
contacts through international meetings which continued to propagandize the idea of international solidarity and the fraternization of the people.

Meetings were frequently held in support of

the restoration of Poland, and special committees for the
regeneration of Poland were organized.

The English Chartist

leaders George Julian Harney and Ernest Jones were actively engaged
in the pro-Polish propaganda campaign. 16.
In these international circles of the mid-forties, Marx
and Engels met with Polish left-wing democrats, among them
Stanislaw Worcell, Ludwik Oborski, and Joachim Lelewei. 1 7

From

November, 1847 to February, 1848, Marx collaborated with Lelewel in
the newly founded international organization,the Democratic
Association (~'Association D__cmocratigue) in Brussels, of which
Marx and Lelewel were vice-presidents.

At that time Marx and

Engels were great admirers of the aging Lelewel who was not only
-.,.;Cf. Mark Hovell~ J'he __fharti_et Movemen,.i (Manchester:
The University Press, 1918;, pp. 28'°'5"=6:
· 1 7rn

the mid-forties Marx and Engels worked together with
the German Workers Educa.tional League and the Fraternal Democrats
which the Chartists also collaborated with. Marx and Engels were
on friendly terms with the Chartists, Feargus O'Connor, Jones, and
Harney. Engels wrote for the Chartist newspaper, No}-"therE .§taF.
Cf. Hovell, op. cit., pp. 285-6. For :Marx and EngeYSi s Tulisli
contacts cf. J:To"Ofiis'Ea, op • .C.i t!.., pp. 70-3.
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an outstanding Polish revolutionary, the "father of Polish
democracy," but also a remarkable historian. 18 Indeed Lelewel
remained the only Pole of renown with whom they entertained close
and very friendly relations.

These relations ended with the

outbreak of the Revolution of 1848.
An Interpretation of Polish Histol'.l,
During the period of their enthusiasm for Lelewel, Marx
and Engels favored the basic concept of his revolutionary theory
that an agrarian democracy was the proper solution for Poland, a
concept which they rejected in later years.

Lelewel derived his

belief in the agrarian democracy from his democratic and
romanticist interpretation of the Polish past which he presented to
the Western· European public in his two-volume work L'histoire de
Pologne published in 1844 in Paris.

Although Engels did not

- mention the book before the summer of 181+8 in the Neue Rheinische
Ze~tung

(Cologne), it may be assumed that Marx and Engels had

become acquainted with Lelewel's work before 1848, and that a great
deal of information on Polish conditions was derived from it. l9
·
·=rnFor a biography of Lelewel see Stanislas Kaczorowski,
.!l.Q.a9,lhiULbelei'@.,l_ ( 1Z..86-1861 ).t Histori~n p~lo_n.§~? (Paris: Pour
l' Auteur, 1927).
- l9(Since Marx and Engels did not know Polish, they only
had access to the translated Polish literature. There is no
evidence that in the forties Marx and Engels had a thorough
knowledge of it.) In the summer of 1848 Engels also referred to a
work by Lu~wik Mieroslawski on the,..insurrection of 1830-31, Debat
Thtr-2~.la Fevol~ip_p .e~ la contre-reyo_l,ution en..E.olog~.
Engels
t ought highly of the book. Many years earlier. Engels had praised
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Yet, their interpretation of the Polish past was different
from Lelewel's.
Lelewel was a Slavophile. 20

He maintained that the

democratic principle of individual ·liberty and equality which the
West

~ad

only recently discovered had been an integral part of the

Slavic social and political structure of the early Middle Ages.
In the later Middle Ages under the rule· of the Piasts, the Poles
were able t.o infuse an expanding civilization with the ancient
democratic traditions of the Slavs.

They created an aristocratic

democracy which was far superior to the Western European feudal
system based on the "enslavement" of the individuai. 21
Ac.cording to Lelewel the principle of equal rights shared
by all the Polish nobles attracted the nobles of Lithuania and
~

(roughly modern White Russia and the Ukraine) to such an exten

that they were willing to enter into a union with the Poles in
the 11 excellentn work on the Polish insurrection by the Polish
count Roman Soltyk. In his opinion it was superior to another
work on the Polish uprising by the German Friedrich von Smitt
published in Berlin in 1839. Engels was certain that Smitt had
written the book 11 by order of the King of Prussia." Cf. Engels's
letter to Wilhelm Graeber, October 8, 1839, in ~' I/2, 539.
20cr. his praise of the Slavic spirit: Joachim Lelewel,
L'histoire ~ Po+ogne, trans. by E. Rykaczewski (2 vols.; Paris:
librairie Po ona1Ge, 184l1-), II/2, 187.
21 Ibid., I, 78, 91; II/2, 61-65,83.
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1569. 22 Lelewel considered the Union of Lublin as the climax of
Polish history.

It represented the "first" attempt in Europe to

organize a vast political entity on the basis of a voluntary
federation.

Lelewel suggested that the Europeans ought to learn

from the Poles and use the federal principle for a regeneration of
Europe. 2 3
Lelewel maintained that the Union enabled the Poles to
perform a civilizing mission among the more backward WhiteRussians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians.

But the Poles failed to

accomplish the second task--to integrate the vast territory of
the Union, which extended to the Dnieper, under the guiding
principle of the extension of liberty.
Lelewel claimed this failure was due to the infiltration
of Polish political thought at the turn of the sixteenth century
---

with the paternalistic notion of Roman law and the principle of
absolute power.

Under the influence of these Western }Airopean

concepts, the Polish nobles sought concentration of power.

They

curtailed the liberties of the townspeople and enslaved the

22 'l. he term Rus designates the Kievan state which existed
from the nineth to t~thirteenth century A.D. with Kiev and
Novgorod as its centers. Michael Hrushevsky, A History of the
Ukraine, trans. by o. G. Frederik.sen with a ForewordbyGeorge
VernaCfsky (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), pp. 39-41.
1

23

.

Lelewel, OJ2. _cit., II/2, 107.
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peasants completely. 2 4
Cossacks.

They also aimed at the subjugation of the

The Polish nobles rejected the demand of the Cossacks

to send representatives to the Polish

~elm

(Diet).

They would not

grant aristocratic privileges to the Cossacks and were reluctant
to include the Cossacks into the Union as equal partners of Poles
and Lithuanians. 2 5
Lelewel concluded that the revolt of the Cossacks in the
1640's, which developed into a widespread peasant uprising, marked
the beginning of the decay of the Polish Republic.

The revolt led

to the first triumph of the Tsar of Moscow over the Poles when the
Cossacks placed their territory east of the Dnieper under his
protection with the treaty of Pereiaslav in 165Lh
In Lelewel's opinion the restriction of liberty was the

.

2411 These unhappy people [the peasants] were regarded by

their seigneurs as non-human beings with whom they could do what
they wanted, sell them like cattle, force them to work like
animals, and take their life." Lelewel, gp. cit., II/2, 248.
2 5Ibid., pp. 264 ff. In 1963 the Slavic Review published
a series of~icles which reopened the old' controvei.. sy over the
significance of the Rzec~~~a Polska. The noted Polish
historian Oscar Hale"C1'2Lmaintainea-i;liaf":rt had been a true
federation based on a large amount of local autonomy. But Joseph
Jackstas and Oswald Backus III opposed this view. They argued that
the main aim of the Poles was to extend their ovm power in the
Union. At first they enlarged their territorial possessions at the
expense of Lithuania, and in the se·1enteenth century they tried to
destroy the Cossacks. The oppressive Polish policies weakened the
Union and led to .its decay. Cf. Oswald P. Backus III, Oskar
Halecki, and Joseph Jakstas, 11 The Question of ~e.c.zl?..9spoli~
E.Qlska," Slavic Revi~, XXII (September, 1963), 41r:32, 439-50.
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main cause of Poland's decay.

He did not lament the economic

backwardness of the Polish Republic.

He claimed that the lack of

prosperous towns and a wealthy middle class had at least prevented
the Polish ki.ngs from establishing absolutism, the enemy of
individual liberty, in Poland.

Consequently, Lelewel believed

that the regeneration of Poland depended in the first place upon
the restoration of the ancient Slavic democratic principles and
the extension of liberty and equality to all the people.
Lelewel's interpretation of the Polish past had little
in common with Marx's and Engels's approach to history.

He did

not measure the progress of a nation by its ability to create a
unified national state and to expand the manufacturing activities.
Neverth~less,

Marx and Engels retained a great esteem for Lelewel

as a historian, but only because he had taken up the social
question and had presented the enslavement of the peasants as a
major question of Polish history. 26 They did not share Lelewel's
enthusiasm for tho democratic spirit of the Slavs, the
aristocratic democracy, and the civilizing mission of the Poles.
Nor did they care for Lelewel 1 s support of political decentralization and federalism nor for his antagonism to the Vlestern European
development.

~In 1858 Marx stated that Lelewel belo.nged to the
historians who "initiated a real progress in contemporary
historiography • • • because they penetrated from the outward
politj_ca.l forms to the internal social life • .. • With his

L
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In their interpretation of Polish history, Marx and
Jt::Ugels followed the same method which they applied to German
history.

They compared Polish history with the ideal historical

pattern--the Western European development from medieval
decentralization to a progressive political centralization, and
from the medieval prevalence of agriculture to the growth of towns
and the expansion of commerce and manufacturing.

The result was

that they could not help but consider Polish history a failure.
Other Germans had done so.
opinion of the Polish past.

Georg Hegel had a very low

To him the celebrated ancient

Polish liberty was merely an instrument of the nobles to limit the
King's power.
medieva~

The nobles had wished to preserve the backward

institution of an elective monarchy.

political insight.

But they lacked

By preventing the development of a strong

political center, the nobles had permitted the destruction of
Poland to take place.

Polish history served as a warning that
"the state must have absolute authority in order to survive." 27
Friedrich List also attrj.buted the decay of the Polish
Republic to the short-sightedness of the nobles ·who did everything
thorough' examination of the economic conditions which made of the
free Polish peasant a serf, the venerable Lelewel has done more
to explain the reasons for the subjugation of his fatherland than
the whole gang of scribblers whose repertoire consists of
invectives against Russia." New York Dail;y: Tr,i12Q_~, May. 11, 1858.
27The Pffiloso;ehy -~f Hegel, pp. 46-65.
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to maintain the old feudal order.
economic insight.

List stressed their lack of

The Polish nobles were unable to understand

that in the modern age the survival of the state depended upon
its economic strength.

Consequently, they had opposed the

adoption of the Western European mercantilist policies.

However,

only the development of a native industry and of populous cities
would have strengthened Poland and preserved i.ts "independence and
political preponderance over less civilized neighbors."

Poland

was "erased from the list of nations for want of. a strong middle
class" interested in economic progress. 28
The basic position of Hegel and List concerning Polish
history was also adopted by Marx and Engels.

They maintained

that the decay of Poland and the ensuing Polish partitions
resulted from the continuation of a medieval political, economic,
and social system.
Although Marx's and Engels's statements on the Polish
past extend over several decades, they may be treated in a
comprehensive manner at this point because their basic interpretation of Polish history remained consistent.

This inter-

pretation also agreed· with their evaluation of the historical
development as presented in the Communist
28

Manife~.

F;.ied~ich List, "Die Freiheit und die Beschraenkungen
des auslaendischen Handels vom historischen Gesj_chtspunkt" (1839),
in ye~amme;!J~_i?s.hr:,iften, II, 65. Cf. also Lis.t, Nat~l Sy.s.te111
of Pol_:ht~~CJ,1.,~.Q.QJE~, p. 273.
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Marx and Engels repeatedly acknowledged a certain analogy
in the history of Poland and Germany when they compared it with
the Western European development towards the elimination of the
feudal system since the sixteenth century.

Engels observed that

in England feudalism was undermined through the alliance of the
gentry with the towns.

In France this was done through the

political centralization under an absolute monarch who profited
from the opposition between the nobility and the bourgeoisie.
Simultaneously, Poland and Germany were unable to overcome
medieval decentralization which resulted in the lack of a strong
political center in both countries.

While Germany consisted of

a great number of large and small political units, Poland was
composed of a conglomerate of feudal provinces.
Engels insisted that the Polish political system was
even more backward than the German.

Germany had developed in the

Middle Ages a "complex feudal hierarchy" which was a flmuch higher
form" of political organization than the Polish aristocratic
democracy.

In later centuries centralization uas at least

achieved j_n the single German states under absolutist rule.

But

the Polish aristocratic democracy "based on bondage" perpetuated
the complete weakness at the center.

According to Engels it was

"one of the most.primitive systems of social organization" and
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reminiscent of conditions in the territories conquered by the
Germanic peoples at the beginning of the Middle Ages. 2 9
Engels related the political backwardness of Poland to
the economic conditions.
11

The Polish constitution prevented

unified national action" because the liberum veto allowed any

deputy to dissolve the Diet and even to annull its previous
. .
30 Simultaneously, the lack of prosperous towns and
d ecisi.ons.
an expanding industry increased the internal weakness of Poland
an4 diminished its defensive strength at a time when Poland's
"neighbors progressed, formed a middle class, developed comr.a.erce
and industry, and created large towns."3l

The political and

economic weakness sentenced Poland to perish.

The country became

an "easy prey" of its powerful neighbors who devastated it in
never~ending

wars and turned it into their "tavern."

Over the years Marx's and Engels' s basic convj_ctj_on that
the political, social, and economic backwardness of the Polish
republic helped to destroy that state remained unchanged.

But

'2"9Friedrich Engels, "Der deutsche Bauernkrieg," Neue
Rheinische Zeitung, Politisch-oekonomische Revue, No .. 5,MayOcto15e"i~115~cf. by Karl Marx, facsimile ed., with a Foreword
by Karl Bittel (Berlin: Ruetten & Loening, 1955), p. 258.
30Friedrich Engels, "Die ausvraertige Poli tik des
russischen Zarentums," Die Neue Zeit, VIII (1890), 148.

3 i Frederic 1'ngels, "What have the Working Classes to do
with Poland?" ( 1866), .Arch].v fuer di2, Geschichte des §g~ialis™
g_nd de!: Ar'!?='?l:..~g~..;n_g, VITf916 J, z:rg:-
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when they dee.lt with the question of the ultimate causes of Polish
backwardness, they made some startling and contradictory
,

statements.

Such repeated inconsistencies were for the most part

dictated by a desire to ridicule an· opponent.

They indicate how

necessary it is to be careful in the interpretation of Marx's and
Engels's statements and to differentiate between basic positions
and transitory assertions derived from their temporary involvement
in some

pol~mics.

Generally, Marx and Engels attributed the economic
backwardness of the Polish Republic to the feudal aristocracy who
subjugated the common people to further their own agricultural
interests.

But in

18L~8

Engels ventured the staggering explanation

that the German emigrants had the greatest responsibility for
Polish economic and political backwardness.

His intention was to

ridicule the popular German argument that for centuries the
German emigrants had performed a civilizing mission in the Slavic
countries,including Poland.
Engels stated that the history of the Slavs proved their
inability to initiate the development of tovms and trades.

The

Slavs were "predominantly an agricultural people, hardly qualified
for the management of urban trade. u32

Engels cla:Lmed that the

~;ich Engels, 11 m_e Polendebatte in Frankfurt, 11
Neue Rhej_nische Zeittm,.g, (in later footnotes referred to as !:IB2i)
August §, 18L~8 .- -- ,
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German eastward emigration since the Middle Ages had not promoted
economic, political, or cultural progress among the Slavs.

The

Germans had reached "the peak of their development with the
1?2tit-bourgeoisie of the medieval towns" where the desire for
great enterprises was absent.
bour~ois

mentality.

They never outgrew the Eetit-

Consequently, the German emigrants in the

Slavic towns did not rise above their old position of artisans
and small traders.

This was also true in Poland.

According to Engels the Germans helped to prolong
medieval conditions in Poland because they were unable to exploit
the excellent opportunities for large-scale commercial and
industrial enterprises, but, above all, because they were
separati13ts.
The Germans • • • obstructed centralization, the most
powerful political means for the fast development of a
country, by their different language, by separating
themselves from the Polish people, and by their
7.
thousandfold different privileges and municipal laws.J3
~hey

also prevented the formation of Polish towns with a Polish

bourgeoisie.

German backwardness had hindered the modernization of

Poland and the creation of a unified nation state.
Several months later, when Engels fought Pan-Slav demands,

lhe contradicted himself without any scruples.
German civilizing mission among the Slavs.

He praised the

He declared that the

____ ___
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German reconquest of the territories between the Elbe and Warthe
rivers, which had been inhabited by the Slavs since the seventh
century, was "in the interest of civilization."

The Germans had

reached a higher stage of industrial, commercial, agricultural,
and cultural development.

Germanization enabled the Slavs to

participate in a "historical development which would have remained
entirely foreign to them had they been left to themselves."
Especially, the subjugation of the Austrian Slavs to German rule
was one of the "worthiest deeds" in Germany history.
made one reservation regarding the Poles.

Engels

Although they had as

little inclination towards the trades as the other Slavs, they
were less retrograde.34
But two years later, in 1851, when Engels returned to the
subject of the German

~

na_yh

Ost~,

he insisted that even the

Poles had profited from German superiorj_ty.

He stated that among

the Slavs "the Western Slavs (Poles and Czechs), in particular,
are essentially an agricultural race. 11 35

Consequently, it was

quite natural that the Germans and also the Jews, who were
"certainly Germans rather than Slavs," developed trade and
manufacture in the Slavic tovms and organized commercial relations

~'

.

34Friedrich Engels, "Dem okra tischer Panslavismus, "
February 16, 1849.
·
35Karl Marx, ;Revo.J-2t;Lo]J. and Coun~er-RevoltliC?P, or Germa&

2:_n 18!±.§_, trans. and ed. by E!Ieanor Marx Avellilif"T.Conaon:

Sonnennchein, 1896), p. 59.

s.
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with the rural areas.

The annexation of the western Polish

territories by the Germans was due to the economic inferiority
of the Polish Republic.

It represented the last phase of the long

process of disintegration which the Slavic element underwent since
the Middle Ages.
In 1902 the German l'iarxist historian Franz Mehring criticized in a scholarly fashion the shortcomings of Marx and Engels
in their

in~erpretation

of the Polish historical development.

He

agreed that Marx and Engels were right to attribute Poland's
decay to the lack of political centralization and urban development
However, their analysis of the ultimate causes of Polish
backwardnes.s was wrong.

It vms unreasonable to ascribe Polish

conditions to the presence of German emigrants or to the supposed
inability of the Poles to organize an urban industry.3 6

The

economic abilities of individuals and nations, said Mehring, were
not determined by their racial origin.

Besides, Marx's and

Engels's contention concerning the Poles had been disproved by the
industrial progress in the Polish Kingdom since the 185o•s.
Apparently

Mehring assumed that Marx's and Engels's statements on

Germans and Poles were made in good faith and were free of any
polemical implications$

36 Aus ~-;.m li terari?cl?:f.n Nac~lass vron Kf-rl Marx t.. .Friedrich
1'!!./itl.sk up.q_'P..erd:inanc1'"..cyl~le, ed. wi:Cn a Forewora by-Franz
Mehring (L~ vols.; Stuttgart:
III (Introduction), 28-30.

J. H. W. Dietz Nachf., GmbH, 1902),
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According to Mehring the geographical position of Poland
was the major cause of its decay.37

Already in the Middle Ages,

when Constantinople was the center of world trade, Poland lay
outside of the great trade routes.

With the discovery of the

New World the Polish state was still further removed from the
great trade routes.

This had a worse effect upon Poland than upon

Germany because the Polish economy was more backward.

The urban

development, which had just begun, was ended, while the power of
the great landowners increased.
When Poland became the granary of Western E.'urope in the
modern age, the landovmers monopolized the production of grain as
well as the grain trade.

They enforced the prohibition of the

exportat.ion of Polish goods and the unlimited importation of forai.§:
goods.

They enslaved the peasants and ruined the Polish merchants

and artisans.
lando\~1ers

Mehring observed that by ruining the tovms the

also destroyed the basis of the great political, social,

and economic evolution which marked the passage from the Middle
Ages to the modern age in Western Europe.3 8
Twentieth century historians have verified Mehring's
assumption that the growth of grain export led to social changes

:;7~.,

----·~----~,._..~~~-

p.

26.

38rt is.noteworthy that Mehring's critical approach to the
writings of Yiarx and Engels is completely absent in the worl<;: of
the contemporary Marxist historian Celina Bobinska. Cf. Bobinska,
~!_£;!. i.•.. t pp. 39-53.
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and the ensle.vement of the peasants.

The Polish historian Jan

Rutkowski has stated that a system of tribute-payments in money
and in kind prevailed in the High
colonized.

~tiddle

Ages when new land was

The Peace of Torun (1466), which had given Poland an

outlet to the Baltic Sea, marked the beginning of the transition
to an extensive system of labour services.

This development

coincided with the growth of grain export.39
The Ukrainian historian Michael Hrushevsky also emphasized
the influence of the grain export upon the social structure.

He

declared that in the Ukraine of the sixteenth century (then a
part of Poland) "serfdom made its initial appearance in Western
Ukraine vrhere the demand for grain (for export) first appeared in
the latter half of the sixteenth century. "l~O

The findings of these

historians confirmed that in the Polish Republic commercial
expansion, accompanied by the growth of a money economy, did not
weaken feudalism but strengthened it.
In the mid-fifties Marx and Engels no longer adhered
to the simple statement made in the Communist Manifesto that the
development of commerce undermined feudalism.

In his work

~

39Jan Rutkowski, HistQ.!Ee elo~~i.9,~~- de la Pol~tne avant
les par.t_a~es, trans. by Ma~a ows ca, aris: U"niversi e,
ins ti tut cfi"~tudes slaves, bibliotheque polonaise, Vol. I (Paris:
Champion, 1927), .pp. 31-.36.
.
40Hrushevsky,

fl. H_j.stori of the ~V~rain<!, pp. 172-74.
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.!}:a:eital, whose basic .ideas were formulated in 1857-58, Marx stated
that commercial expans.ion must not necessarily lead to the
destruction of feudalism.4 1
Neither Marx nor Engels applied this new .insight to their
interpretation of the Polish past.

Both were aware of the

recrudescence of feudalism in Eastern Europe in the modern age.
Engels called it a "second serfdom.u
an analysis· of this phenomenon.4 2

However, he did not go into

When, .in 1856, ·Marx discussed the reappearance of
servitude .in the Polish Republic, he ascr.ibed it to the end of
"the wars of conquest and colonization."

He maintained that,

contrary to· the assumption of Lelewel and his school, the g_m:!-_n_£
-

,_,,

=

"4TM~x observed that the "d.issolving .influence" which

-- commerce vrill have upon the old economtc order depends upon the
char·acter of this system, "its solidity and .internal articulation";
and, in particular, "what new mode of production will take the
place of the old mode of production itself." In connection with
this observation Marx mentioned that 11 in the antique world the
effect of commerce and the development of merchant capital always
results in slave economy .. " ,Q£E.,ital, III, 390, quoted in Maurice
Dobb, ~tu~}~~e Dev~,;.9Pll!el]_t Q.f 9a_Eital:i.sl}! (rev. ed.; New
York: mternationari>Ublishers, 19b'_3), p. lr2• Cf. the comments
of th0 English economist Maurice Dobb on the influence of the
growth of a money economy upon the medieval social structure and
his comments on Marx's position. 11 There seems, in fact, to be as
much evidence that the growth of a money economy ~se led to an
intenGification of serfdom as thore is evidence t~IT was the
cause of the feudal decl.ine." Dobb, opus. cit., pp. 37-43.
4 2:E.ngels's letter to Marx, December 16, 1882, in Karl
Marx and F.r.iedr.ich E-.agels, Correspondence 1846-18.95. A Select.ion
~1L.CQ...DQ~e:g..iar;z. an£. Not~~' trans. and ed. bYJ)OiiaT0rr (London: ·•
n • .uawrence, ~at. , W5li1, pp. 407-08.
.
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(the ancient agrarian commune) had never been fully independent.
Because of the patriarchal relations between the domains of the
aristocracy and the £2P:ina, the peasants enjoyed only a relative
freedom.

When the aristocracy was·no longer able to acquire new

land .through conquests or colonization, these patriarchal
relations led to "servitude."

The peasants, who were'!i.ncapable

of playing the role of a real middle class,

became

• • • the

1'.Y.!UPenprolgtari& (wretched proletar~at) of the aristocracy. "L:-3
Marx made this statement at the time when he prepared
Das Kapital.

In this work he discussed the dissolution of the

peasant classes in Western Europe under the impact of the
industrial.revolution.

This process was presented as the necessary

preparation for the _ent1--ance into the new age of ma.n's freedom.
From the beginning of the fifties Marx and Engels were
definitely against a repetition of the agrarian policies of the
French Revolutiono

They claimed that if ovmership of the land

were granted to the peasants, this would only delay the
liberation of the rural proletariat.44

Simultaneously, they had

43Marx's letters to Engels, October 16 and 30, 1856, in

!1.fil':!, III/3, 152-53, 157-58.

.

-44In 1850 :Marx and Engels warned the members of the
Communist League not to repeat the mistakes of the French
Revolution which had surrendered the landed estates to the peasant
but left the problem of the rural proletariat unsolved. The
German workers, they wrote, "must demand that the confiscated
property remains public property and be converted into workers'
settlements, to be cultivated by the associated agricultural
proletariat;." This passage occurs in "The .Address of the CentrStl

also lost interest in Lelewel's concept of a pease.nt democracy
as a means to solve the Polish question.

Indeed, that interest

seems to have been restricted to the years 1847-48.

But even

then it was not rooted in their ideology because in the Communist
Manifesto Marx and Engels had expressed the conviction that the
peasants were not an independent revolutionary force, and that as
le.ndovmers they were even a reactionary force.
During the brief period when Marx and Engels favored the
Polish demand for a peasant democracy, they were predominantly
interested in the second phase of Polish history which began
with the First Partition of Poland in 1772.

This phase was

characterized by growing awareness of the political and agrarian
problems which considerably deepened after the insurrection of

1830-31.
Yiarx and Engels shared the view of Lelewel and his
school that the so-called period of reforms following the First
Partition of Poland would have saved the Polish Republic if the
partition powers had not destroyed this reform worA.

Like Lelewel

they regarded the Polish Constitution of May 3, 1791 as the climax
of this i)eriod.

Yet, .Lelewel had some reservations about the

Constitution.
Authorl:Cy-to the c·ommunist League," April, 1850. Cf. Max Eastman,
Ca12~tci:!._<in4__ 0th£!' Writinf?..~ (New York:
1933), p. 364, quoted in
David Mitrany, l"iarx against the Peasant; a Study in Social
Do_£,matism (Cha:p'el Hill! On'iversity' o1 Nortn Carolina: Pr·ess, 1951),
p.

43:--
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Lelewel, who was opposed to the concentration of
political power, criticized the attempt of the magnates to replace
the elective monarchy with a hereditary one in 1791.

In his

opinion the hereditary monarchy was· a regression from the
aristocratic republic which at least safeguarded partial liberty.
However, Lelewel observed that the Constitution meant
progress in so far as it had lessened class differences.

The

bourgeoisie. was granted the right to send eighty representatives
to the Diet.

The peasants were placed under the.protection of

the Common Law and were guaranteed individual liberty.

But

Lelewel lamented that the bourgeois representatives had little
influence upon the decisions of the Diet, and that the stipulationi::
regardi~g

the peasants were wholly inadequate.

The Constitution

failed to grant the peasants the right of citizenship and the
right to own the land they tilled.

The extension of liberty, said

Lelewel, was meaningless without the confirmation of the property
principle.45
4/Lelewel, O]. cit~, I, 221-22, II/1, 128-29. Cf. the
comments of the Ukrainian socialist, :Mykhaylo.Lozynskyj, on the
Constitution of Nay 3, 1791. He observed that even if the
Constitution had been put into practice, the peasants would have
remained· at the mercy of the big landowners because they ovmed
nothing. The peasants ~ould have been unable to exercise their
right--granted to them in par. 4 of the Constitution--to negotiate
directly with the landovmers and to exchange their residence for
another one, under the condition of having fulfilled their
contract. M.ykhaylo Lozynskyj, Marx-Engels-Liebknecht ~ro
y_id budovania Polshchi ( "Marx-Eng'eJ.s-LreoI01ecliT on tlie estora ti on
of POJ:aiid11)- O~v:Ci:ll ~ p. , 1 906) , p. 13.
·
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Engels 1 s evaluation of the Constitution of 1791 was less
cautious than Lelewel's.

First of all, he did not agree with

Lelewel's opposition to the centralization of power.

In fact,

he viewed the rise of the magnates since the seventeenth century
as "the only way to overcome the antiquated conditions of Polish
democracy" at that time.

The destruction of the old constitution

could have become the basis for a successful reorganization of
Poland.

The Polish magnates forfeited this possibility by an

alliance with Poland's oppressors at the time of the First
Partition in 1772 in order to preserve their power.
According to Engels the betrayal of Polish interests by
the magnates brought about
an alliance • • • of the szlachta [gentry], the bourgeoisie,
and-partially the peasants against the oppressors of
Poland and against the magnates.46
The alliance meant progress because the allies fought not only for
political independence, but also for social changes.
In Engel's opinion the Constitutj.on of 1791 was the "firs
attempt at reform" by the revolutionary forces released in 1772.
The Constitution proved

11

how well the Poles had understood that

their j_ndependence was inseparable from the destruction of the
magnates and the agrarian reform. 11 47

___c_4i_6 R-.z-,-A-ugust 20, 1848.
N-·

47Ibid.

The Poles were the first
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Eastern Europeans who proclaimed that the

11

patriarchal-feudal

barbarism" in Eastern Europe could only be destroyed through an
11

agrarian revolution" similar to that of the French Revolution

of 1789 in the rural areas.

This was the

11

merit" of the Polish

natio;n.
In his interpretation of the Constitution Engels simply
discarded the fact that this document was the work of the Polish
aristocracy (the magnates and the szlachta), and that the intended
reforms were rather modest because the aristocracy would not
legislate against itself.

Besides, his expectation of a

successful peasant uprising in Poland contradicted his conviction,
shared by Marx, that the victory of a peasant uprising depended
upon bourgeois leadership.4 8

But urban development was weak in

- Poland, and a politically active Polish bourgeoisie was just
beginning to develop.
48cf. the interpretation of the French agrarian revolution
by the Russian historian Nikolai Kareew. He pointed out that at
the beginning of the French Revolution, when the bourgeoisie had
to collaborate with the· nobles, the peasants were merely freed
from obligatory services. Extensive land reforms were only
brought about when the bourgeoisie dominated the revolutionary
scene. The bourgeoisie confiscated the land of the nobles and
granted ?- large part of it to the peasants as their property. But
these far-reaching agrarian reforms had actually not been plo.nned
by the bourgeoisie. They resulted from the desire to consolidate
bourgeois power. Nikola1 I. Kareew, ]=es p~~~-e~_la ,guest!_on
1?.§1Y_~a111~.~ .E'.P_ France dans l~ dernier~Ldu:]c\rI~I<r siE1c):e, trans.
by C. W. Woynarovffika (Paris: Vl. Giard & E. Briere, 1 899),
PP • 54 1·- Z1- 2 •
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Mehring called Engels's interpretation of the Constitution
of 1791

11

the worst of the historical errors" made by Engels.49

He attributed Engels's lack of historical insight to the influence
of Lelevml and his "illusions" about the reformers of 1791 •
However, Lelewel was much more critical of the Constitution.
Mehring would not admit that Engels 1 s overstatements were rather
conditioned by his campaign in 1848 against those German political
groups who .did not wish to get involved in a war against Russia fo
the sake of the Poles.· Engels was anxious to prove that it was
necessary to support the Poles because they were revolutionary.
He insisted that they had overcome the feudal mentality in 1791.
Since that .time the Poles had played a vital role in the
revolutionary fight against the reactionary powers Russia, Prussia,
and Austria because they did not merely aim at national
independence but also at a social revolution.
Actually neither Marx nor Engels had any illusions about
the revolutionary intentions of the

~zlach~.

Thus, in 1856 Marx

referred to the aristocratic character of the uprising of 1793,
and he criticized Tadeusz Kosc:i.uszko, the leader of the
insurgents, because he had been reluctant to organize a peasant
revolt knowing that it would have been directed against the
aristocrats.50
49Aus_.9:.em literarischen Nachlass, III (Introduction), 33.
50Marx's letter to Engels, Deceniber.2, 1856, in

III/3, 157-58.

llf.9!,
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Engels was particularly critical of the insurrection
of 1830-31.

This insurrection had been led by the magnates,

among them Prince Adam Czartoryski, who were not interested in
winning the masses through far-reaching peasant reforms.

Even the

progressive members of the szlachta favored only moderate reforms.
Although Lelewel became a member of the provisional government, he
was unable to further the cause of agrarian reforms which the
Polish radicals considered as a prerequisite of a successful Polis
insurrection.

The Diet made only one

concessio~.

Land was

promised to those peasants who would participate in the
insurrection, but this did not effect a mass uprising.
Whenever .Engels discussed the insurrection of 1830-31,
he stressed the lack of revolutionary initiative.

On February 22,

1848 he stated:
The insurrection of 1830 was neither a national
revolution (it excluded three quarters of Poland) nor
a social and political revolution; it did not bring
about any changes in the conditions of the people; it
was a conservative revolution.51
A year later, on February 18, 1849, Engels made the sarcastic
remark that the insurrection had only one significance--namely, it
contributed to the success of the Paris insurrection.

Therefore,

"the whole of Europe sympathized with the magnates who indeed
initiated the movement. 11 52

™, I/6,

51

412-13.
.
52NRZ, February 18, 1849.. Cf. Mazzini·' s letter to
Lelewel, December 20, 1831, in which Mazzini stated that the fv]j_sh
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In 1850 Engels compared the insurrection of 1830-31
with the uprising of the German nobles against the princes early
in the sixteenth century.

The German uprising failed because the

'nobles were not willing to abolish-servitude which alone would
have secured the support of the peasants against the princes.
The Polish insurrection failed for similar reasons.

The szlachta

made no attempt to win the collaboration of the peasants through
their emancipation.

It had not the least desire to renounce

voluntarily all its privileges and the greater part of the
sources of income.

The szlachta preferred to collaborate with

the magnates.53
While Engels condemned the szlachta, he praised Lelewel
for havi.ng supported the political liberation of the Polish
people, including the Jews, and land reforms in 1830-31.54

He

called Lelewel a highly gifted man "who wished to turn the national
cause into a cause of liberty,
interests of all the

and

who wished to identify the

European people with those of the Polish

people. 11 55
insurrection of 1830-31 conferred upon Poland "the right to belong
to the great European federation" because the insurrection saved
the Paris uprising. Mazzini, Scritti editi ed inediti, II, 275.
53Neue Rheinische Zeitung, No. 5, May-October, 1850,
PP. 258-59.

54Engel~ 1 s speech of February 22, 1848, in ~' I/6, 413.
Cf. also~' August 20, 1848.
55MEGA, I/6, 413.
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Neither Marx nor Engels showed any interest in the
agitation of the Polish Democratic Society for the restoration of
Poland in the thirties and forties.

They could hardly have cared

for this organization.

Most of its members, even the intelligentsia, belonged to the szlachta.5 6 This contributed to a
wavering policy of the Democratic Society regarding the peasant
question because the szlachta was not interested in major
political or social changes.
The Manifesto.of the Democratic Society_, published in
1836, proclaimed the

politica~

liberation of the people and also

the "unconditional restoration of the ownership of the soil to
the peasants. 11

This corresponded to the wishes of Lelewel, the

leader ~f the left-wing democrats.57

But the discussions on the

~~revealed the opposition to extensive land reforms.58
56Baron Georg von Manteuffel-Szoege, Q.~.§.C]}ich~e. de_~
waehrend seiper Unfrei~_ei t,..,.,.J_772-1914 [Berlin:
uncker &Humnofcff-;19)0), p. 97.
·
.

~o.111:,isch;<es 2.£1k~s

57In 1833 Lelewel stated that since the peasants had
never legally surrendered their right of landownership to the
szlachta, they were still the rightful owners of the lando "Tresc
RU'braE.ewicza uwagi natl konsti tuc ja 3 maja.~co do prawa wlasnosci
gruntu (July 5, 1833), 11 {"Hemarks of Kubrakiewj_ch on the Constitution
of May 3 regarding the right to landed property1.1 ) in Joachim
Lel~wel,. ~E];_ki-~uis~ictw_a~ tulaczkj. pols~iej_ (11Nritings of
Polish }.migrantsi9~russels :H359), p. 3'5, quoted in Leslie,
Reform and Insurrection, p. 7o

--

58only tenant farmers were to be granted full ormership
Of the land. No redistribution of the land was intendedo Cf.
"Uwagi Centralizacyi przy dyckussyi natl Manifestem 11 (''Remarks of th
Centr·al Committee of the Democratic Society on the discussions
of the Manifesto' 1) ~if2_st T2.::f.~z~~stwa pemot:r-atic~.fo}_sf'>:?-..£.g,£
(Poit:Lars: 1863), p. b'7, quoted in Leslie, op. cit., p. 13.
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In the following years the Democratic Society became less radical.
The majority of its members were mainly interested in the
restoration of the borders of 1772.

The agitation for peasant

reforms was reduced to a political expedient.
When in the mid-forties the Democratic Society prepared
another uprising in the Grand Duchy of Poznania (then called
Posen) and in Galicia, the insurrectional instructions stressed
above all the fight for the territorial restoration of Poland,
and, secondly , the political liberation of the people and the
need for land reforms.59

Ovmership of the land was to be granted

to the tenant farmers, but the landless would receive

11

five acres

of land" only if they actively participated in the insurrection
against __ the occupation powers.60
The same moderate program was proclaimed in a. Manifesto
issued by the provisional revolutionary government in Cracow on
the first day of the Cracow insurrection (February 22, 1846).

The

Manifesto promised the abolition of serfdom and feudal
obligations, and offered land from the domains to "the man who
59Ludwik Mieroslawski, the agent of the Democratic
Society in Posen, told his collaborators that the insurrection
would best be furthered by granting land to the peasants. Yet, he
also declared that the ~e,j!!! of a liberated Poland was to have the
final decision on the peasant question: "It is not our concern,"
he said, "to solve the economic and social questions, but these
questions are a useful political means." Boleslaw Limanowski,
His·~o~~§._~YLtEl~~ie j :!1-e.J2.o_c_~<?2Z~FOW__j_ ("History of
ForisnJJeillocracy--in t e Post- )arti ti on Epoch 11 )'Zurich: n. p. ,
1901), p. 58.
.
60Limanowski,

012._.__

gt_. ,

p. 60.
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fights for the people. 1161

In spite of these promises the peasants
did not actively support the uprising. 62 They remained indifferen
even when the insurrection -took a more radical turn under the
influence of Edward Dembowski, a leading defender of the communal
ovmership of the land, and when revolutionary decrees abolished
the aristocracy as a class, with all its titles and privileges.63
The Cracow insurrection ended ·in complete failure on
March 4, 1846.

It is noteworthy that Marx and Engels did not

comment on the insurrection before February 22, _1848.

Yet, the

b"iJbid:62In Western Galicia the Polish peasants rose in open
revolt against the insurgent szlachta. Leslie has maintained that
this uprising was caused by the general opposition of the Polish
nobles to agrarian reforms. The peasants believed that the
insurgent szla.chta desired to enslave them still more. Leslie,
OJ>. cit., pp:- 19-20.

63Edward Dembowski has been highly praised by the East

German :Marxist Felix-H. Gentzen as "the ideologist of the peasant
plebeian masses" and "the most consistent revolutionary democrat."
Felix-Heinrich Gentzen, GSolB~oJ-_en im Januaraufstand; das
Qr:o~§.!ier.z,.Q,g.~1 Pof?$en,_ 1§..:!) : -1±,, 'Scnriftenreihe aCS-!nstJ.:Cuts fuer
allgemeine Geschichte derR'U.illboldt Universitaet, Berlin, Vol. I
(Berlin: Ruetter & Loening, 1958), p. 3Lh Dembovrnki was
convinced that only a revolution would solve the peasant question.
It would destroy the feudal order and make an end to the domination
of the great landowners. Then "a new order of social justice
would be established, no longer based on individual property, but
on the common ownership of the nab.onal wealth. 11 Mlynarski U
zr6d2~1™ polskie j_demp..2.£.C3.2J.i ("Documents. on Polish Democracy"~--:
{Warsaw: 1950J, pp. 125, 126, quoted in Gentzen, p. 34. But in
spite of his radical leanings Dembowski had to seek not only the
support of the intellectuals in Warsaw, but also of the smaller
landovmers in Western Galicia to further his revolutionary aims.
Leslie, 212· cit., p. 15.
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uprising had called forth a great excitement among the radical
circles, particularly in Paris.

On March 18 and 22, 1846 the

radical Paris newspaper Democratie Pacifique hailed the
insurrection as an event of immense importance.

According to

this newspaper the Poles, who earlier had merely fought for
national independence, had finally caught up with the European
democratic movement.

They proclaimed "the liberation of the

oppressed people and social reforms."

This proved that the Poles

had understood that the peasant question was the leading question
in Eastern

~'urope.

They were the only revolutionary force in

Eastern Europe and would undermine Austrian and Russian
autocracy. 6 4
Marx and Engels discussed the Cracow uprising for the
first time on February 22, 1848 when the international Democratic
Association of Brussels held a meeting to commemorate this event.
Marx admitted in his speech that the uprising represented an
important revolutionary progress of the Poles.

However, he

insisted that compared to the aims of a communist revolution the
uprising had a limited significance.
intend to abolish private property.

The insurgents did not
They wished to destroy

feudalism by granting political equality to the people and the
ovmership of the land to the peasants.

The insurrection was

merely a re-enactment of the French Revolution.
----·

Q

64L.iman ovm~-tl,
l ·

t

·
£E.=~_..:..,

p. 8c::.1.
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Nevertheless, Marx praised the Poles because they were
the first Europeans who had outgrovm national aspirations
and had combined "the cause of nationality with the cause of
democracy and the liberation of the oppressed classes."

The

Cracow insurgents understood that mere national liberation from
foreign rule would not result in the liberation of the people
from an oppressive government.

They were

deeply convinced that only a democratic Poland can be
independent, and that Polish democracy • • • without
an agrarian movement which turns the 9erf s into
modern free lando\vners is impossible. b.'.?
Marx concluded that since the Cracow uprising the liberation of th
Poles had become "the point of honor of all the European
democrats."
Engels used similar arguments in his speech.

He praised

Lelewel for having inspired the insurrection which was marked by
a "democratic • • • almost proletarian boldness.u

He insisted

that the insurgents did not care whether their demands endangered
the interests of the aristocracy.

They subordinated their

national easpirations to a higher aim--the destruction of "feudal
aristocratic Poland" and the creation of a "modern, civilized
democrattc Polandtt which could truly become the "advanced sentinel
of civilization."

Engels remark implied that the Poles had not
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yet fulfilled a civilizing mission.

Engels observed that because

of the Cracow insurrection the Polish question had become the
immediate concern of all the European democrats.
year 1846 our duty was to revenge a crime.

"Until the

From now on we must

support allies, and we will do it. 11 66
Apparently Marx and Engels were convinced that the Cracow
insurrection had gotten rid of aristocratic leadership, which did
not correspond to the facts.

Furthermore, Marx and Engels did

not distinguish between the two phases of the insurrection.

When

they insisted that the aims of the insurgents did not go beyond
those of the French revolutionaries, they must have had in mind
the first phase of the insurrection because its last phase was
marked by the attempt of Dembowski to introduce the communal
ovmership of the land.

However, the first manif estoes merely

promised a partial curtailment of aristocratic privileges.

Only

Dembowski proclaimed the end of aristocratic rule, of all
privileges and titles.
There is no evidence that Marx and Engels knew anything
about Dembowski, 67 or that they v1ere interested in the Polish

·-65

~.,

'

p. Li-14.

67cr. Bobi:rl:ska's statement: "Apparently Marx and Engels
did not know much about the actual persons and groups who were
responsible for the revolutionary democratic character of this
insurrection." Bobinska, op. cit_._, p. 91.
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socialist group

~

Polski which was founded by Polish emigrants

in England in the 1830's.

This group, which rejected the private

property principle, agitated for the communal ovmership of the
land and the liquidation of the great landed estates, long before
such demands were voiced in the Polish territories (e.g. by the
radical Plebeian League in Poznania).68
In later years Marx and Engels acknowledged the existence
of a social;i.st trend among the Poles.

They stated several times

that the Cracow insurrection had also socialist tendencies.

When

in the fifties Marx referred to the political trends of the Polish
emigration, he not only mentioned the aristocratic and democratic
but also th,e "socialist" group which was pushed into the
foreground by the Cracow uprising of 1846. 69
In spite of their doctrine which stressed the economic
basis of historical progress, Marx and Engels did not discuss
in detail the actual economic changes in contemporary Poland--not
even in

18L~7-48

at the time of their most enthusiastic statements

on the revolutionary spirit of the Poles.

No sources

_69Gesammel te Schriften von Karl Marx und Friedrich
12;~~~l.822~8b2, ea.-:-by~N: RJasanottC2vols., 2d ed.;
Stuttg&rt:
:-H. W. Dietz Nachf., GmbH~ 1920), II, 340. Cf. also
Marx, 11 Do meetingu w Genmvie, zwolanego na pamiatk~, 50-ej
rocznicy Rewolucyi Polskiej 1830 r." ("To the Meeting in Geneva,
Convoked to Commemorate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Polish
Revolution of 1830 11 ) , Arc_hiv fl~r di~.~esghichte des Sozialismus
ill!L~J1.r?~j_te_r}:>,e~:[eeun1:5,

VI (1916"), 220-2-r.-.

78
are available which disclose the extent of Marx's and Engels's
information about economic changes in mid-nineteenth century
Poland.
In January,
Eastern Europe.

18L~8,

Engels spoke about economic changes in

He stated that in "Russia industry develops at a

powerful pace and turns more and more even boyars into bourgeois."
But in relation to Poland he merely spoke of the restriction of
servitude which helped to weaken the aristocracy and to create
a free class of peasants
in need."70

11

of which the bourgeoisie is everywhere

Engels did not mention that since 1820 the Polish

Kingdom had entered the industrial period.
manufacturers, particularly from Germany,
Poland.

VJany foreign
wer~

invited to come to

The transition to big :industry began in the course of the

fifties.

The Russian-Polj_sh customs union of the mid-fifties

especially contributed to the industrial expansion.

In the

following years Lodz rapJdly became the center of the textile
industry.7 1

There is no indication that Marx and Engels ever

showed any particular interest in the progress of industrialization
in mid-nineteenth century Poland v1hich slowly but surely undermine
the old social structure.
In the late forties, when Marx and Engels displayed a
great enthusiasm for the revolutionary spirit of the Poles, they
--..-....4-J,;._ _ _

ro

.
'7 Engels "Die Bewegungen von 184 7, 11 Deuts_che B,r}lesseler
Zeitung (Brussels~, January 23, 1848, in ~,°J7b, 396.
71Aus dem literarischen Nachlass, III (Introduction), L~4.
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apparently expected changes in Poland rather from the readiness
of the Poles to stage insurrections than from a modern economic
development.

This was contrary to their basic convictions.

·consequently, the Poles were assigned a subordinate role in the
revolutionary scheme.
Comments on a Polish Revolution
The question has yet to be answered what kind of future
policies :Marx and Engels expected of the radical Poles on the
eve of the Revolution of 1848.

Their viewpoint.can be derived

from the speeches they made on November 29, 1847 at the London
meeting of the Fraternal Democrats, and on February 22, 1848 at
the Brussels meeting of the Democratic Association--meetings
which were organized to commemorate the Polish uprisings of

1830-31 and of 1846 respectively.
Marx's and Engels's speeches were primarily manifestatkns
of their communist ideology.

It was the current conviction of

the European radicals that the enmity between the nations was the
result of the uconspiracy of the kings."

The overthrov1 of the

territorial and political arrangements of the Vienna treaties
and of the monarchic order would make an end to national
hostilities.
that the

Marx offered a different explanation.

privat~

He maintained

property principle was not only responsible for

the exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, but also
of the poorer nation by the wealthier one.

This caused the

- - -" " ' W W W

A

ii!U •

80
hostility between classes as well as nations.

When private

property was abolished, the nations would be able to unite.
In order that the nations can really associate, they must
have common interests. In order to have common interests,
the present property relations must be abolished because
they cause the exploitation of one nation by the other.72
Marx called upon the Chartists, who were present at the
London meeting, to initiate the proletarian revolution.

As on

other occasions, he stressed the point that England was the most
industrialized country.

Therefore, if the English bourgeoisie

were destroyed, then the power of the bourgeoisie would be
weakened everywhere.

The victorious revolution of the English

proletariat would be "the signal for the liberation of all the
oppressed nations."
In his speech Marx made no attempt to flatter the
national feelings of the Poles.
"Indeed, the old Poland is lost. 11

In his laconic way Marx declared:
The old European society was

doomed to perish through the abolition of private property.
would also liberate the Poles from oppression.

This

Marx advised the

Poles to expect their final liberation from the English
proletariat.
The victory of the English proletariat over the English
bourgeoisie is • • • decisive for the victory of all the
72 11 Reden
. von Marx und Engels ueber Polen in London am 29.
November, 181+ 7," ~' I/6 1 360.
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oppressed people over their oppressors. Therefore,
Poland is not to be liberated in Poland but in
England.73
With one sentence Marx shoved aside the aspiJ:ations of the Poles
to play a leading role as protectors of European liberty.

He

presented the Polish question as a mere appendix to the leading
question which according to him was the English proletarian
revolution.

This corresponded to the revolutionary theories of

the Communist :Manifesto.

A backward country like Poland could

not play a decisive revolutionary role.
Engels also maintained in his speech that

11

the liberation

of all the European countries" depended upon the victory of the
English workingmen over the established political and social
order.74
In their Brussels speeches Marx andEngels avoided such
extremist statements.75

This might have been due to the presence

of Lelewel and of a less radical audience.

Now, the two friends

pref erred to stress the importance of independent revolut:ionary
action in Poland.

They insisted that if the peasants were

liberated through a Polish social revolution, this would help to
undermine the status guo in all of Eastern Europe.

Beyond that,

73Ibid •.
74 Ibid.,. p. 361.

______________

75 11 Reden von Marx und Engels ueber Polen in Bruessel am
Fe bruar, 1848, 11 11.~, I/6, 1+09-1 4.

22.
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hngels's main concern was to propagandize the need for a
revolutionary collaboration between the Germans and Poles.
In his London speech of November, 1847, Engels had
already referred to the question of German-Polish relations.

He

stated that German participation in the Polish partition '\vas a
dark stain in the history of the German nation which ought to
be erased.

This was a current argument of German radicals in. the

fight against the established German governments.

Engels

maintained that the liberation of the Poles from German overlordship would be the major task of the German radicals in the future
German revolut1on.

Polish liberation was the prerequisite of

German unification.

"A nation," said Engels, cannot be free

if it continues to oppress other nations."76

Only two years earlier, when discussing the territorial
settlements of the Vienna Treaties of 1815, Engels had complained
the.t the Germans had not profited from their victory over
Napoleon.

The lack of political leadership and "partly a sort

of ridiculous disinterestedness" prevented the Germans from
strengthening their position in Europe.

Not only was France

enabled to keep Germany weak by supporting particularism, but the
two great German states Prussia and Austria even allowed Russia
to advance further west though this was aga:Lnst their own
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immediate interests.

In Engels's opinion Prussia and Austria

should have annexed as much of Polish territory as possible.
He lamented that

11

Russia got the best part of Poland. 11 77

But he

consoled himself with the thought that soon a complete reorganization of European society would put an end to "such
imbecilities."
The discrepancy between the statements of November, 1845
and November, 1847 resulted from the different objectives which
In 1845 he intended to ridicule the

Engels pursued each time.

shortcomings of German diplomacy which were the result of German
disunity.

Then, he ascribed German disunity to German backwardnes

and French.rivalry.

However, in 184-7 Engels emphasized that

German participation in the partition of Poland prevented the
unification of Germany.

This time, he was anxious to,convey the

message to the Poles the.t the German radicals had the greatest
interest in the liberation of the Poles because they desired
the unification of Germany.

Therefore, the Poles should rely

upon the German revolution for their liberation.
In his Brussels speech Engels elaborated this argument.
He spoke of the irrevocable alliance between Germans and Poles
.

which had been founded at the time of the Cracow insurrection
77Engeis, "Letter II to florther_A_~," November 8, 1845,

in ~' I/L1-,

488.
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when the Poles revealed their "democratic passions."

He stressed

the need for a German-Polish revolutionary collaboration against
Russia and Austria.

Both the German and the Polish people had

''the same enemies, the same oppressors."

Engels remarked:

11

The

Russian government lies as heavy upon us as upon the Poles."

The

first condition of the liberation of the Germans and Poles was
the overthrow of the old political order in Germany and the
destruction of the Prussian and Austrian governments.

But the

success of a German democratic revolution would depend upon a
common war of Germans and Poles against "the barbarian hordes of
Austria and Russia."

Wben Russia vms driven beyond the Dniester

and Dwina rivers, the reactionary Prussian and Austrian governments wquld be overthrown, and only then would Poland and Germany

.~ be free.7 8 A liberated Poland would become the shield of a
democratic Germany.

Engels made no definite statements as to

the territorial extension of the new Poland.

He defended the

ideas current among Western European radicals that Russia must be
destroyed to secure revolutionary changes in Europe, and that a
democratic Poland must be an ally of the West.
Whatever Marx and Engels said about the revolutionary
progress of the Poles, they did not retreat from their principle
proclaimed in the Communist Manifesto that the more advanced

...,"""'™™""''*"'""""'_...._._ _ _ _ _ ___,,,,,.,,.,.,,__,,...,__ _ _.,.,J
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country must effect the liberation of the less advanced one.
Although Polish revolutionary unrest might help to undermine the
established order, the revolution must proceed from West to East.
In case of a communist revolution of the English proletariat, the
Poles were to expect their definite social liberation from
England.

But in case of a democratic revolution in Germany,

Polish national liberation would be effected under the leadership
of the Germans.

Collaboration with the Poles, which Marx and

Engels supported in their speeches as.well as in the Communist
Manifesto, was not to be based on the principle of the equality
of the collaborators.
The question was whether the left-wing Polish democrats
were willing to collaborate with the communists.

In this respect

_ the attitude of leading Polish left-wing democrats towards the
Democratic Association of Brussels is revealing.
This organization had originally been founded in
August, 1847 with the assistance of the London Communj_st League
to which :Marx and Engels belonged.

Early in November, 184 7 it

was reorganized as an international left-wing democratic union.
Marx and Lelewel became vice-presidents under the presidency of
the Belgian Lucien Jottrand.
by

The organization was supported

the ChartistsJ by French, Dutch, and Swiss democrats, by

members of communist .groups in Brussels and London, and by the
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Fraternal Democrats.
nations

On

It agitated for the federation of all the

the basis Of equality.79

Although the Democratic Association supported the
right to national j_ndependence, Lelewel soon found himself in a
difficult position.

His compatriots believed that the organization

was communist, and that its German members tried to interfere
with Polish affairs when they helped to· prepare the Brussels'
meeting of November 29, 1847 in commemoration of the Polish
insurrection of 1830. 80

,.

Lelewel's friends, Stanislaw Worcell, Jozef Wysocki, and
Karol Stolzman, were outraged when Marx, as the official
representative of the Democratic Association, attended the London
79In an address to the Brussels organization the Fraternal
Democrats stated that the aims of the European democrats should be
11
the sovereignty of the people and the fraternity of the nations."
But this aim could only be achieved with the help of 11 the real
people, the proletariat, 11 which was predestined to become the
"savior of humanity." While the landowners and the capitalists
were only interested in dividing the nations, the proletariat alore
wished to bring about their fraternization. The Belgian historian
Louis Bertrand has called this document the forerunner of the
fomn}E_~~~tJi~[~~~o. Louis Bertrand, L'his~o~re d~_la democra~
2L.cl1L.§2.£ialisme en BE'.~8'.g~me dermis 18]1 (2 vOis.; ~
Dechenne,1906), i, 26 - (.
.
_80]!ist;y_§gii~..,yj_1].e_tI9.§S:_lbil'l1§l-1§lewela, ("The Letters of
Joachim Lelewel, Written in Exile") ed. by Helena Wigckowska
(6 vols.; Cracow: Nakladom Polskiej Adademii Umiej~tnosci,
1948-56), III, 414.
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celebration of the November insurrection, prepared by the Fraterna
Democrats, and contacted the Chartists at this meeting.

Wysocki,

in particular, sharply criticized Lelewel for the relations of the
Democratic Association with the "radical communists," meaning the
Chartists. 81
Repeatedly Lelewel tried to reassure his compatriots
concerning the principles of the organization.
to be

alarm~d

There was no need

over the "imaginary communism" of the organization

and the so-called German interference with Polish affairs.
Besides, it really did not matter whether communists belonged to it
or not.

The organization was "useful," and it might be of

"advantage". to the Polish cause.
opposition to the Chartists.

Lelewel also rejected the

He remarked:

"They alone have
excellently taken up the Polish question in London. 1182
In his search for supporters of the Polish cause, Lelewel
had no scruples about associating with communists.

He continued to

entertain friendly relations with Marx and Engels.

He did not

shrink from signing a resolution of the London Communist League nor
from participating in the New Year's celebration of the German
'lorkingmen's Association with which Marx and Engels collaborated.83
1

Ibid., pp. 418-19.

82 Ibid.,. p. 419.
B3Marx "Do meetingu w Genewie, " Ar chi v fuer die Geschichte
~~~s' und_de~.E._eit~r,beweguE.~' VTT19,Tb), 221. t!f. ais"o
isty em~_e;racy_il18Joacn1n1.:;t...}e.lewelri., III, 422.•
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On this occasion Lelewel proposed a toast "to the welfare and
prosperity of a united, indivisble, democratic, and powerful
Germany." 84 Lelewel shared the hope of many Polish democrats
that a democratic Germany would give up its Polish possessions.
When, after the Paris insurrection of February 28, 1848,
Marx and Engels went first to Paris and then to the Rhineland,
their relations with Lelewel ended abruptly. 85

Marx's and

Engels 1 s ho.pe, expressed in the Communist Manifesto, for a
fruitful collaboration.with the most revolutionary Poles--meaning
the left wing of the Polish democrats--was not fulfilled for the
time being.
Bobinska has remarked that a strong bond existed between
the comniun:i.sts Marx and Engels and the democrat Lelewel because
they shared a common "bellef in the indestructible revolutionary
powers of the Polish people and in the European revolution. 1186
However, this corn.mon belief was not sufficient as a basis for a
lasting collaboration because their basic political principles
were so contrary.
.
. 84Joachim Lelewel P~lsk_.fu__dziej_e i rze.2.~L.i~ ("Poland,
Its History and Problems"~ Uosen: 11564)~ 555, quoted in
Bobinska, op. cit., p. 71.

85v!i th the exception of a short letter addressed by

Lelewel to Marx in li'ebruary, 18L~9, no correspondence occurred until
1860 when Marx wrote a brief insignificant letter to Lelewel. Cf.
Bobinska, on. cit., p. 73.

86Bobinska, op~ £it.:., p. 71.
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As was earlier explained, Lelewel considered private
property as the basis of man's liberty.
revolutionary capacities of the peasants.

He believed in the
Although he favored

collaboration of the Polish democrats with the West, he did not
think that Polish liberation depended upon the importation of
Western European political concepts into Poland.

As a Slavophile

he believed that the revival of the ancient Slavic democratic
principles would secure liberty for the Slavs.

Marx and Engels,

instead, condemned the property principle as an instrument of
oppression.

They believed that the revolutionary principles

which were born in the Vlest would effect the true liberation of
man, that the industrial proletariat would be instrumental in
staging the final revolution, and that this revolution would
proceed from West to East.
Lelewel shared Marx's and Engels's conviction that there
existed a basic antagonism between Eastern and Western Europe
which was the result of the different historical development
of the two parts of Europe.

But while Marx and Engels praised the

political and economic progress of Western Europe, Lelewel
insisted upon the moral superiority of the Slavs.

Their different

viewpoints symbolized the tensions _between Eastern and Western
Europeans.
Lelewel 1 s belief in the democratic spirit of the Slavs
was generally shared by the Polish democrats.

The Slavoph1le
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trend among the Poles helped to keep open a line of communication
with Russian revolutionaries.

In the mid-1840's the Russian

emigrant Michael Bakunin, who at the time had become a wellknown figure in Western European radical circles, tried to exploit
Polish Slavophilism in order to further Polish-Russian
revolutionary collaboration.

There is reason to believe that

his propaganda stimulated Marx's and Engels's interest in the
Polish fate.
Bobirtska, who has emphasized the common bond which
united Marx and Engels with Lelewel has been reluctant to
interpret the relations between Lelewel and Bakunin.87

Yet,

these relations were based on a much firmer ground because the
basic P?litical convictions of the two men were very similar.
Besides, their relations indicated at least the possibility of
Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration which at that time
was hardly taken into serious consideration by Western European
radicals.
Already in the 1820's the secret Polish National
Patriotic Society

(~_owarz;ystwo P~trio_tyczne Nar:,.~)

collaborated

with the Russian underground in the hope that the overthrow

87Bobin~ka has only superficially ref erred to the
relations between Lelewel and Bakunin. Bobinska, OE· cit...:., p. 73.
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of Tsarism would bring about the restoration of Poland. 88

In

later years the Polish radicals, among them Lelewel, repeatedly
praised the Decembrist uprising of 1825.

They also stressed the

common racial origin of Poles and Russians.

They were not

opposed to Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration provided
that Poland would be restored. 89
Bakunin became acquainted with· Lelewel in 1844 in
Brussels, a short time after he had collaborated with Marx on the
Deutsch-Franzoesische Jahrbuecher.

While Bakunin ·was neither

attracted to Marx nor to Engels, whom he met in September, 1844,
it seems that his first encounter with Lelewel touched an
emotional chord in him.

Lelewel was willing to different1e.te

between the oppressive Russian government and the Russian people,

1'~ykhaylo Lozynskyj, Polskyj i ruslsyj reMolucyjtJj
i Ukraina ( 11 The Polish and Russian-:Revoiut:Lonary ·ovemen
ancf"lhe Ukraine") (Lviv: n.p., 1908), pp. 6-7.

-- ruch
.

"88Cf'.

B9The German historian R-1.ron Georg Manteuff el-Szoege
has compared German-Polish and Russian~Polish relations in the
nineteenth century. He pointed out that the former lacked the
emotional appeal to co::nmon origins and common "supranational
beliefs" in the restoration of the ancient Slavic liberties through
the destruction of Tsarist autocracy. Manteuffel-Szoege, O.]. cii.:.,
pp. 68, 110. But Nanteuffel-Szoege overlooked the Polish-Russian
territorial problem which in the nineteenth century, at critical
moments, helped to undermine Polish-Russian relations. For a
discussion of Polish-Russian relations in the light of the
territorial proolem see the above quoted work by Mykhaylo
Lozynskyj, Polsk;tj_ i rusk;t.;i F.evol~.Cl.ii.!hLt.J'uch j. Ukr~.
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He was a Slavophile like Bakunin.

He also came from a pre-

dominantly agrarian country and was interested in the peasants
as a revolutionary element.90
Bakunin stated in his Confession that his intense
interest in Poland began in 1844, in the year when he met
. 91
Lelev1el.
It may well be that this encounter with Lelewel
stimulated his interest in the Polish question.
certainly not the only reason.

This was

Another reason for his interest

was the violent European Russophobia, and the agitation of the
radicals for the destruction of Russia and the restoration of the
Polish borders of 1772.

90~urces on the relations between Lelewel and Bakunin
are scanty. Historians who have tried to analyze these relations
have arrived at different conclusions.· The Ukrainian Mykhaylo
Drahomanov stated that Lelewel did not have a decisive influence
- on Bakunin. The two men simply shared a common belief in the
ancient Slavic democracy. Drahomanov assumed that Bakunin may have
tried to organize a Slavic League before 1848, and that Lelewel
supported Bakunin's attempt. Correspondence de Michel Bakounine,
trans. by Marie Stromberg and ed. witn a 'l?o':reword and .l'i.nnotatlons
by Mykhaylo Drahomanov (Paris:
Perrin et CJ.e, 1896), p. 360. The
anarchist Fritz Brupbacher maintained that Bakunin turned from
internationalism to nationalism under the influence of the
nationalist Joachim Lelewel. 1'1:i.chel Ba.kounine, Conf essiol!, trans.
by Paulette Brupbacher and ed. with a Foreword b'Y::Fritz Brupbacher
and with Annotations by Max Nettlau (Paris: Les Editions Rieder,
1922), p. 302. The French historian Benoit-P. Hepner stated that
Bakunin conceived his own idea of a revolutionary Pan-Slavism under
Lelewel's influence in 1844. Benoit-P. Hepner, Bakounine et le
Panslavisme revolutionnaire (Paris: Librairie Pnrcel Riviere et
vl.e , 19""°50"), p. 225. mward Halett Carr declared that Lelewel
taught Bakunin that Poland had a proper history, and that.it was as
much oppressed by the Tsarist government as Russia. Edvmrd Halett
Garr, N:Lchael Bakunin (London: Macmillan, 1937), p. 147.
9 1Bakunin, Coufession, p. 71.

93
Although Bakunin shared the hope of the European
radicals for the overthrow of the old European order, since 1844
he became increasingly concerned with the fate of Russia in case
of a European revolution.

In the following years in articles

and in speeches Bakunin insisted that a European war against
Russia we.s not necessary.

The Russian people themselves would

soon make a revolution and overthrow the Tsarist government.
They were ttdemocratic in their instincts and habits.n

They

would also liberate the Poles.
Bakunin ultimately hoped for the creation of a "federal
republic composed of all the Slavic states" under the leadership
of Russia.9 2 At the time of the Cracow uprising he proposed to
the Central Committee of the Polish Democratic Society in Paris
to work for Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration in the
Polish Kingdom, Lithuania, and Podolia.

His ulterior motive was

his desire to prepare the creation of the Slavic federal republic.
But the Polish Central Committee declined the offer..

Although

Bakunin was often annoyed by what he called a superiority complex
of the Poles in relation to the Russian people, he was firmly
convinced that the salvation of a revolutionary Russia lay in a
close collaboratj_on with a revolutionary Poland.

According to

Bakunin the basis for a Russian-Polish alliance was the common

L
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racial origin of Russians and Poles, and their common political
aim--thc overthrow of the Tsarist government.93

He gave an

unmistakable anti-German slant to his agitation for Russian-Polish
revolutionary collaboration.

He maintained that it would be

instrumental in the "destruction of despotism in Europe" and in
the liberation of all the Slavs under Turkish as well as under
German rule. 94
Bakunin's defense of a Russian-Polish alliance was an
attack against the convictions cherished by the European radicals
that Russia must be destroyed to save the European revolution, and
that Poland must be restored as a bulwark of free Europe.
When in mid-December of 1847 Bakunin was expelled from
France at the request of the Russian ambassador for his agitation
against the Tsarist government, he went to Brussels.
was made a member of the Democratic Association.

There he

But he did not

participate in the activities of the organization, and he did not
attend the meetings of the German communists at the invitation of
Marx.

f

He disliked the company of Marx and Engels because they

93cf. Bakunin's letter to his friend Varnhagen von Ense
October 12, 1847, in Bakunin, Confession, p. 308.

94cr. Bakunin's speech of November 29, 1847, which he
ade at 8. Paris banquet to commemorate the Polish insurrection of
1830-31, in Mikhail Bakunin, .Sobran]-~ sochinennii i pisem
("Collected Works· and LettersT1 ) ed. witii AnnotaFions by-Y. 11.
teklov (4 vols.; :Moscow: Izdatelstvo vscsoiuznogo obshchestva
olitkatorzhe.n i ssylno-poselentsev, 1934-36), III, pp. 270-79.
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constantly attacked the bourgeoisie but were themselves
"ingrained bourgeois from head to foot. 11 95

He also became

alienated from Lelewel whom he considered as a "complete cypher
in politics.". Nevertheless, he orgc.i.nized a Polish banquet with
Lelewel, held on February 14, 1848,in commemoration of the
Decembrists.96
The speech which Bakunin made ·on this occasion was not
printed.

According to his statement in his Confession, it

contained an elaboration of his earlier argument.s.
Russia and Poland, the "mission of the Slavs to

He spoke about

regen~rate

the

decadent western world!' and about the "imminent" European
revolution.which would destroy the Austrian Empire.97
Lelewel, who also made a speech, politely warned Bakunin
not to drear.i too much about the future destiney of the Poles and
Russians before the overthrow of the Tsarist government.

In

Lelewel's opinion it was the first duty of the revolutionaries to
raise the question of the people's liberty.

"Let us awaken their

democratic spirit, and then everything will be decided according
to the will of both nations. 11 9 8 Although Lelewel stressed the
brotherhood of Russians and Poles, he reminded Bakunin of the
95carr, llichae~ Bakunin, p. 153.
961istY. ~lpj-gracyj_ne Joachima Lelew.~lc:-, III, 418.

in
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97B9.kunin, Confession, p. 96.
981 1
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question of the territorial restoration of Poland which Bakunin
had failed to discuss.

Lelewel claimed that if the people of the

former eastern Polish territories were granted the right to
self-determination, they would join the Poles.
It may well be assumed that Marx and Engels knew about
Bakunin's propaganda for a revolutionary Russian-Polish
collaboration in Brussels although no sources are available.

In

the light of this assumption Engels's sudden emphasis on the
need for a German-Polish alliance against Russia in his Brussels
speech of February 22, 1848 may be interpreted as an indirect
polemic against Bakunin.

Bakunin's concept of a Slavic mission

to regenerate Europe, which was to be initiated through the
Russian-Polish alliance, was absolutely contrary to the convictions
of Marx and Engels.
--·

Backward nations could not become the

champions of the liberty of man.

The Communist Manifesi£, issued

in February, 1848, advised the Slavic world to expect its
liberation from the industrially advanced Western Europeans.
retrospect the statement made in the

Comm_·~gli..~.:t-l:~festo

In

in favor

of a collaboration of the communists with the most progressive
Poles impresses as a hastily inserted addition to meet the need
of the moment, that is, to fight a Russian-Polish collaboration.
It was a favorite argument of Marx and Engels and also
Of Bakunin that the collaboration with the Poles was the
:prerequisite for a successful revolution in their ovm countries.

97

However, this argument barely veiled their desire for the consolidation of national power.

No doubt, both parties considered

the Polish alliance also as a means to strengthen their own
countries.

The Poles had the misfortune that their country was

situated between two rising powers.

Already in the forties the

question was opened as to what would happen to Poland in case
of a radical revolution in the neighboring states.

The question

was not answered during the life-time of Marx and Engels because
no radical revolution occurred.

The following analysis of Marx's

and Engels's policies and statements since the late forties will
help to indicate what the fate of Poland might have been in case
of a Germa.n radical revolution.

I

CHAPTER III
PROPAGANDA FOR A RADICAL GERiv'i.AN REVOLUTION

---

The Internal Problem

In the Communist Manifesto, issued shortly after the
Paris uprising of February 24, 1848, Marx and Engels had
definitely predicted the imminent outbreak of a European-wide
social revolution led by the industrial proletariat.

But the

European turmoil of 1848-49 bore no close resemblance to their
prediction.

The revolutionary movement spread neither to England

nor to Eastern Europe, and the accent of the revolutionary
programs was on gaining political liberty.

Besides, Central

Europe, where well-defined nation-states did not yet exist,
experienced a surge of nationalism which became an integral part
of the democratic programs.

Marx and Engels adapted their own

revolutionary program to this development in order to further
their ultimate revolutionary aims.
of German

imper~alist

policies.
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They even became supporters
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After the outbreak of the Paris insurrection, both
Marx and Engels went to Paris.

There, in March, 1848, they

organized a revolutionary committee to promote the German
Revolution.
program.

The committee issued a rather moderate revolutionary

This was in keeping with the conviction which Marx

and Engels had arrived at earlier that Germany was not yet ready
for a communist revolution.

The program demanded the nationali-

zation of the feudal estates, the mines, and the transport system
and the organization of national workshops "in the interest of
the German proletariat, the petit-bourgeoisie, and the
peasantry."

One of the foremost revolutionary demands-was the
creation of a German republic, one and indivisible. 1 The program

did not refer to the future territorial extension of a German
republic nor the future fate of the nationalities under German
rule.
At the outset of the German revolutionary movement, a
radical reorganization of Germany did not seem to be impossible.
In mid-March the Vienna and Berlin insurgents had driven the
army from the capital cities and forced the governments to hold
parliamentary elections.

A considerable fraction of the German

democratic party agitated for the overthrow of all the existing
governments and the reconstruction of Germany on a republican
1

Mehring, Karl

M~~j

The Story

of. H_;L~,

p. 154.
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democratic basis.

It was plausible to suppose that the

Revolution might enter a republican phase as it had done in France
But the creation of a German republic depended upon the developmen
of the revolutionary movement into ·a mass movement.
Vfl1en in mid-April Marx and Engels arrived in the
Rhineland, there was no indication of the emergence of such a
mass movement.

2

The labor movement was in an embryonic state.

Even the democrats vrere only a minority and weakened by the lack
of central leadership.· Marx tried at first to
of the Cologne working class movement.

g~in

the allegiance

When he failed, he

collaborated with the Cologne Democratic Un:Lon.

He soon became

the editor-:in-chief of the radical newspaper, the Neue Rheinische
ZeitunG_ (Cologne), whose publication had been in preparation by
the democrats since early April.3

Engels became a member of the

editorial staff.

2 cf. the analysis of the German Revolution by the German
historian Wilhelm Mommsen. He maintains that the German
revolutionary movement was v1eakened by the split between liberals
and democrats in April, 1848. The democrats remained a minority.
The majority of the German people were not willj_ng to fight for
a radical revolution. This prevented the creation of a German
republic. Mommsen, Gro2sse v.nd Versagen des deutsch8_£

.fulergeptu~~'

pp.

122~3().

3cf. the statements on the early Cologne days of Marx
by P. H. Noyes, ~..f'~.zation and Re:volutiol}_.
Work~~-Cla~
Associations in "fne L~erraan-1-t"evolutions ofl ~
\Princeton,
N. J.: Princeton University ress, 19
, pp. 115-23. ·
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~appeared for the first time on June 1, 1848.4
was.subtitled "An Organ of Democracy."

It

Although Marx and Engels

had made every effort to eliminate the direct influence of the
~emocrats

on the newspaper, they continued to maintain a

tactical alliance with the democrats.

They were convinced that

the liberals would not advance one step unless driven on by a
popular movement.
Marx and Engels tried to stiffen the opposition of the
democratic minorj_ty to the liberals and the ·conservatives in the
Frankfurt and Berlin Assemblies.

They also supported the decision

of a democratic Congress, held in Frankfurt in June, 1848, to
found a nationwide unj4 ted democratic organization.

When Cologne

became the seat of a central committee, representing all the
Rhenish and Westphalian democratic associations, Marx became
its "intellectual leader. 11 5

However, the movement for a nation-

wide central democratic leadership made no progress in the rest
of Germany.
The only political issue on which Marx and Engels agreed
vdth the democrats was the demand for a German republic.

-

However,

4Hereafter the abbreviation NRZ stands for Neue
Fheinisch.e Zei tun_g.

-

5rn September, 18L1.8 the Prussian authorities proceeded
against the Cologne democratic organizat:Lon. EYen NRZ was
suspended from September 27 to October 12, 1848. cr:--Mehring,
~cit., p .. 172.
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they did not share the predilection of the democrats for the
federal principle which was also supported by the liberals.
In the first issue of

.llB1!

the editors proclaimed that

·the German Revolution must aim at the creation of a German
republic, one and indivisible.

They explained that they did not

wish to "present any utopian demands for the immediate
establishment" of a centralized German state.
revolution was in its first stages.
a radical phase.

As yet the

It had still to pass through

The editors warned the left-wing delegates in

the Frankfurt National Assembly that the German question could
not be solved by decrees.
German unity and a German constitution can only be
achieved through a mass movement which will be forced
into action through internal conflicts and a war
against the Ee.st. 6
In the meantime it would be necessary to temporize and, instead
of cling:i.ng to ideological convictions, to watch the

11

general

trend of the German development 11 and to take only "the immediately
possible and practical steps" in order to further the Revolution.
The democrats were condemned for their support of a
federal republicanism.

A federation of German autonomous states

could not become the final constitution of a united Germany.
the opinion of Marx and Engels federalism was a medievalism.
b

~'

June 1 , 18L1-8.

In
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It did not fit into the modern age.

It might only successfully

be applied, if at all, to very large areas.

NRZ called the

democratic leaders, who wished to preserve the old territorial
units, including Prussia, in a federal union, "retrograde and
petit-bourgeois. 11 7

The dissolution of Prussia was the first

prerequisite of German unification.

Even a democratic Prussia

would "prevent German unity," that is, the creation of a
centralized German state.
The editors of NRZ considered centralization a universal
remedy for all the evils in Germany, its political, social, and
economic backwardness.

Centralization would destroy all the

relics of the Middle Ages, above all particularism.
modernize Germany.
the

11

It would

A centralized government would facilitate

concentration of capital and manpower" and permit Germany to

participate actively in the modern era of an expanding
industrialization.

Industrial growth in turn would further

economic centralization, the counterpart of political centralization
Industrialization had already helped to remove many old-fashioned
custom barriers in Germany.

If it could freely develop in a large

German centralized state, its modernizing influence would even be
greater.8

7Cf. th'; critique of the Berliner -~Ze:L trug,sballe, the
organ of the Berlin democrats, _NRZ, Augus£ '2.v-;-' L~O.
8~' January 5, 1849.

L
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According to

~

neither the old ruling class nor the

bourgeoisie would draw any advantages from the modernization of
Germany--its unification or economic expansion.

Industrializatio1

would guarantee the predominance of the cities over the rural
areas, that is, over the reactionary aristocracy and the priesthood.

Industrialization would also destroy the bourgeoisie by

ending the private O\n1ership of the means of production.

This

would benefit the people.

As did the Communist Manifesto, .!Qlli

proclaimed that the "rule

of the cities

was. revolutionary."

Whoever wished for the unification of Germany and its economic
expansion helped to prepare the advent of the communist
revolutiorr.

Many years later, when Germany was close to being

united by Bismark, Engels triumphantly wrote to Mr:J.rx that,
without knowing it, the Prussian statesman was doing part of
their job.9
It may be assumed that even in 1848-49 Marx and Engels
would have been satisfied with a solution of the German question
which fell short of their radical demand for a centralized
German republic, if only it were a step forward.

Indeed, they

could hardly have expected the realization of their radical

~,

~-9cr. ~gels's lotter to Marx, August 15, 1870, in

III/4, 366.
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demand because the Germans in general were not in favor of a
centralized German state.

NRZ's agitation for it was an isolated

occurrence.
In June, when the publication of

~

began, much of the

revolutionary ground which had been won in March had been lost
e.gain.

The prospect that the Revolution might enter a radical

phase had diminished considerably.

Conservatism was slowly

recovering from the initial defeat by the German uprisings.

It

was significant that the Frankfurt National Constituent Assembly,
which had met for the first time on May 18, appointed the
Austrian Archduke John as regent of Germany (Reichsregent).
strengthened the position of the princes.

This

Moreover, the liberals,

vn10 were opposed to a republican solution of the German question,

hoped to win the adherence of the King of Prussj_a to the national
cause in spite of the increasing conservatism of the Prussian
government.
From the outset the editors of NRZ scrutinized the German
scene for any signs of an approachtng internal crisis that might
accelerate the Revolution. 10 But even the short lived Vienna
uprising

j_n

October, 18Li-8 did not strengthen the Hevolution.

--ToMarx's and E.'ngels's concentration on political
problems was reflected i.n their editorial policy. ~ rarely
covered news concerning the working class. Cf. Noyes, .2.I?.~cit.,
p. 116.
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German Revolution.

As the months passed by, the editors of NRZ became
completely disenchanted with the

They

expressed not only a deep contempt for the liberals, but also
for the democrats who lacked a radical revolutionary spirit.
Repeatedly they compared the weakness of the German Revolution
with the efficiency of the French Revolution.

Over and over

again the readers were reminded that the French revolutionaries
had introduced a new European order through the abolition of
feudal and provincial· privileges and the creation of a
centralized French democracy which welded all the inhabitants
of France into one nation of Frenchmen. 11 According to~
the French revolutionary achievements resulted from the
willingness of the proletariat to accept the leadership of the
bourgeoisie.
In the summer of 1848 .!IBE, maintained that at the outset
of the Revolution the German bourgeoisie might have acted the
part of the French bourgeoisie in 1789.
bourgeoisie made no attempt to assume

11

However, the German
a more or less democratic

attitude" in order to w-ln "the people as its ally. 1112

In

another instance NRZ claimed that the German bourgeoisie could no-'
have exercised revolutionary leadership in Germany even if it

--rrNRZ~ September 3 and December 5, 18L}8.
121'!?1.!!., July 11, 1848.
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wore truly revolutionary because the German proletariat had
become class-conscious.
At the very moment when it [the German bourgeoisie]
threatened feudalism and absolutism, it was
threatened by the proletariat and by that part of the
bourgeoisie which shares the interests and ideas of
the proletariat.13
In order to protect the recently acqui.1.·ed political power, the
bourgeoisie struck an alliance with the old society and favored
a constitutional monarchy.
NRZ condemned the bourgeoisie because it had not made
the slightest attempt to create a centralized German state.
would have been a revolutionary act.

This

It should have been

preceded by the organization of a strong revolutionary center
such as Paris had been during the French Revolution.

The success

of the German Revolution could only have been ensured through the
creation of a central dictatorial authority exercising executive,
legislative, and judicj.al powers. 1 4
accomplish this most tu·gent task.

The insurgents failed to

Consequently, the German

Revolution did not develop into a nation-wide unified movement.
It consisted of many isolated uprisj.ngs throughout Germany.

old territorial divisions and even the old struggle between
'-T3Ibid.: December 15, 1848.
14
.
~., July 11, 18L1-8.
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Prussia and Austria for the hegemony in Germany continued as if
the Revolution had never occured.

In the opinion of the editors

of NRZ, the German Revolution was nothing but a farce.

Germany

had become "the laughing stock of all Europe. 111 5
The existence of a National Constituent Assembly in
Frankfurt did not console the editors of

~·

consider Frankfurt as a revolutionary center.

They did not
To them the

Frankfurt Assembly was merely a classical example of German
revolutionary incompetence.

Although it claimed to represent all

of revolutionary Germany, the Assembly had neither the courage
to dictate its ovm internal and foreign policies to the princes,
nor did the Assembly dispose of an efficient army to enforce its
will.

The old German federal army with its "miserable disunity"
/

had not been replaced by a people's army similar to the levee
en masse at the time of the French Revolution.
Marx and Engels were much more concerned about the
failure of Berlin to stage a successful revolution than about the
weakness of Frankfurt.

This is quite understandablevhen taking

into consideration that the two men thought in terms of power.
If Berlin had become the center of the Revolution, the
revolutionaries would have been able to dispose of the Prussian
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army, a powerful tool to enforce revolutionary changes in the
rest of Germany.
Before March, 18Li-8, Marx and En.gels had regarded Prussia
as the future leader of a German revolution.

But the Prussi.an

revolutionary movement remained far behind the earlier expectat:i.C!ls
of Marx and Engels.

NRZ ridiculed the Berlin insurgents for

having failed to change Berlin into the capital of a new
Germany.

The newspaper sneered:

Berlin, far from being a German Paris, is not even a
Prussian Vienna. It is not a capital. It i·s a
residence.16
The decline of the initial revolutionary drive in Prussia
was a severe disappointment to Marx and En.gels.

The liberal

ministry under the bourgeois Ludolf Camphausen, which had been
formed on March 18, 1848, had offered no resistance to a close
collaboration with the Crovm.

In April a law was passed which

provided for the election of a Prussian Constituent Assembly.
The new Prussian Constitution was to be dravm up in agreement
with the Crown.

Because of this clause the position of the Crovm

was strengthened, and the Prussian Constituent Assembly, which
met in Berlin on May 22, was prevented from acting independently.
In the following weeks the opposition of the Prussian conservatives
to liberalism was steadily gaining headway.
16Ib·· ,
--1:.9:.. ' August 27, 1848.

Subsequently, this
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led to the formation of increasingly more conservative ministries
and the eventual elimination of the Berlin Assembly as an active
body in November,

18~.8.

Marx and Engels observed the political development in
Berlin vlith particular interest because it symbolized the general
trend of the Revolution.

They tried to stiffen the resistance

of the left wing in the Berlin Assembly to the growing conservatism
of the government.

They led a sharp campaign against the

camphausen and Hansemann ministries because the bourgeois members
collaborated vlith the King and the aristocracy.

They ascribed

the growth of conservatism to the failure of the liberal
bourgeoisie· to oust the reactionary civil and
11

milita~y

officials,

the defenders of Pl"ussian feudalism," from the government at the

outset of the Revolution.
foreJgn goli ti~

NRZ maintained that the weakness of the Revolution was
reflected in the lack of an aggressive foreign policy of both
Frankfurt and Berlin.

The Frankfurt Assembly should have

imitated the French revolutionaries who considered it their duty
'

to liberate their neighbors.

-

The editors of NRZ did not mention

that this so-called liberation turned into the annexation of the
territories closest to France and the creation of dependent
sister republics which were tributary to the French government.
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What mattered to the editors was that the aggressive French
foreign policy had helped to undermine the old political and
social order in Europe.
NRZ claimed that Germany had a long tradition of
oppressing its neighbors, a tradition which had been established
by the reactionary German governments.

Since the outbreak of the

Revolution even the liberal bourgeoisie had become a strong
supporter of oppressive government policies.

The liberals failed

to collaborate with the insurgents in Italy, Prague, and the
Grand Duchy of Poznania against Austrian and Prussian rule.
In the opinion of

~

only a people's government would

make an end to the oppression of Germany's neighbors because it
would realize the "international policy of democracy."
summer of 1848 !I.E.?! stated:

In the

"Germany will free itself to the

same extent that it will grant liberty to the neighboring
nations. 111 7 The majority of the German middle class and the
German proletariat had already understood that "the liberty of the
neighboring peoples • • • was a guarantee of their orm liberty. 11
The liberation of the peoples under German rule would help to
destroy the old ruling classes and their reactionary policies.
However, as long as the Russian Empire remained intact, neither
the liberation of the oppressed peoples nor the final destruction
of the internal enemies of the German Revolution were guaranteed.
1

1~., July 3, 1848.
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Although before spring, 1848, Marx and 1ngels had
occasionally referred to Russia, the violent campaign against
that state only began v1ith the publication of

~·

.upon the Russian Empire were the familiar ones.

The attacks

The Russian

"colossus" was viewed as the bastion of European reaction, "the
enemy of European culture," and a country with a predominantly
Asiatic character which threatened Europe, mainly Germany, with
a military invasion and destruction.

Repeatedly

~

warned the

Germans not to underestimate the military strength of the
Russian army.

Although the Russian soldiers were underfed, they

had a great power of endurance.

Russia was a real danger.

According to NRZ Russia was the greatest threat to
German unification.

As long as the Russian Empire existed, the

German reactionaries would always conspire with Russia against
German liberation, and Germany would remain under the tutelage
of this Empire.

The war against Ru_ssia was badly needed in

order to awaken the revolutionary initiative of the people, to
push the German Revolution into a radical phase, and to unite
Germany.

NRZ insisted that the watchword for the war against

Russia should be the restoration of Poland.

The Polish question

was one of the most important issues in the revolutionary
propaganda of Marx and Engels.

----------------------------=

113

The support of the Polish cause had become a tradition
in German liberal and radical circles since the 1830's. 18 The
general argument was that only the restoration of Poland and the
destruction of Russia would allow for the unification of
Germany. 19
In the first month of the German Revolution, liberal
newspapers like the jl.ugsburger All_gemeine

Ze_it}l~

and democratic

newspapers like the Deutsche Reform (Berlin), iscued by Arnold
Ruge, supported unanimously the restoration of Poland and a war
against Russia.

They argued that it was necessary to prevent a

Russian invasion of Europe as well as Polish support of Russian
.
20
Pans 1 avism ..
The ltberal Prussian ministry under Ludolf Camphausen
(March-May, 1848) also favored the restoration of Poland as a
means to realize the German national state.

The foreign minister

Baron von Arni.m-Suckm1, who favored a constitutional German
IBFor in.formation on German pro-Polish propaganda in the
period preceding the German Revolution cf. the Cambridge ~stor~
.Qf_Poland 2 frornw-O-ugE_stu.s II to Pilsudsk:h (1697-T9°35), p. )55.f.
also Hermann Buddensieg, ,,Heidelberg and Krasinski," The Polish
Review, VIII (Spring, 1963), 55-67.
1

9Hallgarten, ·studien ueber die deutsche Polenfreundschaft,
in der Periode der Haerzrevolulion, pp. 15=)0.H' .
20 cr. Walter Bleck, Die Politischen Parteien und die
R9.s.~~.:..l'r€!-E_e in den Jap.renJ_"'B48"-l12. (Posen:
Hofbuchdruckerei
W. Decker & Co., 19141, Po 10.
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monarchy under Prussian leadership, tried to convince the Prussian
King Frederick William IV of the necessity to fight. Russia and
to restore Poland.
The Polish democrats, in turn, addressed manifestoes to
the German people in which they called for a German-Polish war
against Russj.a and the restoration of Poland as a means to
liberate the Germans from Russian domination. 21 Polish democrats
tried to obtain guarantees from the Frankfurt Vor-Parlament for
the cession of Poznania and Galicia.

The more moderate Poles

submitted petitions to the Prussian King Frederick William IV
and to the Austrian Emperor Ferdinand I in which they asked for
Polish autonomy in Poznania and Galicia respectively. 22
The question of the immediate surrender of Poznania and
_ GaU.cie., supported by the German demo era ts, caused dissent in

L

the Frankfurt Vor-Parlament.

Nevertheless, a unanimous resolution

was passed on the Polish question.

The resolution stated that the

partition of Poland was a "disgraceful wrong," and that it was the
sacred duty of the German people to work for Polish restoration.

Ibid.,

--z;
pp. 6-8, 77-78.
22 Prince Adam Czartoryski, the leading Polish conservative,
wished to solve the Polish question on the basis of legality.
Before the outbreak of the Poznanian insurrection he conducted
secret negotiations about the creation of an autonomous small
Poznanian stci.te united with Prussia in a personal union. · Stefan
Kieniewicz, ~or.eczenstwo olskie w owstaniu poznanskim ("The
Polish Socic y in tne ·osen
surrec ion-rrr-1\V'arsaw: Rozprawy
Historyczne, Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawski0g.o, 1935), pp. 83,

159.
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Late in April, 1848 the Frankfurt Committee of the Fifty
issued a similar moderate statement in favor of Polish
restoration.

The National Constituent Assembly was to decide

on the fate of Poznania and Galicia.
In the meantime, the initial German and Polish
expectations of the immediate outbreak of a war against Russia
had faded. 23 The German liberals began to fear a military
involvemant with Russia.

Simultaneously, the events in Poznania

contributed to diminish the enthusiasm of the liberals for the
Polish cause.
By the end of April the Poznanians staged

an.

insurrection

because the Prussian King had not fulfilled his promise to grant
autonomy to the Grand Duchy.

On April 24 Frederick William IV

had issued an order that the predominantly German part of the
Grand Duchy should be excluded from a national reorganization of
Poznania.

On May 2 the Federal Diet ratified this order.

The

fate of Poznania had been decided without regard to the wishes of
Frankfurt.

Several days later, on May 9, the Polish insurrection

in Poznania was put do"vvn by the Prussian e.rmy.

23In Mar;b Prince Czartoryski and radical Poles like
Karol Libelt and Ludwik Mierosl"awski, who stayed in Berlin, were
convinced that the Prussians were only waiting for an invasion
of the Polish Kingdom by Polish insurgents and for a Russian
attack upon Prussia in order to begin the war against Russia. Cf.
Hallgarten, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
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In mid-April, when Frankfurt had not come forth with a
definite decision on the Polish question, the democrats had still
hoped that Prussia at least would initiate the liberation of the
Poles. 24 Consequently, they were deeply disappointed with the
high-handed procedure of tht: Prussian government.

They violently

attacked the reactionary forces in Prussia as the main obstacle
to Polish restoration.

The Polish question became a convenient

means of revolutionary agitation against Prussian reaction.
The editors of

~

shared the great disappointment of

the democrats with Prussian policies.

The newspaper repeatedly

condemned Prussia's failure to conduct a vigorous pro-Polish
policy at the outset of the German Revolution.

Prussia should

have profited from the enthusiasm of Germans and Poles for a
military cooperation against Russia and from the threat of a
Russian invasion of the Grand Duchy.

It should have precipitated

a clash of arms with Russia by the liberation of the Poles in
Poznania.

This would have strengthened the Revolution.
NRZ warned that the suppression of the Poznanian

insurrection and the partition of Poznania might force the Poles
to collaborate with the Russians who were eager to exploit the

~4Cf. Deutsche Reform, April 18, 1848, quoted in Bleck,

~1b, p.

65 •.
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Prussian mistakes.

In June

referred to a :Manifesto of
Nicholas· I published in the Polish Kingdom. 2 5 'l'he Tsar declared
~

that it was his duty to protect the Catholic Poles in Poznania
and Galicia, who were the Christian brothers of the Orthodox
Russians, and to organize a crusade against the oppressors of
the Slavs.
NRZ ascribed Prussia's failure to make war against

Russia to the influence of the Prussian reactionaries in the
government.

NRZ clain1ed that the reactionaries .wished to maintain

good relations with Russia in order to prevent the development of
a radical German Revolution. 26 Russia was against the
restoration of Poland and even against granting autonomy to the
Poles in Poznania, and the policy of the Prussian government
_ reflected this attitude.
~

ref erred to a Russian memorandum which threatened

a Russian invasion if the smallest part of Poznania wero

-~---z5NRZ
_, June 2L1-, 1 848.
26The Polish historian Jozef Feldman maintained that the

"extremely skillful and clever tactics of Russian diplo:.1acy," that
is, the pressure of Russia U})On Prussia, caused Prussia to
abandon its support of a war against Russia. Cf. Jozef Feldman,
§J?.F~JY~~...YL.1§.~~8_!:. ( 11 The Polish Questi9n in ~8L1-~ 11 ) (Cracow:
Acade11ya1fm.IejE:Ltno8ci, 1933), p. 130. Bobinska, ins-cead, agrees
with Marx and ~ingels. She claims that the Prussian lib0rals
withdrew their support of a war against Russia because of their
countor-revolutionary attitudee They were afraid that the war
might lead to the creation of a German republic. This led to
their subservience to Russia. Bobinska, .op. _c~~·, p. 115.
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reorganizea. 27 ~pointed out that in spite of this threat the
Prussian government had withdrawn troops from the fortresses of
Poznan and Koenigsberg (East Prussia) and sent them to the Rhine
where no Russian danger existed.

This, according to

~'

proved

that Prussian policy was as much "a Russian one" as before the

Revol~tion. 28 When Russia threatened, Frussia obeyed.

Prussia

continued to be a mere "eastern· province of Russia," regard.ing the
West as an "enemy" and the East as a "fr.iend" and "savior" in
spite of its enslavement by Russia.
In the opinion of

~'

Prussia's failure to lead the

German Revolution, to support the liberation of the Poles, and
to declare war against Russia was a vic.ious c.ircle of events
which originated from the half-hearted Revolution.

The editors

were convinc-ed that the Revolution would enter a re.dical phase if
the Russians invaded German territory.

They claimed that the

German situation showed "numerous analogies" to the French
development after 1789.

In their opinion the German reactionaries

were anxious to enter .into a military alliance with Russia which
might have the samo consquences as in France .in 1791.

-NRZ

threatened that .in case of a Prusso-Russian alliance, the

German people would unite with the French to sa1re the Revolution.

~2 7NRZ, June 23-24, 1848.
281'!21i., June 24, 1848.
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"Together • • • they will wage the war of the West against the
East, of civ.ilizat.ion against barbarism, of the republic against
autocracy.u 2 9 The unification of Germany would be forged in t1the
storms of Viar and revolution .. 11
As long as

~

was published, the editors were forever

hoping for an immediate Russian invasion of Germany •. In June
German-Russian relations were still strained.

When the rumor was

spread that. a Russian invasion was imminent, NRZ rejoiced that
Nichole.s I might soon intervene in Prussian affairs.
The Bastille has not yet been stormed. Meanwhile,
an apostle of the revolution approaches irresistibly
from the East • • • The Tsar will save the German
Revolution by centralizing it.30
With the same enthusiasm

~

speculated about the

consequences of a Russian invasion of Galic.ia and Silesia ..
assumed that the invasion would cause an uprising of the

-NRZ

dissatisfied Siles.ian workers and peasants who would destroy both
the Russ.ian invaders and the Prussian reactionaries ..
Silesia will suffer terribly from a Russian invasion,
but Sile.sia itself .is absolutely in need of the Russian
.invasion for its liberation from all the feudal rubbish.31
Many months later, in mid-April,

18L~9,

!JBZ speculated age.tn a.bout

the effect of a Russian invasion upon Silesia..
--·z9Ibid. , June 25, 18L1.8.
30ibid., June 18' 1848..
311El-2. .. ' June 20, 1848.

~

still expected
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that a Russian .inve.sion would be tbe signal for a mass upris"i.ng of
tbe Silesian peasants against the nobles who continued to exploit
them in spite of the abolition of serfdom.3 2
Late in April, 1849

~hoped

that the Revolution would be

pushed into a radical phase through an alliance of the reactionary
powers Russia and Austria against the Hungarian war of independenc
which had started in December, 18L~8. 33 . In the last ~ issue of
May 19, 1849 the expectations of the editors rose to a feverish
height.

They proclaimed that the Hungarian war against Austria

had a great revolutionary significance.

The war would lead to an

alliance between the revolutionary Hungarians, Poles, and Germans.

-NRZ ventured.

to prophecy' that this alliance would result in the

dissolution of Austria and Prussia, while Russia would be pushed
back "to the borders of Asia. 11

Should Austria attempt to pre11ent

the threatening Central European revolution through an alliance
with Russia, this would merely accelerate the advent of the
revolution.

The editors insisted that a Russian invasion of

Hungary would be the signal for a European war against the
reactionary forces.

They were obsessed with the idea that a

repetition of the :E'rench revolutionary wars was imminent.
A fewv.eeks, maybe a few days, will decide the outcome,
and soon the l!rench, the Magyar, the Polish, and the

--32 Ibid. ,·

April 13, 1848.

331..1?.:b£. , April 29, 1849 ..
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German revolutionary armies will celebrate their
fraternization under the walls of Berlin.34
The Revolution would be saved.
Marx's and Engels's expectations of a Russian invasion
of Germany rose to such feverish heights because they knew that
neither the German liberals nor most of the German democrats were
willing to support an aggressive foreign policy which would draw
Germany into a war with Russia.

Since the spring of 1848 and

increasingly so in the summer of 1848 when Russian troops were
deployed along the German Eastern border, the majority of the
Germans had lost interest in a war against Russia and in the
liberation of Poland.35

Even the democrats, who continued to

favor the restoration of Poland, merely agitated for the convocat:kx.
of a b'uropean Congress in which the two "great civilized nations 11
of Europe, France and England, and a liberated Germany, were to
participate.

The task of this Congress would be to effect the

liberation of Poland by treaties.36

·- 34NRz:: }iay

19, 18li-9.

35Helmut Y...rause, Marx und Engels und das zeitgenoessiscl10
GescEicfi-te" un'C.l-XUltur
tisteuropas Vol. I (Giessen: Wilhelm Schmitz, 1958), p. 21.
Russlap£, Marburger AbhandTungen zur

3 6cr. the speech of Arnold Ruge in the Frankfurt Assembly,
July 26, 1848, in Steno$r§t_:ehischei:_J?.._eri_c.ht u_t?.Per die Verhan~luJ}~
~e:: de~j;_E.E_1lc-m s_onst,I5D~r.~?.~~~ionaTversnm:illung zu._ l:~~ am
a:tn, ed. bywof • .Franz W1garCl in the name oi~ Editorial
UOmmiss:i..011 of the National Assembly ( 9 vols.~ Leipzig: Brei tkopf
und Haertel und B. G. Teubner, 1848), II, .11 ~5. Cf. also Manifesto
Of the Central Committee of the German democrats in Cologne,
August 1 , 1 81~8, ~' August 10, 1 848.
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In the summer of 1848 Engels declared that the foreign
policy of the German democrats was as reactionary as that of the
bourgeois liberals.

The failure of the liberals to declare war

against Russia at the outset of the Revolution had prevented the
unification of Germany and the destruction of the feudal order.
Engels claimed that the liberals preferred to support the proRussian foreign policy of the old ruling classes because they
knew that

~

war against Russia would lead to the destruction of

the bourgeois class after a "short dream of power.n37
As to the democrats, Engels insisted that they were
bound to support the status guo in Eastern Europe as much as the
liberal

bo~rgeoisie

because they def ended also the bourgeois

property principle.

The democrats were not a revolutionary force.

They merely paid. lip service

to Polish liberation.

They did

not agitate for a war but for the convocation of a European
Congress to solve the Polish question.

Engels claimed that it

was ridiculous to expect the restoration of Poland from a
European Congress.

In order to achieve this task, the European

bourgeoisie would have to exert pressure on Russia.
lead to open hostilities.
a war against Russia.

This might

But the bourgeoisie did not wish for

Therefore, it would refrain from any

3'7NRz, ·August 20, 1848.
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strong measures in support of the Polish cause.

Only a

revolutionary war against Russia would solve the Polish question
and save Germany from the reactionary aristocracy and bourgeoisie •
.The insinuation that even the demo era ts would be ruined by the
war belonged to

~s

propaganda tactics which threatened the

victory of radicalism, although the radicals were a minority.
While Engels attacked the democrats for merely paying
lip service to the Polish cause, the liberals and conservatives
condemned the democrats for their continuation ()f pro-Polish
propaganda.

This helped to keep the controversey over the

Polish question alive in Germany.

The controversy centered around

the two problems whether German participation in the partition
of Poland had been a crime, and whether the restoration of Poland
would be in the interest of Germany.

The heated battle of

arguments, used either to condemn the partition of Poland or to
support it, reached a climax in the three days debate on the
Polish question in the Frankfurt Assembly.
The majority was convinced that it was in the best
interest of Germany not to touch upon the Polish question.

The

problem of Polish independence was too explosive and might hinder
the solution of the German national question.

New motions which

declared the partition of Poland a "disgraceful wrong" and the
restoration of Poland

11

the sacred duty of the German people" were

overru1ed.

L-----
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The position of the supporters of the status quo, mainly
conservatives and liberals, was most eloquently presented by the
democrat Wilhelm Jordan, who subsequently went over into the
liberal camp.

He condemned the democrats for their lack of a

realistic approach to the Polish question.

He maintained that

their arguments in defense of Polish restoration were not
substantiated by facts.

The partition of Poland was not a crime

but a historical necessity.

Poland had not been in step with

the historical development towards liberty.
liberate the serfs.

It had failed to

Therefore, it remained weak.

was responsible for its ruin.

Jordan declared:

Poland alone
"History • • •

always mercd.lessly stamps out that nation which no longer has
the strength to maintain itself among the great nations."38

Only

strong nations had a right to survive.
According to Jordan the democrats were also wrong in
assuming that the Poles were revolutionary and that a restored
Poland would turn democratic.

The insurrections of Cracow and

Poznania were not staged to liberate the people but to safeguard

the interests of the aristocracy.

Even a restored Poland would

still be a state composed of "noblemen, Jews, and serfs."39

38stenographischer Bericht, II, 1144.
39

L

.
Ibid., p. 1150.
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would not be a revolutiona.ry element in Eastern Europe.
Consequently, Poland could not become_a bulwark of revolutionary
Europe.

Besides, such a bulwark was not needed.

were on the brink of a revolution.4°

The Russians

They would liberate the

Poles.
Jordan attacked the democrats because they exaggerated
the danger of Russian aggressiveness.

The restoration of Poland

was a much greater danger to Germany.

The Poles would never

relinquish their claim

11

to the green bridge of Koenigsberg."

A

liberated Poland would immediately ally itself with Russia in
order to win access to the Baltic Sea, necessary for the existence
of a modern Polish state.

Only the maintenance of the statU..§......9..!:!.2,

would serve German interests.
In his speech of July 26 Arnold Ruge presented the
democratic viewpoint.
was a crime.
the Slavs.

He insisted that the partition of Poland

The Poles had fulfilled a civilizing mission among
Furthermore, they had proved their revolutionary

spirit by the Constitution of 1791 which promised the extension
of liberty, earlier enjoyed only by the nobles, to all the
people.

The Poles were 11 a necessary element in the European
development$ 111+1 They were the most westernized Slavs and presently

40ibid.
If

~

p. 1145

~-----=lt-~Ib_i_d_._'= P-·_1_1_8_4_. _ ,. . . , . _ _~
1

__

..................-
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the ideal propagators of Western European revolutionary ideas
among the Slavs.

The restoration of Poland would further the

liberation of all the Slavs, including the Russians.
Ruge did not share the conviction of Jordan that the
relations between nations were marked by perennial hostility,
and that power politics alone could save a nation from
destruction.

Peace between nations, said Ruge, would be assured

if a European federal union were organized which guaranteed
the enjoyment of liberty and equality to all the. European peoples,
including the Slavs.
Russia.

But Ruge did not agitate for a war against

He proposed the convocation of a European Congress to

solve the Polish question.
On June 27, 1848, when the debates were over, the
democrats in the Frankfurt National Assembly issued an appeal
to the German people to support the restoration of Poland in the
interest of German unification.42 A few days later, on August 1,
the Central Committee of the German democrats in Cologne
addressed a Manifesto to the Polish people which agitated for the
liberation of all the Slavs, including the Poles.

The Manifesto

supported Polish leadership among the Slavs and the inclusion
of all the liberated Slavs in a future European federation.43

42NRZ,

'August 3, 181+8.

43Ibid., August 10, 1848.
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-NRZ

published the Manif estoos of the democrats without
-~·-

comment, an indication that the paper did not fully agree with
the position of the democrats.
The climactic controversy over the question of Polish
restoration in the Frankfurt Assembly gave Engels the opportunity
to discuss extensively

~'s

viewpoint on this matter in a series

of articles published between August 9 and September 7.

Engels

attacked the opponents as ·well as the defenders of Polish
restoration.

According to him neither the past failures nor the

past achievements of a nation had any significance in relation
to the question whether this nation had a right to independence
or not.
Whatever Poland might have achieved in the past, Engels
·- declared, did not bestow upon the Poles any right to an
independent existence in the present if the Poles were not the
carriers of a new historical task.
of Southern France.

Engels ref erred to the fate

In the Middle Ages it created a sr)lendid

aristocratic republic, but later on it became a stronghold of
reactionary feudalism.

Consequently, v1hen its independence was

destroyed in the French Revolution, nobody objected to this
"merciless" historical judgement because the creation of one
nation under a centralized government meant progress in contrast
to the outdated social order and the separatism of Southern France.
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Engels admitted that Poland had been crushed because
it had not participated in historical progress.

However, nobody

had the right to decree that the Poles must forever submit to
·the death sentence passed by history.

right to revolt and to place the

11

The Poles had gained the

brazen foot of history on

the neck of their oppressors" because they sided with social
progress. 4l~
As before the revolution Engels claimed that the Poles
had outgrown the feudal mentality and mere nationalist
aspirations.

The foremost preoccupation of the insurgents in

Cracow and Poznania had been the overthrow of the whole feudal
order and the creation of a peasant democracy.

The social

revolution would automatically have effected the liberatio11 of
the Poles from foreign rule because the new leaders had no ties
with the foreign oppressors.

Engels insisted that the Poles

had become conscious of the need for political and social changes
before the Germans ever did.

In the preceding decades, while

Germany was still involved in

11

trivial constitutional and

extravagant philosophical ideologies," Poland was already
seat of Eastern European democre.cy. 11

---

44rbid. ·:-August

26, 18L~8.
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In Engels's opinion the Poles, not the Russians, were
destined to become the revolutionary leaders of the Slavs.

They

were the first Slavic people who had understood that the peasant
democracy was "the only possible means to liberate the Slavs
from an "outdated feudal absolutism. 11 45. Engels predicted that
soon the Poles would stage an agrarian revolution in the area
between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea which would turn the
enslaved pe.asant masses into free owners of the land.

The Poles,

not the Russians, would initiate the overthrow of the old order
in E9.stern Europe.

The Polish peasant democracy would become

the true bulwark of European revolutionary progress.
When Engels preclicted an imminent agrarian revolution
in Poland, he actua.lly ascribed revolutionary initiative to the

peasants.

For the sake of propaganda Engels reversed the

statement in the

_Qg~~_jJ~nif eE.,tO

that the peasants were unable

to stage a revolution and must be led either by the bou.rgeoisie
or by the industrial proletariat.
It is significant that in his articles Engels evaded an
analysis of the revolutionary tactics necessary to bring about a
victory of the peasant democracy.

He

restricted himself to

rhetorical phrases such as--that Poland was ell.ready "the seat of
Eastern European democracy," or that "the Poland of the peasant

__ __

-----·

.,...,,,,.

,

45rbid., August 20 and September 3, 1848.
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democracy" was llthe strong son" of the defunct democracy of nobles
and would surely be victorious.
By exaggerating Polish radicalism, Engels justified
the principle, which he had repeatedly stressed in his

~

articles, that only a nation which progresses has a right to
national independence.
nation.

Engels claimed that Poland was such a

The Poles were on the brink of a radical revolution.

A restored Poland would defend democracy.
Engels insisted that the restoration of a democratic
Poland ought to concern all the Europeans, particularly the
Germans.

The Polish nation was one of the "necessary nations"

in the nineteenth century.

It was destined to safeguard liberty

in Europe.

Polish restoration was "for nobody more necessary
than for- the Germans. 111+6 It would free Germany from the

traditional Russian tutelage.
Engels had undertaken the task of steering his
argumentation in defense of Polish restoration safely between
the cliffs of the basic anti- and pro·-Polish arguments used by
Jordan and Ruge.
position.

But Engels came dangerously close to Jordan's

He had layed down the principle that the condition of

Polish restoration was the creation of a peasant democracy.

If

this was not achieved, one might as well forget about Polish
liberation, and the death sentence passed by history would be final
-----~~"l'-~~~~-

L~ b.lb_i;:}. • , August 20, 1848 .
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Obviously a major objective of Engels's line of defense

of Polish restoration was to ridicule the democratic principle
that all nations had a rj.ght to independence.

Engels never

returned to the argument of the peasant democracy.

Many months

later he preferred to use the Hegelian concept of the historical
nation to defend the right of a nation to independence.
~

time

was engaged in a defense of the Hungarian independence

movement against Austria.
had a

At that

Engels maintained that the Hugarians

right to natj_onal inde1)endence because they were a

historical nation, and he applied this same argument to the Poles~7
The argument was also used as a tactical means to undermine the
democratic nationality principle.
The

Bo~~estion:

Poznania and Galicia

Whenever in 1848-49 Engels spoke of the restoration of
Poland, he meant the restoration of the borders of 1772.48

February 15, 1848.
I+8cr. the comment by Lew:Ls Namier on tho agitation of the
German liberals and radicals, includj.ng Marx and Ezngels, for the
restoration of the borders of 1772. He saj_d that they made a
big mi.stake in assuming that a Polj_sh state in j_ts pi·e-1772
frontiers was viable and would be powerful. "If in 181+8 the
national character o:f a country could still have been determined
~y the language and politics of the landowning cle.ss and the
~ntelligentsia, these vast territories would have been Polish; but
in treating them as such • • • the German liberals took no
account of the peasants' hatred of the landlords • • • Such regard
~or social superiorities and disregard of the rights of the masses
J.~ comprehensible in middle-class intellectuals, but is comic when
displayed by men who professed- socialist principles and preached
c~ass war: in reality • • • the radicals and Marx and Engels
d1ffe:rod but little from their milleu • • • the basic nri.sapprehensj.o:r.s and nonsense of contemporaries aro remarkably alike. n
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occasional remarks indicated that an even larger territory should
be guaranteed to the Poles.
The restoration of Poland cannot mean that of a. sham
Poland, but of a state which is capable of maintaining
its independence. Poland at least has to have the
extension of 1772. It must not only possess the
territories but also the mouths of its great rivers,
and must own at least a wide maritime country on the
Bal tic Sea.Li-9
several months later Engels declared that it was a vital question
for Poland "to own the Baltic Sea coast from Danzig to Riga."

It

was a "question of the free development of all the resources of a
great nation. 11 5°

At that rioment Engels apparently supported also

the cession of East Prussia to Poland.

It was the only time that

Engels made such an extreme statement in favor of Polish
aggrandizement •
.. As to the western borders of

Poland~

supported not

only the inclusion of Galicia but also of the whole Grand Duchy
of Poznania into a restored Poland.
~

With respect to Poznania

defended a much more extreme position than. the democrats.

Poznanian question became an important propaganda means against
both the Prussian reactionaries and the dcmocrats.5 1
~W.in:r.er;-l.§1-1-~$; , The. 11.e..Y_o..l~:.tion o.:L the In.tellectuals,
Proceedings Of the Bri ti.SIT Academy' Vol. YXX (:COnaon: creo1frey
Cumber le ge

Amen House,

1 9L1-6) , p. 50.

49~, August 20, 181:.8.
50ibid., February 15, 1849 .

5 1For detailed information on the treatment of the

Poznanian question in the Berlin and Frankfurt Assemblies cf.
Namier, £.P· cit., pp. 71-91.
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On June 9 Engels opened the discussion of the Posen
question with an article on the "Seventh Partition of Poland."
The occasion was a report on the Poznanian events submitted to
the Berlin National Assembly by a special committee of inquiry.
The main theme of this article and of the following ones on the
Poznanian question was that the partition of Poznania was in the
interest of Prussia, not of Germany.
Engels accused the Prussian government of having
betrayed the Poles in Poznania and the German Revolution.

He

admitted that the Prussian liberal ministry under Camphausen
had been willing to support the liberation of the Poles in
Poznania.

But it was not determined enough to defend its position

against the reactionary landowners and the generals who demanded
the suppression of the Polish movement in Poznania.

The

vacillating Prussian policy led to the Poznanian insurrection
in April.

Although this "civil war" was actually forced upon

the Prussian ministry by the bureaucrats, the ministry was
ultimately responsible because it had failed to remove the
supporters of the Prussian Monarchy.
Engels accused the bureaucrats of using the uprising
of the Poles to regaj_n their powerful position, even at the
price of slaughtering the people, a job which was carried out
by the Prussian soldiers.

Engels spoke with sarcasm of: their

services to the counterrevolution.

The soldiers performed
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''heroic deeds • • • not during the war • • •
war."

but

after the

Engels declared that the cruelties perpetrated by the

Prussian soldiers against the Poles were only equalled by the
atrocities of the Thirty Years' War.

He even pitied the

persecuted priests although they ranked normally among the top
reactionaries against whom terrorism was advocated.

On July 8

-

NRZ called the suppresion of the Poznanian uprising a ''fanatic.al

war of exte_rmination conducted by the Christian-Germanic race
together with the :profit-hungry Jews against the

Poles-~·a

fight

of absolutism and bureaucracy against democracy."
~

did not mention that the Polish landowners in

Poznania h.si.d also sided with the Prussian reactionaries.

Even

·before the outbreak of the April insurrection they he.d appealed
to the Prussian government for support against the restless
peasants who attacked the estates.
policies.
Poles.

-

But NRZ did not denounce their

It evaded in general derogatory statements about the

Thus, a picture of strong contrasts emerged from the

reports on

Poznanj~a.

On the one side stood the reactionary

pO\'lex·-hungry Prussians, on the other, the lj_berty-loving Poles.
A discussion of social tensions in Poznania was not undertaken.
Prussj_a was blamed for having disrogci.rded justice and the rights
of the Polish :people in Poznania.

It failed to honor the

principle that political relations must be governed by the moral
law.

r
135
Engels was particularly critical of the manner in which
the whole question of the reorganization of Poznania was handled
bY the Prussian King.

When on April 24, 1848 Frederick William IV

·ordered the partition of Poznania, he acted independently as if
the Berlin and Frankfurt Assemblies did not exist.

The same was

true with regard to the proclamations of General Ernest v. Pfuel
of May 12 and June 4 which limited Polish autonomy to an
increasingly smaller area of the Grand Duchy.

Engels considered

this procedure as a perfidious manoeuvre to push. the borders of
the reorganized Grand Duchy ever further east until its autonomy
would finally be liquidated.

Engels did not mention that the

partition cf Poznania was actually supported by the growing
German opposition to the radical Polish demands for the
restoration of the western Polish borders of 1772.
According to Engels the Prussian officials had falsified
the number of Poles and Germans living in Poznania in order to
support the manoeuvres of the Prussian government.

They claimed

that 50% of the people who lived in the districts which had been
incorporated into Prussia were Germans.

Engels used the

information submitted by the Polish Archbishop of Gniezno and
Poznania Leon

Przy~uski

to the Prussian government to criticize

the Prussian official statistical data.

Archbishop Przyluski

stated that 1,200,000 people lived in the Grand Duchy.
250,000 were Germans and Jews.

About

Of these only about 100,000
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"mostly Jews and recent German emigrants," were anti-Polish.
The Poles were definitely in the majority.

On the basis of this

information Engels assumed that only 24% Germans lived in the
incorporated districts.

Many months later he spoke of only 6%.5 2

He insisted that the number of Germans had been artificially
increased by counting also the Jews who were not Germans.

The

Germans were ridiculed because they had fraternized with the Jews
for the sake of keeping Poznania, and the Jews were condemned
because they had placed themselves on the side of reaction.
Whenever there was an opportunity,

~

supported the

opposition of the left wing in the Berlin Assembly to the
Poznanian policies of Prussia.

The causes of the insurrection

·in Poznania remained a controversial issue in the Assembly.

When

the Poznanian question was debated in the Assembly on July 4,
the left wing agreed with the Polish delegates that the insurrect·
vras not caused by a deep hatred between Poles and Germans but
rather by the agitation of the reactionaries who stirred the two
nationalities into fighting one another.

The left wing demanded

a new investigation of the whole matter.

On the same day a

resolution was passed that a commission be appointed to investigci.te
the ca.uses of the Poznanian insurrection.

~'

which sided vlith

the left wing, commented that this inquiry was an "urgently
necessary act of justice towards the Poles."
--..._.__,--~·----

52NRZ, April 29, 1849.
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Although

~

supported the attacks of the democrats

against the Prussian policies in Poznania, it criticized their
demands for the liberation of Poznania as being too moderate.
The democrats, who defended the right to national self-determina ·
demanded that the Poznanians should be granted the liberty to
exercise this right.

They opposed the demarcation line in

Poznania because it was drawn by the Pr·ussian government, not by
the people..
Assembly

During the debates on Poznania in the Frankfurt

(July 25-27,· 1848),the democrats defended this position

against the majority of the delegates who desired to safeguard
German national as well as strategical interests.
The debates were occasioned by a motion of the Committee
on International Law to ratify the resolutions of the Federal
Diet of April 22 and May 2, 1848 on Poznania and to incorporate
..

the predominantly German part of the Grand Duchy into the German
Federal Union.

The supporters of the partition of Poznania,

mainly conservatives and liberals, referred to the necessity to
defend the German eastern borders and to unite half a million
Germans, who lived in the Grand Duchy, with their fatherland.
Jordan

criti~ized

the democrats for their willingness to

sacrifice vital German interests.

According to him the German

part of Poznania belonged to Germany by the same right by which
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pomerani.a had once belonged to Poland--namely, by "the right. of
the stronger, by the right of conquest. 11 53
The Polish delegates from Poznania defended the integrity
.of the Grand Duchy.
arbitrary act.

They called the partition of Poznania an

The partition could not be defended on the basis

of the nationality principle because the German minority did not
live together in a compact group.

Besides, even if the Poles

were willing to agree to border rectifications, only the
government of a restored Poland could make the final decision.
Meanwhile, the Vienna treaties remained in force, and these
treaties had recognized the historical right of the Poles to
Poznania.

Even the Prussian King had acknowledged this right

.when he issued a proclamation guaranteeing the preservation of the

Pol:ish ~ationality. 5I+
The democrats opposed an immediate decision on Poznania.
They called for a new impartial inquiry into the Poznanian
question and a popular vote in Poznania.

A European Congress

should act as the arbiter in the Poznanian question.
The majority in the Frankfurt Assembly rejected a
postponement of the decision on Poznania.

On July 27 the majority

53§ten~ischer Bericht, II, 1146.
54~.; II, 1166-69.
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sided with the right wing which had desired an immediate decision.
The resolution of the Federal Diet of May 2, which confirmed the
Prussian partition of the Grand Duchy, was carried by 342 votes
·against 31, with another 31 registered as abstaining, and 157
as absent.

Sixty-nine of those who had voted for the delaying

motion declared that since their demand for a further inquiry had
been rejected, their conscience did not permit them to vote on
data which.they considered insufficient.55
On that same day the democratic representatives in the
Frankfurt Assembly protested against the nnew partition of .
Polandn which was decreed without having held "definite inquiries"
into the n~tional origin of the inhabitants of Poznania.56
On August 1 the Manifesto addressed to the Polish people
by the democratic Central Committee in Cologne condemned Prussia
and Austria for not having liberated the Poles.

Simultaneously,

the Poles were urged to give up the historical-right principle
with respect to Poznania.

They should agree to the application

of the democratic principle of national self-determination to this

province.

A just German-Polish border could only be drawn if

the people in Poznania were granted the right to decide freely on
their national status.

A European Congress should act as an

arbiter in the Poznanian question.57

551.Ei.£.'

1238.
56NRZ, August 3, 1848.
p.

-

57Ib:i.c1., August 10, 18lt-8 ..
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Engels sided with the democratic opposition to the
decision of the Frankfurt Assembly on the Grand Duchy.

However,

be did not identify his own position on the Poznanian question
with that of the democrats.

As in the case of the question of

Polish restoration, he steered an independent course.

He attacked

both the supporters and opponents of the new demarcation line in
Poznania.

In his first article on the Frankfurt debates, Engels
told the story of a priest who acted .the· part of a benefactor
for birds whose wings he had mutilated.
Prussia applied a similar method.

According to Engels

First, Prussia. deprived the

Polish peasants of their independence, and then it posed as their
.benefactor who had improved their lot.58

Engels ridiculed the

Prussian bureaucrats because they were suprised when the peasants
58Cf. Engels's reluctance to acknowledge any benefits of
Prussian rule in Poznania with the statements of the English
historian John H.. Clapham. He said that the absolutely landless
peasant was rare in the Prussian Kingdom, and that the Prussian
peasants were better off than the Polish peasants in Poznania in
the eighteenth century. 11 The Polish peasant had no rights. His
land, his goods, his services were all at the lord's disposal • • •
It is probable that he found the Prussian government an
11
improvement on his ORTI, even before Prussia began the €mancipation.
Clapham said that for political reasons "the Polish peasantry
in Poznania were sedulously protected, and their position improved
in every way after 1815. These poor folks were not dreaming of
their lost kings. 11 Clapham called the Prussj_an policy "an
interesting case of calculated humanity" which aimed at the
weakening of the· Polish landowners. John H. Clapham, The Ec~1?~~..2..1.QJ?_in.§llLof F~~..2.~.....§~.~d_5}er1(~l1Y 1 81 5-1 fil (Cam bridge : 'l'nc
Univ0rsity Press, 1945), pp. 39, 44.
·
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participated in the Poznanian uprising.

The bureaucrats should

have known that "nothing compensates for the loss of national
independence, not even the help offered to or forced upon the
·people. u59
Engels's statement that national liberty was the highest
good and that no material betterment could make up for its loss
can hardly be taken seriously.

It clashed with Engels's

rejection of a basic right to national independence.

This fact

has to be taken into consideration when attempting to evaluate
Engels's agitation for the complete surrender of Poznania to
the Poles.

Otherwise, the illusions about the sincerity of his

agitation will be perpetuated, notwithstanding the fact that in

1851 Engels himself destroyed this illusion.

The support of the

surrender of Poznania was a political expedient to fight
monarchist Prussia, the 1',rankfurt Assembly, and the democrats.
The arguments used in the Frank.furt debates that the
Germans had a right to Poznanj.a because they were more civilized
than the Poles offered Engels a convenient basis of attack.

Engel"'

ridiculed the Germans for their superiority complex towards the
Slavs which was not justified, particularly not with regard to
the Poles.

The German emigrants had not promoted any political,

cultural, or

________

.,.

eco~omic

progress.

-

59NRZ, August 9, 1848.

l

Engels also rejected the need for military security
and the historical-right principle.

He called this principle

"a garbage doctrine" which the autocrat Frederick II had used to
defend his claim to the Netze district.
in 1848.

However, it was obsolete

The democratic revolution should not be concerned with

historical rights or wrongs but with the liberation of the
oppressed.

As to the question of military security, the eastern

German bord.er was safe without the possession of the fortresses
of Poznania, Kuestrin, Bromberg, and Glogau.
Engels was particularly opposed to the application of
the nationality principle in Poznania.

He maintained that the

Germans and the Jews, who had lived for centuries among the Poles,
·had become de facto Polish citizens.
of a Polish-German lord er problem.

He denied the existence

Yet, on another occasion he

admitted to its existence and expressed the belief that this
problem could be solved by a reasonable approach.
According to Engels the supporters of the partltion
of Poznania did not defend German but Prussian interests.

For

decades the Prussian treasury had immensely profited from the
confiscati.on of lands belonging either to the Catholic Church
or to the Polish aristocracy.

Most of these confiscated lands

were situated within the incorporated area.

The new border line

was not determined by "the demands of this or that nationality"
or by "so-called strategical reasons."

It was determined by "the
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position of the domains, the greed of the Prussian government,"
and by the desire of the Prussian aristocracy to get "a splendid
estate for nothing."

The new border, said Engels, safeguarded

the economic interests of reactionary Prussia and helped to
strengthen that state.GO
In Engels opinion the ratification of the partition
of Poznania proved that the Frankfurt Assembly had been unable
to assert j_ts independence from the reactionary forces in Prussia.

Under the influence of Prussia, Frankfurt decided against a
democratic Germany.

This sj_tuation would continue as long as

Prussia and Russia were united in the common desire to keep Poland
divided.
the

The victory of democracy was only possible through

res~oration

of Poland which would destroy Russia and also the

Prussian and Austrian Monarchies whose strength depended upon
·-

Russian support.
While l"l""RZ followed the debates on the Poznanian question
in Frankfurt with an intense interest, it paid little attention

to the development in the Berlin Assembly where the left wing
.
-~ 60'.fbid:.., August 12, 1848. Cf. the view of the Germe.n
historian M. Laubert who also maintained that Prussia's interest
in Poznan5.a was mainly of an economic nature. Laubert mentj_oned
the expropriation of the Polish aristocracy by the Prussian
government since the time of Frederick the Great and the attempt
of the government to gain the support of the Polish peasants and
~he bourgeoisie.
Germanization was merely a result of the
immediate aim to increase the income of the Prussian state. M.

Laubert, _l2;1§.....J?!..£2:~~i.§.9jie Pol~~.1.91 !±. (3d ed. ;
Craco\7: Hurgverlag, 19441; pp. 103 f:f.
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was stronger.

Berlin was not willing to ratify the decision of

the Frankfurt Assembly on Poznania.
attitude

to~ards

Frankfurt.

It adopted a defiant

On October 19 and 23, 1848 the Berlin

Assembly resumed the debates on the Poznanian question which ended
with a victory of the left wing by a one vote majority.

The new

demarcation line was considered as "unfair and completely
arbitrary. 1161 The democrats proclaimed· that the Prussian National
Assembly war:> more democratic than the Frankfurt Assembly.
acknowledged the

democ~atic

It had

principle that the sovereignty of

each nation should be respected.

Apparently

the enthusiasm of the democrats.

On October 22 and 26 !!.E& briefly

reported on. the debates vrl thou t any comment.

~

did not share

After this crisis

the interest in the Poznanian question subsided.

In the meantime,

the Vienna uprising in early October, 1848 had turned the attention
of NRZ to the events in the Austrian Empire.
It is interesting that in NRZ's agitation for the
destruction of the Austrian Empire, the Galician question did not
play the same role as the Poznanian question in the fight against
Prussia.

Although

~

repeatedly stated that the destruction of

Austria was as necessary as the destruction of Prussia to free
Germany from the Russian yoke, neither Austria nor the Frankfurt
Assembly were attacked for not having decreed the liberation of

t

Galicia.

l

6Tcf. Sten~f-12hische Berj.chte der Preussischen NationalJ!.ersai~:...I'll, 16', f rf;-qu"obd in B:le""Ck, )lP·-~~· 55.
-

~

limited itself to reporting news about Galician

r~-------...
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events, rarely accompanied by any comments.

This was another

.indication that the Poznanian question was mainly a convenient
propaganda means because it was a much more explosive question
in Germany.
After the outbreak. of the German revolutionary movement
no uprising had occurred in Gaiicia.

The Poles had merely

addressed petitions to the Austrian Emperor for Polish autonomy
in Galicia and to the Frankfurt Vor-Parlament for the immediate
surrender of Gaiicia.

The.ir conviction that the whole Galician

province was Polish was contested by the Galician Ukranians
(then called Ruthenians) who addressed separate petitions to
"'"'.,... ttn. • .a.""',...-.; ... ._11 _ ...
62
Ji. ..... _ _ _ _

-~·

J.""4.".U.V..U..J.-~

"""'W."VUV~ •

The f.ight between Poles and Galician Ukranians vra.s
continued at the first Pan-Slav Congress in Prague (June 1-12,
1848).

The Poles tried to convince the Ukranian delegates :from

Galicia that in the future a restored Poland would avoid the
mistakes of the old Polish Republic which had been a federation

62For information on the Galician question in 1848

cf. the treat.ise of Ivan Bryk "Slavjanskyj Kongress v Prasi
v 1848 i ukraDiska sprava" ('.'The Slav.ic Congress of Prague in
1848 and the Ukranian Question"), CXXIX (1919), 141-217. This
treatise is most useful because Bryk extensively quoted from
documents which are no longer available.

l ____________.
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only in name. It would become a true federation based on "general
liberty. 116 3 But the Ukrainian delegates remained hostile.
Ivan Borisikevich, a leader of the Ukrainian movement
in Galicia, made a strong statement against the restoration of
the Polish borders of 1772.

He said that the Ukrainians, because

of their memories of Polish oppression, did not wish to become
members of a restored Poland.

He

agitated for the liberation

of the two .and one half million Galician Ukrainians from Polish
rule and for their recognition as a separate nationality.

The

ul tirna te goal of the "Ruthenia.n movement, 11 which had originated
early in the nineteenth century as a cultural movement, was the
reunion of the Galician with the Ea.stern Ukrainians (then called
·Little Russians) and the formation of a separate nation of "fiftee
million" people free from Polish or Russian over lordship. 6Lr
,!'IR~

repeatedly covered news on the tensions between the

Poles and the GC3.lician Ukrainians due to the
movement.

11

Ruthenian" national

But in this connection NRZ never referred to the

arguments used at the Prague Congress.
Polish position.

NRZ strictly defended the

The "Ruthenians" v1ere attacked for being anti-

Polish, pro-Russian, and narrow nationalists who had n.o other
T5Cf. th; speech of Prince Lubomirski, the Polish delegate
to the h""'ague Congress, June 1 , l 8L1-8, Narodni Nowin;r (National
News [Galicia] ), No. 52, 181+8, quoted1nB'.rylt,- pp. 189-190.
64
.
.
~ryk, pp. 180, 190.
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desire than to safeeuard the

"I~uthenian"

nationality.

The

11Ruthenian 11 movement we.s ridiculed because priests and peasants
who participated i.n it relied upon "religion and fanaticism" to
attain their nationalist goal.

In some instances ,!!RZ printed

information that the movement was exploited by the Austrian
government as a convenient means to fight the more radical Poles,
in others that the movement had been artificially created by
the Austrian government for that same purpose.
Most other news about Galicia consisted Of rumors or
speculations about a Russian invasion of the province and its
effect upon Silesia.

Nowever,

~did

not undertake a propaganda

campaign for the independence of Galicia.

At the time of the

Vienna insurrection early in October, when Polish hopes for the
liberation of Galicia flared up again,
the separation of Galicia from Austria.

~

did not agitate for

It me.Lely reported the

excitement which the Vienna·insurrection had caused in Cracow.
also published a Polish

£1~nifesto,

It

issued in Vienna, which appealed

to all the Poles to fight together with the Viennese insurgents
for the liberty of Poland and all the oppressed peoples.

Even

when tho war between Hungary and Austria had started in December,

1848, ~ only speculated that a closer Hungarian-Polish
collaboration might lead to a Polish insurrection in Galicia and
o the defeat of the Austr:Lans.

During the early months of

181~9

news about a growing opposition to the oppressive

!'
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policies of the Austrian government in Galicia (Lwow and Cracow).
In January, 1849 Austria declared a state of siege in Galicia; in
February it threatened with an enforced recruitment; in March it
imposed a new Constitution.
issue of it.

But NRZ did not make a special

Even when early in May, 1849 NRZ expected a Russian

invasion of Hungary, it did not agitate for a Polish uprising
in Galicia.
It. is significant that Engels, who extensively discussed

the Poznanian question'in
on Galicia.

~'

did not write a major article

This proves the priority of the Poznanian question

in the revolutionary strategy of

~·

The Poznanian question was

connected with Prussia, and Prussia was still considered as the
barometer of the German Revolution.

Consequently, all the

problems of Prussia had to be fully exploited to further internal
conflicts in that state.
The Slavic Question in the Austrian

~

The development of the Poznanian question, which

~'

had followed with an intense interest, belonged to the larger
problem of the future extension of the political borders of a
united Germany.

It was, therefore, part of the explosive question

of German rule over alien peoples.
A majority in the Vor-.!_>.§rlament and in the Frankfurt
National Constituent Assembly supported the creation of

Q[Q.§...Sdeutschl-2:,D.£, .including Austria and its Slavic dependencies.
The

gr_9~i§ldeutsche

aemocrats. 65

solution was also favored by a majority of the

Only a minority, led by Arnold Ruge, genuinely

adhered to the nationality principle.

They demanded that the

right to national self-determination should be granted to all
the peoples under German rule and also to the Austro-Slavs.

They

considered the recognition of this right as the prerequisite for
the creation of a European federation.

The ,g_rossdeutsche question

contributed to an even ·larger degree than the Poznanian question
to dissension in the ranks of the democrats.
Marx and Engels had fought the democratic principle,, of
national self-determination before the Revolution.

They fought

this principle even rnoro strenuously in 184-8-49, not only because
they supported the surrender of Poznania to the Poles but because
the creation of QE.2._12,§.9._eutschland was at stake.
who supported the

e;ros_§§!uts~

Marx and Engels,

solution, opposed the wishes of

the democratic minority for the liberation of the Austro-Slavs.
discussion of this controversy regarding the right to national
self-determination in relation to the Austro-Slav question helps
to throw light on Marx's and Engels's arbitrary handling of the
question of national liberty.

It reinforces the doubts as to the

Sincerity of their declarations in favor of Poznania, and it
a now objective of their pro-Polish agitation.

A
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The def enders of the ,grossdeutsche solution in the
Frankfurt Assembly were merely willing to guarantee the equality
of all the non-Germans in a united Germany.

On May 31, at the

tenth session of the Frankfurt Assembly, a motion was introduced
that Germany should not oppress any nationality.

Thereupon, a

resolution was passed which guaranteed equality of civil rights
to all the non-Germans in a united Germany and "the use of their
own language--as far as it extends territorially--in religion,
education, literature, and the internal and judicial administration.1166

This resolution did not satisfy all the democrats.

Early in June the democratic members of the Frankfurt
Assembly led by Arnold Ruge published a Ma_nifesto which demanded
liberation of the individual as well as of nations, condemned
the conquest and oppression of Germany's neighbors, and supported
the creation of a European federation of
to safeguard liberty and unity.

11

free and equal nations 11

The "Holy Alliance of the peoples 11

was to j_nc1ude not only a restored Poland but all the "democratic
Slavs. 11 67
On June 7, at the thirteenth session of the Frankfurt
Assembly, the democrat Ruge returned to these demands.
declared:

--55':--

§ten9.i~~his ch~!._

BericJ~t,

I, 183.

67 Cf. l".ianJ-.f.£.~.£, in NR~, June 6, 184-8.
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The territorial and nationality problems belong to
the despotic times. All the peoples should be
permitted to organize and fraternize as freely as
·possible.68
The Germans should grant independence to all the Slavs under
German rule and collaborate with them on the basis of equality.
~

printed the declarations of the democrats on the

nationality question--but v1ithout any comments.

This indicate.d

that the editors did not wish to identify themselves with the
democratic

~iewpoint

that each nation had a right to liberty and

that all the Slavs should enjoy this right.
From the outset occasj_onal statements in

~

revealed

that the editors were not opposed to the conquest of foreign
nations provided that the conquering nation was more progressive.

In June, when NRZ repeatedly condemned the Germans for the
oppression of their neighbors, it also rejoiced that the German
military campaign against the Danes for the incorporation of
Schleswig-Holstein might soon end vri th a German victory and German
rule over the Danes.

According to

~

this would be a blessing

because the Danes were more couterrevolutionary than the Germans.
The Danes were still immersed in their Nordic past which they
glorified, and all the social clo.sses wore imbued with "an
unshakable loyalty to the princes."

The Germans were "frivolous,

civilized Frenchmen'' compared to these "upright barbarians. 116 9

"b8Ste~gr_~__h;Lscher Beri£h!, I,
69
~, June 29, 18L18.
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Several months later NRZ declared that the
least made a revolution and had progressed.
against Denmark was justified.

war" of the Germans.

Germans~had

at

Therefore, the war

It was "the first revolutionary

Under German rule Schleswig-Holstein would

be drawn into the revolutionary movement and freed from a sterile

union with the backward northern nations.
Germany takes Schleswig by the same right, by which
the Frenchmen have taken Flanders, Lorraine, and
Alsace--by the right of civilization over barbarism,
of progress over backwardness.70
"The right of historical development," not treaties, counted in
international relations.
Finally, in February, 1849 the editors pronounced a
full~scale

condemnation of the democratic principle that each

nation had a basic right to liberty and self-determination.

They

declared that "justice and other moralistic principles" did not
count in the relations between nations if progress was at stake.
As an example they mentioned the conquest of California and Texas
by

the United States of America.

This conquest was not a crime.

It vms in "the interest of civilization. 11

Tho Americans, who were

more progressive than the Mexicans, initiated a. splendid
development of the conquered territories which fully justified
. 1a·ion
t.
i~
•
•
d epen d.ence. 7 l
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7 l Ibi_9:_. , February 15, 18L;. 9.
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The editors of

~

treated the question of national

liberty in an arbitrary manner.
a principle.

To them national liberty was not

But whether they made statements in favor of

national liberty or against it, they always aimed at furthering
the Revolution.

They reverted to the Hegelian idea that the

nation was the carrier of historical development, and that the
historical right was on the side of the progressive nation.

In

their propaganda the progressive nation was revolutionary, and
the backward natj.on reactionary.

This theory placed a limitation on the right to national
liberty.

It also lent itself to a very arbitrary application.

It might be conveniently used either to support the liberation
of a nation or to justify conquest and the overlordship of one
nation over another in the name of progress or revolution.

The

editors of NRZ applied this theory to defend the restoration of
Poland
Empire.

e.s

vrell as to condemn the Slavic movement in the Austrian
They took an extremist position and would neither grant

autonomy to the Slavs nor the right to preserve their own
cultural traditions.

Marx and Engels supported the complete

absorpt:Lon of the Austro-Slavs through Germanization.

Their

position was even more radical than that of the liberals, not
to speak of the democrats.
The Vor-Parlament had invited the Czechs (then called

Bohemians) to send delegates to Frankfurt.

But the Czechs

refused to do so.

They became the most active supporters of the

creation of an Austro-Slav state in whj_ch all the nationalities,
Germans and Slavs, would enjoy equal rj_gh ts.

They initiated the

preparations for the first Pan-Slav-Congress at Prague.

At this

Congress the question of Austro-Slavism was discussed.
From the beginning the Polish radicals and conservatives
opposed the political concept of Austro...;Slavism.
the creation of Grossdeutschla!!Q in Frankfurt.

They supported
They hoped that

·n return the provisional German government would grant Galicia
independence.

The realization of an Austro-Slav state would

have precluded the fulfillment of Polish aspirations in Galicia.
The Poles were convinced that Austro-Slavism was "a declaration
of war against Poland" concocted by the Czechs to prevent the

estoration of the historical Polish borders and to destroy Polish
72
leadership among the Austro-Slavs.
They agreed only reluctantly

to participate in the Pan-Slav Congress.
The Czechs, in tux·n, displayed much animosity against
the Poles.

They ridiculed Polish claims to the historical borders

of 1772 as outdated.73

Besides, they supported the demand of the

·7zCf. Mlnutes of the Preparatory Commj_ttee, May 5, 18li-8, i
ational Archi veso1'- :Clie Czecfl Flu~seum inl-Tague ;-quoted j_n Bryk,
l.>· 152--;--andEdmund Chojecki, Rer1~..ic;Pisci i s·Y..;.?.P.1.1ictwa wstecz.ne
("The Revolutionaries and the Upposit1on 11T\13er'Ii11: ~
p. 306, quoted in Bryk, p. 153.
·
73cf. article of a Czech correspondent, published

in

arodaj.. Novi:Q.): (Nati opal News), reprinted in Dz1:_~:qnj-Js_ 1'{?-F.?.d~y;'l,
People"TSDaily [Lwow] ), No. 47, May 18, 184F," quoted in Bryk,
• 158.
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Galician Ukrainians to be recognized as a separate nationality.
The Galician Ukrainians, on the other hand, favored the Czech
concept of an Austro-Slav state as a means to liberate themselves
·from Polish rule.
Silesia.

The Czechs also opposed the Polish claim to

They considered Silesia as rightfully theirs.

Territorial problems helped to undermine unity at the Prague
Congress.

When the Congress was dissolved because of the radical

Prague uprj_sing on June 12, 1848, no real progress had been made
in the direction of Au'stro-Slavism.74
~

hardly commented on this Congress.

The editors

made no attempt to exploit Slavic agitation against German rule
at the Prague Congress although in June their propaganda campaign
against_German oppression of the neighboring peoples was most
intense.

In some isolated statements the Austro-Slavs were

ridiculed for their political ambitions.

NRZ maintained that

the

Austro-Slavs wished to create a new European power between Russia
and Germany through the organization of a "great Slavic state
bordered by the Riesengebirge, the Carpathian Mountains, the
Adriatic Sea, and the BaJ.kans."75

But the Austro-Slavs would be

too weak to realize this plan against the opposition of Russia,
Hungary, and Germany.
774For further information on the Prague Congress cf. Hans
Ko~n, Pan-~vis~~ It?_History a~d I1eolo~z (Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of--rr0tre Dame Press, 1953 , pp. 65-74.
75NRZ, June 9, 1848.
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In NRZ's opinion the whole concept of Austro-Slavism
was reactionary.

The Austro-Slavs were accused of merely

supporting the Austrian Monarchy in order to further their
narrow nationalist aims.

O\'m

The Czechs, in particular, were attacked

Although the Prague uprising was hailed as a revolutionary event,
soon afterwards the Czechs were dubbed counter-revolutionaries
whose fate it was to be exterminated by· the Revolution.
to

~'

According

Cro.atian support of the Austrian government 1 s fight

against the Hungarian independence movement was merely another
proof that the Austro-Slavs preferred the Austrian yoke to
liberty.
Actually it was not so much a question for NRZ whether
the Austro-Slavs were revolutionary or reactionary, but rather
how the creation of a strong Germany would be furthered.

The

policies of the Austro-Slavs, which aimed at safeguarding the
integrity of Austria, were a hind1·ance to the gross_geutsche
solutj.on.

Consequently,

.fillli advised the radicals against any

support of the Austro-Slavs.

~

favored the Hungarian

independence movement because the Hungarians were for the
destruction of the Austrian Empire.
Repeatedly

I!fili pointed out that the Hungarians were as

worthy of collaboration with the Germans as the Poles.
Hungarians were revolutionary and pro-German.

The

On August 11 NRZ

referred to debates in the Hungarian House of Representatives

,.
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which disclosed that the Hungarians were anxious to support the
German cause and to collaborate with revolutionary Germany.7 6 One
of the deputies declared:
the heart of Europe.
bearer."

"I consider Germany as the torch in

Hungary will play the part of the torch-

This was the role which NRZ ascribed to the Hungarians.
At the time of the Vienna uprising in October, 1848,

when the Hungarians made an attempt to collaborate with the
Viennese

in~urgents,

and particularly after the outbreak of the

Hungarian war against Austria, NRZ's enthusiasm for the Hungarian
cause kept rising.

Meanwhile, the immediate interest of NRZ

in the Polish cause was pushed more and more into the background.
However, NRZ continued to praise the Poles for their

-

.

support of the Viennese insurgents and the Hungarian war, and for
their opposition to Austro-Slavism.

On November 9 NRZ referred to

a recent article against Austro-Slavism published in the Polish
newspaper hvow Gazeta Powszechna (General Gazette of Lwow).

The

article declared that the Poles had acquiesced in the idea of a
federo.l Austro-Slav Monarchy in order to prepare the political
independence of Galicia.

The Poles withdrew their support of this

idea when the Austrian. government made no attempt to realize it.
~

commented that the Poles, with the exception of a few

"fanatics~

7bcf. th~ information on the readiness of the Hungarians
to support the grossdel!_ts,ch.~ solution, in A. J. -!'· Taylor, The
~bsburt)_ Monarcny 1809-191 ~~(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948),
p.

4-5.

4
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were not interested in the survival of the Habsburg Empire.

They

did not join the imperial camp "with beating drums" like the
Slavic deputies at the time or' the Vienna uprising.

NRZ hailed

the Poles as the only revolutionaries among the Austro-Slavs.
Towards the end of 1848

~began

to report about the

rising opposition among the Austro-Slavs to the Austrian
government which had not kept its promise to grant equal rights
to the Slavic nationalities.

NRZ hoped that the growing unrest

might develop into a new crisis and contribute to the fall of
the Austrian Empire.

This hope was also nursed by the Polish

democrats.
On January 22

~

published a Manifesto of the Central

Committee of the Polish Democratic Society in Paris which was
addressed to the Slavs and signed by the Polish democrats Ludvlik
Mierosrawski, Stanislaw Worcell, and V/ojciech Darasz.

In this

Manifesto the dissatisfied Austro Slavs were warned not to ally
0

with the "Muscovites" against the Austrian government which had
betrayed them.

They were urged to collaborate with the Poles

for the restoration of Poland.

This would be the only means to

destroy the Austrian rule over tho Slavs and to create a

free

Slavic union.
~

published the

Mani~

without comment.

editors no doubt disliked Polish support of the
the Austro-Slavs.

But the Manifesto vras useful.

The

independ~nce

of

It supported

,.
159

the opinion of the NRZ editors that the Austrian Empire was
rapidly moving towards a new crisis because of the rising
unrest of the Austro-Slavs which occured at a time when Austria
was faced with the Hungarian war.
However,~

did not agitate for a close collaboration

of the Austro-Slavs with the Poles or Hungarians or even with the
German revolutionaries to hasten this event.

It merely continued

to report a,bout Slavic unrest which became very serious when a
new Austrian constitution was imposed upon the Austro-Slavs in
March, 1849.

At that time NRZ called the Slavic opposition to

the government "the third disorganizing element" which, along
with the Hl.lngarian and Italian wars, condemned Austria to an
imminent end.
What the fate of the Austro-Slavs would be in case of
the fall of the Austrian Monarchy, Engels had outlined in a series
of articles published in February, 1849.
weeks of 1849,

when~

In those early

rejoiced over the growing opposition of

the Austro-Slavs to the Austrian government, Engels pronounced
the most absolute condemnation of their aspirations to national
liberty.
Engels used his articles to attack the policies of
Arnold Ruge and, in particular, of Michael Bakunin, the political

r
___
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opponents of Marx and Engels since 184l1.• 77

As was mentioned

earlier, a German democratic minority defended the liberation
of the Austro-Slavs and German collaboration with them on the
basis of equality.

They considered the Slavic question as "the
vital question of the Revolution. 11 78 Bakunin maintained the
same position.
After the outbreak of the German Revolution, Bakunin
had continued his propaganda for the destruction of the Austrian
Empire and the liberat1on of the Austro-Slavs as a major step
towards the creation of a new Europe, along with the destruction
of Tsarist Russia.

As one of the tvro Russian participants in the

Prague Congress, Bakunin became the most determined opponent of
the political concept of Austro-Slavism.79

He also sided with the

Poles in their fight for the integrity of Galicia and its eventual
reunion with the liberated Poland although he fought the Polish
claim to the eastern borders of 1772. 80
'17Marx and Engels, who disliked Bakunin, welcomed the
repeated accusations that Bakunin was a Russian spy. Already in a
letter of September 16, 1848 Engels had informed Marx that Bakunin
was strongly under the suspicion of being a Russian spy. Cf.
Bakunin, Confession, p. 62. In the summer of 1848 NRZ published
such sland.er.--- ·
78cr. Man:Lfesto of the democrats in the Frankfurt
Assembly, ~' June 6, - 184-8.
79Bakunin, £2P.. f,e_?sion, p. 139.
80
The Polish historian Boleslav Limanowski insisted that
Bakunin tried to dissuade the Galician Ukrain~ans from agitating
for a partition of Galicia because this wo~ld support the desire
Of th0 ;,ustrian government to weaken the Slavic cause
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In the autumn of 1848 Bakunin composed an !J2peal to the
Slavs at the invitation of the Berlin d0mocrats.

In this

pamphlet he continued his agitation for the liberation of the
Austro-Slavs.

He defended the democratic

principl~

of national

self-determination and demanded that it should be applied to the
Austro-Slavs.

He railed against the old diplomacy which had

drawn frontiers without considering the· wishes of the people.
Future bord.ers ought to be determined "by the sovereign will of
the nations on the basis of their national origin. 1181 But when
Bakunin touched upon the Galician question, he did not defend the
right of the non-Polish inhabitants to national self-determinat:inn.
He merely expressed the opinion that the Polish landovmers were
ndemocratically inclined and inspired by the spirit of liberty. 11
Engels began his polemic against the Austro-Slavs with
an attackagainst the conviction of Bakunin and the German
strengthen the-Pan-Slav aims of the Tsar. Cf. Limanowski,
democrac;rfu pols~i.e,j,, p. 200. The Ukrainian Ivan Bryk
maincairiee.r"fha-ti.ta unin supported the Ukrainian demands which
weakened the Polish position. Cf. Bryk, op. cit., p. 206.
Unfortunately, his sources are no longer avafia6Ie. There is no
evidence that Bakunin stated that the Poles had a right to the
Galician Ukraine. It is quite possible that he tried to keep
both parties of the controversy in a friendly mood by supporting
Officially the Polish viewpoint and in private discussions with
Borisikevich, with whom he was on good terms, the Ukrainian
position.

and

~a

81

Josef ·Pfitzner, Bakuninstudien (Prague: 1932), p. 102,
quoted in Hepner, Bakounine et' le panslavisme revolutionnaire,
p. 267.
-
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democrats that democratic governments would end national
oppression by applying the democratic principle of national selfdetermination.
unfounded.

Engels maintained that this contention was wholly

The subjugation of nations was not merely the work

of "despotic congresses" as Bakunin had maintained.

Even the

democratic United States of America had not refrained from
conquering Mexican territory, and that conquest was justified
from the vi_ewpoint of progress.
According to Engels such terms as humanity, liberty,
equality, fraternity, and independence, which Bakunin had used
in his .6JJ..P_Q_al, had no meanj.ng at all.
They are more or less moralistic categories which are
high-sounding but prove nothing in historical and
political questions.82
Nations were on different levels of development.

The conquest and

assimilation of more backward neighbors was necessary to further
progress.
Without force and without iron ruthlessness, nothing
is accomplished in history; and if Alexander, Caesar,
and Napoleon had been capable of compa.ssion • • • what
would have become of history.83
According to Engels the whole principle of national selfdetermination was unrealistic.

History taught that the higher

- 02 NRZ':-February 15, 181+9.

83lli£.
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developed nation had a right to rule the leis developed one.
Although the Austro-Slavs were not fully Germanized, the
application of the nationality principle to them was not
defendable.
Engels rejected Bakunin's claim, shared by Ruge, that
the subjugation of the Austro-Slavs by the Germans was a crime.
He adopted the popular argument, which he had earlier ridiculed
that the Germans had fulfilled
Slavs.

~a

civilizing mission among the

He declared that the Slavs had little inclination towards

the trades.

While the Slavs were predominantly involved in

agricultural activities, the Germans contributed to the development of towns and a bourgeoisie vrhich meant progress.

Under

German rule the Austro-Slavs were enabled to participate in a
higher civilization.
..

Engels pointed out that history taught that small
nationalities could only share in historical progress as members
of large political units.

The Pan-Slavs who demanded the

liberation of the nhalf-Germanized Slavs" did not understand that
this would be detrimental to them.
11

for the most material necessities."

The Pan-Slavs had no regard
In the nineteenth century

large territorial units and political centralization had become
an even greater historical necessity than in the past when the
great monarchies were organized "because of the formidable
advance in industry, trade, and communications."

The Austrian

r
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Slavs lacked the geographic, political, and industrial prerequisites for the creation of a modern state.
Besides, according to Engels the Czechs, Croations, and
Blovenes would not achieve national independence because they
had never developed into strong independent nations in the
past.
Peoples • . • who from the moment when they reached
the first crude stage of civilization came under a
foreign domination, or who were only forced into the
first stages of civilization under a foreign yoke have
no vitality. They will never be able to attain any
sort of independence.84
Engels claimed that the Austro-Slavs did not even have a right
to national independence because they were not historical nations.
The Poles and Hungarians, instead, had a right to national
independence because they had shown the ability to form independent
- states in the past.

They were historical nations.

Engels used Hegel's differentiation betvroen the historicaJ
and non-historical nations here.

But Hegel vrould not have

considered Poles and Hungarians as historj_cal nations because
they were not carriers of world historical progress towards
liberty as were the Germanic peoples.
It may be assumed that Engels def ended the right of
historical nation to national independence because his
argument that German superiority justified German rule over the
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Austro-Slavs caused him some difficulty regarding his support of
Polish and Hungarian national liberation.

Obviously Engels tried

to extricate himself from this difficulty at the cost of
arbitrariness.
Although Engels maintained that German initiative
was superior to that of the Slavs, he was anxious to differentiate
between the Austro-Slavs and the Poles.

He declared that the

Austro-Slavs were even more backward than the Poles.

This was

certainly an overstatement with regard t'o the Czechs.
With respect to the Hungarians, Engels's arbitrary
treatment of the Austro-Slavs was even more obvious.

When he

defended the subjuge.t:Lon of the Slavs by the Hungarians in the
past, he dropped the argrunent that this was in the interest
of progress.

Indeed, he could hardly have used this argument

because he himself spoke of the Hungarians as a "barbarian
people."

He switched to the more convenient argument that force

makes right.
If four million Hungarians were able to oppress eight
million Slavs for eight centuries, this proves
sufficiently who had more vitality and more energy,
the many Slavs or the few Hungarians.~5
Engels supported the continuation of Hungarian rule
over the Slavs in a restored Hungary.

It was more important to

safeguard the interests of a historical nation, like Hungary,

-
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than to liberate a few backward nationalities.

If Slovenes and

Croatians were liberated, Hungary and Germany would lose their
outlet to the Adriatic Sea.
as much a

11

The 'possession of this outlet was

vi tal question for Germany and Hungary a.s for Poland

the need to own the Baltic Sea coast from Danzig to Riga."

He

added:
When it is a question of the free development of all
the resources of a great nation, then sentimental
feeling~ for a few scattered Germans and Slavs
will
decide nothing.86
Ultimately, Engels could always fall back on the argument
that the Austro-Slavs, were incurable counter-revolutionaries who
invented the reactionary concept of Austro-Slavism to further
their narrow nationalist aims.

In his opinion the Austro-Slavs

opposed the reunion of Galicia with Poland at the Prague Congress
- in order to secure a Slavic majority in the Austrian Empire.
They had absolutely no interest in the restoration of a strong
Poland capable of fulfilling a revolutionary role in Eastern
Europe.

Engels insinuated that Bakunin and the German democrats

who advocated the liberation of the Austro-Slavs and collaboration
with them were political fools.

Anyone truly interested in

furthering the Revolution was bound to collaborate merely with
the Poles and Hungarians because they were revolutionary.

Since
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the French Revolutionary Wars, said Engels, the Poles had always
In 1848

sided with the revolutionary party against reaction.

the Poles and also the Hungarians collaborated with the
·revolutionary Germans against reactionary Austria.

But the

Austro-Slavs supported the fight of the Austrian government
against the Italian, Hungarian, and Viennese insurrections.
As was pointed out earlier, the major concern of the
editors of NRZ was the creation of a large German state under a

·-

centralized government.

They were convinced that only such a

state would further industrial progress and ultimately the
communist revolution.

Consequently, they acted in accordance

with this conviction when they agitated in

~

for the

incorporation of the Austro-Slavs into a united Germany.

The

question discussed by Engels whether the Austro-Slavs were
revolutionary, and whether they would be' able to organize
independent states was merely a convenient means to ridicule
Bakunin and the German democrats.

Besides, Engels exploited the

Austro-Slavic question to launch a formidable attack against the
concept of a union of all the Slavs which was ardently def ended
by

Bakunin.

fan-Sla~ism,

a Danger to Germanl

In the period before 1848 Bakunin had coupled his
Pan-Slav agitation with the demand for Polish liberation.

He
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continued this line of revolutionary propaganda in 1848-49.

At

the outset of the German Revolution, Bakunin tried to go to
Poznania to work for Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration
in order to prevent the apparently-imminent war against Russia.
His plan was to turn the fight against Tsarism into an
exclusively Slavic affair. 87 When the Berlin authorities
prevented Bakunin from going to Poznania, he went to Silesia
and then to Prague.
At the Prague· Congress he agitated for the reunion of
all the Slavs in "a great indivisible political body" based on
the equality of all its members. 88 According to him the
destructioR of the Austrian and Prussian Monarchies was as
necessary as the destruction of Tsarist Russia to liberate the
Slavs and to unite them.

He denounced Tsarist Russia as a state

where "death, darkness, and the work of slaves" prevailed.89
However, he warned against the exclusion of a revolutionary
Russia from a future Slavic union.

"Without Russia, Slavic unity

is not complete • • • without it Slavic power does not exist."90

In his speeches at the Congress, Bakunin told the Poles
that a revolutionary Russia would end the oppression of the Poles.
87Bak
.
con f es~,
.
_ unin,
p. 116.
88
.
Ibid. , p. 139.
8 9Ibid., p. 141.
90 Ibid. , p. 152.

169
Russia has separated itself from the Slavic community
by subjugating Poland and even more so by surrendering
it to the Germans, the common and principle enemy of
the Slavic race. Therefore, it can only reenter the
Slavic brotherhood by the liberation of Poland.91
·But a liberated Poland would not include the former eastern
provinces.

Bakunin maj_ntained that the Poles had no right to

these territories.

White Russians and uLittle Russians" had not

been Polonized, but merely oppressed by the Poles.

The "Little

Russians," in particular, had been quite successful in preserving
their ovm "language • • •

and

culture," even under the Tsarist

government.
Bakunin's immediate aim was to fight against the
territorial partition of Russia.

He claimed that a war against

Russia was not necessary because Russia was on the brink of a
revolution, and that the restoration of the eastern Polish
borders of 1772 was absurd because the inhabitants of the former
eastern Polish provinces would not welcome Polish rule.
In order to end the threat of a war against Russia,
Bakunin desired that the Poles should not collaborate with the
Europeans, rather they should side with the revolutionary
Russians.

In that case the territorial losses of Poland in the

would be compensated in the West.
91

~., p. 136.

A revolutionary Russia
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would help the Poles to restore the western Polish borders of 1772
and even support their aim to incorporate Silesia and E.ast Prussia
into Poland, that is, to partition Germany.9 2
Bakunin proved himself to be a staunch defender of the
extremist demands of the Slavs for the partition of Eastern
Germany in order to liberate all the Slavic minorities.
~peal

In his

t<l.. 1£.~.?Y~ he threatened:

Truly, the Slav shall not forfeit anything • • • As
long as the smallest part of our rights is disputed,
as long as one single member is separated • • • from
the whole body, we will fight •• ·• until the Slavs
finalli stand great, free, and independent in the
world.93
In the !£.peal Bakunin's anti-German feelings got out of hand.
The demand for revolutionary collaboration of the Slavs with the
Italians, Hungarians, and Germans and for the creation of a
"federation of European republics" contradicted his radical
Slav:ism.
It is surprising that the editors of

~

never referred

to Bakunin 1 s agitation before February, 18Li-9 al though they must
have been quite familiar with Bakunin's political concepts.

Both

-9-~tin- :V.18.y, 181+8, when Bakunin frequented the German
democratic club in Breslau, he supported Polish claims to Silesian
territory. Cf. the German liberal review P}2 Gre~o~en (Leipzig),
1848, III, p. 343, quoted in Bakunin, Q2E.fession, p. 321).
93~, February 16, 1849.
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Marx and Engels met Bakunin in April, 1848, and Marx met him
again in the summer of 1848.

Apparently these meetings were

rather stormy. 94
Initially the editors of NRZ limited themselves to
occas~onal

references to extremist Pan-Slav statements which

endangered the territorial integrity of Germany.

In July, 1848

-on the Slavs published by a leading supporter of Austro-Slavism,
NRZ

turned the attention of the readers· to statistical data
.I

.,/ /

the Czech P. J. Safarik.

The Czech leader stated that 2,180,000

Slavs (that is, 1,982,000 Poles and 82,000 Lusatians) lived in
Prussia, and 60,000 Lusatians in Saxony.
On July 16, 1848

~

printed a Manifesto of the Slavs

to the European peoples which had been composed by the Prague
Congress early in June.

The Manifesto protested against the

partition of the Grand Duchy of Poznania and declared:
We expect the governments of Prussia and Saxony to
refrain from the systematic denationalization of the
Slavs in Silesia, Lusatia, East and West PruRsia.
Such statements indicated that the Slavs would not be satisfied
their liberation from Austrian and Prussian rule, and that
also aimed at the partition of Germany.

!!BE, printed this

information without comments.
94cf. the remark of Fritz Brubpacher, quoted in.Bakunin,
·
_Conf essio!:!.,
p. 116 •
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In those early months, when

~.R.~

repeatedly expressed its

disgust with German oppression of foreign peoples, the publication

of the Slavic statements could have been interpreted by the
readers

e.s

a support of Slavic aspirations.

But in February,

1849 Engels came out with a sharp attack against Slavic claims
to Eastern German territories.

He declared that the territories

east of the Elbe river had belonged to the Germanic people
before thej,r settlement by the Slavs.

These territories were

reconquered by the Germans after the partition of the Carolingian
Empire when "geographic and strategical ree.sons" necessitated
this reconquest.

In the course of the following centuries the

territories were completely Germanized.
The affair has been settled and cannot be reopened
unless the Pan-Slavists rediscover the lost Sorbian,
Wendish, and Abodrite languages and force them on the
inhabitants of Leip~ig, Berlin, and Stettin. Besides,
it has never been questioned up to now that this conquest
was in the interest of civilization.95
According to Engels all the Pan-Slavists were
reactionaries because they

~ere

extreme nationalists.

Among all the Pan-Slavs nationality, that is, the
fanciful, all-Slavic nationality comes before the
revolutj_on. The Pan-Slavs will join the revolution
under the condition that they shoula be allowed to
turn all the Slavic nationalities into independent
Slavic states, without consideration for the most
material necessities.96

·-95irRz-, -February

15, 1849.

96ill.£., February 16, 18lf9.
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pan-Slav:Lsm was a kind of supernationalism.

It would never agree

with democracy.
Engels referred to the Pan-Slavic leanings of the
Austro-Slavs.

He maintained that tbe Austro-Slavs, who shunned

collaboration with the revolutionary Germans and Hungarians,
would not refrain from collaborating with the reactionary Russians
in order to realize their nationalist aims.97

According to

Engels Pan-.Slavism only helped to strengthen reactionary Russia.
It must be fought to save the Revolution.

Whoever supported

Pan-Slavism was either an "illusionist" or a "villain. 11
Engels ridiculed the expectations of Ruge that the
fraternization of the European nations and their union in a
European federal republic would end the old political and social
order in Europe.
phantasies. 11

Such expectations were "sentimental

They had been disproved by the rise of nationalism

in the Revolution and strong national hatreds, namely of the
Austro-Slavs for the Germans and Hungarians.

Ruge and his

followers, said Engels, should give up their support of Bakunin's
agitation for an indiscriminate revolutj_onary collaboration
between the Europeans and the Slavs in general.

Such a policy

would only endanger the Revolution •

l
,

l.

. -- 97Momms~ has pointed out that because of the Prague
Congress the Frankfurt Assembly also overrated the ties of the
Slavi? movement in the Austrian Empire with Russia. Cf. Mommsen,
Qp.

c~~ : ·

117.
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It is obvious that Engels, who insisted upon German
collaboration with the Poles and the Hungarians, wished to keep
the Slavs divided.

The partition of the Slavic areas in the

Austrian Empire between the Germans and Hungarians and, in
particular, the partition of Russia through the restoration of
Poland would destroy Pan-Slav aspirations which endangered the
very integrity of German territorial possessions.
While Bakunin urged the Poles to collaborate with the
Russians and again.st the Germans in order to gain East-Prussian
and

Silesian territories, Engels insisted that the Poles had

no intention to join the Russians because they had immensely
suffered from Russian oppression.

"With the Poles the hatred

of the Russians comes even before the hatred of the Germans, and
most rightfully so. 11 98

Hatred of the Russians, which was also

"the first revolutionary passion among the Germans," cemented
the German-Polish alliance against Russia.

According to Engels

there was absolutely no danger that the Poles would enter a
Pan-Slav union directed by Russia against Germany.

They were

"free from all Pan-Slav desires."
Engels was right that the Poles were opposed to
Russian leadership which Bakunin considered as the only guarantee
of Slavic liberty.

Engels, however, v;as wrong when he stated

98"1mz ~UFe bruary 15, 18L~ 9.
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that democratic Panslavism had no adherents among the
revolutionary Poles.

According to the Polish historian Wilhelm

Feldman "Slavic propaganda was strong in 1848, partly because of
the disappointment with the Germans. 11 99
The Polish democrat Karol Libelt had submitted to the
Prague Congress a project for a Slavic union.

The only other

project submitted to the Congress was composed by Bakunin.

On

the whole, both projects were concerned with organizational
problems of the union.

They proposed the election of a central

representative body which should guarantee the enjoyment of equal
rights by all the members of the Slavic union. 100

Territorial

problems were not discussed •
. The question of a Slavic union caused dissent among the
Polish democrats which did not end with the Revolution of 1848.
Polish democrats who emigrated· to J.Jondon from Paris in 18lt-9
issued an official statement i.n which they condemned the support
of the Slavic idea:

"Slavism pushes us back into the epoch of

barbarism when mankind was divj_ded according to race, and when
blood, not an idea, was the only link between man. 11101

In 1850,

p. 159.

d . N ,·
No. 52, 18L1. 8 , quo t ed in
. .Bryk,
. , lOOCf. • Na~E~nn;z:.,

.QJ>. ci;., pp. 1'89-90.
101

Feldman, op.

c1!.!..,

p. 159.

r
176

when Libelt agitated for a federal structure of a restored
Poland and against a unitary state, he returned to his support
of a Slavic union.

"The future of Slavism can only be a

federation.

The people have acquired a feeling for equality •
I
102
•• Land for the right toj their own national development."
Engels chose to ignore the existence of dissent among

the Poles concerning the question of a Slavic union.

He

singled out the Austro-Slavs and the Russians for his

atta~k

upon

R~n-Slavism.

He played the Poles and the Hungarians against

the Austro-Sla.vs and the Russians.

His strategy aimed at

defending the territorial integrity of a future great German
state.

It was fully supported by Marx.

Poles and Hungarians

were considered as useful factors in deterring the Russians
and

in barring the creation of a Slavic union.
Many years later Bakunin maintained that the anti-Slavic

propaganda of Marx and Engels in 1848-49 vms determined by
German power political considerations.

In 18'?0, when he

defended himself from the accusation by the German socialists
that he

was a

Pan-Slav, he commented on h:Ls convictions of

18L~8:

As a Slav, I desired the emanc:ipation of the Slavic
race from the German yoke. But as a German patriot

-

Po l'is h DaiJ.y
. - [P
'~
h c.:.o,
r:>r:
_ oznan ] ) , 1hare.
1850,. quoted in tilliarioV.i"ski·,· ·_.li....P..;..•_c_i_t..;..., p. 238. Cf. also Feldman,
cit., p. 155.
l0-2 Cf • - D,z1emlJ.1\:.
'
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Marx did not admit • • • the right of the Slavs to
emancipate themselves from the German yoke.103
J38J'>'.unin added that he agitated for the destruction of the
Russian Empire and the Prussian and Austrian Monarchies in order
to achieve the liberation of the Slavs.

Marx and Engels, the

German patriots, could not swallow the attack on German rule
over the Slavs.

The Germans were ridiculous.

[They love] • • • to identify, very naively, their
nationality with humanity. In their opinion, to
detest the German domination and to despise their
civilization of voluntary slaves means to be the
enemy of man's progress.104
Obviously, Bakunin's agitation for the liberation of the
Slavs had the same power-political aspect as the anti-Slavic
propaganda of Marx and Engels.

If Russia would have been

instrumental in the liberation of the Slavs, as Bakunin desired
in l 8L1-8, then Russian influence would probably have replaced
German influence in Central Eastern Europe, and Germany would
have been weakened.
development.

Marx and Engels vtished to prevent such a

A revolutionary Germany should become a strong

state in the center of Europe.
Everything that Marx and Engels wished for Germany--a
large territory, political and economic centralization, and the
increase of power resulting from it--would naturally have

'"""103()~_uvr~~~ de ]e.lf~.mi£, ed. by Max Nettlau (6 vols.; Paris
Stock, Hf95-1913·5, II, XX (Introduction).
V
lOL1-_Ib~d., III, 16. Cf. also Michael Bakunin, Gesd.1.:~
i.erk~ ~ e~ •. by Ervlin Rho~_fs (3 vols. ; Berlin: Verlag, DP.r

ndi}~12;~~~
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destined Germany to hold a preponderant posj_tion in Europe.

The

desire of the liberal Friedrich List coincided with that of the
communists Marx and Engels.
NRZ 1 s propaganda for a radical German Revolution
revealed that Mo.rx's and Engels's interest in Poland was mainly
determined by their concern with Germany.

Their statements in

support of Polish liberation were undermined, to say the least,
by their defense of the annexionist policies of progressive
or revolutionary nations.

Their arbitrary handling of the

national question adnd.ts the assumption that in case of a
successful radical German Revolution, the two men could have
switched with the greatest ease to a defense of German annexation
of Polish territories because Germany represented progress.
Marx 8.nd Engels had no understanding for Ruge and likemindod democr·ats v1ho shrank from power politics and the
concentration of power.

Power politics was a law of history.

Concentration of power had furthered progress because it
destroyed parochialism.

Only the ultimate liberation of man

by the proletarian revolution would make an end to power politics.

Until then, power politics were necessary to safeguard that
revolution.

In the meantime, whatever revolutj_onary progress

might be made, it was only e. prelude to the final European-vdde
liberation of the oppressed classes.
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Tho development of the European revolutionary movements
of 1848 confirmed Marx and Engels in their conviction that this
final liberation could only be achieved through the overthrow

of

the present social order in England by the Englj_sh working
On January 1, 1849 Marx and Engels expressed this

classes.

conviction in an NRZ editorial.

They called England the real

center of the counter-revolutionary forces.

England transformed

"whole nations into its proletariat" because it embraced
whole world with j_ts giant arms."

11

the

The industrial and commercial

development and the social conditions of all the other nations
depended on England because it was the :master of the world
market.

Whatever changes weL·e realized in the social or economic

sphere, they would not represent a real victory if they were
limited to the nations of continental Europe.

Revolutionary

changes would always be threatened with extinction as long as the
powerful English bourgeoisie was not destroyed by the English
Chartists.
The article of January 1 , 18Lt-9 defied the propaganda
of the European radicals that Russia's fall and Polish restoration
would be the decisive tu_-rning point in Eu:copean affairs and
would absolutely safeguard revolutionary progress in Europe.
editors of

~

thought di ff eren.tly.

The

'The Poles, even the

Hungarians, might be the handymen of the Revolution.

The Russian
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threat might be used as a means to increase revolutionary unrest.
A victorious vrar against Russia might help save the German
Revolution and Europe.

But the significance of these events

yfith regard to a European-wide proletarian revolution was
relative.
England.

The fate of that revolution would be decided in

CHAPTER IV
THE POST-REVOLUTION ERA

European Left
-Critique Inofthetheyears
following the Revolution of 1848,the
European Left continued to agitate for the overthrow of the old
European political, social, and territorial order.

F.ach

European crisis in the fifties--the Crimean War of 1854-56 and
the Italian War of 1859--intensified the hope of the European
Left for a European revolution which would completely overthrow
--

the Vienna treaties and restore Poland.

Marx and En.gels shared

the general expectation for the imminent outbreak of a European
conflagration.

They did not, however, resume their energetic

propaganda for the restoration of the Polish borders of 1772.
In the post-revolution era they played no part in the
conspiratorial activities.

Instead, they became observers of

the European scene.
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The Revolution of 1848 had deepened the conflicts among
the European Left.

The split between the political and the

economic Left became more articulate.

As a result political

alignments became more sharply outlined in the post-revolution
era than in the previous years.

This development affected Marx

and Engels.
The two friends, who had gone to London late in 1849,
remained isolated from the political exiles who flocked to this
city from the continent.

Marx and Engels did not participate in

the founding of new international revolutionary organizations
in 1850, such as the Mazzinian European Central Committee or the
Universal Democratic and Socialist Republic which opposed the
Mazzinian Committee.

Nor did they resume close contacts with

_ any member of the Polish left-wing democrats.

Marx and Engels

did not even continue their collaboration with the German
Workers Educational League, and their relations with the
Central Committee of the Communist League were also strained
after September, 1850. 1
1 rn the period after

1848-49 Marx and Engels did not
· even own a newspaper with the exception of the Neue_filleinisch.2,
Zei tu~, ]Oli ti,sch_:,O.~k.OJ.lOmischLBevue, of whichC5ii'Iy Tissues
appeared :Glf85~ Ape.rt from a f ey1 articles which appeared in
Chartist newspapers--Notes to the PeH£le in 1851-52 and
~O..]~' s ]?aJ2._er in 1852-54 ancrf856 -- arx and Engels wrote mainly
fo: the American and German democratic newspapers, Th.~Jiew,.,!9_rk
~' particularly from 1852-54, and the Breslau Neue Oder
,!'e:i.tu~g in 1855.
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In February, 1951, when Engels had returned to Manchester
to work again with the firm Erman & Engels, the two friends
exchanged letters in which they congratulated one another that
the political exiles rejected them.

Marx was quite satisfied

that they were no longer compelled to make concessions to these
"donkeys."

Engels agreed.

It was good that they were rejected

by these "narrow-minded dogs" whom for years they ha.d treated
as rembers of their party--which did not yet

exist-~al though

these

"fools" did not even understand the most "elementary principles"
of their cause.

Engels consoled himself' that the day would

come when he and Marx would be able to dictate their "own
conditions 11 to their opponents.

Until then they had "peace,"

but, as Engels admitted, they also experienced "a certain
.
112
- 1 one 1 iness.

In Marx's and Engels's opinion the political exiles,
includ1ng the members of the Communist I.1eague, had not learned
anything from the Revolution of 1848.

In spite of their

ideological differences the exiles still shared the foolish hope
that tho mere fraternization of nations would give birth to a
new age :ln Europe.

The :Mazzinian revolutionary theories, which

Were based on this hope, became the chief target of Marx's and
,. Engels's attacks.
~

i.f

-
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In the fifties Mazzj_ni was the most prominent figure
among the European democrats.

He had not given up his conviction

that the main objective of a European revolution ought to be
the liberation of all the people mider foreign rule and the
defense of free Europe against the

11

encroachments of Russia.n

He condemned the socialists for their exclusive concentration on
the social question.

In Mazzini's opinion this question was not

a major problem in a large part of Europe.

In Italy, Poland,

and even in Germany there did not exist a pronounced class
antagonism because these countries had not yet experienced an
abnormal development of large-scale industry.

Mazzini admitted

that it was necessary to liberate the proletariat from
tyranny of capital. 11

11

the

However, the social question was still a

subordinate question and should be solved by the single
nations following the political reorganization of Europe on a
federal basis.3
The European Central Committee became the mouthpiece
·of Mazzinian propaganda.

It \7as founded by Mazzini in the

summer of 1850 with the collaboration of leading European
democrats, such as the German Arnold Ruge, the Frenchman Alexandre
Ledru-Rollin, and the Pole's Wojciech Darasz and Stanislaw Worcell
3Giuseppe Mazzini,
series 1, 1852), 457.

11

Europe, 11 Westminster Hevi.eY£,; LVII
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The first

!i~lt;i.festo

of the Co1mnittee proclaj_med that all the

people ought to enjoy "national sovereignty" which was the
prerequisite of "an alliance" of all the emancipated nations

on

the basis Of their equality.

International fraternization

would bring an end to wars and reactionary governments and initiat
an era of European peace and liberty.

The first step towards

this goal would be the liberation of Poland and Italy and the
unification of Germany.4
Marx and Engels ridiculed the desire of the Committee
to reconcile all the parties in order to obtain their collaboratio
for the libere.tion of the oppressed nations.

They stated that

the conflicts between the parties were the result of different
class interests.

If the conflicts were suppressed, this would

not liberate the people.

It would only contribute to "the

domination of the interests of ·one party--the bourgeois party."
The class struggle was a reality.

1'he democrats ought to know

1

from their experiences in the Revolution of 1848 that not even a
democratic victory would initiate a "golden age" without class

struggle.

The next revolution would again develop into a class wa.1

against the bourgeoisie regardless of the "fraternity phrases. 11 5

• - · --- l+cf. ~~o of the European Central Committee,), July 22,
1850, in the radical French newspaper Pros~t, June 1, 1651,
quoted in Alvin R. Calman, ~~£ll:t,l-E£llin aJ2f'.§.?._L8!tlL et ies :er,oscrii

Jrag,g,.~}ete~

(Paris: 'l'hcJse ""'011:Cversi·Eaire,-i-92ff; Po TCf3.

5~e.ue _pho_?.nis..£.b-J: ... ze~fu..-122J~'°=i:.~.;i.s.~Jl::.2ek<?.E.£rQi§.9J1e R~vlli2_, ed.

by Karl Jvlarx (London and. Hamburg: 1850) ~ with

Bittel (Berlin: Ruetten &

al 'orer1ord byKarl
Loening, 1955J, pp. 175, 177, 332.
1

186
As in the past years, Marx and Engels insisted that
onlY a revolution which aimed at fundamental changes in the
economic structure would end social and national oppression.
TheY criticized Mazzini and his collaborators--Vlorcell and the
Hungarian revolutionary Louis Kossuth who came from predominatly
agrarian countries--because they did not formulate a radical
agrarian program.

Without such a program the fight for national

liberty would merely strengthen the old social order.

Marx

pointed out that this had been proved by the Galician events in

1846.

When the Polish aristocracy fought for national

independence, the Austrian goverrm1ent had been able to hold
Galicia by gra.1rting some liberties to the oppressed peasants.
Only a social revolution would put an end to foreign rule.

Mazzini, in particular, was sharply attacked when he continued
to treat the "economic reality" as something unimportant and to
overrate the "political form of the state. 116
In their private correspondence Marx and Engels
ridiculed the "sublime Mazzinian manif estoes" which agitated for
the liberation of the oppressed nations.

In their opinion the

manifestoes contained nothing but empty phraseology.

Marx and

Engels despised the democrats who imitated the Mazzinian

. ~-~ --t;Th~

-

_,

Nm;1 York Tribune

Mc'ly 11, 1858.

rr
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prop..-8.ganda style.

When Arnold Ruge, in a manifesto, spoke about

the immortality of Poland, Engels called him one of thos0 North
German "whimpering democrats" who wished to convince the Germans
that Poland was "immortal," but there was nothing immortal
about a nation. 7
Marx and Engels also spoke scornfully of the Hungarians
and Poles vn10 collaborated with Mazzini.

They disliked Louis

Kossuth whom they had praised as the leader of the Hungarian
uprising in 1848.

They used the contemptuous term "Polack" when

they spoke of Da.rasz.

Even Worcell, who enjoyed a general esteem

in emigrant circles, did not escape their ridicule.

Marx and

Engels believed that at the time of the insurrection of 1830-31
Worcell had been an incompetent mili te.ry leader.

They claimed

that he was incapable of sound political judgment and was a
b"abbler like Ruge and Ledru-Rollin.

8

-~s letter to Ma:r.x, January 25, 1851, in !!!QP.: 1
III/1 , 13.
8Engels 1 s letter to Marx, August 22, 1852, and V.iB.rx's
letter to Engels$ December 2, 1853, in M:J!!GA, III/1, 384, 515.
Marx found the Polish exiles who collaborated with the Universal
Democratic and Social Republic even more contemptible. This group
proclaimed the end of "all nations and borders" and the establishment of a universal democratic republic. M9.rx felt that this ld..nd
Of propaganda was even emptier than that of Mazzini. He derided
the Polish delegates of the London Central Committee who, in
search of supporters of the Polish cause, also signed the
manifestoes of the socialist group. Marx's letter to Engels,
December 2, 1850, in~' III/1, 118.
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Darasz-~until

his death in 1853-·mand \lforcell were the

prominent leaders of the London Central Committee of the Polish
Democratic Society.

This new center of Polish democracy had been

founded in 1850, a.n event which divided the leadership of the
polish democrats in the emigration.

As the years passed by,

the estrangement between the London and Paris centers became
greater.

Ludw:ik. Mieroslawski--the leader of the Polish democrats

in France--was the only Pole whom Marx and Engels considered an
important figure in the fiftj_es because Engels believed him to
be an expert on partisan warfare which would be useful in an
insurrection.

Otherwise, Marx and Engels had neither any liking

for the Paris Central Committee which soon came under the influenc ·
of the Bonapartists, nor for the London Central Committee which
collaborated closely with Ma.zzini and even vrith the Russian

emigrant Alexander Herzen.
Herzen was a friend of Michael Bakunin who had been
extradited to the Russj_an government by the German authorities
in 18LJ.9.

In 1852 Herzen had come to London.

In the circles

of the political exiles he was faced with the same superiority
complex towards the Russians and the samo anti-Russian propaganda
which had exasperated him in Paris in the late forties.

Since

the Revolution of 1848 Herzen had become convinced that the
world would gi.ve birth to the new age of socialj.sm.

He

that the Slavic world had remained a stranger to Roman
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la.VI and feudalism which had furthered authoritarianism and
inequality.

Herzen believed, as did Bakunin, that the Great

Russians were predestined to take the revolutionary initiative.9
A revolutionary Russia would become the center of a democratic

and socialist federation of all the Slavs, including the Poles,
because Russia was "the organized Slavic world," the Slavic
10
state par exc§!J.le~.
Herzen was confident that the Poles
would collaborate with the Russians in the overthrow of Tsarism.
Autocracy was to be replaced by an agrarie.n socialism, based on

the m;1r, the Russian village commune.
In view of Herzen's convictions it is not surprising

that he would not collaborate with the European Central Committee
which agitated for the restora t:i.on of Poland, that is, tho
partition of Russia.

Although Herzen knew Nazzini, he declined

the offer to join the Committee.

He had also become acquainted

with Marx in the late forties, but the relations between the two
men remained very cool and were "limited to distant and transient

--·%r-.

Herzen' s letter to his Moscow friends, Nove~ber 5,
18!1.8, quoted in Raoul Labry, Herzen et Proudhon (Paris: Edition
Bossard, 1928), p. 65.
~---------

10cr. Herzen's letter to the German revolutionary poet
Georg Herwegh, August 25, 18L~9, which was published in the
radical newspaper of the French socialist Pierre Proudhon, !§. ~Oi7;,
d~~12].e, November 18, 25, and December 10, 18L1-9, and also in
1:1azzinivs jom."'nal 1'~..c1el .Po.E.21£, November 20, 1849, quoted
~n. Raoul Labry, !_l~I:~n.dJ.:e. Iyano~820-1870 (Paris:
Edition Bossard, l92ITT, p. 55"r.

r

)

190

encoun t ers. u 11

Herzen preferred to entertain close relations

with the Polish Central Committee in London.

He was particularly

attracted to Stanislaw Worcell who had socialist leanings.
Early in the 1850's the Central Committee had organized
a printing plant in London for the purpose of issuing Polish
propaganda material to be distributed in Poland.

With Worcell's

help Herzen established a Russian section at this plant in 1853
in order to print Russian propaganda literature which agents of
the Central Commj.ttee were to smuggle into Russj_a.

M:;i.rx knew about the preparations for the collaboration
between Herzen and the Central Committee.

On June 14, 1853 he

informed Engels about them without any further comment.

Marx

and Engels could hardly have been pleased with Herzen's

publication of appeals to Russians and Poles for their
revolutionary collaboration since the sunnner of 1853.

In 1853 Herzen, vlith the help of the Polish Central
Committee in London, published his treatise, Du develo

ement des

idees rfu~naire__c;_n B£s.,:Si§., in which he elaborated the

political ideas he had formulated since the Revolution of 1848. 12
dedicated ·11 To Our Friend Bakunin."

..

In the

--------1~1~--~~-

Vera Piroschkov, llixandq~ He.~~--~nbruch
!,!ne.r.J!.LC2.P1.~ (Munich: A. Puster;-19() ff; p. 121.
12
rrhis treatise was first published in 12..E2.\!ts,..q!1e
na.t£~~F:.iLt fl-!2! E~l,=ht~~~§2!1~CJ:l?-_f_!J13nst .. }:ll1d~~l?~J'.!, Nos. 1,
'

'

10.)
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foreword Herzen payed tribute to his Polish "friends" who had
made the publication possible.

This was "another proof of the

fraternal alliance of revolutionary Poland with the Russian
revolutionaries."
In his treatise Herzen advised the Western Europeans
to abandon their illusion that Western Europe could be saved by
the restoration of Poland.

The Poles lacked the ability of the

Russians to organize "a strong and independent state. 111 3

They

would be unable to withstand Russian aggressiveness which had
destroyed them in the past.

Only a social revolution of the

Russian people would save Europe from certain destruction by
Russia~

Herzen insisted that the Great Russians were the true

leaders of the Slavs.

They were more genuine representatives

of the anti-authoritarian Slavic character than the Poles who
had become partially Westernized, that is, corrupted by their

conversion to Catholicism.

Herzen warned the Western Europeans

that the people in tho Russian Empire were as much against the
territorial parti ti.on of Russia as the Tsarist government.

The

in particular, were absolutely against a reunion
because they shared common traditions and a common
the Kiev state, with the Great Russians.
,..
. l 3Al~ksandr Ivonovich Herzen, p-~__gfv0loJ2.12f!:fept, ~s idees
evolut~E~J·~~~],!,~~~' by A. Iscander '{pS'e'Udonym) {2d ed.;
non: Jeffs, Libraire, 1853), p. XXI.
·
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When Herzen addressed himself to the Poles, he warned
them not to expect any support of their liberation from the
western Europeans.

Most of the European states were subservient

to the Tsar, particularly Germany which was actually governed
by "the pro-consul of the Tsar • • • the King of Prussia. 111 4

Herzen declared that the liberation of the Poles, as well as of
the Russians, would only result from their revolutionary alliance
which in turn would become the nucleus of the Slavic Union under
Great Russian leadership. 15

Herzen was as aware of the power factor as Bakunin.
He was fascinated with the territorial extension of the Russian
Empire to the Pacific Ocean and the Russianizing of the peoples
in Siberia.

It was easy to foresee that if, through the

initiat:Lve of the Great Russians, a Slavic union were created,
Great Russia would unite under its rule all the territories from

the Pacific to Southeastern Etu·ope.

Indeed, the Slavic union

would be a formidable power bloc j_n which the Western and
Southern Slavs would represent the defense line of Russia against
Western Europe.

Its realization would completely overthrow the

balance of power in Europe and allow Russia to establish its
.supremacy in European affairs. 16

ili.___

1J2.:h£.. ~
15
~.'
16

p•

8.

p. 138.

Tiie French historian Benolt-P. Hepner ma:tnta:lned the.t

was free from the "veritable

chauvini~m 11

which Bakunin
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It is amazing that the London Central Committee was
willing to collaborate with Herzen although he expected the Poles
to renounce the restoration of the eastern Polish borders of 1772
and to accept Great Russian leadership in Ea.stern Europe.
Marx knew about the publication of Herzen•s treatise.
In a letter to Engels of August 23, 1853, he stated that the
book was well received in English circle·s. l 7
comment.

Apparently he had not read the work.

He made no further
He merely

expressed his general dissatisfaction with the miserable Russians,
including Herzen.

They were "donkeysn and veritable "intriguers"

exhibited in the-late forties. He stated: 11 If it is true that
Bakunin was.the first to profess a belief in revolutionary PanSlavism, with Russia as the center of the general conflagration,
it would be most exaggerated to see Herzen's ideas of the 1850's
in the same light • • • His [Herzen 1 s] messianism does not turn
into Pan-Slav expansi.onism. 11 Hepner attacked Marx and, among
- modern writers, Alexander von Schelting, who wrote a work on
Russ land und Euro~ (Bern: A. Francke, 191+8), for having
ic.fentI1'J.ed the aims of Bakunin and Herzen. Benoi t-P. Hepner,
Bakounine et le p~nslavisme revolutionnaire, p. 233.
17MEGA, III/1 L1.28. In this same letter Marx commented
at length aoout Herzenls attempt to defend Bakunin from the
renewed accusation of having acted as a Russian spy in the late
forties. In a sunnner article in the Englj_sh newspaper The Morning
;!1_v:._cr~J:.?er, Herzen had insinuated that "Dr. Marx" was greatly
responsi1ll'e for the slander against Bakunin because he had cast
suspicion on Bakunin in an~ article in 1848. In that same
neVTspaper Marx rejected Herzen's contention. Marx stated that he
merely published the information he had received from a "Polish
refugee," and that in spite of it he had continued to praise
Bakunin for his participation in the radical revolutionary
movement. Herzen, however, was not impressed by these statements.
Cf. Vera Piroschkow, op. ci_t., p. 123. In his letter to Engels,
Marx mentioned that the fi"Polish refugee" was actually the German
Hermann Ewerbeck, his liaison man in Paris in 1aLi-8.
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who used English and American newspapers, among them the London
Advertiser and The New York Tribune, to influence public opinion
in favor of Russia. 18 He ridiculed Herzen's propaganda that the
Russian people were democratic and had nothing in common with
the official despotic Russia represented by the Tsar and the
aristocratic bureaucrats who were of German stock.

Marx commented

that consequently
Germany.must be fought in Russia, not Russia in
Germany • • • Like~ise, the Teutonic donkeys hold the
Frenchmen responsible for the despotism of Frederic II
• • • as if backward slaves do not aluays need
civilized slaves for their training.19
As in 1848, Marx was exasperated that the Russian emigrants combined their anti-German propaganda with the claj_m that
Russia, _a backward nation, should play a leading revolutionary
i 8MEGA, III/1, 428. Regarding 1'h~ N2.w York Tribune,
Marx appareii'ITY thought of Count Adam Gurowski,-a:--15o1ish
renegade, who collaborated with the American newspaper in the
fifties. Since the thirties Gurowski had published a number of
books on Russia and the Pan-Slav question. He was convinced that
Russia would soon become a highly industrialized and wealthy
country, and he urged the Poles to collaborate with Russia. A
Polish-Russian customs union would enable the Poles to par~icipate
in the Russian industrial development and to find a "na.tura.l
market" for their goods in the Russian Empire. In his articles
for The New York Tribune Gurowski fought the European propaganda
for tlie~destruction·of--i<ussia and agitated for the dissolution
of the Austrian Empire because it was a mere "anomaly." Cf.
G?sammelte Schriften ~n. Karl..f1arx und F~iedrich ,Engels, 18~f.
~oy N. ""!(Jasanoff (2 vols.; 2a ed.; Stuttgart: • H.
Vr;--:Die"fz Nachf., .GmbH, 1920), I, XXXVI-XLI (Introduction)~ .

l9Yiarx 1 s letter to Engels, September
III/1, 501.

7, 1853, in~'
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role in Europe.

Marx's old opponent Arnold Ruge also resented

~ermanophobia.

Herzen's

He told Herzen in 1854:

I doubt that the Slavs would play the role of the
friends of liberty should German power be destroyed.
The system of government under i.vhich they have been
educated has affected their reason and hardened their
hearts.2 0
It is surprising that Marx and Engels did not attack
the Polish Central Committee in London
Herzen.

~or

its collaboration with

They preferred to criticize the Mazziniem revolutionary

policies which were pursued by both the European. Central Coiruni ttee
and the Polish Central Committee.
The revolutionary propaganda of the Polish democrats
stressed the need for improvised uprisings in order to achieve
national liberationo

In 1851 the Polish Democrat, the organ of the

London Central Coro.mi ttee, published an appeal to the Poles to
stage another insurrection which might "succeed or fail. 1121 When
Russia got involved in the war with Turkey in 1853, the Polish
Democ:r:tl appealed to the Poles "to make the most of the Turkish
War • • • , that is, to stage an insurrection .. 1122

·2oArno~d~ge' s Briefwechsel und Tagebuecher aus den
Jahren 1825=f8[o t2 vols. ;13erlin: Weidmann, 18'8b), IT, f47·.
21 Marceli Handelsman, Adam Czartory_?.Ei, ed. by Stefan
Kieniewicz, Rozprawy h.i.storyczne, Vols. XXIII-XXV (3 vols.;
Warsaw: Towarzy_stwo Naukowe Warszavrnkie, 1948·-50) , III/1 , 182.
22
New

York:

Boles3::aw Limanowski, Stanisa'.aw Worcell (Cracow and
n .. p.: 1910), p. 370.
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Marx and Engels were as opposed to the propaganda for
improvised uprisings as to the emphasis on the fight for
national liberation.

Revolutions were not brought about by

proclamations and by commands.

Marx stated:

Since the terrible experiences of 1848 and 1849 there
is more needed than paper decrees issued bi distant
leaders to call forth national uprisings.25
Moreover, Viarx and Engels did not believe that the revolutionary
forces in Europe, includ_i.ng the Polish ones, were strong enough
to support new insurrections after the defeats of 1848-49. 2 L~

But

they did not relinquish their own expectations for an imminent
outbreak of a revolution.

In the fifties 118.rx still regarded England as the country
where the "real revolution" would occur.

At the outset of the

fifties ho believed that a new economic crisis would cause an
uprising of the English workingmen followed by the overthrow of
the whole social order in England. 2 5 Marx interpreted the wave of
strikes which spread to the great coal and iron centres in the
second half of 1853 as a promising sign o:f approaching changes.
He was enthusiastic about the worY-J.ngmen parliament which was

organized in VJ.anchester at that time by the Chartist leader

Ernest Jones, an acquaintance of Marx.

---z't
.
.:.>Gesammelte

Schr:!-fte_n, ed. by Rjasanoff, I, 100.

24Enge1s's letter to Marx, Hay 23, 1851, in~'
III/1, 252.
2 5Gesarn.melte §cb3~~' I, 118.
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In

M~rx's

and Engels's opinion collaboration with the

Chartists vras a true measure of revolutionary zeal.

Only the

collaboration of the European revolutionaries with the Chartists
would further the overthrow of the old European order.
the

m~jority

Chartists.
them.

However,

of the exiles would have nothing to do with the
Mazzini and his European Central Committee opposed

Even the Polish Central Committee in London did not

sympathize with the Chartists although they supported the
liberation of Polan<l. 2 6
Marx repeatedly warned the European democrats against
any collaboration with the Enelish or French governments.

The

existing governments would never support. truly revolutionary
changes.

Collaboration wj.th them was a betrayal of the European

revolution.

When, early in the fifties, the unfounded rumor was

spread that Mazzini, Kossuth, and also Lelewel, who still lived

in Brussels, had taken up contacts with Napoleon III, Marx only
too readily believed this.

In a letter to Engels he remarked

that the leaders of European democracy had a prefer0nce for
Bonapartist conspiracies. 2 7 In a New York Tribune article he
--""*~~--

stated that the democratic leaders looked for questionable
su1)porters of the revolutionary cause. 2 8

~b"Lirn;:i.~owski,

opt.

£.:J:b_,

pp. 31 0-11 •

2 7Marx's lotter to Engels, August 30, 1852. in MEGA
"
~--'
III/1, 471.
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When England and France declared war against Russia
on March 28, 1854, Marx hoped that the Crimean War would cause
an uprising of the English proletariat which would change the
local war into a European ·war against the reactionary forces.
He ridiculed the democratic exiles in England because they
hoped that the war would lead to the destruction of Russia,
and that the English and French governments would support the
restoration of Poland.

The Polish exiles were convinced that

the English statesman Viscount Henry Palmerston was a "gallant
protector" of the Poles, and that he wished to liberate Poland.
Marx and Engels did not share the expectations of the
democratic exiles.

They did not even acknowledge that Palmerston

was determined to check Russian expansionism in Asia and in
Southeastern Europe.

Their interpretation of Palmerston's

foreign policies was dictated by their conviction that the
established gov0rnments were incapable of understanding their
most vital interest--the destruction of Tsarist Russia.

Thus,

they maintained that the English government and Palmerston pursued
a reactionary foreign policy which aimed at the preservation of
the Russian Empire9

Even before the outbreak of the Crimean

Viar, at the time of the Turco-Russian conflict in the Balkans,
Marx had :presented this :point of view in a series of sarcastic
articles on "Palmerston and Russia". which were published in the
~le's

Pa]_G!, a Chartist newspaper, between October and
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December 1853.

According to Marx, Palmerston's foreign policies

in the past years proved that he merely assumed the role of a
protector of the Poles.

Palmerston was actually pro-Russian;

that is, a.reactionary.

Marx maintained that Palmerston did not

try to.prevent the suppression of the Polish insurrection of

1830-31 by the Tsarist government.

He did not support the

proposal of other European powers to take a firm stand in favor
of the Polish insurgents.

Nor did he protest against the

occupation of Cracow by the Austrians in 1846 although this hurt
English commercial interests in Cracow. 2 9 Harx said that
Palmerston's policies revealed the reactionary role which bngland
played in Europe.

He insinuated that the Poles who believed in

Palmerston's pro-Polish sympathies were duped by that man.
In V.Jarx's opinion Palmerston's treatment of the Polish
exiles also proved that he was not a sincere supporter of the
Polish cause.

Marx believed that the English Literary Society

of the Friends of Poland, to which English aristocrats and
followers of the conservative Polish leader Prince Adam Czartoryski
elonged, was a "blind tool in Palmerston's hand. 11

Palmerston

nnually received the delegations of the Society merely in order
maintain his "anti-Russian reputation."

When in August, 1853,

t the time of the Russian occupation of the Danube principalities,
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a delegation of the conservative Czartoryski camp in Paris
congratulated Palmerston on his interest in the Polish question,
he assured the delegation of his sympathies for Poland.

However,

he declared that he did not receive the delegation "as a member
of th_e Cabinet but • • • only as a private person. 11 3°

According

to Marx this confirmed that Palmerston evaded any deeper
involvement in the Polish cause.
Ma:r:-x was outraged that in spite of the obvious
insincerity of Palmerston even the Polish Central Committee in
London continued to have confidence in the English government.
At the time of the Crimean War the Polish democrats organized
a number of meetings in England in support of the Polish cause.
Worcell, Kossuth, and Mazzini, who spoke at these meetings,
not only appealed to the English people for their support of
Polish liberation, but also to the English government.

The

democratic leaders maintained that the "war against Russia • • •
[was] a fight between liberty and despotism," and that it was a
revolutionary war.3 1 Mazzini insisted that the restoration of
Poland would be the first step towards a complete reorganization
of Europe,,

In addition to the partition of Russia the

3'0The New York Tribune, Septemb0r 5, 1853.
3 1 cr. Kossuth's speech made in Sheffield, June 5~ 185Li-,
in support of the Polish cause, in Gesammelte Schriften, II, 1 •

.----------······'"'''"""""------~-----~

r

201

reorganization would also include the partition of Turkey
and the Austrian Empire.

Mazzini hoped that the Crimean War

would ultimately result in the destruction of the territorial
arrangements of 1815 and the reorganization of Europe on the
basis-of the nationality principle.
Marx was most dissatisfied with the Polish meetings.32
He felt that the democratic leaders betrayed the revolutionary
cause because they merely asked for the national liberation of
the Poles.

Moreover, Marx insisted that the appeals to the

government for Polish liberation from Russian rule vrere illusory.
The English government was not revolutionary.

It would not use

the Crimean War to overthrow the old territorial order.

Contrary

to the convictions of the democrats, the Crimean War was a
conservative war.

It served "the maintenance of the balance

of power and of the Vienna treaties, that is, of those treaties
VThich suppress the liberty and independence of nations. 11 33
The only time Marx expressed a great enthusiasm for
any of the Polish meetings was in the surn.t'"ller of 1855.

On

August 8, 1855 the conservative Czartoryski camp organized a
meeting at St. Martin's Hall.

In a special report for the

------xCf. also Marx's letter to Engels, February 13, 1855,
j_n

!iIP.Gfl:,

III/1, 101-02.

33Gesammel~~~E., II, 1.
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z.ei.tun,g (Breslau), Marx stated that this meeting was

instigated by the English government.

Its aim was

the formation of a Polish legion, • • • the renewal
of Palmerston's popularity, and. the delivery of any
possible Polish movement into his hands and those
of Bonaparte.34
.
According to Marx the majority of the audience were
Chartists, but Polish democrats were also present.

They

collaborated with the Chartists against the followers of
Czartoryskic

They supported the following anti-government

declaration
That the destruction of this Polish nationality was
mainly due to Palmerston's perfidious policy from
1830-~.6; that as long as Palmerston remains a servant
of the Cro·vr.a, any proposal for the restorati,on of
Poland is nothing but a trap and a deceit.35
When Lord Harrington, the president of the meeting, refused to
read the declaration, the radicals took over the meeting.

They

distributed leaflets which declared:
Poland condeULns any allian~e with the present
European powers. It does not wish to be restored by
any of the exj_sting governments and to become a tool
of diplomatic intrigues.36
Marx maintained that the meeting was a def eat for Palmerston and
for the English bourgeoisie which he represented.

34rbi-d., - pp.

340-L1-1 •

35Ibid., p. 3Li-1 •

36~.

,.
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The Czartoryski camp was convinced that Moscow had
caused the scandal through payed agents.37
by the government circles.

This rumor was spread

Marx ridiculed these rumors.

"Any

suspicion of a conspiracy" was invalidated by the fact that the
relations between the Polish democratic emigrants in

]~ngland

and the Chartists were not at all friendly.
Alexander Herzen was as opposed as Marx to the
propaganda activity of the Poles at the public meetings during
the Crimean War.

In his diaries he expressed his surprise over

Worcell's political shortsightedness:
How could Worcell assume that England would encourage
Poland to stage an insurrection, or that the France
of Napoleon II would instigate a revolution there.38
When the Crimean War was in its second year, even
Mazzini became dj_senchanted with the war because it had not
developed into "a war of liberty against European despotism."
He criticized the English and French governments because they
did not vigorously support the liberation of the Poles and the

Balkan Slavs which would lead to the dissolution of the Austrian
57The Polish historian Mo.rceli Handelsm,9.n declared that
the meeting was intended as a "semi-official manifestation for
a Poland allied with the England of Palmerston and the France of
Bonaparteo 11 It was regrettable that the meeting turned into a
"manifestation against the government, 11 which prevented the
organization of a PoliGh legion. Marceli Handelsman, /t§,E:.12!
!2~.i, III/2, 503.

3811..1exa11der I. Herzen, Er1ebtes und Gode.chtes (Weimar:
1953), p. 380, in Bobinska, p. 1()I(7~. - ~-
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Empire and the independence of Italy.

In V.iarch, 1855 :Mazzj_ni

remarked that England failed to p0rform the great task "to
organize a living barrier of young associated nations around the
:Muscovite Empire."

Neither Austria· nor Turkey, the two

decaying states, were "a valid defense against the young,
growing, and compact Russian power. 11 39
The endeavours of the Polish democrats to obtain
effective support of their cause from the English people and the
government remained unsuccessful.

The Polish meetings, organized

in many cities to further the Polish cause, were received with
enthusiasm everywhere, but aside from the collection of money
nothing else was e.ccomplished.

In vain, Worcell tried to win

the favor of the government circles by excluding radical elements

from the Polish meetings.

As the war dragged on, the interest

of the English public in the Polish cause cooled, and the

members of Parliament refrained from any official involvement.
The Paris Treaty of 1·1arch, 1856 v1hich ended the Crimean
War greatly disappointed the Eur·opean democratic exiles.

The

Polish democratic emigration in England and on the continent lost
its confidence in Western European willingness to support Polish
rcctoration.

After the Paris Congress the

Poli~h

Democrat

r
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declared that "in the futu_re, Poland cannot expect any support

from any of the European governments."40

In the following

years the opposition of the Polish left-wing democrats to the
old democratic program which had been formulated by the Polish
Democratic Society in

the~~

of 1836 was increasing.
/

Franciszek Z<3.wadzki in Paris and Zenon Sw:Letoslawski
in London
e.
renewed the propaganda for an agrarian socialism which had been
the ideal of the Polish emigrant group A'd.d ....~glski in
in the thirties.

:E~gland

Simultaneously, the desire for a closer

revolutionary collaboration with the Russian radicals was
voj.ced. l+ 1 But Marx and Lngels did not comment on this
development.
_!~uestion

of

Ge.rm~C,21£J.tY.

Marx's and Engels's opposition to the European Left
was not only determined by the revolutionary polj.cies and tactics
of the Left, but also by their concern with German security and
with border questions.

As in

1848-1~9,

in the post-revolution era,

Marx and Engels repeatedly defended the need for safeguarding
German territorial interestso
--~

4-v~Limanows.
·
~ k"J., ~'
\1l .,, 11 p. 397.
4 1Bobihska, ~__.£};!~!.' pp. 179-800

Bobinska ma:Lntained
that Marx and Engels were in favor of a collaboration between
tho radical Poles and Russians. But she did not quote any
statements of }.-:Iarx and bngels which would support her contention.
Cf. l111.£., p. 165.

206

At the outset of the fifties the French government under
President IJouis Napoleon took increasingly severe measures
against French radicalism, a policy which prepared Napoleon's
cou:p. d I etat of December 2, 1851.

_ . . . •.i~·

Farly in 1851 the political

exiles in London were in a state of great excitement.

They

expected the imminent outbreak of a French uprising against the
government of Louis Napoleon.

They speculated that this uprising

would call :forth an anti-French alliance of the reactionary powers
as in 1792 and ultimately result in a general European

revolutionary movement.

Marx and Engels shared the general expectations of a
French uprising.

However, Engels, who prided himself on being

an expert of military affairs, was convinced that the French
uprising would end in failure because the French radicals were

not strong enough to withstand an enemy attack.

This thought

greatly relieved Engels because he feared that a successful
French revolution would lead to an encirclement of Germany and
endanger German territorial integ:t."i ty.

In Engels 1 s opinion the

Italian and Polish revolutionaries would support the French
desire to annex the German territories west of the Rhine in
order to obtain French assistance in the destruction of Austria.
Engels

v1as

convinced that a revolutionary Poland would be

interested in tho
France and Italy.

~=-a Ga~man~Polish

11

as

much

dismemberment 11 of Germany as a revolutionary
As a result he abandoned his earlier support

alliance.

~~~~,~~-™w

wwwtmwa.c::t."""_asa.za:wm::;;:aaz:..~~.•Wprnt;;;.<5~.f'm':.·.cr.~~~r:
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In his letter to Marx of May 23, 1851 Engels declared
that under the present circumstances it was necessary to look
for new allies.

He proposed an alliance of revolutionary

Germany with revolutionary Russia.

"Aside from Hungary, Germany

would only have one possible ally, Russia, provided that Russia
would bring about a peasant revolution. 11 42

Engels's arguments

in defense of a German-Russian alliance· were surprisingly similar
to those of. the German democrat Wilhelm Jordan whom Engels had
ridiculed in 1848.
Engels maintained that a German-Polish alliance offered
no advantages to a revolutionary Germany.

In case of a

military engagement with Russia the Poles would be no match for
the Russ.ians because their military power was too weak.

At the

most they could raise an army of about 20,000 to 30,000 men.
Engels bluntly stated that such a weak nation had "no right to
have a word" in international affairs.
as a nation.

The Poles were finished

The "immortality" of Poland was a mere fiction.

According to Engels the Poles might serve best as an
"instrument" in the overthrow of the old Russian order through
an agrarian revolution.

When this task was accomplished, "Poland

would have absolutely no other reason to exist. 11 43

However,

(

43l&Q...., Pe 207, Cf. also Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
Corre_§l?2ndence 1 184:6-1892_Lfl Selection With Co11).me11tary and Notes,
trans. and ed'. by bona-1'forr(LonuOh:M:J.,awFence;Lta·. , T934) ~
p. 38.
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Engels doubted whether the Poles would be able to accomplish
this task.

He stated that even their past history was a failure

because the Polish aristocracy had alvmys been so "stupid" and
"quarrelsome" and preferred to live the life of the "idle
cavalier."
In E:ngels's opinion the Russian aristocracy was much
more active.

The aristocracy had furthered modern progress by

engaging in· busj_ness.

Engels was rather convinced the.t "due

to the national character and to the greater development of
the bourgeois element in Russia" an agrarian revolution would
first break out in that country.

There, it would also have a

much greater significance due to the territorial expanse of
Russia.

Engels insisted that the Poles would not be suitable
military or revolutj_onary allies of the Germans.

Besides, they

would only enter the alliance with the Germans under the condition
of territorial concessions to them.

This would endanger German

territorial integrity which must be defended by all means.

Engels

told Marx how satisfied he was that in 1848 they had not incurred
"any positive obligations towards the Poles, except for the
unavoidable one, the restoration of Poland with suitable borders,"
but on condition.that the Poles would carry through an agrarian
revolution.44
--~-

4411EGA

~-'

III/1

'
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Disregarding his statements of 1848-49, Engels now
maintained that the Polish demand for the restoration of the
Polish borders of 1772 was not justified.

He pointed out that

most of the people living in the former Polish territories were
totally indifferent to a reunion with the Poles.

The restoration

of Poland could only mean the restoration of ethnographic Poland.
The western borderlands of the old Polish Republic had been
subjected to a long process of Germanization with the result
that

11

one third of the ·proper Polish section • • . •

Germanized."

was

Simultaneously, the non-Polish people in the former

eastern territories of the Polish Republic--including the German
and

Jevlish minorities·--had become Russianized.

Engels claimed

that the Poles bad been unable to solve the nationality problem
because they lacked tho ability to organize a centralized state

which would have supported the Polonization of the foreign
elements.

Russia~

on the other hand, had solved the nationality

problem because tho Russians were able to centralize power and
to exercise it.

A proof of this Russian a b:Lli ty was the

Russianization of the foreign peo1)1es in the area of the Black
Sea, the Caspian Sea, and in Central
Rurasj.an

lacked.

Asia~

Engels suggested that

history revealed a certain greatness which Polj.sh hj_story
Russianj_zation, like Germanizatj.on, meant progress

becauoe it destroyed particularism.

r
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The concern for the eastern German border drove Enge1s
into expressing an insane desire for the complete destruction
of the Poles.

He advised the Germans

to take away
occupy the:Lr
to send them
put them off

from the Poles what • • • they can, to
fortresses, especj.ally Poznania, • • •
into the fire, devour their country, and
v;ith the prospect of getting Riga and

Odessa.Lt-5

Communist interpreters have been concerned with Enge1s 1s
violent anti-Polish statements.

N. Rjasanoff attributed them

to the policies of the Polish emigre democre.ts who, "in the
fight between democrats and communists, sided with the
democrats. 11 4 6 According to Rjasanoff, Engels reacted with a.n
outburst of anti-Polish feelings due to his impulsive nature.
But it was a passing mood of no consequence.
judgment may be questioned.

Rjasanoff 's

There is as much reason to interpret

Engels' s pro-Polish agitation in

18L~8-4 9

as a passj_ng mood.

Engels's basic attitude in 1851 agreed with the opinion he had
expressed in 18L1-5 that after the Napoleonic Wars the Germans
should have annexed as much Polish territory as possible, and
that the failure of the Germans to do so was regrettable.

Besides

since the Revolution of 1848 neither Marx nor Engels had returned

'
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to a defense of the surrender of Poznania and West Prussia to
the Poles, nor did they do so after 1851.
As was :pointed out previously, Engels and Marx were in

favor of the large centralized state as an instrument of economic
progress and revolutionary action.

Consequently, from the

beginning Polish inability to create a strong state represented
an immense deficiency in the eyes of Marx and Engels even though

they expressed a genuine enthusiasm for the bold readiness of
the Poles to fight in all kinds of revolutionary.movements.
On the other hand, since Narx and Engels considered empire
building as a sign of national vitality, they must have felt a
certaj.n attraction for the Russian Empire in spite of their
violent antis·Russian propaganda.

This is confirmed by their

admiration for the bold policies of Peter the Great.47

Moreover,

the sudden denial of the Polish right to a. free national existence
was not extraordinary because national independence was neither
a principle for En.gels nor :tJ..arx.

Any nation might become a pawn

in the game of revolutionary strategy.

Thus, in 181+8 the

Czechs ha.d been sentenced to national death by

~

because they

hindered revolutionary progress and the creation of
Grossdcrntschland.
...

~----~ ,_,~·--·

47N. Rjasanoff, "Karl Mci.rx ueber den Ursprung der
Vorherrscha.ft Russlands in Euro1Ja, eine kritische U:ntersuchung, 11
Dj.e Neue Ze:Lt, XXVIJ. Supplement No. 5 (:March 5, 1909), 23.
--~·-~

r
212
Engels had discussed the need for German-Russian
collaboration in a private letter to Marx.
were made in support of such a policy.

No public statements

But Engels contj_nued

his cri tj_que of Polish claims to the western borders of 1772

in an article, "Poles, Czechs and Germans," published on
March 5, 1852 in The New York Tr;i-bul}2_.

In keeping with his

letter of May, 1851, though in a less violent manner, he
agitated against any diminishment of Germs.n territorial
possessions.

He stated that their preservation had been a major

aim of the German "progressive party" in 18Li-8-49.

According

to Engels the propaganda of this party for the restoration of
Poland had been prompted by the necessity to invigorate the
weakening revolutionary initiative in Germany.

Only a

\'la.r

with

--

Russia could have achieved this aim.
Considering that even a partial national restoration
of Poland would inevitably lead to .such a war, • • •
the progressive party in Germany supported the Poles
who demanded the Polish borders of 1772.4 8

But Engels declared

that the ttprogressivc partyu had never thought of giving up the
Grand Duchy of Poznania and West Prussia because these provinces
had undergone a :process of Germanizat:i.on.

He frankly admitted

that the propaganda for the surrender of these :provinces to the
Poles in

18L1-8-~.9

had been nothing but a farce.
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According to Engels German superiority over the Poles
entitled the Germans to hold Poznania and West Prussia.
Germans had promoted the urban development.

The

They ushered

poznania and West Prussia into the modern age.

Besides, it was

too late to undo the Germanization process in these provinces ..
Engels maintained that already in 1772, at the time of the
First Polish Partition, the

Polish~German

border had become

"obsolete • • • as the demarcation line between tho Polish a.nd
German nationalities 11 because the Germans had settled east of
that border.49

After 1772 the old border had become even more

outdated because of the rapid progress of Germanization.

As a

result, the restoration of the Polish borders of 1772 would have
had disastrous consequenceso
181+8.

Nobody could have wished it in

Engels asked whether it would have been reasonable to

surrender
whole tracts of land chiefly inhabited by Germans
[am{\ large entirely German tovms • • • to a nation
which had not yet given any proof of an ability to
progress beyond the state of feudalism based on
serfdom.50
Engels applied to the Poles the same argmnent which he had used
in

18L~9

to fight the Czech demand for independence--namely, that

the more progressive natj.on has a right to domJ.nate the less
progressive one.
----~-·--.l·~Ib.
d

.;:..2;_., pp.

60-61 •

Engels argued that in case of a common German-Polish
war against Russia in 181+8 a victory over the Russians would
have enabled the Germans to turn the interest of the Poles
eastward.·

If the Poles had received large territories in the
East, they would have become more tractable and

reasonable in the West. After all, Rige and Mi.tau
would have been as important to them as Danzig and
Elbing.51
Certainly Engels' s interpretation of the fox·eign policies

of the ttprogressive party 11 in 1848-49 was not merely another
e:iqiression of his dissatisfaction with the Poles.

In later years

neither Marx nor Engels ever again made any public statements
in support of Polish aspirations to the western Polish borders o:f

1772.
In his New

:f.££L!£.i.~un2_

article of March 5, 1852

1ngels connected the Poznanian question \ij§_th the Austro-Slav

question.

He repeated the old argument that the Czechs had

profited from German rule.

It made no sense to liberate them.

He also addressed a warning to the Pan-Slavs who desired to
partition Eastern Germany.

He insisted that for several centuries

"all the inhabitants" of Eastern Germany were Germans, with the
exception of

11

a hundred thousand souls," who did not count, the

Kassubians in Pomerania and the Wends or Sorbians in Lusat.ia.

- 5 "1Ibid.

--- '

p.

61.
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Several days later, on March 15, 1852, Engels published
an article on "Pan-Slavis!u 11 in The New York Tribune.

He used

this article to discredit the claims of the Poles that a
restored Poland would become the bulwark of Europe against Russia.
In the customary fashion Engels maintained that the Pan-Slavs
intended "to subject the civilized West to the barbarian East
and the towns to the primitive agriculture of the Slavic
serfs. 11 52 He warned that this aim could be achieved if Russia
became the actual leader of the Slavic world.

The Russians were

the "only energetic 11 Slavs and their expansionist drive was
tremendous.

If they v1ere able to conquer the Balkans and

Constantinople with the help of their Pan .... Slav supporters, all
of Europe would soon become "the domaj_n of the Slavic race, 11
especially of the Russians.

Although Engels declared that the

Poles, with the exception of the nobility, had never been
"seri.ously entangled in these Pan-Slav traps, tt he suggested that
they were no match for the energetic Russ:I.a:ns.

Some of the arguments which Engels used in his discussions
on Russia in 1851-52 were remin:Lscsnt of those V!hich Herzen,

though for different purposes, had employed in his treatise, Du
.9§.Y2J~si,,~m0n:~~9J.ui~.Q.™'~Il-1i~~o

52--2--..:..
rb·a ,

p•

6"'i· •

Herzen
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maintained that the Russians were the most energetic Slavs.
Since the Middle Ages, and more so since the time of Peter the
Great, they had distinguished themselves as great state builders.
As a result, nineteenth centuxy Tsarist Russia had become an
immense Empire which extended from the Pacific Ocean to Central
Eastern Europe.

Herzen admitted that this immense Empire was

a threat to Western Europe.
only.n53

He stated:

"Germany exists in name

His conclusion was that if the Germans were unable to

withstand Russian control, a restored Poland could certainly not
become a barrier against the tremendous expansionist drive of
Russia because in the past it had been unable to defend itself
against Russian aggressiveness.
Early in the 1850's Engels also claimed that the Poles
would be unable to defend Europe from the Russian danger.

He

insisted that the Germans together with the Hungarians were
called to become a barrier e.gainst Russia because they were "more
energetic."

Germans and Hungarians had already diminished the

Slavic danger because they had been able to subjugate the Czechs
and the Croatianse
Although in the fifties Marx and Engels continued to
warn Europe against the danger of Russian expansionism, they did
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not resume their propaganda for a German war against Tsarist
Russia, not even at the time of the Crimean War.

Since 1850

Harx and Engels had become interested in the Eastern Question.
They expected that Russia would soon try to conquer Constantinople$

"the key to its house."

They speculated that a Russo-Turkish

conflict would develop into a European war and eventually cause
the outbreak of a European revolution •. However, Engels was no
longer convinced that the revolutionary continental armies
would be able to destroy the power of the immense Russian Empire.

In 1850 he referred to Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign
in 1812.

Engels maintaj.ned that in a future war the destruction

of Russian power would depend upon the military collaboration

between England and Sweden and the conquest of Odessa e.nd
Petersburg.

11

Without Petersburg and Odessa, Russia is a giant

with cut-off hands," said E...ngels in 1850. 54

No mention was made

of the Pol0s as a decisive factor in the struggle against
Tsarist Russia.
Early in 1853, when the tension b0tween Russici. and
Turkey was rising, Engels appe.3.led to England and Fre.nce to
imitate the "s1Jlendidll disregai"'d of Napoleon I for e.ny k:Lnd of
st~~us

gu.2_ and to overthrow the weak Turkish rule in the
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Balkans.55

This would remove the danger of Russian aggression,

a.nd it would also result in a "European war" and lead to
revolutionary changes.

It was in the interest of the people to

support the overthrow of the status·guo.
history.

Change was the law of

It furthered progress.56
Engels speculated that the liberation of the Balkan

Slavs would strengthen the anti-Russian ·bourgeoisie.

He said

that the Serbs had a right to overthrow the Turkish rule because
they were more progressive than the Turks.57

---

They would emerge

.5'5c'f·.· Engels' s

article, ttTurkey," The New York Tribune,
April 7, 1853, in Karl Marx The Eastern Question, ed. '6'y-1fleanor
Marx Aveling and Eduard Aveii'ng-Ci,ondon: S:-Sorilienschein & Co.,
1897), :p. 2. Cf. also Gesalli)Tiel];.~ Schriften,, I, 145. Regarding tharticles on the Eastern "Question, they were the result of Marx's
and Engels's close collaboration. Some were written by Engels,
others by Marx, and some by both, but all were signed by Narx. Cf.
Maximilian Rubel, Biblio~aphie des oeuvres de Karl Marx avec en
- ~i?J2£E:..c!i~e. un_r.iR~r:-l~yea.es oeuvr"es a,e li'riearich WdF-L.§. (Par-is:Librairie Fla.reel Riviere et ere, 195br;--p. 1Db.
56Engels stated: uwho, through historical studies, has
learned to admire the eternal change of human history, • • • who
has f ollowod the iron course of history whose wheels relentlessly
roll over the :ruins of great states and crush whole generations
without mercy, who, therefore, is able to understand that •• • no
revolutionary proclamation can be as revolutionary as the simple
naked facts of the history of mankind, • • • such a man will
certainly not shy away from asking himself this historical
question [the Eastern Question] only because its correct solution
would result in a European war." Friedrich Engels, "What should be
done with European Turkey?" The New York Tribune, April 21, 1853,
in Gesammol te Schriften, I, 1'67.
·
.
·57when the Ukrainj.an ·socialist V. Levynskyj discussed
Marx's and Engels's attitude towards the Czechs and the Serbs, he
was annoyed by their arbitrary approach to the question of
national liberty. While Mci.rx and 1ngels condemned the Czechs to

L~o:..d0at0h~- the~=:~.th~·===~he

se::__J
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as the new leaders in the Balkans.

In order to maintain their

position they would be forced to turn to the West and to adopt
western political and educational ideas.

The construction of a

railroad would increase trade relations with Western Europe, and
this would also counteract the Russian influence.
In 1853 Engels supported tho modernization of the
Balkan era as a means to withdraw it from Russian influence, that
is, a Balkan policy which in the forties had been advocated by
Friedrich List, the defender of Grossdeutschlo.nd. · Unlike List,
Engels did not ascribe this task to the Germans in particular,
and he did not specifically state that the Balkans ought to
become a German sphere of influence.

But it must be kept in

mind that Marx and Engels, as List had done, wished for the
- creation of Grossdeutschland.

List had pointed out that a strong

German state which would also command the collaboration of the
Hungarians would be predestined to obtain a predominant position
in the Balkans.

It may be assumed that this was also taken into

consideration by Marx and Engels.
tevy11skyj co111Illen=Eed that Engels wavered between Hegel's theory
that only historical nations have a right to exist and a
revolutionary theory that also non-historical nations have this
right if they are revolutionary. Levynskyjdeclared that only the
latter theory was worthy of a socialist. Cf. V. Levynskyj,
Soc_iali.stychn;Li International i Ponevoleni Narod~ (.1'The Socialist
lnlernafional ana tlielJppressed Ifat':i.. ons~(1tiev an Vienna: n.p.,
1920), p. 35.
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Indeed, in the mid-fifties Marx and Engels defended
List's basic foreign political concept that Grossdeu.tschland

---.--·~~

in collaboration with Hungary and the modernized Balkan area

would become a true barrier against Russian expansionism, not
Poland.

They regarded s.ny increase of Russian influence j.n

the Balkans as an imminent danger to Austria and ultimately
Germany.
The Balk.an crisis flared up when in June, 1853 the
Russians invaded the Turkish vassal states of Moldavia and
Vlalachia and the Turks reacted with a declaration of war.

In

the following months }JE..rx's and Engels's agitation fo.r a war
of the Western European powers, England and France, against
Russia became more urgent.

In his articles of August, 1853,

Marx warned that Russia desired to conquer Constantinople.

Should

Russia be able to achieve this traditional aim, its "supremacy
in Europe" would be strengthened.

The conquest of Constantinople

would become the instrm.:ient for further Russian aggression--the
conquest of the whole Balkan area, as well as of Hungary and
Bohemia, and the destruction of Austrie.n power which acted as a
barrier against Russia.

According to Marx the Western powers

did not understand the significance of Constantinople for the
preservation of European liberty.

"Only the revolution"

r
221

resulting from the Balkan conflict would save Europe from "the
demoniac influence of the Rome of the East. 11 58
While Marx and Engels agitated for western European
intervention in the Balkan crisis, Herzen became increasingly
concerned about it.

On February 20, 1854, shortly before the

outbreak of the Crimean War, he addressed an open letter to the
radical English newspaper, the Eng_li:sh..-~l!..1:?1.i£, in which he
advised the -Europeans not to prevent the Tsar from conquering
Constantinople.

It was Russia's mission to restore Slavic unity,

and only Constantinople could become the center of the rising
Slavic world.

Herzen warned that a European war against Russia

would probably meet with the same fate as Napoleon's invasion of
Russia.

Besides, it would certainly accelerate the dovmfall of

Tsarism and the advent of the socialist revolution.
increase Russia's influence among the Slavs.

This would

Then the Russians

might be able to destroy the German, Turkish, and Hungarian
rule over the Slavs and to organize a Sle.vic unio11 "from the Volga
to the Elbe river, and from the Adriatic Sea to the Archipelagoo"
Herzen indicated that a war against Russia might call into
existence that formidable Slavic power bloc under Russian
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1eadership which the Europeans fearea.59

It would certainly not

result in a restoration of Poland and Polish leadership in Eastern
Europe.
While Herzen attacked Western European infatuation vii th
tbe Poles, he continued to stress the need for Polish-Russian
revolutionary collaboration.

On March 25,

185L~,

three days

before the outbreak of the Crimean War, he published an appeal
to the Russian soldiers stationed in Poland.

The soldiers should

take advantage of the Tsar's difficulties in the· Balkan War and
stage an insurrection against the Tsarist government as the
Decembrists had done.

They should collaborate with the Poles

who waited ·for a suitable moment "to revolt in defense of their
rights."
On March 28, 1854 England and France declared war
against Russia.

The professed aim was "to restrict Russia to

its natural borders."

Austria and Prussia vrere invited to join

the alliance, but they preferred to remain neutral.

The lack

of a united European front precluded a vigorous attack upon Russia
at the outset of the war and diminished the possibility of a

reopening of the Polish question.

England and France continued

to make great efforts to draw Prussia and Austria into the war.
59Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzon, Sobranie Sochinenii
Collected Workstr), Vols. I-XIX, XXVII-XXX01oscow: Isdatelstvo
Akademiia Nauk, 195l+), XIII, 67-71.
( 11
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They promised Prussia the acquisition of more Polish territories.

Rumors were spread about Polish unrest in Poznania and Silesia.
Pe.mphlets insisted that if Austria, and particularly Prussia,
should remain neutral at the instigation of Russia, they would
almost certainly risk an "internal rebellion and the loss of
their territorial possessions in Italy and on the Rhine."60
As in 1848, there was a war party in the Prussian
government •. This group felt that Prussia should enter the
Anglo-French alliance in order to eliminate the Russian opposition
to German unfication. 61 The anti-war party did not share the
hope of the interventionists that a European ·war against Russia
would liberate Germany from Russian influence.

In the end the

anti-war party prevailed.
One of its most prominent members was Otto von Bismarck,
the Prussian envoy to the German Federal Diet in Frankfurt.
Bismarck feared that Prussian and Austrian participation in the
war might divide Germany and endanger a common German policy.
The small German states might believe that Prussia and Austria

intended to use the war against Russia as a means to deprive them
·-·t;oThomas Carlyle, Shall Turkey Live or Die?
n. p. , 1854) , p. 30 •

(London:

6lcf. F. Heinrich Geffcken, Zur Geschichte des
(Berlin: Verlag von "Gebr1;leder
~aetel, 1881), pp. 90-91. Cf. a!So the discussion of the Crimean
War and German policies in Manteuffel-Scoege, Geschichte des
P..Ql.nj-_?chen Volkes, pp. 129 ff.
Orien~~lJ_schon Krie~_18.?2.:185§.
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of their independence.

In order to save themselves, they might

support a Franco-Russian rapprochement directed against Prussia
and Austria.

This would endanger the chances of a future

German unification.6 2
According to Bismarck the preservation of the status_guo
in Central Eastern Europe was in the best interest of Prussia
and Germany.

He was against the acquisition of more Polish

territories-.

Prussia could not be interested in increasing

the number of its Poli~h Catholic subjects. 63
against the restoration of Poland.
would profit from it.

Bismarck was also

Neither Prussia nor Germany

The German support of Polish restoration

would exposB Germany to Russian revenge and increase the English
and French influence in Europe which was a greater danger to
_ Germany than Russia.

Bismarck insisted that it was in the

interest of the German powers to preserve Russia's territorial
integrity as a counterweight against England and France. 64
At the time of the Crimean War, Marx's and Engels's
opinion on the course of action which Germany, particularly
Prussia, should pursue was surprisingly similar to Bismarck's

b2 Bismarck's letter to the Prussian foreign minister Karl
von Manteuffel, April 25, 185L1., in Fuerst Otto von Bismarck, Die

£.B~l}l.el~n

Werket-.,.PoJJ:...ti_§)c_p.e Sch~~~' ed. by Dr. Herman von
Petersaorf'f {19 vols.; 2d ea-:-;:rserlin: Otto Stollberg & Co.,

1924-35), I, 447.
c .
63Bismarck's letter to Karl von Manteuffel, February 2,
1854-' in Bismarck, .QJ2.!•• cit •. , I, 1+22.

6L1-J.E.~·, PP~
1~5L~-55,
.
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basic position.

Although Marx and Engels continued to agitate

for a vigorous war against Russia, they nevertheless supported
German neutrality, though for different reasons.
Shortly before the outbreak of the Crimean War, Engels
had

expressed the opinion that, at the outset of the war against

Rlwsia, Prussia and Austria would not collaborate with England
and

France.

Nor would the German powers join Russia if through

the conquest of the northern and southern Russian ports England
and France would weakeri Russia and liberate Germ0ny from
Russian control.

In that case Prussia and Austria might like to

enter the anti-Russian coalition "to profit from Russia's
difficulties.u 65 However, should a military failure of the West
permit a strengthening of the reactionary powers, this would
bring about a .revolution from ".Manchester to Rome [and]
Paris to Warsaw and Budapest."

from

However, Marx's and Engels's

propaganda tactics at the time of the Crimean War do not in.dicate
that they seriously desired the outbreak of a revolution at that
moment.
As was pointed out earlier, Marx a.nd Engels were
convinced that all the European radicals shared the conunon
desj.re for the partition of Germany.

After the outbreak of the
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Crimean War the two friends were faced with the propaganda of the
European Left that the war should be turned into an instrument
for the liberation of the oppressed peoples.

The radicals dernande

not only the restoration of Poland, but also the destruction of
Austria.

The anti-Austrian propaganda vms supported by Herzen.

:Marx and Engels remained aloof from the agitation for the
liberation of the oppressed peoples.

They did not agitate for

the restoration of Poland in their articles for the

--

~

Tribune, nor for the participation of the German powers, Austria

and Prussia, in the Crimean War.

Nor did they return to a support

of the liberation of the Balkan Slavs.

When it became obvious

that Prussia would not enter the '\7ar, they did not denounce
Prussian neutra.lity as a reactionary policy as in 18Li-8.
they maintained a conciliatory attitude.

Instead,

Obviously they did not

desire the extension of the war.
In his
of May 19,

185~-,

~~112.

article on "Prussian Policy'!

Engels defended Prussie.n neutrality against

its condemnatj_on by English and ll'rench newspapers.

According

to Engels, Prussia would be foolish to enter the crusade of the
Western powers against Russia, especj_ally because the outcome
of the war was not yet certain.

Prussia was in need of Russian

protection from ''.the unsated appetite" of every Frenchman for

the Rhenish provinces.

Besides, Engels did not think that the

Western powers could off er any real advantages to Prussia for its

,
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participation in the Crimean \'Jar.

Prussia was certainly not

interested in the acquisition of new Polish territories.
It can hardly ma.nage that part of the Polish territory
and people it already owns. Besides, the Prussians
hate and despise the Poles, and the general feeling
is adverse to any new acquisitions in that quarter. 66
Moreover, Engels insisted that Prussia needed peace
to remain prosperous.

He even permitted himself to praise

Prussia--a rare occasion.
The Kingdom is not.rich by nature but by industry,
activity, and thriftiness. These beneficent· results
of peace, and peace alone, may and must be destroyed
by an untimely war. 6"I
.Any

alliance, either with Austria and France or with Russia,

would threaten the economic welfare of Prussia.
__In the summer months of 1854 it became evident that the
__ Russians were unable to deal with the inefficiently prepared
campaign of the allied troops.

In August$ 1854 the Austrians

forced the Russians by mere diplomatic pressure to withdraw from
Moldavia and Valachia.

The development of the Crimean War sup-

ported Bismarck's viewpoint that there was no need to check Russian
power by joining the Anglo-French alliance, that Russia was not
strong enough to become a danger to the Germans, and that even
6""6Marx, The Eastern Question, p. 357.

67

12i£.

"P·

358.
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a.n isolated Prussia would be able to defend itself from a
Russian attack. 68
When the military weakness of Russia and the poor
conduct of the war by the Western European allies was revealed,
Engels suddenly contradicted his earlier prognosis that the
capture of the Russian seaports would bring about the defeat
of Russia.

He

declared that the loss of' the Russian ports and

their hinterland would not weaken the j_mmense Empire because its
povrer rested on the massive armies of the interior.
Russia may loose the Crimea, the Caucasus, Finland,
and st. Petercburg, and all such appendages, but as
long as its body with Moscow for its heart and
fortified Poland for its 9word-arm is untouched, it
need not give in an inch.69
Novi, Engels preferred to consider the Polish Kingdom as "Russia's

center of gravity."

Ho said that already Napoleon had recognized

its importance by the construction of a system of fortifications
which was

it

stronger than any other in the world. 11

According to

Engols the Russians remained unconquerable and a danger to

Europe e,s long as they were able to "concentrate more than
300,000 men" in this excellent strategic position.

At the very

moment, when it had become manifest that France and England alone

·t8Bism~k, Qk_l£2.§'~~mmel~~, I, 474.
69 11 The iulitary Power of Russia," .TI1Llew_.Y,9£k Y.£i.1.?Jl11e,
October 31, 185L1., in Marx, .Tii.e )~~ern g;;!.est~, P~ 490.

P"
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would be unable to overthrow the statl!s .ci-q.e, in Central Ji..E.stern
Europe, Engels turned the attention of the readers to Poland,
but only to its strategic importance.

He threatened that soon

Russia would attack Europe and a "real war on a large scale"
would ensue, finally leading to the revolutionary wars of the
European peoples against the despots.

This, however, was an

empty threat.
Early in 1855 lffiss:i.a was still unable to repel the siege
of Sevastopol by the allied troops.

articles on

11

:Nevertheless, Engels, in his

Pan-Slavism," continued to warn Europe against

an imminent attack of the united Slavs under Russian leadership.70
Engel.s's agitation against Pan-Slavism was mostly a repetition
' 71
of earlier statements.
As in 1848, Engels maintained that all
. ·7oAcc~rding to Rjasanoff, Engels wrote about 14 to 15
articles on "Pan·-Slavism" for the New York Tribune, but almost
none of them was published. This was-apparenlly due to the
influence of the Polish Count Anton Gurowski who, as mentioned.
earlier, collaborated with the Tribune and was a supporter of
Pan-Slavism under Russian leaderruuP:- Cf. also the comments on
Gurouski and the fate of Engels's articles by Paul Blackstock in
The Russian Menace to Europe by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
A-Cofl"e c ti on o '.r"".i'lr~E:L cJ.es,-speGcnes , 178 flersaoorre\vs~D'ispatches ,
ed. by Paul w. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz (Glencoe, Ill.:
The Free Press, 1952), p. 2Li-9. Two of Engels's articles on "PanSlo.vism" were published in the :Neue Oder ZeitunP" on April 21 and
24, 1855.
--~
~g.
71Engels's himself did not think much of these articles.
In a letter to 1.ria.rx of February 7, 1855 ho commented: "Enclosed
Pan~-Slav:Lsm, number 2, v1here the lack of quality is at least to
some extent made up by the quantity of the work. With number 3
I ~inally enter into medias I'..£1§!.·" De~- Br:i._e.f~Y2.Shsel z_yi_sc}f_~}l

!)'_~22:E;i-g_LlpJte1s _tP.:..cl.J~~--:~J_8Lt.EtS:,8).., ed. ~1:gu~r"Be bel and
Eduard Bernstein (4 vols.; :Stuttgart: J. Ho Vl o D1e·1.-z Nachf.,
GmblI, ·1919), II, 87.
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the Pan-Slavs, whether reactionary or democratic, were
imperialists.

Their political program was to conquer Europe

under Russian leadership.

First of all, the Pan-Slavs aimed

at the conquest of the Balkans and half of Germany.

After having

advanced into the very heart of Europe, they would attempt to
dominate all of Europe.

Consequently, Europe was faced with the

alternative of either being subjugated by the backward Slavs
or of destroying Russia, the center of their aggressive power.
Engels stated that Pan-Slavism was initiated by the Austro-Slavs.
Russia used Pan-Slavism to further its orm aim, the creation of
a "great Slavic Empire from the Elbe river to China and from the
Adr:Latic Sea to the Arctic Ocean. 11 72 E.ngels fought Pan-Slavism
as a German and as a communj_st.

He insisted that Pan-Slavism

threatened the territorial integrity of Germany and the
achievement of a European radical revolution.
Although Engels repeated that the Poles were hostile
to the Russians and were ttmost definitely opposed to Pan-Slavism,n
he maintained that only Austria constituted a strong bulwe.rk of
Europe age.inst the· Pan-Slav threat.
prevent the unification of the Slavs.

Austria's function was to
It was in the greatest

interest of Eur·ope to preserve the territori.al integrity of the
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Austrian Empire. The Slavs should remain subjected not only to
Austrian and Hungarian rule but also to Turkish rule which likevr.Ls
was the result of a long historical process.

While Engels had

agitated for the liberation of the Balkan Slavs before the
Crimean War, he now supported the English and French policy
which favored the status quo in the Balkans.

Engels was

obviously satisfied that the Crimean War had remained a local war.
In- 1855 Engels continued to refrain from any declarations
in support of Polish restoration.
against it.

Indirectly he.even agitated

For the first time he maintained that the Galician

Ukrainians were different from the Poles.

He mentioned that

about three· million Poles lived in Galicia, and that the number

of Ukrainians living in Galicia and northeastern Hungary was
about the same.

In Engels's opinion the Western Ukrainians were

a branch of the Russian people.

Similarly to the Galician Poles

they had been separated from "the main body of their nation" by
the historical development.

Consequently, it was inevitable that

the Galician Poles and the Western Ukrainians gravitated towards
their "naturaltt centers--Russian Poland and Hussia respectively •
.Their desire for reunification with their fatherlands would
become "ever more urgent as civilization and the need for national
historical activity" spread among them.73

-

73Ibid., p. 229.

According to Engels
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the national consciousness of the Poles and UY,.rainians would

grow with the dissolution of the agricultural society and the
rise of the bourgeoisie.
Engels had come fairly close to the viewpoint upon which
he had expounded in his letter to Marx of May 23, 1851 that
Polish restoration was to be limited to ethnographic Poland
which might seI'Ve as a buffer state between Germany and Russia
but would be too weak to play an influential role in European
politics.

At the very moment, when Engels warned the Europeans

of Russian expansionism, he backed the claim of the Great
Russians that they had a historical right to all the lands which
had been part of the medieve.l Kiev state Rus, including Red RtJs,

the eastern part of Galicia.

In 1893, shortly before his death,

Engels still supported the Great Russian viewpoint when he
declared that only the annexation of the Polish Kingdom by the
Tsars was a v:Lolation of Polish national riehts.74
Marx's and Engels 1 s hostj_li ty to the nationality
principle, which had deepened in the fight against the political
exiles, resulted in the support of the §>J;~.~·U.t?.__~ at the time

of the Crtmean War.

The two friends resumed the policy which

Engels had outlined in h:Ls ~articles of February, 1849 and

-~--r~fiied;.ich Engels, "Die e.usvraertigo Poli tile des
russischen Zarentums," Die Neue Zeit, VIII (January-September,
1890), 150.
----

l
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which aimed at keeping the Slavs divided in the interest of
Germany. ·They supported the preservation of the Austrian and
Turkish Empires.

However, they did not agitate for the

partition of Russia and the restoration of Poland as in 1848-49.
They defended a position which was absolutely opposed to the

revolutionary program of the European

Left~-who

aimed at the

restoration of Poland and the destruction of Austria as a
prerequisite for the reorganization of Europe.
Three years after the Crimean War, at the time of the
Italian War of 1859, Marx and Engels again took an isolated
stand on the question of European reorganization.

The Italian

Wax· released another wave of agitation for the complete overthrow

of the European territorial order.

As earlier, Viarx and

remained aloof from this kind of propaganda.

~ngels

With the

exception of the members of the European Left, Napoleon III was
the most determined defender of the nationality principle.

Marx

and Engels interpreted his support of the Italian fight against
Austria as a convenient means to achieve his ultimate goal, the
conquest of the Rhenish provinces.75
status qup in the Austrian Empire.
--

Therefore, they favored the
They desired that the

75Engels def ended this viewpoint in his pamphlet Po und
1. 859) which apJ?eared anonymously.
It was aga:ln'PU'blished by Eduard Bernstej.n (Stuttgart: 1 91 5) together· with
?av9yen, N~.zz~ lµid der Rhein, also published anonymously by Engels
ii113erlin in 1°1r6o.
Rhe:!:..11 (Berlin:
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socialists in Germany spread propaganda for a war of the German
governments against Napoleon III

11

for the sake of Germany's

existence. 11 7 6 They speculated that a war against France would
also involve Germany in a war with Russia allowing the "most
energetic party" in Germany--meaning the socialists--to seize
power.7 7
To the dismay of Marx and Engels their compatriot
and political partner Ferdinand Lassalle supported the war of the
Italians against Austria in Germany.7 8

In his p~mphlet Der

italienische Krieg, ho declared that the war was
advantage to the German nation."

11

of the greatest

If the Italians were liberated

with the help of Napoleon III, this would also enable the
Hungarians to get rid of Austrian rule.

A partitioned Austria

would no longer be an obstacle to German unity.

"On the day when

• • • Austria is destroyed • • • on that day Germany is
constituted.. 11 79
. 7y;Marx11 s letter to Engels, May 18, 1859, in Karl Marx
and Friedrich Engels, £orrespondence, 18L~6-1895_, p. 122.

irx,

77Aus dem lite.rf3.ri2cJ10n Nachlass von K~rl
Friedrich
En.g§Js und F~ssa.T;Le, ed. b:Yll1ra.nz Behring ~ v~
Stuttga!7"t:-'"'Je H. vi. Tirnlrachf, GmbH, 1902), IV, 185.
78Note: Ferdinand Lassalle,~ became the founder of the
first workers' political party in Germany in 1863.
79Der ital,i!i.n.i.sche Krie,g, in Ferdinand J. G.. Lassalle,
Red en und Schr:_iften, ed. with a Foreword by Eduard
oernstein [3 vol:s.; Berlin: Paul Cassirer, 1919), I, 61.
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The Italian

Viar

caused a controversy between Marx and

Engels and Ferdinand Lassalle over the proper foreign policy of
t1the revolutionary party" in Germany.
to

~.arx

In his letters written

and Engels from Germany in 1859-60, Lassalle criticized

the two men for their support of a war against France and Russia
by

the established German governments.

If the war were

victorious, it would only strengthen the counter-revolutionary
forces. ·Lassalle felt that Viarx's and Engels's reasoning lacked
"logic" because of their exaggerated Russophobia.

Moreover,

the defense of the territorial integrity of the Austrian Empire
by

the German socialists would alienate the European revolutionary

forces.
By adopting this wrong position must we not become
enemies of Frenchmen, Italians, Hungarians, and Poles?
Until now we have always preached the solidarity of
the people, and all the revolutions have failed because
this solidarity has not been realizedo shall we
ourselves raise our weapons against it?80

In Lassalle's opinion the popularity of the nationality principle
should rather be exploited to further the revolutionary aim of
the German socialists--the unification of Germany.

He could not

~

understand why Marx and Engels disregarded this possibility •
.Actually Lassalle was as much opposed to the nationality
principle as Marx and Engels.

He

did declare that "democracy

8bLassalle's letter to Marx of mid-June, 1859, in
Aus dem literarischen NachJ.ass, IV, 189-90. Cf. also Lassalle's
Ielter to r;rar:x -of B8pt.em1>er ff, 1860, ____._
Ibid., pp. 276, 278.
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cannot suppress the nationality principle without committing
. . d e. ,,81 However, he interpreted the nationality principle
su1c1
merely as the right of the people to cultural autonomy.

Only

the great Kultur-Nationen (civilized nations) had a right to
national independence.

The right of the Racen (nationalities)

consisted in being assimilated and developed by the great
nations.

In a private letter to his friend Carl Rodbertus-

Jagetzow of .!"Jay 2, 1863 he frankly stated: "I am not an adherent
of the nationality principle. 1182 In 1859 it was "not the
principle [but] the policy most suitable for a revolutionary
development" which caused the controversy between Marx and Engels
and Lassalle. 83 Otherwise, both parties involved in the
controve~sy

agreed that the aim of the German socialists must

be the creation of a large centralized German state,
11

G.rossdeutsch1and !£9ins les dynasti.es. u84
When in 1859 Ma.rx and Engels exchanged letters with

Lassalle on the territorial extension of a revolutionary Germany,
the three men agreed that neither the Austro-Slavs nor the Poles
Lassalle, Gesammel te Re den und Schrift.eP._, I, 70.
82 Briefe von ~erpina1~d. L.ass?lle .. an Car)-, Rodbertus;:.{a_getzoJ.!,
d. with a Foreword by Adolf Wagner (Berlin:---r:>lltt'Fammer und
Muehlbrecht, 1878), p. 54.
83Lassalle 's letter to Marx, mid-June, 1859, in ~ff>- dem
literarischen Nachlass, IV, 192.
84Br:Lefe von .Ferdinand Lassalle, p. 54.·

--------

237
under Prussian rule were to be liberatedo
and

In a letter to Marx

Engels of H3.y 27, 1859 Lassalle commented on a letter by

Engels which unfortunately is not available.

He

remarked:

"I

fully agree with him [Engels] that P-russian Poland is Germanized
and must be retained."

But Lassalle made one reservation:

As to his remarks on Hungary, I do not agree with him
because they permit a double interpretation, as if
Hungary should remain under German domination. I
consider this neither possible nor necessary and useful,
but it is certainly important and rather good that they
[the Hungarians] are dependent on us by their opposition
to primj_tive Slavism.()5

Four years later Lassalle argued that the German socialist party,
"the natural candidate for the German revolution, 11 would establi.sh

Germany as a poy1erful state in Europe.

That party was also
destined to solve the Turkish question. 86 It is evident that
in this case Hungary would have truly become an appendage of

Germany, and that a strong Gerr.mn position in Central Europe

would have eliminated any considerations of Polish territorial
claims~

In 1859 Marx and Engels opposed Lassalle's desire to
exploit the nationality principle in the interest of their
revolutionary aj_m for the same reason they supported the sta..tu_s_gu..

-----8'~~L1:~~~!2:..§..ShG_1l_.1f~J.:1..l~,

IV, 183.

86Brj_ef~ von Ferdinand Lassallei p. 56.
---~--"~-----
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a.t the time of the Crimean War.

'Marx and Engels were still

apprehensive that any support of the nationality principle, whether

bY the Western European revolutionaries or by the Pan-Slavs,
\vould endanger German territorial integrity and prevent the
creation of a revolutionary Grossdeutschland.

In 1859 their

concern for German security was increased because they suspected
that Napoleon III and Tsar Alexander II were plotting to ·weaken
Germany.

'Marx and Engels were outraged ·when in 1859, at the time

of the European crisis, a German democrat, Karl Vogt, supported
the application of the nationality principle to Central Eastern
Europe.
In his treatise Studien

~.'l£J>egenwaertigen

Lage

Euro:P.~!=!.'

Vogt maintained that the Austro-Italie..n conflict offered a chance
for territorial changes in Central Eastern Europe.

He urged

the Germans to follow the example of Napoleon III and Alexander II
who supported the liberation of all the oppressed peoples.
Germans should liberate the Slavs under German rule.
contribute to the unification of Germany.

The

This would

Vogt also promoted

Polish-Russian collaboration and the creation of a Pan-Slav union
under Russian leadership because this would permanently safeguard
the liberty of the Slavs.
In 1860

~1arx

published the pamphlet Herr V2_g!_ which was

mainly an elaboration of Engels's articles against Pan-Slavism
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of February,

and spring, 1855.

In this pamphlet Marx

sharply attacked the German democrat as an agent of the Tuileries.
Be maintained that the realization of Vogt•s political concepts
would not liberate the Slavs, including the Poles, but merely
help to extend the Russian sphere of influence in Europe.

This

would ultimately result in the destruction of Germany's
independent national existence.
buffer state.

Germany would be reduced to a

According to Marx this was the desire of Napoleon

III and Alexander II.

Marx insisted that it was in the greatest interest of
Germany to prevent a Polish-Russian union in order to protect
the eastern.German border from being further weakened.
explaine~

viewpoint.

He

that the border was already too weak from a strategic
In order to support his opinion, he referred to the

Prussian field marshal Count August von Gneisene.u who had also
considered the border as intolerable from a strategic viewpoint.
Marx repeated Engels's argument that the western border of the
Polish Kingdom vras criven like "a wedge" between Austria and
Prussia.

The border provided Russia with an excellent strategic

advantage in case of v1ar which was increased through the
construction of a number of fortresses near Warsaw after the
Polish insurrection of 1830-31.

According to ¥i.arx these

fortresses permitted "the complete strategic domination of the
Vistula territoryo"

Their construction revealed the Russian
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intention to use the Polish Kingdom as a "base for an attack"
against Prussia and Austria.

Marx concluded that the fortresses

threatened "Germany more than all the French fortifications. 11 87
According to Marx a Polish.-Russian union would increase
the danger of a Russian invasion of Germany.

But the situation

would become intolerable should the Germans follow Vogt•s advice
and surrender Poznania and West Prussia ·to the Poles.
territories.would ultimately be absorbed by Russia.

These
Then East

Prussia, which Vogt had· called the only "truly Ge.rman province,"
would become "a Russian enclave," ready to be swallowed by
Russia. 88
Ma~x

also warned the Poles against a union with Russia.

It would not mean their libera.tion but the end of

Poloniae. "

Poland~-"Finis

The annexation of Galicia, which had been a Russian

aim since Alexander I, would be a major step towards the complete

According to Marx, Napoleon III was

subjugation of Poland.

willing to sacrifice Poland to the Russians.

Marx suspected

Napoleon of having invited Russia to annex Galicia in order to

win Russian support for his aim to annex German territories.
In the opinion of Marx the liberation of the Austro-Slavs
would endanger Germany even more than Polish-Russian collaboration
87Karl Marx, Herr Vogt (London:

PP. 78-79.

..

88 Ibid., p. 79.

A. Petchu u. Co~, 1860),
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because Bohemia and Moravia (present-day Czechoslovakia) would
certainly pass under Russian rule.

A Russian Bohemia, located

"in the middle of Germany" VTOuld be "a wedge" driven between
Northern and Southern Germany and Austria. 89 In case of a war
against Russia, German military power would be completely paralyzed,
and the Russians could easily overrun Southern Germany from
Bohemia and occupy it.

Henceforth, military cooperation between

Northern and Southern Germany and.German Austria would only be
possible "under Russian leadership."

Marx concluded that,

contrary to the expectations of Vogt, the surrender of the Slavic
possessions would not bring about the unification of Germany but
the destruction of a thousand years of German history, the
subjugat_ion of Germany _to Russian rule, and ultimately the
partition of Germany itself.
According to Marx the Pan-Slavs would not be satisfied
with the surrender of Bohemia and Moravia.

In addition, they

would demand that a "natural border" be drawn between the Germans
and Slavs in Eastern Germany.

They would not be deterred by

the impossibility of drawing a just border in that area which
was proved by the language map of the Slavophile Czech P. J.

"'

..,,

Safar{k.

Marx said the map showed that territories where German

was spoken, such as Silesia, the whole lower Vistula region, and

l
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most of East and West Prussia, were wedges driven into the
Slavic world.

He remarked that the Pan-Slavs would not consider

the existence of the German territories a problem.

They would

simply declare that these territories had once been Slavic
and incorporate them into the Pan-Slav union.
Marx maintained that according to Pe.n-Slav plans the
new German-Slavic border was to extend from the Baltic Sea coast
near Stolp to the Netze river, then west to Lieberose and Luebbe-incorporating also Lusatia--from there south to the passage of
the Elbe river through the Bohemian Mountains and west along
the Bohemian border.

Ultimately the Pan-Slavs would even

incorporate German Austria as an undesirable wedge between the
Western and Southern Slavs.

They used the nationality principle

merely to hide their expansionist dream.

The application of

that principle, said Marx, would cripple Germany forever.
We Germans do not loose anything more by such an
operation than East and West P-.cussia, Silesia, parts
of Brandenburg and Saxony, all of Bohemia and Moravia,
e.nd the remainder of Austria, except for Tyrol (which
is partially lost to the Italian nationality 1)rinc:iple)-~
and our national ex:istence into the bargain.90
With this pamphlet Marx disqualified the German democrats,
who defended the nationality prj_nciple, as the leaders of a
revolutionary Germany.

He insinuated that they had no

l
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understanding of the factor of power politics.

The support of

the nationality principle would bring about neither German
unification nor a peaceful coexistence between Germans and Slavs.
!t would merely promote Germany's disappearance as a power in
Central Europe.
When the Marxist N. Rjasanoff commented on Marx's
pamphlet in 1916,he stated:
This SO··Called strategic proof for the need of the
restoration of Poland was not present in the polemics
of NRZ. 91
.
Rjasanoff failed to see that the main aim of the pamphlet was to
defend the territorial integrity of Germany, not to agitate for
the

restora~ion

of Poland.

for the liberation of

11

Although Marx referred to the need

the Polish nationality," he did not

promote the creation of a large and strong Poland as a European
bulwark against Russia.

Germany would defend itself from

Russian encroachments if the borders were preserved.
Farly in the sixties the popularity of the nationality
principle reached a climaxo

The demand of the European Left

for the overthrow of all the territorial arrangements of the
. Vienna treaties became more emphatic.

After April 8, 1861, when

Russian soldiers were ordered to shoot at the Poles who

91 Rjasanoff,
"Polenfrage," p. 189.

r
244
demonstrated in the streets of Warsaw against the Tsarist
government, European attention was focused on the Polish
question.

Numerous pamphlets, many of them written by Poles

and Frenchmen, demanded the restoration of Poland.

However,

Marx and Engels continued to remain aloof from such agitation,
even in 1863 when the Poles in the Kingdom rose in revolt
against the Tsarist government.

At that time the two friends

merely intended to utilize for propaganda purposes the past
failures of European diplomacy to fight Russian expansionism.
!:1F2.Pean Foreign

Pol~cJes

and the Partition of Poland

Since the mid-fifties Marx had become increasingly
interested in the diplomatic history of Europe from the seventeenth
to the early nineteenth century.

His studies of the past were

determined by his desire to understand why Russia rose to an
.

-

influential position in nineteenth century Europe.

Several

months after the end of the Crimean War, Marx published a series
of articles on "The Revelation of the Diplomatic History of the
Eighteenth Century 11 in which he discussed Russia's relations \'iTith
the West.92 In the following years he made a more thorough study
92Marx' s stud.y, The Re-!'.elatio_n of the Diplomatic Histp...£.iY.
of the ~~~teen~h C_£nturl, was actually composed as an introduction
to a compreliensive work which he had planned to write but never
did. In 1856-57 the study was first published in a series of
artj_cles in the Free Press, the organ of the followers of the
English Russophooe 15avfdurquhart, with whom Marx collaborated
briefly. The study was again published under the title Secret
~iEf?mati~ Histor.Y., of ;!;he Eigh.t.ee_nth Centur,;x., e.d. by Eleanor l-1arx
LTii"gTlioncfon: s. 'Sonnenscnein &Co~, fB99)o Then it was
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the political history of the Polish Republic.

During this period

he made excerpts·which he apparently utilized for the composition

of two groups of manuscripts on the history of the European states
and Poland since the seventeenth century.93

These manuscripts,

which were written early in the 1860's, remained unpublished
until 1961 when the German historian Werner Conze edited them.
Among the literature which Marx used for his studies
on the relations between the Western European states and Poland
and Russia, there was riot a work which went beyond the usual
historiography and treated social or economic questions.94
Likewise, Marx's discussions of the European political history
from the se¥enteenth to the nineteenth century did not touch
upon such questions.

They were not related to the socio-economic

pu51islied in German by N. Rjasanoff, "Karl Marx ueber den
Ursprung der Vorherrschaft Russlands in Europa, 11 in Die Neue _?;eit,
XXVII, Supplement Noo 5 (March 5, 1909), 1-79. FinaIIylhe study
appeared in a French edition, La Russie et l'Europe, ed. with a
Foreword by Benol t-P. Hepner (Paris :·-f951~) . ·
-~
_j

93cf. Stan:i..slaw Schwann, 11 Nieznane no ta tki Karola Marksa
dotyczace dziejow Polski v! zbiorach Archiwum Zakladu Historii
Partii c: przy KCPZPR, 11 ( uunknovm Notes of Karl Marx on Polish
History in the Collection of the Archive regarding the History
of the Party at the Central Committee of the Polish Communist
. Party 11 ) , Z Pola. Vlalki (From the Battlefield), No. 3,. (1958) 80, in
Kr:-rl Marx, £1ElnUSErzyZe ue.E._er die pol2~:!:..f?.C£e Frafe ~1~62-1864), ed.
WJ. th a Forewora by vrerner Conze and lJieter Her z-:E'icllenrode
(Amsterdam: International Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis,
1961), p. 55.

9L~This is shown by the list of books which according to

Werner Conze, Marx most certainly used for the composj_tion of the

manuscripts.

Karl Marx,

~ill·,

p. 55.
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theory of history on which Marx had mainly been working since
the mid-fifties.

They were charged with his emotions, his

antipathies, and hatreds.

Overstatements occured frequently.

The articles on "The Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth
Century" marked a break with the earlier occasional interpretation
of the responsibility of the European powers for the Russian
territorial expansion through the partition of Poland.
forties

Mar~

In the

and Engels had stressed the responsibility of

Austria and particularly of Prussia for Russia's westward advance.

In1845 Engels criticized the short-sightedness of German foreign
policies at the Vienna Congress.

Instead of permitting Russia

to annex "t:P,e best part of Poland," the two great German states
Prussia and Austria should have annexed as much of the Polish
territories as possible, but they were unable to
pb\•rer politics.

mal~e

use of

Engels consoled himself with the thought that

soon a complete reorganization of European society would make an
end to "such imbecilities. 11 95

The statement of 1845 revealed a

greater concern with the westward advance of Russia and its
consequences for Germany than with the fate of Poland.
At the time of the Revolution of

1848-L~9

Marx and Engels,

as editors of NRZ,malntained that the Germans should have evaded
any involvement in the partition of Poland which strengthened
95Rjasanoff, "Polenfrage, 11 pp. 179-80.

?C"Q'Qm
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Russia and weakened Germany.

Simultaneously, Engels, in his

articles against Prussian reaction, ridiculed the lack of
initiative and bold action in Prussian foreign policies since the
seventeenth century.

He ridiculed the adulation of the

Hohenzollern by the conservatives.
11family of corporals"

~vho

The Hohenzollern were a

achieved Pruss1.a' s aggrandizement by

contemptible methods--"through breeches of faith, perfidies, and
legacy hunting."

They acquired the western Polish territories

through treci.sonous policies--by allying with the. enemies of Poland,
first v1ith Svrntlen in the seventeenth century and then with Russia
and Austria in the following.

Finally, by participating together

with Austria in the Third Polish Partition of 1793, the
Hohenzollern helped Russia to destroy Poland completely.
In the year 1793 three crovmed thieves divided the
Polish booty among themselves according to the same
right by which three street robbers divide among
themnelves the purse of a defenseless traveller.96
As was pointed out earlier, Marx and Engels had little
consideration for the question of morality in international
relationso

Their outbursts of moral indignation over Prussia's

annexation of Polish territories

\~rere

not too convincing.

Much

more convincing was their contempt for the lack of bold action in
Prussian foreign policies.

What they meant by bold foreign

policies was defined years later in Marx's lotter to Engels of
December 2, 1856.
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In this letter 1'-brx once again ridiculed Prussian history
He stated:
lousy."

"World history has never produced anything more

After having explained that the Prussian rulers developed

neither a great nation like the French nor a great dynasty like
the Austrians, Marx added that they had also been unable to make
true conquests.
It [Prussia] has not conquered one single powerful
Slavic nation. During five hundred years it did not
even succeed to seize Pomerania which was finally acquired
through an exchangeo On the whole, the Margraviate of
Brandenburg as it was taken over by the Hohenzollern-has never made any conquest with the exception of
Silesia. Since it was their only conquest, this seems
to be the reason why Frederic II is called the unique. 97
Pruss1a' s foreign policies v1ere characterized by "oscillating
perfidy • • • [and] sna~ching at some morsels which Russia throws
before Prussia during the partitions contrived by Russia. 11

Prussic

had become chained to Russia by her lack of a de.ring foreign

policy ..
When Marx wrote this letter, the English Urquhartist
newspaper

Fre_L~

had started to publish his articles

"The Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century."

011

They wore

presented to the English public a.t a moment when tho excitement
over the Crimean \'Jar, which had ended in March, 1856, had not yet

cooled off.
In these articles Marx maintained that in the past not
only Prussia and Austria but also England c;i.nd France had fallen

r
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under Russj_a' s spell.

This new line of argumentation had already

found expression in Marx's articles on Palmerston's pro-Russian
policy late in 1853.

Marx now develo11ed a· theory of the

collective crime committe.d by the European powers against Poland.
The Europeans shared a common responsibility for the increase of
Russian power in Europe which especially endangered Central
Europe.

This contention reduced the responsibility of the Germans.

Marx was now inclined to regard German participation in the
partition of Poland as·an act of necessary self-defense from
which all of Europe profited.
In his presentation of the relations.between Russia and
Western Eur.ope in the past, Marx was very concerned with the
power factor in international politics.

According to him the

deyelopment of the European state system since the late
seventeenth century proved that the Western Europeans were wholly
incompetent in foreign politics.

The Western Europeans failed to

understand the crucial role of power in internat:Lonal relations.
Therefore, they were unable to cope with the rise of Russia.
Their unawareness of their vital interests permitted Russia to
advance steadily VJestward.
According to Marx the Russian success was not only due
to the short-sighted foreign policies of the Western Europeans
but also to the superiority of Russian diplomacy.

Marx

:ridiculed the methods of Russian diplomacy, but. he was quite
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fascinated that it had achieved the uninterrupted extension of
Russian territorial possessions.
Marx explained that the Great Russians became crafty
diplomats_ through the example set by Ivan I.

Vfl1en Ivan I tried

to get rid of the Mongol rule, he did not act boldly like a hero,
but after the manner of slaves he used all kinds of "diplomatic
tricks and subterfuges."

Since Ivan I the pattern of Muscovite

foreign policies was
to win advantages by the deceitful exploitation of an
enemy power, to weaken thereby this power, and to ruin
it finally because it had allowed itself to be used as
a tool.98

According to Marx, Peter the Great added a new aspect
to Russian foreign policies.

This Tsar created a

bold synthesis which united the method of the
imperceptj_ble penetration of the Mongol slave with the
world conquering tendencies of the Mongol ruler and
remained the motivating force of modern Russian
diplomacy.99
As did Herzen, :Marx regarded Peter the Great as a most capable
ruler because the Tsar knev1 what he wanted and how to achieve it.
Peter's dream was to change Muscovy from "a half-As:tatic inland

country into a strong maritime power."

His dream set in motion

a series of conquests by which Russia reached the Baltic Sea and

-..

'98Rjasanoff,

11

Vorherrscha.ft Russlands in Europa, 11 p. 22.

99Jbid.' p. 23.
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the Black Sea and finally swallowed most of Poland with the
result that Russia became a decisive factor in European politics.
Marx praised Peter's "immense achievement" of having
transferred the capital of Moscow to St. P.etersburg--to the very
border of his state.

This testified to the Tse.r's "amazi.ng

boldness" and revealed his intention to obtain influence in the
Baltic Sea area.

According to Marx, Peter the Great achieved

this aim in the Northern War of 1700-21 because he had no equal
in the pursuit of a purposeful policy.

Marx condemned the

European powers for not reacting to the appearance of Russia in
the Baltic Sea area.

England, in particular, should have had

the greatest interest in keeping the Russians out of that area.
Instead, England did not try to support Sweden's fight against
Russia.

It became "the tool of Peter and his successors and

helped to realize their plans."

When Sweden succumbed to the

Northern Alliance, the Poles participated i.n the partition of
Sweden.

They supported Russian aims and signed their "own

death sentence."

The Poles had their share of responsibility

for the destruction of their country beccnrne they also became
Russia's tool.
Marx said that the Swedish partition was of greater
historical significance than the Polish partition.

The Swedish

partition marked a turning point in European history.

It

introduce~

1
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the modern
first time
basis of a
proclaimed

era of international politics • • • For the
in Europe the breach of all treaties as the
new treaty was ny5 only realized but also
[as a principle] • 0

The partition of Poland was merely the logical result of this
"first great deed of modern diplomacy."

:tt.ia.rx declared that since

the 1720's, when Russian troops were stationed in Poland, Russia

was practically the master of Poland.

Russia initiated the

partition of Poland, and it was Russia which mostly profited
from the partition.
Marx condemned the general European compliance with the
aggressive foreign policy of Russia in Europe.

Even at the

Vienna Congress the European statesmen did not change their policy
towards Russia.

'1111e

Vienna treaties were the result of the

common Europea.n foolishness..

'l'hey permitted the Tsar to gain

"a position without competitors in Europe," mainly through the
partition of Poland, and to threaten Europe "with the renewal
of a universal monarchy" should Constantinople be conquered.
According to Marx mostEuropeans were not aware of the
historical fact that within a century Hussi.a had achieved
"monstrous dimensions."

It had undermined the European balance

of power principle and had become a "real power" which must be
reckoned with.

Yet, many Europeans still assumed that Russia was

weak because it was backv,,rard.
Offered

In history, Marx said, Russia

r
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the only example of an immense empj.re whose real power,
even after world-renovmed achievements, was often still
regarded as a mere illusion, not as an accomplished fact.
In 1909 N. Rjasanoff criticized Marx for his concentrat:kn

on Russian foreign policy and his neglect of the economic history
of Russia.

Thereby, Marx gave the impression that Russian

history had remained static.

Eut Russia had undergone the same

changes in the social structure as the Western European countries,
only at a later date.

Rjasanoff was right that the preoccupation

with Russian foreign policies became a real obsession with Marx
and Engels's in the 1850's.

Yet, scattered remarks on Russia's

internal development prove that since 1848 Marx and Engels were
aware of the symptoms of internal changes in Russia.

However,

with regard to their revolutionary calculations, which concentrated
upon Western Europe, these changes were rather insignificant
because Russia was still predominantly an agricultural country.
Thus, for Marx and Engels, Russia primarily remained the
expansionist power l?ar

e_JCc.~llence

whose advance endangered revo-

lutionary progress as well as Germany.

Above all, the articles

of 1856-57 were intended to prove that the balance of power
-principle had become obsolete because of Russia's rise as a
European power, that the policies of the European cabinets were to
inefficient to stop a further Russian advance, and that a new
revolutionary fore::Lgn policy was needed to save Europe.

l

Marx retained his basic approach to the development
of the European state system in his two groups of unfinished
manuscripts--Polen,

Pre~~~.E. un_~~~d

and Polen und

frankreich--which he wrote at the time of the great excitement

..--~---

over the Polish uprising in 1863 and 186i+ respectively. 1 Ol

The

manuscripts were also composed in the traditional manner and
relied on diplomatic and military events to explain the
historical development in Europe.

Once again Marx's main

objective was to reveal the short-sighted foreign policies of

the European stateso

This time he treated in detail the events

which led to the destruction of the Polish state in order to

prove his pointe

He paid particular attention to the impact

which the weakening of Poland had
The manuscript on

011

Germany.

Pole1}_ 7__1?.!'_9y.;.§.~E;n

q31d Russland was

mainly an elaboration of :Marx's earlier attacks against Prussia's
servile attachment to Russia.

Marx repeated that the Hohenzollern

rulers did not rehieve the extension of their dynastic power,
which was their immediate aim, by bold action but by devious
political machinations which injured "the general and permanent
interests of Germany. 11102

Since the seventeenth century the

Hohenzollern had pursued two objectives:

(1) to deprive Sweden

Of its Pomeranian. possessions and to annex Polish West Prussia

~itle

Polen und Frankre:i.ch was given to the second
group of unfinished maiiU.SGrTp-E"scy-WeFffer -Conze, the editor of the
manuscripts.
102Karl Ha1. . x, Dif? P,0}:11=!-;S_C}?-_~ F~. .§1.f.Se, p. 91.
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which separated East Prussia from Brandenburg; and, (2) to
consolidate their power against the German Empire.

However,

the extension of their dynastic pov1er could only be achieved by
leaning upon a foreign power, and this power was ultimately
Russia because France in the long run had no interest in

supporting the rise of another German power along with Austria.
When Russia entered the European political scene, it pursued
the same aims e.s the Hohenzollern, the partition of Sweden and
Poland and the weakening of the Empire, and this became the
basis for the collaboration between Russia and Prussia.
Marx condemned Prussia's collaboration with Peter the
Great in the Northern War.
Sweden.

This contributed to the fall of

The destruction of Sweden increased Prussian power.

But it D?russici] rose as a satell:L te of the Russian
power and the Russian accomplice in the plundering
of a ne:Lghbor who had become defenseless.103
After the Swedish partition, said J:!Jarx, it became Prussia's callin-:
to make '.'Russian policy" and to be Russia's
against the Ilabsburgs.

11

sent.ry 11 j_n Germany

Marx ridiculed the German historians,

among them Heinrich von Sybel, v:ho glorified Frederick II as a
great ruler.

According to Marx, Frederick the Great had been as

submissive to Russia as the rest of the Hohenzollern.

Frederick

would have been truly great if he had tried to destroy tho
Austrian hegemony, "but to reorganize the Empire and to place

!
r

!
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himself at the head of it, such ambition was far from him. 11104

A

strong Empire under a central leadership would have freed the
Germans from Russian overlordship.

Marx contended that Frederick,

"at the head of Germany, V!OUld have·dest]'.'oyed Russia," but at the
head of Prussia he became its slave. 105
Marx criticized Frederick for not having made the
slightest attempt to get rid of Russian.influence by supporting
the growing.Polish opposition against Russian interference in
Polish affairs which or.igina ted in 1709 when a Polish-Russian
alliance was concluded.

Frederick preferred to help increase

Russian domination in Pole.nd.

In 1764 he agreed with Catherine

the Great to guarantee the old Polish constitution with its
liberum veto.

This perpetuated Polish anarchy and the defense-

lessness of Poland against Russian intervention in Polish
affairs.

"Only a Russian could contrive such a pact, and only
a P-.cussian sign it. 11106 Finally, Frederick even complied with
Catherine's desire to annex Polish territories and proposed the
partition of Poland.
According to Marx in the First Partition of Poland
Frederick was "only the instrument which Russia, with cunning
calculation, ordered to take the initiative. 11107 Marx said that
l O'lj:"I bid ~ , p. 101.

l05Ibid., p. 120.
10 6Ibid., p. 107.
107Ibid. p • 112.
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Frederick needed Russia to round off his eastern territorial
possessions.

However, Frederick should at least have understood

that Catherine was too weak to swallow all of Poland which was
her ultimate aim.
she

n~eded

She agreed to a partition of Poland because

Frederick's support against the Poles.

Consequently,

Frederick should have dictated his conditions, but he did not
dare to demand Danzig and Thorn and allowed Russia to profit
mostly

fro~

the partition.

Austria, which participated in the

partitj_on against its desire, acted more independently.
Lwow in spite of Russian opposition.

It took

Besides, the imperial

government understood much better than the Hohenzollern rulers
that the further annexation of Polish territories by Russia would
be a permanent threat to Germany.
Marx said that Frederick, through his collaboration
with Russia against Poland, betrayed both Germany and Europe.
In 1779 Frederick committed an even greater political crime.
He invited Russia to become a guarantor of the German constitution
at the Peace Treaty of Teschen which ended the conflict between
the Hohenzollern and the Habsburgs over the Austrian attempt to
incorporate Bavaria •. This gave Russia the right to interfere in
German affairs.

Yet, only in 1806, when the partition of Poland

was completed, and when Germany was weakened by Napoleon, could
Russia exploit this right--namely, by helping France, the other
guarantor of the German status guo_, to destroy. the German
constltution and to partition the German Empire ..

rr
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Marx pointed out that the Russian influence in Germany
wa.s coni'irmed by the Vienna treaties.

As Engels had done, Marx

condemned the German governments bE;cause they did not profit
from their victory.over Napoleon.

He believed that Prussia,

in order to obtain Russian support for its territorial expansion
within Germany, had even been willing to relinquish its claim
to Poznania and West
defenseless.

Prussia~

This would have left Berlin

Marx said that the English foreign secretary

Viscount Robert Castlereagh had been against the surrender of
the Grand Duchy of Warsaw to Russia because this would have
imperiled the security of Prussia and Austria and Europe.
Nevertheless, the Prussians permitted the Russian Tsar to annex
almost the whole Grand Duchy of Warsaw under the title of the
King of Pole.nd.

11

\Vith the right instinct they forced the

Russian hegemony upon Europe. 11 108
Prussia, said Marx, did not profit from the support of
Russian aims.

Russian restrictions upon the commerc:i.al relations

between the Polish Kingdom and Ea.st and West Prussia after 1815
revealed Russia's intention to fj_nally destroy Pru.ssiao

Marx

repeated that Prussia's collaboration with Russia had been

necessary to defend Prussian interests, but it weakened Germany
and made the political existence of Prussia dependent upon
Russia's grace.
p. 11+0.
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In the manuscript on Polen und Frankreich l'.arx
--·

7"11
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mitigated his harsh critique of Prussj.an foreign policies and
concentrated his attacks on France.

Marx claimed that France

greatly contributed to the rise of Russia by failing to support
either the Swedes or the Poles against Russia.

According to

Me.rx the French had never had a serious interest in the fate
of Poland because their foremost desire was to keep Germany
divided and weak.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,

when Poland was still strong and the Russian Empire did not
yet exist, the main aim of France was to weaken the German Empire
through alliances with Poland, Sweden, or Turkey.

The anti-

German policy was continued when Poland had declined.

This

contributed to the rise of Russian power and to Prussia's
eastward expansion at the expense of Poland.
While Marx in his earlier statements had presented
Frederick the Great as a man without a political vision, he nov1
maintained that at the time of the Seven Years' War Frederick II
had wished to organize a "formidable coalition" against Russia

which would have been a means to liberate Poland from the Russian
yoke.

But the French betrayed European interests and concluded

an alliance with Russia.

rhi.s enabled the Russians to use Poland

1

as a military base for an invasion of Prussia.
Marx

According to

the results of the French pro-Russian }')Olicy vrere:
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.Russia establiE;hed its supremacy in Germany • • •
Prussia became its slave • • • Catherine became the
most powerful sovereign in Europe and • • • the First
Partition of Poland took place.109
Marx claimed that the French were ultimately responsible

for the First Partition of Poland, but the Poles themselves
shared the responsibility.

They permitted Russia to use Poland

as a military base against Prussia.

Prussia reacted by

participating in the Polish partition.

l·hrx was convinced that

the French would not have acted differently if during the Seven
Years' War the Belgians had allowed Prussia to use their country
as a military base against France.

The French would certainly

have tried "to incorporate Belgium or to destroy its

indopendence. 11110
Marx insisted that neither the French revolutionaries in
tho 1790' s nor Napoleon made e.ny serious efforts to liberate the

Poles.

The French betrayal of Polish national interests reached

a climax in 1810 when Napoleon agreed vrith Alexander I that the
name of Poland be forever stric1rnn from tho European map.

1815 the betrayal Of the Poles was continued.

After

rhe French

1

government under Louj_s.Philippe, did not support the Polish
insurrection against Russia and did not protest when Nicholas I
violated the Vienna treaties and changed the Kingdom of Poland
into a Russian province.
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Werner Conze made the following remark on Marx's
manuscripts of

1863-6L~:

"Marx does not impress us as a historian
.

.

111

of high standing with these one-sided and partial comp1lat1ons. 11
It is true that

th~

manuscripts are charged with overstatements

_and contradictions, but as a propaganda piece they are most

effective.

Marx did not approach his subject as a historian

but as a political man who desired to use his knowledge in the
fight against Tsarist Russia and the contemporary conditions
in Germany.,

Whatever Marx said about European policies towards
Poland, he suggested that the development of the European
state system would have been different if the German Empire had
developed into a strong state in the center of Europe.

In this

connection his reference to the Prussian annexation of East
and West Prussia is revealing.

Marx stated that these two

provinces had once belonged to the Teutonic Knights but wex·e lost
to Poland in the fifteenth century.

If East and West Prussia

would have been reconquered by a war of the German Empire against
Poland instead of through Prussia's betrayal, this would not have
been resented by the Poles, nor would it have excluded German-

Po11· o.
""h co 11a b ora t.ion agains·
. t th e common enemy, Ru ssJ..a.
· 112

It can

hardly be expected that the Poles would have approved of Marx's
argument.
4·~-m---

.!E_ict.,

---·"==<"

p.

38 (1ntroductio:n).
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Since the 1850 1 s Marx and Engels had shovm a great interest

in European power politics.

They were convinced that the

European state system of the nineteenth century, in which Russia
played an influential role, originated from the foolish foreign
policies of the European states in the past two centuries which
had permitted Russia to annex the greater part of the Polish
territories.

But Marx and Engels did n·ot think that the foreign

policies of European democracy--in case of its victory--and the
restoration of Poland would save Europe or Germany from the
Russian and Pan-Slav threat.

They were worried about the

popularity of the nationality principle which in the 1850 1 s had
received an unexpected support from an anti-revolutionary source,
t
I·

t· ~.

t
r

t

the Fre11ch government under Napoleon III.

They believed that

the realization of the nationality principle would increase
Russian aggressiveness which would endanger Germany and the
radical revolution.

Only

11

the revolutionary party," meaning

the communists, would save Germany and Europe because it would
conduct a vigorous foreign policy.

When the First International

Workingmen 1 s Association was f ouncled in 186L~, Marx, with the
assistance of Engels and his supporters in Germany, tried to
force an aggressive anti-Russian policy upon the members of
that organization.

THE POLISH INSURRECTION OF 1863

!,!W AttemP.t .§;t

Pgiish-EBT~ian

Reyolut.i_Q.11§£.L...9.o_lla£9ration

The Polish insurrection of 1863 was the prelude to the
fotmding of the First International Workingmen' s Association.

It marked the end of the period of Polish uprisings in the mid ....
n:Lneteenth century.

As in the years preceding the Polish

uprising, Marx and Engels avoided public statements in support

of the restoration of Poland.

However, their old opponents

Herzen and Bakunin became actively engaged in the support of
the Polish cause.
The dialogue betvreen Herzen and the Polish left-wing
democrats, which had begun after Herzen's arrival in London in

1852, reached a wider audience after the publication of Herzen's
newspapElr lLC?.1.91~~

(The Bell [London] ) in 1857.

This newspaper

became the center of attraction to the dissatisfied elements
in the Russian Empire and also to the Poles under Russian rule.
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The articles on Herzen's activity in London and on his political
concepts, which appeared in the Polish democratic newspaper
,!J'z.egl<ed Rzeczi Polskich (Survey of Polish Affairs [cracow] ) afte

1857, reveal that Herzen probably had as many enthusiastic
supporters as opponents among the Poles.· Ultimately the dialogue
between Herzen and the Poles centered around the problem of the
restoration of the Polish eastern borders of 1772.

Whenever this

problem was.touched upon tensions arose.
In November, 1958 Przegl§d _Rzeg:zy- Pol.skich published an
enthusiastic article on Alexander Herzen and the independent
Russian printing-office in London.

The article stated:

"Herzen's

work and that of the Polish democrats is the same • • • Herzen
is a friend of the Poles. 111
_misgivings.
aspirations.

This statement caused Herzen

He did not wish his aims to be identified with Polish
He felt that the Poles generally lacked a serious

interest in the solution of the peasant question.

Besides, he

resented the continuation of their anti-Russian propaganda and the
demand for the restoration of the eastern borders of 1772.
Herzen clarified his position in a series of articles on
"Rossiia i Polshcha 11 ('!Russia and Polandu). They were written
shortly before an<l after the Italian War which rekindled the hopes
of the Polish emigrants for the restoration of Poland with the

~468.

1Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen, Sobranie Sochinenii, XIV,
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help of Western Europe. 2

The articles were mostly a repetition

of the arguments Herzen had used in his treatise on Russian
revolutionary ideas in 1851.

He still insisted that only a

revolutionary Russia vrould liberate the Poles.

Re warned the

Poles,against the "despotic"government of Napoleon III.

Although

Napoleon supported the nationality principle, the French
government would not help the Poles restore Poland.

Herzen

claimed that the nationality principle was merely used by the
reactionary governments as a means to prevent the unification
of the European peoples which was the prerequisite of their free
development.

Re repeated that the Poles had a right to "a

political existence independent of Russia," but their claim to
the former eastern provinces of the Polish Republic--White Russia
and the Ukraine--was not justified.

This time, though, he

stressed that also the Great Russians did not have a right
to the possession of these provinces.
According to Herzen the claim to a foreign territory
could neither be defended by "long lasting possession" nor by
"the former rule" over it; that is, by the historical-right
principle.

Since all the states had originated from conquests,

the basic question was not "how the parts [of a state] had been
i"

rF·

"~

.

joined but whether an independent life was assured to them."

-

2The articles appeared in Kolokol, Jan.uary 1 and 15,
1, 1859; March 15, April 1, 1860.
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Neither the Poles nor the Great Russians had guaranteed liberty
to the conquered people.

Only if the right to self-determination

were granted by a revolutionary Russia, the oppressed people would
enjoy an independent life.3
Herzen claimed that the White Russians, who spoke a
language which was "closer to Russian than Polish," would
"naturally wish to be Russians," while the Galician Ukrainians,
who were Uniates, would feel a stronger attachment to the
[catholic] Poles. 11

He .was sure that the Eastern Ukrainians (then

called Little Russians) would demand recognition as a separate
nationality.
the Poles,

Herzen hoped that the liberated people, including

~ould

be willing to unite with the Great Russians

in a socialist federal republic if their equality were guaranteed.
He remarked that he did not desire "the dissolution of the

Slavic world but its free federation. 11 4
When Herzen made these statements, Mikola Kostomarov
and Pantelejmon Kulish, the leaders of the Ukrainian movement
in the Eastern Ukraine, agitated in St. Petersburg for the
recognition of the Ukrainian people as a separate nationality and
for the unification of. all the territories inhabited by
Ukrainians from the Carpathian mountains and Ea.stern Galicia to

31!?2:.£.jpp.
.
-

21,

4!J2i,£., p. 35.

35.
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the left bank of the Dnieper.5

Simultaneously, they supported

political and cultural collaboration with the Great Russians
and fought Polish claims to the Ukraine.
On January 15, 1860 Kolokol published an anonymously
written letter by Kostomarov sent from St. Petersburg.

This

letter supp.orted Herzen' s assumption that the Ukrainian radicals
were more willing to collaborate with the Great Russians than
with the Poles.

Kostomarov stated that the Ukrainians aimed at

the creation of "a separate political entity comprising all the
lands where the Ulrrainian language • • • was spoken, 11 free
from Polish or Russian overlordship. 6 He expressed the hope that
Alexander

I~

would grant judicial equality and cultural autonomy

to the Ukrainians.

This would prepare a peaceful coexistence

with the Great Russians and eventually the realization of a
Slavic union.7
5Mikola Kostomarov (1817-85) and Pantelejmon Kulish
(1819-9'?) had founded the secret Cyril and Hethodius Society in
1846 Y1hich fought Polish and Russian claims to the Ukraine and
demanded the recognition of Ukrainian independence and the creation
Of a Slavic federation of which Kiev should become the center. In
1847 the leading members of the Society were exiled from the
Ukraine. Kulish was permitted to settle in St. Petersburg in 1850
and Kostomarov in 1859.
6Kolokol, ed. by A. I. Herzen and N. P. Ogarev (London and
Geneva: Volnai'a Russkaia Ti pografia, 1857-67) (facsimile ed.;
11 vols.; Moscow: Isdatelstvo Adademiia Nauk, SSSR, 1962), III,

502-03.

.
7Early in the 1860's Kostomarov published a number of
articles in Osnova (Foundation [st. Petersburg] ), the organ of the
Ukrainophiles, in which he emphasized that the .Ukrainians were
superior to Russians and Poles because they .were true defender:::: of
the dGmocratic principles--the right to individual liberty and the

m

WT
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Herzen's opposition to the restoration of the Polish
borders of 1772 called forth a strong reaction among the Poles.
The democrats, among them Ludwik Mierosl'.awski, who favored the
~reation

by

of a centralized Polish state were particularly outraged

Herzen's support of the Ukrainian claim to national self-

determination.

In

Przegl~d

Rzecz)1' Pol?kich, articles had repeate'.

appeared which condemned the Ukrainian ~ovement.8

In December,

1859 and January, 1860 the newspaper attacked Herzen for
advocating the restoration of a small Polish state which would
be confined to the Vistula basin.

Herzen was accused of desiring

a Slavic union "under Russian hegemony" in order to strengthen
Russia's pO'sition in Europe..

The newspaper concluded that even

the progressive Russians were enemies of Poland .. 9

In his articles of spring, 1860 Herzen evaded any
further discussion on the controversial Polish territorial
question.

Instead, he emphasized the need for peasant liberation

through a socia.l revolution and for the creation of a "federation
of free Slavic countries'' destined to become the pioneer of the

reorganization of Europe on the basis of federalism and soci~lism! 0
voluntary ass"oclation of the people. Cf. Mikola Kostomarov,
Sochinenii, I, 35-64, quoted in Dmi tro Doroshenko, Mikola
Ivanovich Kostomarov (Leipzig: Ukrainischer Verlag, 1924), P.'5'87

.§.ob~r_an_ie

8Cf. Lozynskyj, ~_y_olucyi!!Lj ruch, pp. 16-17.
9Herzen, Sobranie Sochinenii, XIV, 41, 469.

____

_____ ___________ _ _______
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In the following months Herzen repeatedly expressed his
doubts as to the realization of a Polish-Russian reconciliation.
At times, he was under the impression that the Poles would prefer
to perish with the old Western world rather than save themselves
through the revolutionary collaboration with the Russians.

He

admitted that Russian history was cruel; but without cruelty the
Russian rulers would not have forged Russian unity which was a
b"
t • 11 Herzen defended the same position as did
posi•t•ive ac._ievemen
v~rx,

Engels, and

L~ssalle

that the use of force had furthered

progress in history and was therefore justified.· Consequently,
Herzen's repeated declarations that the social revolution would
abolish despotism and the rule of one nation over the other were

not too convincing.

Force might still be used in order to

· . realize that unified world of which Herzen dreamt, and in which al
the national and social distinctions would disappear.
The Polish radicals continued to pay attention to
Herzen's statements.
opposition to him.

They wavered betweAn support of Herzen and
In June, 1860

:i:,r~e~J4:d Rze~...E..o~cl2

emphasized the solj_dari ty between the Poles and Herzen al though it

admitted to differences between thorn.

But in October, 1861 the

newspaper rejected the idea of a federation with
want the Poland of 1772.

TJ 1.b:!:_C!,o ) p. 52.
12 Ib. 1

•..:...-2:.S.... ' p • L1.'?0.

11

Moscow • • • We

'11hat is our ultimatum. 1112
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Late in 1861 Bakunin had arrived in London.

He had

escaped from Siberia where he had continued to agitate among the
Polish exiles for Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration
against the Tsarist government and·against Austria and Prussia. 13
In London he continued this propaganda.

He was partially

responsible for Herzen 1 s consent in 1862 to a close revolutionary
collaboration with the Polish radicals;
In.his manifesto Narodnoe Delo ("Goals of the People 11 )
Bakunin supported the destruction of the centralized Russian
Empire, but he did not favor the restoration of the Polish
borders of 1772.

For the first time he emphasized that the

Russian Empire was a multi-national state, and that the right to
national self-determination should be granted to all the
nationalities in that Empire--Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians,
Finns, Latvians, and the people from the Caucasus.

As a result,

the Polish question appeared as only one question of national
liberation from Russian rule among many others.

Bakunin hoped,

as did Herzen, that if a revolutionary Russia were reorganized
on the basis of voluntary federation, then all the nationalities,
including the Poles, would prefer to enter into a union with the
Great Russians rather than to create independent states. 14

. 13Bakunin 1 s letter to Herzen, December 8, 1860, sent from

Irkutsk (Siberia), in Correspondance de Michel Bakounine, ed. by
Mykhaylo Drahomanov, p:--i-22. G"f. also ~~efwechsel
and. Ta~ebueche.r a}LS den Jah~1825-1880, II, 222-23.
l l~Lozynskyj, .2.J2.:__£i t .. , pp. 110-11.

r_____..__
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Obviously Bakunin and Herzen considered decentralization
and "self-government in the village, the district, the province,
and the whole state" as the most effective means to preserve the
unity of the vast territory extending from the Pacific Ocean to
the western borders of the Polish Kingdom.

It was paradoxical

that Herzen and Bakunin agitated for the creation of a Slavic
federation.

Actually the federal union which they promoted would

not be based on mere racial affinity because the Finns, the
people from the Baltic ·provinces and from the Caucasus, and the
Siberian tribes would also belong to it.
Notwithstanding the imperialist implication of the
federal concept of Herzen and Bakunin and their opposition to
the restoration of the eastern borders of 1772, the Polish leftwing democrats signed a pact for Polish-Russian revolutionary
collaboration with

The

conclusion of this pact had been promoted by the events in Warsaw
in the previous year.

On April 8, 1861 Russian soldiers shot at

Poles who demonstrated against the government in the streets of
Warsaw.

This killed Herzen's enthusiasm for Alexander II whom he

had only recently praised for the emancipation of the serfs in the
Russian Empire (March 3, 1861)9

It renewed Herzen's sympathy for

the oppressed Poles and weaken.ed his suspicion of them.

The

Warsaw shootings increased Polish unrest in the Kingdom.
Preparations were made for an insurrection.

Early in 1862 the

r
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insurrectional committee in Warsaw invited Jaroslaw

D~browski

to become a member as the representative of the military circles.
Dabrowski
was an officer in the Russian army and had come under
'the influence of the Russian Nikolai Chernyshevsky (1828-89) who
advocated an agrarian socie.lism.

D<ebrowsh:i' s membership meant

the strengthening of the left-wing Polish democrats.

He believed

firmly in the necessity of a social revolution as a basic
prerequisite for a successful Polish insurrection.

Moreover, he

hoped that a.n uprising in the Kingdom would be the signal for the
outbreak of the agrarian revolution in Russia.
Pol:Lsh~Russian

government.

Dabrowski
favored
c:.

revolutionary collaboration against the Tsarist

It was mostly due to his influence that in 1862 the

National Central Committee in VJarsaw communicated with Herzen in
London afl well as with the Russian revolutionary organization
~]X§..iJ!ElYa (Land and

Liberty) in st. Petersburg, which was

under Chernyshevsk.y's influence, and with officers of the
Russian army stationed in the Polish Kh1gdom.

When Dabrowski
c

was arrested late in the summer of 1862, his successor became

Zygmunt Padlewski who had also been influenced by Chernyshevsky,
shared

D~browski's

convictions, and continued hts policies.

When the rumor of an impending Polish uprising spread in
Western

Europea1~

radical circles, only a tiny rninori ty, foremost

the French socialist Pierre Proudhon-·-vrho lived as a political

exile in Belgium--objectecl to the preparations for ite

Proudhon

Was convinced that the insurrection would have no other aim
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than the restoration of the historical Polish borders of 1772
because it would be led by the szlachta.
In the forties Proudhon had become acquainted with
Marx and also with Herzen.

While Proudhon and Marx soon became

political enemies, Proudhon continued to have closer relations
with Herzen.

In the mid-fifties the question of Polish

liberation began to undermine their relations.

By that time

Proudhon had become strongly opposed to the nationality principle,
"that humbug of a revolutionary theory." 15 When he knew about
Herzen 1 s collaboration with the Polish Central Committee in
London, he tried to dissuade Herzen from supporting Polish
aspirations. because they had nothing to do with democracy. 16
The Italian War turned Proudhon definitely against the
nationality principle, whether supported by Napoleon III or the
European radicalso

He feared that the Italian War was merely

the prelude of ever more terrible wars in the name of the
nationality principle.

He was convinced that the crusades for the

liberation of the peoples under foreign rule would merely diminish
liberty.

Such wars would undoubtedly result in the reduction of

r5P!'oudhon 1 s letter to Herzen, July 9, 1854, in Pierre
Joseph Proudhon, Cor~e~~on~anc~, ed. with a Foreword by J. A.
Langlois (14 vols7;15aris: A. Lacroix et ce, 1875), VI, 39.

I~;

l6Proudhon 1 s letter to Herzen, July 23, 1855, in Proudhon
Cf. also the excellent account of
Correspondance, VI, 219-22.
~owing estrangement between Proudhon and Herzen due to their
different approach to,,the Polish question in Ra~ul Labry, Herzen
!t~oudho~ (Paris:
.Edition Bosserd, 1928)._
.
·
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the number of independent nations and in the partition of Europe
among two or three great powers.

They would also impede the

European socio-economic development and the final liberation of
the oppressed classes. 17
In view of such dangers Proudhon composed his book
La Guerre et la Faix which he terminated in October,

1860e

In

this work he appealed to the European radicals to help def end the
territorial_ sta.Es quo in Europe instead of agitating for its
overthrow.

In Proudhon's opinion the peace which had been

promoted by the Vienna treaties had permitted Europe to enter a
new era.

The rapid progress in the economic sector and the

increasing ?.den ti ty of laws and morals had already furthered the
assimilation of the European nations.

The preservation of peace

would finally lead to the dissolution of the European states,
the end of wars, and the liberation of the oppressed nations.
According to Proudhon it would be criminal to interrupt
this promising development by plunging Europe into a war for the
resurrection of nationalities which had perished because they had
been unable to compete with stronger and more progressive nations.
Proudhon said that throughout history

le droit de la force

(the

law of force) had governed the creation and survival of states

17Proudhon's letter to Gouvernet, May 3, 1860, in

Proudhon, Correspon~a~~' X, 47.
,.

~------------------·~-,--~--_....---..---·------
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and the conquest and assimilation of foreign nationalities.

The

use of force, which implied superiority, had furth0red "the
progress of civilization" which would have stopped had the
nationality principle been recognized in the past. 1 8

On the basis of such considerations Proudhon became the
most violent opponent of the restoration of Poland.
that the partition of Poland was not a crime.

He held

Poland had "perish, '

through its own dissolution'' due to its unruly aristocracy and
its absurd constitution. 1 9

Russia had vanquished the Poles

because Russia was a stronger and better organized state.

It

would be foolish to plunge Europe into a vm.r for the liberation
of the Poles because Russia was in the process of changes from
which the Poles would profit.

Proudhon advised the Polish people

to wait for their liberation until the day when all the European
:·.
~

--

oppressive states would be overthrovm through the process of
economic evolution and the assimilation of the European peoples.
The emancipation of the serfs in the Russ:Lan Empire on
March 3, 1861 strengthened Proudhon's 011posj_ tion to a war for the

restoration of Poland..

He celebrated th:Ls event as the dawn of

the socic:;.l revolution in Russia.

--

Progress was on the side of

l ff,p.ierre
- J oseph Pr~ouclh on, La_guerre e.~-=:!:..~~:1.x,
~ J
.
.
in
~l!_vres completes, ed. with AnnotatTOns-ancfunpubj_Tsnea Documents
Y cr.--13oug!e--et'H. Moysset, VII (2d ed.; Paris: Marcel Riviere,
-

1927), 503.
19
!._b.i.£. .. ' p. 506.
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nussia, not Poland.

20

Proudhon remained unperturbed by the

Warsaw massacres of April 8, 1861.

He was annoyed when Herzen

became emotional over the shooting of the Polish demonstrators

in

In a letter of April 21 Proudhon advised Herzen

Warsaw~

not to support the national aspirations of the Polish aristocracy.
Rather, Herzen should help to prepare the Polish people
for a more radical revolution which will bring about
the disappearance of the great states and all the
national distinctionso21
Proudhon. complained that the European radicals, by defending the
nationality principle, furthered the reactionary policies of
Napoleon III who tried to "divert the social revolution" by
sup1Jorting the liberation of people under foreign rule. 22
__ In spite of Proudhon's entreaties Herzen continued to
support the liberation of the Poles in the Polish Kingdom.

On

September 20, 1862 he published in KolokC21, a statement by the
revolutionary Central National Committee in Warsaw on the aims of
a Polish insurrection.

- 2b
- Proudhon,
21

~·,

22

The statement was intended to fight the

Q.orre_spo~~,

X,

339.

XI, 23-4.

Proudhon's opposition to the restoration of Poland
called forth a violent reaction among the French democrats who
maintaJ.ned that Proudhon was a reactionary and a Russian agent.
But Proudhon stuck to his convictions. _ He wrote a "Polish
biography" in order to inform his compatriots about their "stupid
democracy" and the reality of French foreign policies. Cf.
Proudhon's letter to Rolland, November 1, 1861, in Proudhon
~tr£::L2.E....«2.;}:.to~en R?l~fl, ed. by Jacques Bompard (Paris: Grasset,
1946), pp. 226-2z:--11ne 11Polish biography" was not published. The
manuscrj.pt re111ained in the poscession of Proudhon's family.
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rumor circulatfJd in Russian, French, and German newspapers that th
polish szlachta prepared an insurrection which merely aimed at the
restoration of the historical borders of the old Polish Republic.
The Committee declared:

"The main aim of a Polish uprising is the

recognition of the peasant's right to self-government. 11

In a

revolutionary Poland the peasants would become ovmers of the
land in return for a monetary compensatfon to the former landovmers
paid by the.government.
social classes.

Political equality would be granted to al

The ne\7 Polish state would be composed of

nation of free and equal citizens."
to the territorial question.

11

a

The Committee also referred

It demanded the restoration of a

Polish state which would include IJithuania and Rus--Vfhite Russia
and the :t.Jkraine"·- 11 free from the hegemony" of the Polish nation.
The right of the Lithuanians, ·white Russians, and ill;.rainians to
national self-determination i'Jas acknovrledged.

The Committee was

convinced that these nationalities would collaborate with the
Poles in a people's insurrection and enter into a
union" with the Poles. 23

11

voluntary

Compared to the Manifesto of the Polish Democratic
Society of 1836, the revolutionary program of 1862 contained one
new concession, the recognition of the right to national selfdeterm:Lnation of the non-Polish nationalities who had been under
Polish rule.

However, the Polish democrats who acknowledged that
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poland could no longer be restored as a centralized state ruled
bY the Poles were a minority, and their influence in the Warsaw
committee was fleeting.
The insurrectional program ·of the Committee revealed
that the Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration rested on
weak foundations.

Although Polish and Russian radicals aimed at

the overthrow of the Tsarist government' and at political and
social changes, the territorial question divided them.

Both

parties were willing to acknovrledge the right to. national selfdetermination of the Ukrainians, \Thi te Russians, and Li thuan1.ans.
But the Great Russians hoped that these nationalities would
collaborate with Great Russia, while the Poles assumed that they
would prefer to collaborate with Poland.
tensions were bound to develop. 2 4

From such contrary vieviS

Herzen tried to forestall them

by emphasizing in Ko1oko1 that the common aim which united Polish

and Russian radicals was the liberation of the peasants and the
recognition of the right of each nationality to national selfdetermination.
The

rapproch2~

between the Warsaw Committee and Herzen

was strongly opposed by the Paris Central Committee under
-ZL1.The -Polish democrat Boleslav Limanowski pointed out that
the territorial question was an obstacle to a successful PolishRussian revoluti'onary collaboration. Limanowski, op. cit., p • .323 ..
The East German Marxist Felix Gentzen in his previously quoted
wor~, Qr-o~~l} iIQ..__~~lar2.ufst~, omitted any reference to the
nat:i..onali ty probTem in the former Polish Republic. Consequently,
he underrated the obstacles in tho way of Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration at the time of the Polish uprising of 1863e
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Mieroslawski.

In his organ Bacznosc he maintained that the

Warsaw Committee had sold Lithuania and Rus to the "Muscovites."
Be supported the restoration of Poland as a centralized nation
state.

He would not acknowledge the existence of a nationality

problem in the old Polish Republic, and he insisted that the
success of the Polish insurrection depended upon the proper
solution of the peasant question. 2 5
Ruch, the organ of the Warsaw Committee, sharply
criticized 11ieroslawski's agitation for a centralized Polish
state.

The Committee maintained that the people of Rus had been

alienated from the Poles because the Polish Government had not
fulfilled the stipulations of the treaty of Hadziach (1658) which
granted equal rights to the people of Rus.

White Russians and

mcrainians would only collaborate with the Poles if liberty were
granted to them.
Territories and people are not held together by
centralization and by force • • • but by liberty
and individual rights for which our forefathers
have given a solemn example in the Lublin Union and
in the treaty of Hadziach • • • We desj_re a union
based on equality, not on the oppressive domination
of the Poles over fraternal peoples.2o
On the first day of the Polish insurrection (January 22,

1863), the Provisional National Government issued a Manifesto
2

320.

5Baczn~sC:, June 1, 1862, quoted in Limanov1Ski, o;p. cit.,

26 Limanowski, ~it., pp. 325-26.
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which promised liberty and equality to all the people who lived
within the borders of the old Polish Republic.

The peasants

were to receive the land \7hich they had worked, and those rural
v1orkers who would fight in the ranks Of the national army were
to receive land from the national domain. 2 7
In the beginning the insurrection was supported by the
Russian organization Zemlya"i

V~lY:..a·

Revolutionary Russian

officers, stationed in the Polish Kingdom, took part in the
insurrection and tried to keep the Russian soldiers from fighting
against the Polish insurgents. 28 Meanwhile, l1ieroslawski
continued to oppose the collaboration with the Russian radicals
and the right to national self-determination of the Lithuanians,

White Russians, and Ukrainians.

He had hoped to assume

dictatorial powers and to lead the insurrection.
no influence over it.

But he gained

Instead, after February 8, 1863 the

conservatives (Whites) steadily increased their influence in the
Provisional Government, until they controlled it in the summer
of 1863.

Their insurrectional propaganda concentrated on the

demand for the borders of 1772.

Because of the victory of the

. 2'l Stefan Kieniewicz, Wy~or tekst6w zrodlo\~{1ch z historii
~lski w late.ch .1795-1864 ~'3elec ed documents on Hie History of
o1anafrom 179;5'=f8'6~-1 ry (Warsaw: 1956), p. 739, quoted in Gentz en,
.21?• c~t., p. 285.
28 Jozef Kowalski, pie ru~sische revolu~ion~er~ Demokratie
!!!ld der_J?olnische Aufstand (Beriin7Huetten & Loen:1ng, 195if J,
·
-

pp.

1'13"" f f

•

r
281

consorva ti ves the Russian revolutionary circles defj.ni tely lost
interest in the Polish cause.
The Polish democrats (Reds) had been unable to assert
themselves against the conservatives because they were divided
between a left and right \'Ting pursuing different aims.

The defeat

of the Polish insurrection which ended in April, 1864, has been
attributed to this lack of unity. 2 9 There has been a tendency

to understate the apathy of the peasants.

Hovrnver, from the

beginning the insurrection was not actively supported by the
peasants of Galicia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine.

The peasants

did not believe in the promises of the revolutionary manifestoeso

They feared that in case of a successful Polish insurrection,
they might again loose the rights they had been granted in the
Austrian and Russian Empires in previous years.

The Ukrainian

peasants in the Fastorn Ukraine actually fought tho Polish

landowners who in turn appea1ed to the Russian authorities for
help and received j.t .3°

Herzen' s and Bakunin's assumption that

popular feeling in the former Polish provinces did not favor the
restoration of Poland was confirmed by the development of the
insurrection.

But their hope that the Polj.sh insurrection would

the Russ:Lans into action was not fulfillcd.3 1

-z9Ibi£.;
· ·.·-

p. 115 1 Cf. also Gentzen, OJ?..

30correspondance de Bakounine, p. 65.
--~~~-

-

.

cJ_i., p.

1L~2.
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Soon after the insurrection had started, Bakunin and
Berzen recognized the futility of their hopes.

In February, 1863

Bakunin observed that the insurrection had strengthened Polish
as well as Russian nationalist feelings.3 2 Some time later, when
he accompanied a Polish liberatj_on expedition from Kiel (Northern

Germany) to Haelsingborg (Sweden), the majority of the Poles
resented his presence because he was a "moskal 11 (Muscovite).33
After his arrival in Stockholm the Polish leaders opposed his
intention to participate actively in the insurrection in the
Polish Kingdom or in Lithuania.
In spite of the Russophobia of the Poles, Bakunin
remained convinced that the cause of Polish independence was
11

inseparable 11 from the emancipation of Russia.34

In a letter to

Herzen of August 1, 1863 Bakunin insisted that it was necessary
to support the Polish insurrection in order to weaken Russian
imperialism.

"I will rejoice over the destruction of the Empire

from whatever side it may come. 11 35
However, as the weeks passed by, Herzen increasingly
resented tho alliance with the Poles.

He claimed that from the

beginning he had knovm that the alliance was doomed to perish

..i

f'

1863, in

3 2Bakunj~'s letter to He:czen from

Kiel, February

Corres_.£.opdan~e de_Bako~ine, p. 153.

33.Q..orre§J?.opj.~g f?..aj:>:..0~1l1.tJ'.!.~,
34~., p. 166.
35Ib:);£., p. 187.

p.

165.

2~.,
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because it had been a matter of convenience for the Poles, not
of deep conviction.

He reproached Bakunin for having drawn him

into this affair against his better judgment.

This had resulted

in compromising himself and his newspaper Kolokol in Russian
. 1 es. 36
progressJ_. ve circ_
In spite of Herzen's critique Bakunin remained convinced
that they should continue to support the alliance and assume full
responsibility for its outcome.

Above all, they should fight

Mieroslawski's propaganda against the "abstract and destructive
tendencies of

Kolol~ol

and its impractical aims. 11

Bakunin held

that the revolutionary program of Kolok9J:. vms far superior to that
of MierosJ:awski because Kolokol supported the principle of selfgovernment and of free federation~37

Yet, towards the end of

1863 Bakunin had also given up hope for the success of the Polish

insurrection and Polish-Russian collaboration.

By November he was

on his way to Italy.
Shortly before the Polish insurrection ended, the
Tsarist government had issued a decree on March 2, 1864, which
promulgated agrarian reforms in the Polish Kingdom.
were liberated from all feudal obligations.

The peasants

All the land worked

by the peasants, including the land which the aristocratic
---..._._..~--.-~--

.!.l1.£.,
37l..1?.1£.'
J

Cf. also p. 1 91 •
p • 13Lh
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landowners had appropriated to themselves since 181+6, became
peasant property without compensation.

Even the landless received

land so that the entire peasant property in the Kingdom rose

30%~

The landowners were deprived of their judicial and police power.
Through these agrarian reforms the government sought to weaken
the aristocracy and the Roman Catholic Church.

However, the

aristocratic landowners retci.:Lned their immense estates and thereby
a large measure of their influence.

Thus, the agrarian reforms

which had been the object of many Polish manifestoes were carried
through by the Tsarist government, not by a Polish insurrectional
force.
Herzen welcomed the agrarian reforms.

He became convinced

that changes could only be brought about by collaborating with the
established government.

This exasperated Bakunin.

To him it was

utopian to believe that Alexander II would realize socialism.
During a visit to London, when Bakunin met Marx :for the last time
on November 3, 186L1-, he attributed the failure of the insurrection
to the refusal of the Polish aristocrats to proclaim "peasant
socialism. 11

He told Ma.rx that from now on "he would take part

only in the socialist movement. 11 38
The Polish quest:ion remained a controversial issue
betvreen Ball.:unin and Herzen in the years following the ruthless

-
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suppression of the Polish insurrection by the Russj_an government.
The progressive Great Russian cj_rcles who had supported Kolokol
in previous years had now turned against Herzen.
him

They called

a traitor because he had collaborated with the Poles who

aimed -at the partition of the Russian Empire.
of being responsible for the

defend himself.

insurrection~

They accused him

Herzen tried to

He insisted that he had been against the

insurrection, and that he had pleaded with the Poles not to
disturb the liberal trend in Russia by a premature act.

Vfl1en

Herzen was unable to regain his former influence in Groat Russia,
he became very bitter.

He continued to blame Bakunin for his

involvement in the Polish affair.

Bakunin ridiculed Herzen's

attempts to win back the confidence of the former Great Russian
supporters.

He kept his conviction that the Polish uprising

against the des1)otic Tsarist government was justifiedo

He

accused Herzen of being as super-nationalist:Lc as the Great
Russians who condemned the insurrection in the name of "the
integr:Lty of the Empire."

Thus, the Polish question ca.used an

ever deepening estrangement between Bakunin and Herzen until
Herzen's death in 1870.39
......._.__"""""...,,.._...,.~,-

39cf. Correspondan~~~' pp. 219-20, 226, 257.
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Marx's and Engols's
Comments
on the Polish
Insurrection..
,....___ •• • ----------------

;....---"'I>'--

Unlike Herzen and Bakunin, Y.iarx and Engels had not
established a close contact with the Polish radicals before the
insurrection, and during the insurrection they refrained from
public statements j_n favor of Polish liberation.

They preferred

to exchange their vievrn on the development of the insurrection
in their letters.
When the Polish insurrection broke out, Marx and Engels
hoped that it might lead to a European revolution.

Vlarx greeted

the insurrection as the beginning of a new "era of revolution
in Europe," but the ebullient enthusinsm of 184-8 had vanished.

In a letter to Engels of lt,ebruary 13, 1863 Marx stated:
The comfortable illusions and almost childish
enthusiasm with which we greeted the revolutionary
era before February, 1848 went to the devil • • •
~roday vre know what part stupidity plays in revolutions,
and how the latter are exploited by scoundrels.40
Marx and Engels follorrnd with great interest the policies
of the European eovernments towards the Polish insurgents,
particule.rly of the Prussian government, then under the premiership
of Otto von Bismarck since 1862.
Pruss:i.an

On February 8, 1863 the

government concluded a military convention with Hussia

which was directed against the Polish insurrectiono

Bismarck was
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determined to prevent the encirclement of Prussia and Germany
through a Franco-Russian alliance.

As the Prussian ambassador

to St. Petersburg (1859-62) Bismarck had become concerned with
the pro-Polish policies of Alexander II.

After his accession

to the throne (1855) Alexander II had appointed the Polish
Margrave Alexander Wielopolski, who was a Germanophobe, as the
head

of the entire civil administration in the Polish Kingdom.

Bismarck feared that the pro-Polish policy of the Russian
government might lead to a Franco-Russian understanding which
was favored by Prince Alexander Gorchakov, the Russian foreign

m:Ln:Lster.

The

Polish insurrection of 1863 offered Bismarck the

chance to prevent such a development as vrell as a European
conflict which might have resulted from it.4 1
In 1863 Bismarck \'las as much against a restoration of
Poland e.s he had been at the time of the Crimean Viar.

Re had

remained convinced that the restoration of Poland would not agree
with the vital interests of Prussia.4 2

In his statements on

the Polish question of 1863 he maintained that a restored Poland
was more dangerous to Prussia than the Russian Empire.

An

. ·~41\vern~;

Frauendienst, "Prussian Ci vie Consciousness and
Polish NaU.onalism, 11 in ]':~§.~52!'n G~l?.;n~p. Handbook, ed. by the
Research Cammi ttee, Goettingen-rGermany) (2 vols.; Wuerz burg:
Holzner Verlag, 1963), II, 197-98.
.
42cf. Bismarck, Die Gesammel ten \'leF,]E..0:_, IV, 63 ff.,
101 ff c; XIV, 752 •...
k

--··

•
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independent Poland would become "a French encampment on the
Vistula."

Prussia would be faced with the threat of a Franco-

Polish encirclement.

Bismarck warned the British and French

diplomats that Prussia would not tolerate an independent Poland.
When the Polish insurrection was debated in the Prussian House

of Representatives, Bismarck declared on February 18, 1863:
I admit that Russia does not make Prussian policy;
it has not been called to do so • • • But I ask
whether an inder)endent Poland which claims the
territory of Danzig would make Prussian policy.

Apart from such considerations, Bismarck favored the suppression

of the Polish insurrection

by the Russians because he feared that

the insurrection might develop into a 1u.ropean revolution against
the established governments.

· 11arx and E':ngels condemned Bismarck's policy which
supported the maintenance of the
Kingdom.

:S~f!.tUs__g..£2.

in the Polish

They were exasperated that Bismarck was against tho

Pol:Lnh insurrection although it was directed against Russian ruleo

In thGir eyes this proved that Bismarck was the handyman of
Russia.

He continued the traditional Hohenzollern policy which

had subjected Germany to Russian hegemony in order to preserve

the integrity of the Prussian state.

The Russo-Prussian military

convont:Lon confirmed that P-.cussia remained an obstacle to the

Unification of Germany.
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The Prussian liberals supported Bismarck's anti-Polish
policies.· On February 27, 1863 Baron Georg von Vincke stated in
the House of Representatives that only a partitioned Poland
guaranteed the existence of the Prussian state.

On Vi.arch 24, 1863

Marx commented in a letter to Engels:
Indeed, Vincke and Bismarck have correctly interpreted
the Prussian political principle according to which the
Prussian state • • • cannot exist without present-day
Russia nor at the side of an independent Poland. The
whole Prussian history leads to this conclusion • • •
Since Poland is nec~ssary for Germany, but cannot
coexist with a Prussian state, this state has. to be
eliminated. The Polish question is only a new proof
that it is impossible to assert German interests as
long as the Hohenzollern stat~ exists. Down with the
Russian hegemony in Germany.43
Marx and Engels hoped that German-Polish collaboration would soon
['

replace ~he Prusso-Russian one.

I

danger of a Polish-French or Polish-Russian collaboration which

t

Marx and Engels feared as much as Bismarck.

This would also eliminate the

t

From the outset of the Polish insurrection both the

i

conservative Czartoryski camp in Paris, which worked closely

l

together with the French government, and the democratic
Mieros::tawski camp had expected French intervention on behalf of the
Polish insurgents.44

In their letters Marx and Engels sharply

43~1EGA, III/3, 132.
44since the fifties Mieros3'.awski had urged the French to
collaborate with the Poles for tho restoration of Poland. In 1856
he warned the French that Germany was too weak to protect France
from the Russian danger. Only a restored Polanq would guarantee
Peace t~ France. Louis Mieroslawski, De f.a p,e,tiop._ali_t_{ J?Olonaise
~ng~SJ.1',ili bre ~ (Paris : I. 'Chamerot, 1'83bT, p. ;i6.
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criticized the policies of the Polish democrats.

As did the

polish conservatives, the democrats supported Napoleon III in the
hope that he would help liberate the Poles.

According to Marx

and bngels this policy actually contributed to weaken the Polish
insurrection.

They were convinced that Napoleon had smuggled

followers of P-.cince Adam Czartoryski into the revolutionary
government in Vlarsaw in order to overthrow it, and that
Palmerston supported the intentions of Napoleon.45
:Marx and Engels believed that the willingness of the
Poles to collaborate with Napoleon III endangered Germany more
directly than did the Polish insurrection.

They feared that

Napoleon might use the Po1ish insurrection to strengthen hts
position in France through a war against Germany.

In a letter

to Engels of February 21, 1863 Marx wrote:
Wbat I fear most in the Polish affair is that the
Sau-BonaT)arte (pig~Bonaparte) will find a pretext to
acfvan'c"elo. . -:Ene m1ine and thus be enabled to piss on
the dreadful situation.46
Many months later, on January 3, 186Li-, Engels still complained to
M:u·x

about the "Plon-Plonism" (a term used by Marx and Engels to

describe the enthusiasm for Napoleon III) of the Poles and the
Hunge.rJans.

Ho

remarked that these people could only be cured

from their Francophile attitude if a revolution broke out in
---~Cf.hYia:cx's letters to Ene;els, July 6 and August 15,
1863, in ~' III/3, 1L~8-L~9, 153.
4 6!.t@, III/3, 131.
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Berlin and Vienna, and if the German revolutionary governments
made "sufficient concessions" to Poland and Hungary.

However,

Engels conoidered it to be more likely that the Polish
insurrection would bring about the restoration of the Holy
Alliance for the preservation of the partition of Poland.

This

would correspond to the highest expectations of Napoleon.
Could he [Napoleon] desire more thari the restoration
of the Holy Alliance and a war both for the Rhine
and Poland supported by England, Italy, and all the
small European stat.es?l+7
Such a development would endanger Germany.

Although :Marx and

Engels did not approve of Bisme.rck's policies, they shared his
apprehension that the crisis of 1863 might lead to an encirclement

I

!

of Germany.
·-:Marx and E'ngels were much less worried about Kolokol' s

!

~ · propaganda for Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration.

They

l"

wondered whether Herzen and fukunin would actually support the

~

liberation of the Polish Kingdom from Russian rule.

''
i

Soon after

the outbreak of the Polish insurrection Marx asked Engels, who

understood Russian, "to watch Kolokol."

He added:

"Herzen and

Co. have now the opportunity to prove their revolutionary honesty,

at lea.st as far as it is compatible with their Slavic
predilections. 111i- 8 A few days later Engels reported about the
47Ibid., p. 163.
48Narx's letter to Engels, February 13., 1863, in MEGA,
lII/3, 127.
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t

violent controversy which had erupted between Bakunin and
Mieroslawski regarding the territorial extension of a restored
Poland.

He told Marx that he had subscribed to Kolokol in order

to hear more about it.

Marx and Engels must have relished this

contr_oversy which revealed that the Polish-Russian collaboration,
which they had opposed for years, was built on unsafe grounds.
They must also have ·welcomed the Russophobia of Mieroslawski.

The

Polish Colqnel Teofil !.apirtski, whom Bakunin found unbearable
because of his violent· anti-Russian feelings, wa_s quite
acceptable to Marx.

!iapinski hated the Russians not only because

they oppressed the Poles but because in his opinion they were not
Slavs.

He.objected to Polish-Russian collaboration and

supported the restoration of Poland under the rule of the Poles.
In a letter of September 12, 1863 to Eng&, Marx commented
approvingly:

"Instead of the struggle of nationalities the

latter [Lapinski] only acknowledges the struggles of races. 11 49
Two years later, in 1865, when Marx read the book by the

,,

Frenchman Elias Regnault La guel§.tion

europe~nne

n.omm~f2_, "l§l__questij:m polonai~~' '·' published in

faussement

1863, he understood

that !,apinski had been influenced by the Pole Franciszek
Duchinsk..i..

Since the 1850' s this Polish nationalist used a racial

theory in support of the restoration of Poland.
49Ibid., p. 155.

He maintained
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tllat the

11

Muscovites 11 (Great Russians) belonged to the Turanian

or Mongolian race as did the Turks, Jews, and Chinese, while the
Slavs v10re Indoeuropeans like the L'.1tin and Germanic people,
that is, members of the Aryan race.· According to Duchinski tho
.Aryan$ were creative, attached to the soil, and had formulated
the concept of prj_vate property.

The Turanian race, instead, was

servile, preferred the nomadic life, uniformity, and business
activities •. It was an inferior race.
/

On the basis of this racial theory Duchinski claimed that
the eastern Polish borders of 1772 along the Dvina and the Dnieper
rivers marked the natural borders of the European and Slavic
world and the beginning of Asia.

A restored Poland would become

the easternmost out1)ost of Europe against the barbaric world.
~chifiski

rejected the right to national self-determination of

the V/hite Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians.
these nationalities had been Polonized.

He

claimed that

Therefore, Polish rule

over them was justified.50
Marx welcomed Duchinski's racial theory as an excellent
means to fight the Russians and Polish-Russian collaborationo

He

wished "that Duchinski was right, and that his theory would
-

)o'/ - - --Elias Regnault, an OpJlOnent of Proudhon, used
Duchinski' s racial theory in defense of his view· that the Great
Russ:Lans should be excluded from a future reorganization of
Europe o In 1864 Duchj_nski agitated for tho restoration of Poland
as an outpost against the Asiatic world in his book PeUJ?l..~.e- arJ.Y.§lS
~7~~£ll~1-!'.:6~..§! f).L.!1..£121:.?.:..q~ (Paris: F. Klinc:ksJ.ecK,
·~--~'-
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'

prevail among the Slavs."
end to Pan-Slavism. 11 51

This would certainly

11

cause a dreadful

Although Harx and Engels were not in favor of PolishRussian collaboration, yet, at the outset of the Polish
insurrection they hoped that the latter would develop into an
uprising of the peasants in the whole Russian Empire.

During

the second months of the insurrection Marx and Engels began to
have misgivings as to its outcome because a vigorous peasant
movement did not mater{alize in the Polish Kingdom.

However,

Engels still clung to the hope that the insurrection in the
Kingdom might be strengthened by a peasant uprising in Lithuania{2
But, early
t

June, Marx and Engels became convinced that the

insurrection lacked vitality because neither in the Polish

I
k
L

Kingdom nor in Lithuania nor in the Ukraine was it supported by

~.
~

~n

.

the peasants.

Marx was surprised that even the Great Russian

.

!f

peasants had remained apathetic.53

But until the disastrous end

of the Polish insurrection Marx and Engels continued to hope that

i

it might still be saved by a European revolutionary movement which

I;

this time might start in Berlin, rather than in Paris.

~l~, III/3, 276.
p. 135.

52 Engels 1 s letter to Marx, April 8, 1863, ~' III/3,
53Marx's letter to E-11gels, -June 10, 1863, ~' III/3,

Pp. 143.. 44.
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It seems that initially Marx and Engels intended to
conduct an active propaganda for the liberation of the Poles.
In a letter to Engels of February 20, 1863 Marx proposed to support
the Polish insurrection with a proclamation and a pamphlet on the
Polish situation.

Engels was enthusiastic about this idea.

He

suggested that the pamphlet should be entitled Deutschland und
Polen.

Poli tisch-mili taerische Betrachttu_lgen bei Sielegenhei t

I.o.lnischen Aufstandes von 18§}.
following problems:

d~

The pamphlet was to cover the

Russia's military position in relation to

Western and Southeastern Europe before and after the three
partitions of Poland, as well as after 181li-; the position of Russia
and Germany. after a restoration of Poland, including some statements on_ "Prussian Poland, linguistic borders, and statistical
data on its population. 11 54

From these scanty remarks it may be

derived that Engels proposed the same kind of propaganda which

Marx had employed in his pamphlet Herr Vo_gl.

Therein, Marx had

emphasized the Russian military threat to Europe and Germany
through the destruction of Poland, but he did not support the
surrender of Prussian Poland to the Poles.
As mentioned earlier, in the course of 1863 Marx
composed a group of manuscripts on ?olen, Preussen und Russland,
Which remained unfinished and unpublished at the time.

52tMEGA
_, III/3 ' 130-31.

In these
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raanuscripts he concentrated on the condemnation of Prussia's
collaboration with Russia as an immense obstacle to any political
or social changes in Germany and Poland.

The restoration of

Poland would push Russia out of Europe, reduce it to the "level
of an ·Asiatic power," and depose it from its "candidature to
world power. 11 55

Deprived of its Russian support, the Prussian

state would be ruined.
in a united Germany.

It would become a mere German province
Then, Germany would be liberated from the

"'11artar yoke of the Muscovites" wh:Lch had been consolidated

through the Polish partition of 17950
As in his pamphlet against Karl Vogt, Marx warned that
the complete incorporation of the Polish Kingdom into Russia
would pe:cmi t tho Tsarist government to unite all the Slavs under

its rule and deprive Germany of tho Polish barrier against the
"Slavic deluge. 11

Marx declared:

"For

Ge1~many

all the foreign

poJ5tica1 questions are included :in one single problem:
restoratton of Poland. 11 56
revolutionary Germany.

the

This would be the major aim of

Marx refra:i.ned from making any definite

statements on the territorial extension of a restored Poland.,
However, he expressed his concern for the safety of the eastern
German border as he had done :previously.
....._.______.,_---~.:.-

This indicated that

5511arx, .P~~lnJ.ss;_l}e.. fi£..~~' p. 93.

561!?islo
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revolutionary Germany would not promote the surrender of the
Grand Duchy of Poznania and West Prussia to the Poles.

From a

Russian outpost agaj_nst Germ.any, Poland was merely to be changed
into a German outpost against Russia.
The question arises why did Marx not try to finish
his manuscripts for publication.

Obviously, Marx andEngels were

hes:i.tant about getting involved in the Polish affair when the
insurrection did not promise to develop into a European
revolutionary movement in \Vhich Germany participated.

\'/hen in

the spring of 1863 the German Workingmen's Association issued a
proclamation in support of a collection for the Polish
insurrection, Marx's name was not mentioned although the
proclama~ion

betrayed h:Ls authorship.

The proclamation stated

that the restoration of Poland, v1hich was necessary for Germany,
depended upon the support of the working classes because the
bourgeoisie collaborated with Russj_a.

The German workers were

urged to hold mass meetings and agitate for the liberation of
the Poles.
While Harx and Engels avoided public statements in
support of the Polish insurrection, although they hoped that it
would cause a European conflagration, Proudhon became actively
involved in the agitation against the Pol:Lsh fight for liberty.
When the Polish insurrection broke out, he was convinced that this
Was

a· foolish undertaking.

In 186Lt he published a pamphlet,

298
§.L.l_e~LlJ&te:s .cl~,, 1815_~l}t C..£§~§_9:~.f2Sist_e~, in which he

condemned the Polish insurgents for their attempt to overthrow
the stipulations of the Vienna treaties.
There is something • • • exorbi{;ant in this sacrifice
of the interests of a whole continent to the
satisfaction of one nationality which has been
abolished for more than a century.57
Proudhon repeated that European progress could only be safeguarded
through the maintenance of the

sta~,tld:;s.

gug_o

He appealed to the

Polish insurgents to lay down their arms, and he urged the
European radicals not to support the Polish insurrection and to
prevent a European war.
Proudhon insisted that the

~_lacll!.§...

would not bring about

They had no political sense.

any changes in Poland.

They had not

even talrnn advantage of the constitution granted to the Polish

Kingdom by Alexm1der I in 1815 in order to promulgate the
necessary agrarian reforms.

Thereby, the

~.l§..2!rt§i:.

promoted the modernization of the Russian Empire.58

might have
Instead,

the aristocracy permitted Russj_a to take the :Lni tiative in the

liberation of the peasants.

Proudhon said that this deprived the

Polish e.ristocrats of their tradit:i.onal argument that the Tsarist
government had prevented them from freeine the peasants.

-·--;?l}")j_~;;-;-Proudhon, §J:.J:f.~t£§..Uis !l~e.

~e~~bste~

(Paris:

181_.2_;:int.. cesse

E. Dentu, li:i.nraJ.re-Tiditeur, IB6L1.T,P-

581!?..=h.1., p. 90.

65.
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Proudhon also repeated his warnings against the
"monstrous" wholesale condemnation of the Russian people.

He

argued that the Russians were actually superior to the Poles
because of their political qualifications.

It was criminal

to present the restoration of Poland as the salvation of Europe
from Muscovite barbarism.

Proudhon regarded the racial theory

of Franciszek Duchinski, Vlhich denied the Russians the right
to belong to the civilized world, as one of the vilest examples
of anti-Russian propaganda.

In Proudhon's opinion Duchinski's

contention that the natural borders of the Polish nationality
extended to the Dvina and Dnieper ·was absurd.
are not Poles,

and

"The

Lithuanians

the inhabitants of Fast Prussia and of

the Grand Duchy of Posen, partly German or Germanized, cannot
become Polish again. 11 59
According to Proudhon the essence of the Polish question
was the desire of the Poles to replace the Russian hegemony in
}astern Europe with their own.

However, this would hinder the

development of the Polish people and European revolutionary
progress because a restored Poland would become the supporter of
the reactionary forces to an even greater degree than Russia.
Europe would best be protected by Russian progress in civilization
and the liberation of the peasants.
-------~-3~9~1-b-.-d-----

6

--2:_., p. 0;/ •
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Proudhon's condemnation of the Polish insurrection called
forth a strong reaction in France.

The critique of Proudhon was

summed up by the Frenchman Constant·Portelette in 1864.
accused Proudhon of being deaf to human suffering.

He

The Poles

had a right to fight for their liberty, even if this endangered
the p0ace of Europe.

At times, it was necessary to sacrifice

peace in order "to save liberty."

It was immoral to sacrifice

the Poles to some uncertain higher goal--disarmament and universal
peace:
Yes, war is terrible; but if we have to do our duty,
we have to defend the oppressed people,. and we should
not speak of the monstrosities of war.oO
MaTx and Engels did not refer to Proudhon's anti-Polish
propaganda in their correspondence.

Yet, it is hardly possible

that they remained unaware of the controversy between Proudhon
and the French republicans.

Not only were there differences in

the political outlook of the tvTO friends and that of Proudhon,
but also striking similarities.

Vf.aile Marx and Engels believed

that the victory of socialism depended upon a European
conflagration, Proudhon supported the status_guo in Europe because
he was convinced that socialism would be the result of a
:peaceful evolution.
Russia.

-

Therefore, he was opposed to a war against

This would not further progress.

After all, the approach

60 Co1?-s tan t Porte 1 et t e J. La..Po}-~f?:-n_e_e_,t_1_8_1~2...-.·~--R_e.....p_o_n_9_e_a_M~
.!1:.2ydhop (Paris: E. Dentu, 18b4J, p. ~?.
.
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of both Harx and Engels and Proudhon to the Eastern

~uropean

problem was dictated by their interest in the victory of
socialism.

This hindered a realistic approach to the Russian

problem and consequently to the Polish problem.

Certainly

Proudhon's approach to Russia was more superficial than that of
Marx and Engels.

Russia's foreign political aspirations, which

were strongly criticized by Marx and Engels, apparently did not
concern him.

He did not perceive, as Marx did, the bitter irony

that the Russian government, while it favored the liberation of
the Slavs under foreign rule, simultaneously oppressed the
national minorities in the Russian Empire. 61
In spite of their different views on the Polish
insurrection Marx and Engels and Proudhon shared the same
approach to the nationality principle.

Both parties were

convinced that the higher developed nation had the right to
absorb the less advanced people.

In their opinion the emphasis

on national liberation distracted from the real problem of the
age--the reorganization of the socio-economic order.

The victory

of socialism would ultimately solve the problem of national
oppression. 62

Yet, Marx and Engels continued to favor the Polish

6l Cf. l"r~
·~rx, Herr Vog t , p. 90 •
62 such similarities were overlooked by the socialist

V. JJevynskyj.

He maintained that while Marx and Engels vlished for
the assimilation of the non-historic nations Proudhon desired
their independent development. He referred to Proudhon's theory
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opposition to Russian rule as a means to weaken Tsarist Russia
a.nd to bring about tho European revolution.

Proudhon, on the

other hand, rejected the exploitation of national aspirations for
the purpose of furthering the reorganization of the
socio~·economic

~uropean

order convinced that wars would only prevent it.

Proudhon died early in 1865.

But his ideas exercised a strong

influence on the formulation of a foreign policy in the First
International \'lorkint:,Pmen' s Association.

OTTCcTera'.liSmV/fiich Proudhon had elaborated on in his book,

• •
+. d_2~..9S:.2.§SJ_
]
/
•t/
1
'•
Du
era t""
1.r_ o"
9 d.e re9_op.:s t"t
1 ue.£._~~Sh
de 1a-revo1ut:Lol1Tf8b3;:- According -ro-:Levynskyj the theory of
federalism g1.i.a.ranteed not only to each individual bu.t also to each
collective unit, consequently to a nation, "full material and
spir:Ltual devolopment. 11 After the destruction of the capitalist
system it would be possible to realize the federalist system by
conclucUng bilatera1 contracts which would preserve the liberty,
sovereignty, and initiative of each partner. V. Levynskyj,
~~~;Ls.t;y_c~J'.lGGl:}l?~l.£.3:., pp. 35 ff.
n/1/
~£J.ncJ_.:eQ..2..<2.S

CHAPTER VI
THE QUESTION OF A FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL

~I1L~ Fip;_~t..

fo_r an

Ag_g:r_e..§>~=hY.£

Forej:.gn Pplic;y_

The end of the ill·-fated Polish insurrection marked the
definite termination of the period ·when the European Left
unanimously agitated for the restoration of Poland.

After

186~.

Proudhon's opinion that sympathy for the Polish people must not be
combined vrlth an agitation for the j_mmediate rostoration of Poland
vra.s widely adopted in French and Belgian socialist circles.

This

had an impact upon the First International Workingmen's
Association vrh.ich was founded on September 28, 1864 in London
to promote the collaboration of the European workers against the
established governments.

The Pob.sh question stood at the

cradle of the F'irst International.

This national question

developed into ono of the most controversial j.e>sues in the
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International and contributed to an increase of the internal
tensions in the organization which led to its early dissolution
in

1872. 1
The initiative for the founding of an international

socialist organization came from the leaders of the English trade
unions, among them George Odger and Vlilliam Cremer.

English government would not grant military aid to the Polish
insurgents, the English labor leaders organized mass meetings in
favor of the Polish cause.

Late in 1863 they

p~oposed

to the

Parisian workers to address a common petition to the English and
French governments for the recognition of Poland as a belligerent
povrnr in its fight against Russia.

They also suggested a

permanent collaboration between the European workers.

The

fraternization of the people was necessary "to check the existing
abuse of power • • •

and

to discuss the great questions on

which the peace of the nations depends. 112
The Polish insurrection was over before any definite
action in its support had been taken.

But the insurrection

. For general information on the First International see
Julius Braunthal, Geschichte der Intern?-tionale (Hannover:
J. H. W. Dietz Nacfi~, GmbH, 1961), pp. ~
2 The appeal was published in the English newspaper
Bee-Hive, December 5, 1863, quoted in Archives Bakounine - Bakunin
Archiv, edo by A. Lehning, A. J. C. Rueter, P. Scheibert under
the auspices of the International Institut voor Socia.le

l --G-e~s._c_h_i_e_d_e_n_i_s_,_Am_s
....terdarn
II, 383.

l

When the

(2 vols.; Leiden:

E. J. Brill, 1961-65),
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had contributed to the birth of the First International
Workingmen' s Association at the historical meeting at St. Jl1artin' s
Hall in London on September 28, 1864.
attended by Western Europeans.
repre?entatives of the Slavs.
not speak.

The meeting was mostly

The Poles were the only
Marx was also present, but did

He and his friend George Eccarius were elected as

German representatives to the Central Provisional Committee
(roplaced in 1866 by the General Council as the head of the new
association) in which Harx soon gained great influence.3

In the

following years Marx attempted to extend his control over the
different sections of the International against the opposition
of the followers of Proudhon and after 1868 against that of
Bakunin.

-

The Inaugural Address which Marx composed at the
---""~--

...

invitation of the sub-committee (appointed by the Central
Committee to draw up a programme and statutes) in the autumn of
18611. was moderate e

It was a clever combination of his own views

with insignificant concessions to his opponents.

The Address

appealed to the workers to fight for their liberation through

-----3".-T-h-·e·

German work:Lngrnen' s movement was not represented in
the International in the first years of its existence. Lassalle
who in 1863 had founded tho first German workingmen's party
.:SJ1.gef!l.§.=!-ner ~Dn~utscg_§£. Arbei terve~ei.E_ had been killed in. a duel on
August 31"";1861j~1orfryDefore tho meeting at Sto Martin's Hall.
His successor in the presidency became J·. B. von Schweitzer, but
under him the Arbeiterverein did not join the International. It
Was not until 1868, when the German Social Democratic Party was
founded 1 that the Germans entered the International.
1
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"the conquest of political power" in each country and to formulate
a common foreign policy which v1ould counteract the exploitation
of national prejudices by the governments.

The .Address maintained
-~-~

that the workers would deal with a reactionary country like
Russia more efficiently than the European ruling classes who with
idiotic indifference • • • have witnessed • • •
heroic Poland being assassinated by Russia [and] tho
immense and unresisted encrochments of that barbarous
power, whose head is at St. Petersburg and whose hands
are in every cabinet of Europe.
It was the duty of the workers
to vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice,
which ought to govern the relations of private
individuals, as the rules paramount of the inter•a
course of nations.4
When :Marx composed the

f:r:.'..2.!.=h.~Jo~J:~_By.les

International, he had to insert into the

Pr..£_e.rr:..~

of the
another

reference to ntruth, justice, and morality" as the basis of
personal and international relations at the request of the subcommittee. 5

In a letter to Engels of November

Li-,

1864 Marx

remarked that be had put these words in such a manner "that they

cannot do any harm. 116

He VJas

determined to keep the nationality

4D--;cuments of the International The General Council of
1Qe _First Tnternaf:LoiLir;:.lF6'4-f8'6b.--H~es:J'.,·:--c17oncfon"!-La\vrence
& TJ:G,=nar-r-;-110c.fa:E'"€t)~-21fo.

--------·-

5Ibid., · p. 289.
6

~.A, III/3, 198.
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problem out of the foreign policy of the Internationale

He

told Engels:
As far as the question of international politics in
the Address of the working classes is mentioned, I
do speak o1 countries, not of riationalitiQs, and I
denounce Russia, not the minores gentium.r
Marx wished to give an anti-Russian slant to the foreign policy of
the International.

All of socialist-minded Western Europe was to

be aligned against Russia.

The anti-Russian slant of the Address

was not mitigated by a.declaration for a collaboration with the
progressive Russians.

Even in 1864, when an agrarian socialist

movement existed in Russia, Marx would not officially acknowledge
any changes in the Russian Empire and remained reluctant to
differentiate between the government and the people.
As in 181+8, Marx considered the war against Russia a
"part of the general fight for the emancipation of the working
classes.''

He insisted that the liberation of Poland should be

included in the program of the International.

Due to his

instigation the following resolution was adopted by the Central
Committee on November 25, 18640
(1) That the Polish war of independence was conducted
in the general interest of the people of Europe, and
that by its defeat the cause of civilization and
human progress suffered a severe shock. (2) That
Poland has an unimpeachable claim upon the leading
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nations of Europe that they contribute in every
possible way towards the restoration of its national
sovereignty. 8
:Marx used the Polish question not only to strengthen the
anti~Russian

front in the International but also to diminish the

French influence.

Many of the English intellectuals who favored

the International, among them Prof. Edward Beesley, who had
presided over the meeting at St. Martin's Hall, had great
sympa.thies for France, its revolutionary tradition, its foreign
policy, and even for Napoleon III.

When Peter Fox, Beesley's

friend, wrote a Polish address at the invitation of the subcommittee, he stated that French foreign policy had traditionally
favored the Polish cause.

Marx suspected Fox of having tried

"to present the Anglo-French alliance, under a democratic form,
as the nucleus of the International."9

In a letter of December 10,

1864 he informed Engels that in the sub-committee he had strongly
criticized Fox's exaggerations of French pro-Polish foreign
policies.

In order to undermine Fox's pro-French position, Marx

had "listed the irrefutable historical facts regarding the

continuous betrayal of the Poles by the French from the time of
Louis XV until Bonaparte III. 1110 Marx's objections to the address

---~n schriftlichen Protokollen des Zentralrats, 11
quoted in Rjasanoff, "Polenfrage," p. 192.
9MEGA, III/3, 21 l+.
1o.l£.:L1.
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by

Fox vvere accepted by the sub-committee, and Fox was invited

to change the address.
The controversy with Fox induced Marx to vrrite the
earlier mentioned pamphlet on Polen t!i1d Frankreich which remained
unpub~ished

at the time.

In this pamphlet Marx maintained that

France had never seriously supported the liberation of Poland
because

j_ t

disunited.

needed the support of Russia in order to keep Germany
He sc..id that no changes of the traditional French

policy could be expected from Napoleon I!I who was "on the throne
by

Russian permission," and who desired to partition Germany.

"With the approval of the Tsar, Louis Bonaparte would, if

necess:;i:ey~

incorporate the Rhine province into France, dismember Germany in
the interest of Poland, and compensate the Tsar with the

incorporation of Prussian Poland into Russia. 1111

According to

Marx the foreign policy of Louis Napoleon III was the climax of
]'rench anti-European

policj~es,

and anti-Polish policies.

from France against Russia.

that is, pro-Russian, anti-German,

The Poles could not expect any help
Only revolutionary Germany would

guarantee the liberation of Poland.
The first clash between the members of the International
over the question of Polish restoration occurred at the London

1i . ----:--·
Marx, Die

poln:i~§~_F'r;3_g§_,

p. 1 95.
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Conference late in September, 1865. 12

The preliminary program

for _the first general congress of the International, to be held
in 1866, had been elaborated by
preceding months.

th~

sub-committee in the

It was amended and approved by the Central

Committee on July 25, 1865.

Point 9 of the program, for which

Marx was largely responsible, read:
The Muscovite invasion of Europe and the reestablishment of an independent and integral Poland. 13
When the program was submitted to the delegates at the London
Conference, a heated debate developed over point 9 during the
session of September 27, 1865. 14

- - 17originaily it had been planned to hold the first generaJ
congress of the International in Brussels in the summer of 1865.
Against _the opposition of the Parisians and the Swiss, Marx was
able "to transform the public congress, to be held in Brussels,
into a preliminary private conference in London." Cf .. Marx's
letter to Engels of July 31, 1865 in Der Briefwechsel zwischen
!'rJcdri£.h__~@l~und Karl Marx 1BL:-4 bisF i B8~, ed. by August' Bebel
and Eduard Berns:Eein L~ vo s.; Stu tgart: J. H. \'I. Dietz Nachf.,
GmbH, 1919), I, 213. The London conference was attended by a
limited number of delegates from England, France, Belgium, and
Switzerland, by tvlO German delegates of the German Workers
Educational League in IJondon, by Narx and Hermann Jung as
corresponding secretaries for Germany and Switzerland respectivel~
and by George Eccarius as vice-president of the Central Committee.
13 11 Report of the sub-committee, 11 July 25, 1865, in
~nts of_the International, I, 117.
14rn order to reconstruct the controversy regarding
point 9, the following three reports which vary in tone and
completeness were used: "Extract from the Minutes of the London
Conference:1 (session of September 27, 1865) and "Extract from the
Report on the London Conference," J?Ublished in the English radical
newspaner, The Workman's Advocate (London), on September 30, 1865,
in Document801':111_F1.!i~.er,i].I§-~, I, 246·-47, (Cf. also Archives
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Point 9 aimed at an aggressive anti-Russian policy,
that is, 'the restoration of Poland through the destruction of the
Russian Empire.

Although the delegates agreed that the Polish

·people should be free, they did not unanimously support a war
against Russia for the liberation of Poland.

In general those

delegates who supported point 9, mostly Englishmen and Germans,
held that Russia must be destroyed because it was the most
dangerous threat to European progress.

The opponents of point 9,

foremost among them the French and the Belgian d.elegates, felt
that it was unjust to single out Russian despotism as the main
danger to European progress because the Western European governments were-no less despotic.

It was argued that if the Poles had

to be f;reed from Russian oppression, then the Irish who suffered
under English rule should also be liberated.
Several propositions were submitted regarding the
definite formulation of point 9.

The fOQrth proposition by the
Pole Konstantin Bobczynski was thus worded: 15

139,kounine, II,

~2"7-29), and the most complete report by Pierre
a member of the Central Committee and opponent of Marx,
"Pierre Vesinier surla conference de Landres," in Archives
~?~nin~, II, 233.
·
15rn the mid-fifties Konstantin Bobczynski was a leading
member of the London Centralizationo He participated in the
Polish insurrection of 1863, was nominated a member of the
Central Committ~e, September 19, 1865, corresponding secretary for
Poland, May 8, 1866, and was re-elected a member of the General
Council at the Geneva Congress in September, 1866.

V~sinier,

!

l-----~------'
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That it is imperative to annihilate the invading
influence of Iffissia in Europe by applying to Poland
the right of every people to dispose of itself, and
re-estaplishing that country on a social and democratic
basis.lb
The Frenchman Victor Le Lubez proposed, "that only the latter
part ·Of the proposition be retained, that is--that peoples have
a right to dispose of themselves. 111 7

Then the demand for Polish

liberty would be of universal significance.

Although the English

delegate John Weston supported the amendment proposed by Le Lubez,
he opposed the introduction of political questions into the
program of the International.

This would only cause dissent.

The Belgian Cesar De Paepe, a })rominent participant
of the I_Jondon Conference, was among the most outspoken opponents
of point 9.

He demanded that the Polish question should not be

put on the agenda.

The restoration of Poland would not be in

the interest of progress.

It would only serve the Polish

magnates, the gentry, and the clergy, not the people.

De Paepe

rejected the unilateral condemnation of Russia as a danger to
European liberty.

The Russians were not worse than other people

and could not be held responsible for the destruction of Polandv

----16' -·- .

.

Documents of the International~ I, 246. In
The workman's- Acfvocaf'e' ~of-Sep'temoer-.3o-;-·TTo65 the resolution was
VTOraedsomewn-a-f'{f:[ff8r°entJ.y: II • • • and tO re-establish that
country upon its native democratic basis, 11 in Archives Ba1';:ouni~,

II, 228.
17 Docu~ents. of the International, I, 246e
-~...,_,.-------"'-----~
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If it were necessary to destroy the influence of the Russian
government in Europe, then it was equally necessary to check the
influence of the other European governments.
· 11

De Paepe asked:

Is the influence of the Prussian, 'Austrian, English, and French

governments less baneful than that of Russia?

I say no. 111 8

Besides, it would be unjust to mention only the Poles because so
many people suffered under foreign rule.
When Bobczynski replied to the objections raised against
the introduction of the Polish question into the. program of the
International, he insisted that the restoration of a democratic
Poland was the "key to European freedom."

Bobczynski warned

against separating the political from the social questions.
"Political reforms must precede social advancemento 111 9
The Chairman George Odger, who supported Bobczynski' s
viewpoint, insisted that the International originated from the
concern for Poland.
the Polish causeo

The International would stand or fall with
The Englisman James Carter also opposed the

separation of the political from the social questionso

The

liberation of the Poles was necessary to prevent the spread of
despotism.

18 Ibid.
19
.
Archives Bakounine, II, 229.
~

~----....-
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When the Chairman put Bobczy1lski' s proposition to the
vote, it was adopted by an overwhelming majority.

When the

Frenchman Pierre Vesinier demanded that the names of other
oppressed nationalities be included in the resolution, the
Chairman declared that this was against the rules since the
question had been resolved. 20
In the official reports on the controversy over point 9
at the London Conference the narne of Marx did not appear.

Vesinier;

nho was one of the more impressive figures at the conference, was
only briefly mentioned.
Marx.

Yet, he was an outspoken opponent of

This can be derived from Vesinier's report on the London

Conf0rence.

Vesinier was dissatisfied with the London program

becaus0 it lacked a "rational plan."

His critique centered on

point 9 which called for the fight against Russia and the
restoration of Poland..

a Hussophobe

1

Vesinier said that Marx, who suffered from

monomania," was its main inspirator.

:Marx had not

been satisifed with introducing the Russo-Polish question into the
111.~.ral

Address.

--'2-a-~

Ho had also entered it into the program of the

Pierre Vesinier ( 1821+-1 902) was exiled from France after
the coup d'etat of Louis-Napoleon of December 2, 1851. On
September 19, 1865 he was elected a memb0r of the General Council.
Re v1rote a number of works against Napoleon III and Bonapartisme
In 1870 he b0carae a member of the Paris Commune. After the fall of
the Commune he went back to Eneland and was active in the French
branch of the International. He was strongly opposed to the
General Council which tried to centralize the administration of
the International.
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International.

This vms "completely inopportune and contrary to

the aj_m pursued by the Association and to the principle of right
a.nd justice, 1121 Vesinier condemned the delegates who had
·supported point 9.
According to Vesinier Marx's victory was due to two
fa.ctors:

(1) the pro-Polish sympathies o:f the influential

Parisian delegation; and, (2) the presence of a great number of
Poles at the conference.

Vesinier claimed that the Parisians

were naturally predisposed to adopt Marx's position.

In 1864

they had addressed a petition to Napoleon III for his intervention
in favor of Polish liberation.

Evidently they were willing to
support the restora.tion of a reactionary Poland. 22 As to the

- . . . 2-1 "Pierr: Vesinier sur la conference de Londres, 11 in
Arcl]l.y~s .Bakoy.nin.~, II, 233.

-

22obviously Vesinier was mistaken in his judgment of the
Parisian delegation represented by Henri-Louis Tolain, Charles
Limousin, Louis-1ugene Varlin, and E.-E. Fribourg. In his book on
the First International, Fribourg stated that the Parisians were
strongly opposed to the introduction of point 9 in a socialist
congress because it was a political question. According to him
the Parisian position was supported by Fran~ois Dupleix, the
delegate of the French section of Geneva. But among the members
of the Central Committee only De Paepe vms against point 9, while
Karl Marx, Peter Fox, and Le Lubez rrnre for it. Fribourg
maintained that even V~sinier fought the omission of the Polish
· question and attacked the opponents of point 9 as agents of the
French Emperor Napoleon III who was believed to be a Russophile.
Doubtless Fribourg was mistaken in this. Cf. E.-E. Fribourg,
L'Association International des Travailleurs (Paris: Armand Le
mieV'ai..:Cer,--:lli:rfeur', T87'tD, pp. 44-45. IJ:'hereport of Cesar De Paep
corroborates Vesinier's. According to him Vesinier demanded that
if the Polish Republic were to be restored, the former Venetian,
Roman, French, ana Mexican republics should als.o be restored o De
~aepe remarked that Vesinier, T9lain, and Fribol;lrg were se:riously
:i..p.tor::;.sted in tho debates on point 9. Cf. Archives Bak.ounine,
,
r,~
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-

______________

~

316

Poles, Vesinier held that they acted as a pressure group.

In

their speeches the Poles addressed themselves to the emotions
of the delegates and created a climate of opinion favorable to
their wishes for Polish restoration.

They insisted upon an

indiscriminate condemnation 6f Russia and did not distinguish
between the Russian people and their government.

Vesinier

mentioned that some delegates went so far as to demand that
11Russia should be driven back into Asia. 11
According to Vesinier, Marx did not participate in the
heated debates.

Since he vms

in public • • •

he

11

completely

inc~pable

of speaking

merely supported the well-defended

proposition with a gesture and his influence. 112 3

/ ..
VesJ.nier

maintained that Marx achieved hj.s goal because, instead of
logical reasoning, emotions prevailed in the debates on point 9.
Even the opponents were touched by the efforts of the Polish
exiles to keep the Polish question on the agenda, and they
hesitated to contradict the Poles.

They feared that they might

be considered as supporters of Russian despotism.

Vesinier

remarked that when De Pae1)e, in spite of his sympathy for the
oppressed Polish people, dared to condemn point 9, he practicalJy
asked the audience to forgive him and not to consider him as a
"Russian agent. 11

r

}17

!
'

Evidently Ves:inier was very attracted to De Paepe' s
argun10nts because ho shared the basic assumptj_on of the Belgian
delegate that Russia had already entered a period of progress.
Accordingly, he reported more extensively on De Paepe's speech.
De Pa_epe did not believe that the restoration of Poland would

guarantee liberty to the peasants.

The Polish nobles were still

too powerful, and they v1ere only interested in the territorial
restoration of Poland and in the preservation of their
privileges.

Therefore, the peasants could only expect their

final liberation from Russia v1hich had already improved their
lot.
Vesinier's report on his own speech reveals that he was
as embarrassed as De Paepe when he opposed the adoption of
point 9.

As did the Belgian delegate, Vesinier upheld the right

of the Polish people to liberty, but he opposed the restoration
of Poland because the people vmuld not prof:Lt from it.

A

restored Poland would become a reactionary state dominated by the
nobles.

Vesinier also defended the right. of the Russian people

to liberty.

It was unjust to treat the Russians as outcasts.

'11hey were neither responsible for the crimes co:nm1itted by their

despotic rulers, nor were they as backward as was generally
maintained.

The peasants and also the members of the Russian

intellieentsia, among them the exiles Herzen and Bakunin, hoped
for a socialist revolution.

According to V6sinier even the

r
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Russian government was not altogether unaware of the needs of
the modern age.

It had introduced peasant reforms and planned

to connect Europe with India, and China through the construction
of railroads.
11

Therefore, it would be a grave mistal-re to place

a gr.eat nation, a whole human race, under the ban of Europe."

Vesinier insinuated that Russia was not a threat to Europe
because its main interest lay in Asia where it played "a great
civilizing end emancipating role."
Vesinier insisted that the extremely one-sided antiRussian foreign policy of the International, as proposed in
point 9, was even less justified \7hen considering that
dictatorship, centralization, and militarism were not restricted

to the

~ussian

Empire.

The audience reacted violently when

Vesinier declared that Napoleon III was worse than Alexander II.
While the Russian Tsar had at least liberated 50,000,000 serfs,
Napoleon III had helped to destroy the Roman and Mexican
republics.

He had enslaved the French nation and conspired

v1ith Bismarck for the establishment of the supremacy of the great

mil:i.tary nations.

Vesini.er suggested that Marx should be more

immediately concerned with

11

tho Prussian ambition and the

Bismarckian influence" in Europe than with the "Muscovite"
danger.

He concluded that the formulation of a foreign policy

of the International was only justifj_able j.f it includGd

11

the

liberation of all the oppressed nationalities" because it was
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the primary task of the Internatj.onal to further the frate:cnizatio:n
and solidarity of all the people.
A few months after the London Conference V6sinier
attacked the introduction of point-9 in the preliminary program
of the International in the Belgian newspaper Echo de
on December 16 and 18, 1865.

Verv:le_:r~

He ascribed the adoption of point 9

to the "regrettable influence" of Marx,- the Parisians, and the
Poles.

Their one-sided view of the European situation resulted

in the condemnation of Russia at a moment when, through the
emancipation of the Russian and Polish serfs, this country had
proved to be more progressive than the Polish nobles and priests.
In the opinion of Vesinier the adoption of point 9
endangered the very foundations of the International.
mainta~lned

Vesinier

that many Poles wished to join the organization so

that they might use it to further their own nationalist aims:
rl1us, because of the mist.31te of the Central Committee, the

111

Association • • • has been turned from its real aim--the
liberation of la bar. 1124

Vesinj.er charged the Central Commit tee

with having degenerated into a ncommittee of nationalities under
tho influence of Bonapa.rtism. 11

The International could only be

sewed by the election of new delegates to the Geneva Congress

and the nomin<.::i.tion of a General Cotmcil which sould be composed

r
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of workers from each nation who alone would have a real interest
in the liberation of labor.
Vesinier's article appeared at a time when the
·controversy over point 9 continued in Paris.

The reaction of the

Paris office of the International was as negative as Vesinier•s.
~e ~!}E.r~s. 9....U1!~£§.,

When the Parisians published a brochure,

1866, the paragraph on Russia and Poland was omitted.

in

But when

the French historian and politician Henri Martj_n reported on the

.

London Conference in the Paris newspaper Le

Si~cle

-~-4---

on October 14,

1865, he gave a full statement of the program for the Geneva
Congress to be held in 1866 and defended point 9. 2 5 According

to Hartin the demand for the restoration of Poland on a soctaldemocratic basis had already been stated in the revolutionary
decrees of the Polish insurgents in 1863.

Point 9 was "the

reply of true socialism and social progress, in concordance with

I

i
i

justice and liberty, to the communist despotism of Muscovy.u 26
Martin's position vras cri ticizcd by the French Proudhoni.st.
August Vermorel in the Paris newspaper b,e. Presse on October 17,

1865.

Vermorel declared that the Poles had as much a right to

natj_onal self-determination as did all the other people under
~~~~jl!~~

~5The report vms reprinted in the London newspaper
~E2,.JI.2rls!P~~-~~~v.9ca~§., Novembor 18, 1865, quoted j_n b:r£1~
~01.~1£, 11, i;.2'1.
2 6Docuri.ents of the First International, I, 141 •
...--.-'<JC!:.
..
.....
~

,--~----~..- ~--
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foreign rule.

However, true socialism would not be furthered if

the International supported a war against Russie..

This would

only divert the workers from their immediate aim:

ttto accomplish

the task of economic emancipation which needs peace and liberty
as

an essential condition. 112 7
Marx, who closely followed the reaction to the London

Conference, referred to the Parj.s controversy in a letter to
Engels of November 20, 1865.

He was highly satisfied that the

l:Lberal and republican newspapers had reported on the London
Conference, and that point 9, in particular, had received their
This had helped to publicize the International and to

approval.

drow11 the opposition.

Marx did not hide his feeling of triumph ..

He commented in his letter to Engels:

Our Parisians are somewhat flabbergasted that the
greatest sensation is caused by the pa:,r.g.graph on
Russia and Poland which they rejected.2o
:Marx's satisfaction with the warm reception of point 9
by

the non-socialist commentators was certainly surprising.

It

suggests that Narx, who preferred to weaken his opponents by

ind:Lroct maneuvers, agitated for an active support of Polish
liberation in order to fight his strongest ideological opponents
in the International-... the Proudhonists who were mainly French.

Tho Proudhonists could be expected to disagree with a belligerant
--~r..,--:~

.

f.1rc4_i:ve,s. ~aj7.:,2~2.:n.£, I I, lt28 o

28

~, III/3, 280.
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policy of the International, and since the Polish question had
not yet lost its appeal, this might lead to their isolation.
The assumption that Marx aimed at the isolation of the
Proudhonists is born out by the later development.

The London

Conference had accentuated his hostilj.ty towards the Proudhon:ists.
Marx became convinced that they suffered from a superiority
complex believing themselves to be the real representatives of
the International, but actually they were traitors.

In a letter

to Engels of January 5, 1866 Marx remarked that a:t the Conference
the Polish question was

11

the true nerve of the polemic."

Those

who attacked point 9 were imbued with the "Muscovitism of Proudhon
and Herzen."

:Marx concluded that the Russians found in the

"Proudhonized part of Jeune France their newest allies. 112 9 He

branded his ideological opponents as supporters of Russian
imperialism.

Russophobia was to be the badge of the true member

of the International.
Marx had conceived a particular dislike for Vesinier
whom he regarded as a leading member of the "Proudhonist gang"
which had infiltrated the Belgian and London French sections of
the International.,

Marx was enraged that Vesinier had interpreted

the defense of Polish restoration under point 9 a.s a defense of
the nationality principle.

., __ . '""'2'9I"bid:-:-

p. 302.

He had.as little interest as Vesinier

r
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in turning the International into a defender of the nationality
In a letter to Engels of Jauuary 15, 1866 Marx called

principle.
Vesinier a

11

jackass. 11

The Frenchman had not understood that "our

declaration for Poland" was not influenced by the Bonapartist
nationality principle or Polish ascendancy in the International
but by the opposition to Russia. 30
A month later

¥~rx

composed an official answer to

Vesinier's·article for the Central Committee which appeared in
L'Echo de Verviers on February 20, 1866 and was .signed by Georg
Jung.

Vesinier was ridiculed for having assumed that the

introduction of the Russo-Polish question, that is, a political
question, in the provisional program of the International was
an innovation due to certain "regrettable influences"--meaning
the Pole's and Bonapartism.

Marx declared that the Inaugural

Address was certainly above suspicion of having resulted from a
conspiracy.

However, the

~~had

also voiced the demand for

the destruction of the "Muscovite influence in Europe."
«

merely repeated this demand.

Point 9
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As the Geneva Congress drew nearer, Marx apparently
became quite concerned with the opposition to point 9.
request Engels wrote a series of articles entitled,

11

At his

VJhat have

3brb·d
--2:....·' p.
3l Documents of the First Internationa.l, I, 325.
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the \'Jorkine Classes to do vri th Poland, 11 which were published in
the English newspaper

1866.

~lli.2J..lwea\~.h

on March 24, 31 and May 5,

In these articles Engels defended the introduction of

point 9 in the program of the International against the opposition
of the Proudhonists.

He declared that since the forties the

working classes had pursued a pro-Polish policy which aimed at
"intcrvent:Lon [and] a war against Russia as long as Russia
meddles with Poland. 11 32 According to Engels the International
continued the traditional pro-Polish and anti-Russian policy of
the

11

progressi ve and thin1dng 11 workers.
The Proudbonists who objected to point 9 were branded

as Russophiles who opposed the wishes of the majority in the

International.

According to Engels they pursued the same

reactionary policy as the Tories in England who hailed Russia
as the most progressive nation on earth which should not be
excluded from civilized Europe.
As Marx

had done in his manuscrtpts of 1863 and 186L1.,

Engels minimized the German responsibility for the partition
of

Pol~md.

The main culprit v1as Russi.a, while Prussia and

Austria, who were Russian vassals,. had been forced to comply
with the wishes of their Russian overlord to destroy Poland.
~.

'II

'

,.,.,

""'z--,..~·~~

_.1C!Rjasanoff,

11

Polenfrage," p. 212.
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Engels objected to the demands for a distinction between the
Russian government and the people which had been voiced by the
opponents of point 9.

As long as a class conscious industrial

proletariat did not exist in Russia, the Russian people were as
responsible as their government for the oppression of the Poles.
The case was different in Germany where the class fight had
started.

The German workers were not responsible for the anti-

Polish policy of Prussia.

One of their main aims was German

unification which could only be achieved through. Germany's liberation from Russian vassalage.

Therefore, the German workers had

a "greater interest" in Polish liberation than the workers of
other countries.
The essence of Engels's arguments was that the German
workers were the most nrdent promoters of an anti-Russian foreign
policy and;therefore, the foremost defenders of European liberty.
Should the German workers fight Russia to

prote~t

interests, they would also protect all of Europe.
European interests coincided.

their own
Gerllk.'Ul and

The important political role of a

revolutionary Germany in Europe was stressed even more when
Engels insinuated that there was no absolute reliance on Polish
hostility towards Russia.

The Poles might suddenly submit to

Russian rule hoping that this might bring about a partial
restoration of Poland "with the Russian Tsar as king."

Engels's
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line of argumentation imperceptibly led to a defense of German
leadership in the International and in Europe because the German
workers represented the true revolutionary spirit, not the
Frenchmen.
Engels was particularly anxious to refute the contention
of the opponents of point 9 that the support of Polish liberation
meant the adoption of the nationality principle by the
International.

As he had done in the past, he defended the

territorial integrity of the "historical nations" who originated
from the assimilation of different nationalities in a long
historical process.

He said that it would be absurd to destroy

the historical nations in order to liberate nationalities which
would be unable to remain independent.
were not a nationality.

The Poles, however,

They were a "large and well definedu

historical nation as were the French, Italians, Hungarians, or the
English.

They had the same vitality to lead an independent

national life.

This justified the Polish demand for the

restoration of Poland and the support of that demand by the
International.
Although Engels defended the creation of large political
units through the annexation of foreign nationalities, he did
not apply the same criterion to the Russian Empire.

According

to him Russia did not belong to the European historical nations
because it had been unable to integrate the conquered people.
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Therefore, the partition of Russia was justified.

Russia had

become the "retainer of an immense amount of stolen property
which would.have to be disgorged on the day of reckoning. 11 33
Th:Ls time Engels maintained that the nationality principle
was "a Russian invention concocted to destroy Poland."

The

Russians had used it to incite the Ukrainians and \Vhi te Ru.ssians
age.inst: the Polish government and to swallow most of Polando

The

Russian propaganda for a Pan-Slav union was merely "the
application of the nationality principle" to the Slavs under
German, Hungar:i.an, and Turkish rule.

The aim was the destructioi.l

of the Austrie.n Empire and the conquest of the Balkans and

Constantinople.

This proved, said Engels, that Russia would

never gtve up its rule over Poland without a fight.
When Engels defended tho restoration of Poland, he
adorJt:ed

the i:>osj_ tion of the Polish left-·wing democrats.

He

stressed the point that the restoration of Polan.d meant "the
restoration of a state composed of at least four different
nationalit:Lesn--the Poles, the non.,Slavic Lithuanians, the White

Russtans, speaking a language
between Polish and Russian but nee.rer the latter • • •
[and] the Little Ru.ssi.ans • • • whose language,
according to the best authorities, is now considered
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as being completely distinct from the Great Russian,
or commonly called, Russ:Lan languag0.34
No longer did Engels endorse the popular argument that the

nationalities of' the former ea.stern Polish provinces had been
Polonized, nor did he revert to hts opinion of the fifties that
they had been Russianized.

He admitted that the Poles as well

as the Russians had failed to assimilate the foreign nationalities ..

Yet, he :i.nsisted that the former eastern Polish territories
belonged to Poland by historical right because they were under
Polish rule long before a Russian Enpire existed.
Engels's defense of Polish claims ended with the
conclusion that Poland must be restored because j_t had :formerly
existed.

This was contrary to the basic convictions of Engels

shared by Marx.

In the past years Engels had repeatedly declared

that a nation had a right to dominate foreign people if it were
eithe:t' more :progressive or more revolutionary.

Apparently in the

m:Ld-sixties he did not believe that the Poles wore either a
revolutionary or a c:Lvilizj.ng force among the .Slavs.

He insisted

that the destruction.of the Polish Republic was due to its
backvmrdness.

Simultaneously, he made no attempt to prove that

a Polish revival was at hand although the Polish... Russian customs

union of 1856 had already effected economic changes in the
Polish
~t:w

Kj~ngdom.

Since Engels had often denied that backrmrd
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nations had a right to an independent national existence, the
logical conclusion would be that in his opinion the backward
Poles had forfeited this right.

Thus, Engels's agitation for

Polish restoration acquired a futile character.

However, it

helpe_d to fight ideological opponents in the International.
Besides, Engels's polemic against the nationality
principle gave him the opportunity to indirectly defend German
rule over the Slavs.

If non-Polish provinces were to be

restored to Poland on the basis of the historical rj.ght principle,
the Western Slavs, including the Poles in Poznania, were not
just:lfied in demanding their liberation from German rule.
The effort Engels had made to marshall support for
point 9 was not too successful as can be seen from the
proceed:Lngs of the first Congress of the International which was
h.cld half a year later in Geneva in September, 1866.
Engels v1ere not present.

Marx and

But Marx had composed a memorandum for

the Central Committee in which the reasons for the formulation
of point 9 were stated.

He insisted that as iong as Russia

remained the center of European reaction, the aristocracy as well
as the bourgeoisie v1ould always find protection from the
11.J.ropean labor movement o

The victory of the working class

depended upon the destruction of "the sinister Asiatic powert1
Ru.ssia.

through the restoration of Poland.

Marx said that it was

the special "duty" of the German workers to take the initiative

r
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in the liberation of Poland.

The destruction of the Holy

Alliance would further revolutionary progress in all of Europe.

As did Engels, Marx ascribed a leading role to the German workers
in the revolutionary scheme.35
Marx's arguments did not gain much support at the
Geneva Congress.

The French delegation became the center of

opposition to point 9 which read:
That it is imperatively necessary to annihilate the
influence of Russia in Europe by applying to Poland
the right of every' people to dispose of itself and to
re-establish that country upon its native deinocratic
basis.36
The French delegates wished that the following version be adopted:
That it is necessary to annihilate the Russian influence
in Europe in order to apply the right of the peoples to
dispose of themselves and to reconstruct Poland on a
democratic and social basis.37
In their memorandum the French delegates stated:
As defenders of liberty we declare that we are against
any kind of despotism, that we definitely condemn and
reject the organization and social tendencies of Russian
despotism, inevitably leading to a communism vn1ich kills
the mind, but that we as delegates to an economic
0

~~~~~~:~t~ c~~~e~~i~:v~h!np~~l~~c~~t~~~i~;~tlgnm~ep~~~d.38
During the debates on point 9 E.-Eo Fribourg, in the name of the
French delegation, made a motion that the Congress should not

[

l

35cr. Documents of the First International, I, 350.
361.1?1.£., p. 314.
3711?1:£., p. 350.
38Fribourg, £1?.!, _citu p. 59.
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vote on this question.

Fribourg said:

One should desire and also demand the emancipation of
the people in Russia and in Poland, and condemn the
traditional policy which incites one nation 8.gainst
the other.39

The Congress, hovrever, should limit itself to a declaration that
it abhors despotism under any form and in any country, but would
not interfere with the very complex questj_on of the
The rejectj.on of point

nationalities~

9 by the French delegation was suppox·ted

by the delegates from French Switzer·land.

Fran~ois

Dupleix

claimed that the Polish question only concerned the Germans and
should be omitted.L:.l

But the English delegates, particularly

Odger and Carter, supported the resolution on Poland, and so did

---~--~9~Yf~J:E.£,

II, 238.

L~O Johann Philipp Bocker, "Der Kongress der Internationalen
Arbeiterassoeiation in Gonf, 11 Der__Y,'2_.E.,bot.s:., Politische und sozialooko110E1:i.sche Zeitschrift ( GeneVaJ, November, 1866, No. 2; central
organ of the German-s1)eaking section of the Internationalt ed. by
Johann Philipp Becker (1866-67); (facsimile ed.; Berlin: Dietz
Verlag, GmbH, 1963), p. 165. Becker's report offers the most
co1nplete information on the Geneva Congress. It was published in
Do.;°f:Jorb~, September, October, November, and December, 1866,
NO. 9-::fZ, and January, February, e.nd March, 1867, No. 1-3. The
G01ieral Council released two very brief and incomplete reports
on the Geneva Congress nb.ic;h were published in the Courrier
In~~£rnat.i2.lli=11 (London), Larch 9, 16, 23, 30 and Apr:.rr-6713 1 20,
0', f8b'7 and :i.n The International Cour~Ler, (London) Harch 2U,
27
and April 3, 10,~1"'?~Zfi.';-~r8t1/:--~41Franqois Dupleix, member of the French s0ction in
Geneva, editor of the ~Ul?d_,,_de,- ;t~~s9.E1£~,t!:_m1 l!l~...9£.DEi~~lct d.§§.
Travai1101u:·s
(Geneva) and of B12·afite
('GonevaY:.....
....
u

~
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the Germans--Eccarius from the Central Committee and Johann Becker.
the delegate of the German section in Switzerland.
Although Becker was in fe.vor of point 9, he did not
share the radical Russophobia of Marx and Engels.
between the Russian government and the people.

He distinguifhe

He claimed that

point 9 did not imply a declaration of war against the Russia.ti.
people.

The International, he said, aimed at the destruction

of all despotic governments and at the emancipation of all the
oppressed people.

In Becker's opinion the liberation of the

Poles would accelerate that of the Russian people.

Until then

Russia continued to be a real threat to European culture and
progress because of its backward poli.tical, economic, and social
structure and its aggressiveness.

The annexation of the Polish

provinces had augmented the military power of Russia because
these territories were mo1'"'e densely populated and. more developed
and provided the Russian army with a military elite.

According to the unofficial report by Card, a delegate

of the French section in Geneva, Becker admitted that the Polish
question might be co.lled a German question because the Germans
had an immediate interest in the liberation of Poland.4 2 However,
Becker added that the Polish question did not only concern

-----~-f. ~;tract from the Report

by

Congress," in &-.~ld:..y_e.s2ako!l~f?,., II, 237.

Card on the Geneva
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Germany but all of Europe.

The restoration of Poland would

destroy the "aggressive potent:Lality" of Russia and the danger
of the creation of a Slavic world empire under Russian rule.
It would accelerate the "internal evolution" in Russia e.nd

contribute to the emancipation of the people from the oppressive
TsaT·ist rule.

Becker insisted that the abolition of standing

armies, on which the delegates to the Geneva Congress had voted,
would not be possible without the restoration of Poland as a
barrier e.gainst the Russian Empire.
was

11

Therefore, Polish liberation

the concern of the norkers and of all mank:Lnd. 11 !~3
In spite of such arguments the majority of the delegates

favored the French viewi1oint.

¥!hen unanimity could not be

achieved, Becker proposed to add the following declaration to the
minutes:
Since it is the task of the International \'forking
Men• s Association to em<J.ncipate the working gclasses
of all the countries and to fight any kind of
despotism in order to realize the equality of all
men and nations, the elimj_nation of the imJ)erialist
influence of Russia and the restoration of a social
democratic Poland are an j_ntegral part of its
aspirations. Li-4
0

According to Beck0r's report this declaration vras
supported by the Gorman delegates, including those of German

. ·-43Cf. ·,~tract from the Report by Johan.n Ph. Becker
on the Geneva Congress, 11 in !E.2111-.Y~,~ .~~~E_£, II, 238-39.
4Li-_!r~fE-~UD:i~, II, 239.
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Switzerland, and by the delegates from the Jura region, and it
v1as unanimously adopted together with the motion of the French
delegation.

But Becker did not mention that the opposing parties

agreed to further amendments which bridged the difference and
made some kind of general consent possible.

The French

amendment to the original motion read:
The Congress is convinced that through the development
and the consolidation of the International Working
Men's Association all despotism will disappear, and the
restoration of a democratic Poland will be realized.45
The Becker arnendment was similar to that of the French.
The Congress is convinced that through the strengthening
and expansion of the International Working Men's
Associat:Lon, the destruction of the despotic influence
of Russia in Europe and the restorat:j,.on of a social
democratic Poland will be realized. L~b
The

two c:i.rnondments were simply added to the minutes of

the meeting after it had been decided that no vote would be taken
on th:Ls political question/i-7

Both represented a compromise.

They approved of the restoration of Poland but omitted the
aggressive tone of the original point 9 as proposed by Marx.

The

.

---'Lj.'~:--

Fribourg, 9J2G_ cit.• , p. 67.
46Ar cn1veE?__:._~9y.p.];.E-.~'
, ·
I I , 387 •
Ba
. k-

•

47The amendments \Vere not published in the official
re1)orts on the resolutions of the Geneva and Brussels Congress.
In the report on the Geneva Congress which appeared in lit_..C..2. .ll.rFie£
International the French amendment vms attributed to Becker,
1'1llfi.e~n:rsaii1endment vras al toeether omitted. Cf. 11 E.xtract from
the Report on the Geneva Congress," published in Le Courrier
liliEP.§~:ip)}~l, in !-r_c]1i_yre.?•..l?Q-15£_11.11.Jd!£, II, 237.
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def eat of Russian despotism and the liberation of the Poles were
not expected from a war against Russia.

Changes in Eastern

Europe would be the result of the victorious advance of the
International Working Men's

Associ~tion,

that is, of general

internal changes in the European countries.

The formulation of

the amendments funde1nentally agreed with the basic concepts of
Proudhon who was convinced that the liberation of the people
under foreign rule would be accomplished through an evolutionary
process.
After the Geneva Congress the French delegates published
a memorandum in Brussels entitled:
,S_es D§lf,q,Y_§s J."'.l:illl£~-(18,§..Qo

Q.£g_gr~de

Geneve.

Memo ire

They expressed their sympathy

for the independence of Poland and their hope for the liberation
of the peasants and workers after the complete overthrow of the
old political and socio-economic order o

Hov;ever, they criticized

the English and German delegates for their attempt to combine
the support of the Poles with a condemnation of all things
I?ussian..

If this policy of identifying the government and the

people were a})pJ.ied to the other European countr:tes, then the
Germans, in particular, would certainly not fare weli.4 8
The Brussels section of the International, led by
De Paepe, supported the French pos1.tion in a report on the
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Geneva

Congress~

It was declared that the French delegates

were right to reject the traditional policy of inciting one nation
against the other.

Besides, the restoration of Poland would not

guarantee the liberation of the peasants.

It would only mean

the restoration of the aristocracy and of Catholicism.49
Marx did not respond to the French and Belgian
statements.

He had lost the battle fo1.; an aggressive anti-

Russian foreign policy of the International.

The controversy over

this question had proved that the majority of the socialists did
not share his Russophobia.,

As

long

a.s

the International remained

in ex:istence, Fiarx did not try to reopen the question of the

restoration of Poland.

Hor1ever, when Bak.unin entered the

International in 1868, Marx was alarmed.
Brikunin

as

He

still considered

a Russian nationalist and a Pan-Slav, and he feared

that Ba..lrunin rn:lght impose his ideas on tho International.

In

order to prevent such a development, Marx fought him indirectly as
he had done in the past.

This only strengthened &Jnmin' s

opposition to tho Slavic policies of Yiarx and Engels.

In the last

two years of the International he analyzed Marxrs views on the
state and foreit;n policies in order to reveal the inherent dangers
of Marx's views regarding a peaceful coexistenc0 of the European
people.
u-n-4•9Cf ~- ·~,Ekt"ract from the Report on the Geneva Congress' II
published in ~L~E2~'b,.£!:'!:pe~9:_g_,J?e~aj.,~, the orgon of t~e Belgian
socialist Cesar de Paape, in ~rclflvos B~s_e_lJ]-l=b,p.£.., II~ 238.
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-Bakunin's .Fight- against
· . Marx
After the Polish insurrection of 1863 Bakunin's views
on the revolutionary reorganization of Europe had undergone a
definite change.

This was due to his observations at the time

of the insurrection.

Bakunin was appalled that the Polish

insurgents merely wished to replace one oppressive centralized
state with another, and that the progressive Russians were
willing to ·put up with their despotic government in order to
preserve the territorial integrity of the Russian Empire.

Bakunin

became convinced that the centralized state was the greatest
obstacle to the liberation of the people in Europe, and that the
destruction of that state was necessary for a revolutionary
reorganization of Europe.
In

186~-,

in the same year when the International was

founded, Bakunin tried to organize the International Brotherhood,
or International Alliance of Socialist Revolutionaries, in Italy.
In the revolutionary program which Bakunin composed for the
Brotherhood he omitted any reference to his earlier revolutionary
postulates--the creation of a Slavic union under Great Russian
leadership and the revolutionary mission Of the Slavs in Europe.
Now he emphasized the need for
the complete destruction of all enforced
unions • • • and the radical dissolution of the·
centralized paternalistic and authoritarian
state.50
0 ..
5 Archives Bakounine, II, 29.

338
A nation was to be formed through the voluntary federation of
individuals, communes, and provinces.
units were to enjoy autonomy.

All the administrative

In order to prevent anarchy, the

.national government should have
the right to demand that the constitution and
particular legislation of a province which desired
to belong to the federation and to enjoy national
protection, ought to conform to the national
constitution and legislation on essential points.51
At the first Congres.s of the League of Peace and Liberty,
held in Geneva from September 9-12, 1867, Bakunin had the
opportunity to propagandize the ideas which he had elaborated
since 1864.

The Congress was organized by prominent European free

masons, am?ng them Bakunin who was a member of the Central
Committee of the League.

The aim of the Congress was to discuss

the creation of the United States of Europe.
On September 10, 1867 Bakunin delivered a speech in which
he demanded the destruction of the centralized European states,
including the Russian Empire, and the unification of Europe.

In

his opinion Europe could only be saved through federalism and
socialism.

The federal principle, not the nationality principle,

would guarantee each nationality the right to "self-determination."
Several weeks later, on October 26, 1867, Bakunin
submitted his brochure,

F~deralisme,

so,cialis.me .et anti-

theologisme, which summarized his convictions, to the Central
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Committee of the Leaguo.

He declared that the centralized

:European states originated from conquests and became permanently
chained to their expansionist drive, resulting in militarism
and despotism.

The reorganization of Europe depended upon the

destruction of the centralized states.

It should be based on

the "interests, needs, and natural inclinations of the people"
and on "a voluntary federation" of individuals and administrative
units--communes, provinces, and nations..

All the demands for

natural, political, strategical, or commercial borders and,
likewise, the historical-right prj_nciple should be abandoned.
No nationality should be forced to remain a member of a state,
even if it had voluntarily joined that state.

Bakunin stated:

"The right to a voluntary reunion as well as to a voluntary
secession is the first and most important of all the political
rights.u5 2
Although Bakunin defended the "natural right" of each
nationality to self-determination, he condemned the nationality
principle because it was used by Poles, Italians, and Hungarians
to disguise their real aim--the creation of a strong centralized
stateo

According to-Bakunin any increase in the number of

centralized states in Europe would heighten the threat of war.
Consequently, j_t was wrong to assume that the restoration of
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Poland would guara11tee peace in Europe.

Only the destruction

of all the despotic states, including France and Prussia, would
establish 1)eace in Europe.
Bakunin's formulation of a European policy for the
League was influenced by the continuation of the one-sided anti_Russian agitation in Western Europe.

He vras familiar with Marx's

anti-Russian propaganda in the International.

The Geneva

Congress of the League was attended by members of the
International, and at tho opening session the Inaugural

Addres~§.,

in which Marx had expressed his hostility towards Russia, was

read,,
Moreover, on the second day of the Congress (September

·1

o,

1867), Borkhci:m, a friend of Marx, delivered part of an antiRussian speech whj_ch he had prepared for this occasion.53

He

claimed that the Russian masses were kept "in a state of healfbestiality" for the sole purpose of subjugating all of Europe.
The danger of Russian ae;gression had been increased through the
liberatton of the serfs (1861) which facilitated the recruitment
--53Som;-;eeks before the Geneva Congress of the League,
on August 27, 1867, Borkheim had sent a letter to :V.tarx with
:Lnformation on his intended anti-Russi.an speech. He said that he
would present the Russian question as "the main question in
Europe" and would urge the Luropeans to conclude an alliance for
the prevention of an invas:Lon of }:iv.rope by the backward .Russians.
He asked Marx and Engels for their comments on his intended
speech. There is no trace of an ansv1er to his request.. Cf.
At><:J1i:;:g,§_£1r::i.£?::-~L';~, Internatj_onaal Institut voor Socia.le
Geschicder..is""Tl\mste1--clam), quoted in ~ive~~EHb"0:=bE..£, II, 249-51.
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of soldiers.

Only the restoration of Poland would guarantee

peace in Europe because it would allow for the unification of
Germany.
As long as Poland is not restored, Prussia \7ill
never become German, and as long as Prussia is not
German, war between Germany and France will be a
normal Qccurrence • • • constantly fomented by
Russia.'4
In consideration of the Russian danger, Borkheim held
that it ·was a mere mockery that

11

certain Russian publicists 11 - -

meaning Bakunin and Herzen--had tried to spread pro-Russian
propaganda in Western Europe.

According to these Russians

11

the

beaut:i.ful young and j_nnocent Russia" was the classic country of
socialist institutions; the realization of "the Russo-Slavic
paradise" had only been impeded by German immigrants and the
Tartars.

But, said Borkheim, only a few people in Western

Europe, among them the late Proudhon, expected from Russia "the
salvatj.on of the world."

Borkheim urged the European nations to unite against
Russia.

They should collaborate with the North Americans in

order to stop Russj_an expansionism and "to force the Russians
to be conceriwd with- themselves and to \'!Ork honestly • • • This

would be a blessing for Russia. 11 55

Borkheim concluded that the

principle question in Europe was "the Russian question."

---"'511-~t:~~~_,£, II, 2lt7.
55.f...biSlo, Po 2li.8.

342
Bakunin was quite annoyed by Borkheim 1 s speech.
regarded Borkheim as a

11

He

strange man, a kind of maniac detesting

all of Russia and the Russians."

He assumed that Borkheim 1 s

speech, if not written by Marx, had certainly been inspired
by him.
Bakunin's friend Karl Vogt, vtl1om Marx detested,
insinuated in the Swiss newspaper peue·Zuericher Zeitung late in
September,. 1867 that Marx was the anonymous author of Borkheim's
speech.

Marx was furious about this identification.

He disliked

the speech and was upset that Borkheim wished to publish it in
several languages.

In a letter to Engels of October 4, 1867

Marx remarl';:ed that the publication of the speech would reveal
how stupid it was.
With the exception of some catchwords which I have
breathed into him, it [Borkheim's speech] is nothing
but an insiEid babbling and more often a mere
stupiclity.5
It is difficult to understand why Marx reacted so
violently against Borkheim's speech.

He

could hardly have

objected. to Borkheim' s violent anti-Russian declarations.
Apparently it was Borkheim' s propagation of an un-Mci.rxian idea
that peace in Europe could be achieved merely through the
collaboration of the Western nations which irritated Marx.

In

any case, Marx refrained from public statements against .Borkheim

.

. 55MEGA
_, I II/3. 428 •
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because Borkheim was "his personal friend" and

11

a valuable man"

in the party.
Marx did not object when in F'ebruary, 1868 Borkheim
continued his polemic against the Russian political emigrants
in Western

EuropeM~meaning

radical German newspaper

mainly Herzen and Ba.kunin--in the

Qe~10fr.£§ltJ.-.EEJ?-~e.§>_1:'..Q2henblatt.

Borkheim

decle.red that if the Russian emigrants were truly democrats
and socialists and enemies of the Russian government, they should
join the Western European radicals and fight against Russian
expansionism.

They should condemn the subjugation of Poland,

Finland, a.nd the Baltic provinces and the Russian aim to
annex Turkey .. 57
It was not u..11til the second Congress of the League of

Peace and Liberty, held in Bern from September 22-26, 1868, that
Bakunin replied to Borkheim's insinuation that the Russian exiles
were not true enemies of the oppressive Russian government.

The

occasion was the speech which the Pole Valerien Mroczkowski delivered at the fourth session of the Congress (September 25,

1868). 58 When Mroczkowski

a.gitated for the liberation of the Poles'

from Tsarist rule, he declared:
-97"Russische ;pol:l.tische Fluechtlj_nge in Westeuropa,"

Del]l(2~~;.~1e s \:[Q9_hen b~,_ _Q.:iz.,e;.2;!l....S,\,e;:.__,§21:l t,_§.£ll~JLY2.l~t e i,

February 1 , ~1 o6b,q_uofed in £}.r~hj.J.:.G_~1::\~kO~l,~}.ii;E;--J:T, 3~

58Valerien M:coczkowsJd_ vms a Polish soc:i..al democrat.
was a member of the Central Conunittee of the League and of
Balnmin 1 s organization. the International Brotherhood or
International Alliance· of Soc1a1ist Revolut-i.onaries.
<

He

We desire neither the restoration of the old state
nor the restoration of the historical right of Poland,
. but we wish to assert our national right • • • to be
inde11enden t. 79
l"rroczkowski did not wish to discus:;; the future borders of a
"people's Poland."

He merely indicated that they would depend

upon the outcome of a war against Russia.

However, since he

insisted that the Poles would respect Hthe rights" of the
nationalities who had once been under Polish r.ule, he certainly
assumed that these nationalities would become members of a
restored Poland ..
Bakunin, who was dissatisfied with M.roczkowski 1 s speech,
improvised an answer which developed into an attack against the
territorial claims of the Poles and their German supporters, among
them Borkheim and M.arx. 60 According to Bakunin the problem of the

"-591-froczk~~ski' s speech was printed in Bulletin
Stenograµhiaue du IIG Congres de la Paj_x et de IaL:I'5erte e
S,ten:of?:fi~~~~:su:r~r~}~?Z11~a:i~;r..1e-~~l!P·d
·
1.§:rrtG~~~..2?26l:fJS£.~,§_~13ern: . f8b3), PI?· ~1T-2T ::>, quoted in
LozynskyJ, E21El'SYJ...1-_~rp..s~~.J-E..~1P..;t;l_L1.!.£h., p. 113.
60Bakunin' s speech was printed in Bulletin Steno~,aphi_q~
d.Ll~"~po~~~_J..,~J: :pa~~~t~-J~~;.:t{!.-=~~~-~riEisc es
l3ulletin des zwe:Lte11"1~riE")dens-und Ereitskongresses <..~68),
p137~T4-2~,5,and"J.n15:is~s.-.Plg~~g};~f ~~~~. J~~aix et de
.Le. Liberte a Berne 11$1;'8 par hl"Io Hroczkovrski et Bakoun1ne
"'{cr~r~riiI'i:fr;ltr;--rffb*9J.--1~1~o·czEo\vs'.K:rrssp0ecli \•ias
reprinted in [olC2k~, December 1, 1868. In that same issue
Bakunin's speeCh was also referred too It vms deplored that only
fragments of this "magnifj_cient" speech could be reprodu.ced.
However, it may be doubted that Herzen would have been interested
:Ln printing the complete speech of Bakunin which agttated for the
destruction of the territorial integrity of the Russian Empire.
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reorganization of Eastern and Central Eastern 11irope could only
be solved if the principle of centralization, which prevented
the liberation of the people, was rejected by Russj.ans, Poles,
and Germans alike.

Thereby, he implicitly rejected the exclusive

condemnation of Russia.

Simultaneously, he repeated his demand

for the destruction of the Russian Empire.

He

insisted that l;lis

agitation against the preservation of the territorial integrity
of the Russian Empire should have convinced the German socialists
of his opposition to the subjugation of the people by the
centralized Russian government.6 1
Bo.kunin reiterated the argument which he had used in his
manifestoes of 1862 that the Russian Empire was a multi-national
state under the rule of Great Russia which tried to enforce unity.
He pointed out that recently the Russian government had initiated
a campaign for the systematic suppression of the Ukrainian
language, a policy which vras simultaneounly applied to the Polish
language.

'11his revealed the determination of the Tsarist

governnlGnt to bring about the com1)letion of the centralized state
and should be a warning to all the Pan-Slavs outside the Russian
Empire6
Bakunin insisted that the problem of the liberty of the
nationalities would not be solved by the restoration of P,oland.
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He pointed out that the Polish Republic had also not granted
autonomy to the nationalities.

Particularly the Ukro.:L:nians he?.d

suffered as much under the oppressive rule of the Poles as under
.that of the Great Russians.

They wished to be united and free

from Great Russian and Polish rule.

As to the Baltic provinces, Bakunin admitted that they
were presently ovmed by Russia nby the right of conquest, that
is, by a flagrant injustice.n

However, neither the Poles nor

the Germans who had previously owned these provinces had a right
to them.

Bakunin attacked the German socj_alists because they

did not condemn the oppression of the Lithuanian peasants by the
German nobility, the bourgeoisie, and the Lutheran clergy
although the German' minority supported the Tsar's oppressive
polj.cies.
Bakunin had arrayed his arguments in order to prove
that the solution of the Polish question vwuld be quite simple
if only the Ukrainians, White Russians, and Lithuanians--formerly

ruled by Poland and now by Russia--were granted the right to
national self-determination.

Bakunin argued that after their

liberation it would be
most probable and most desirable that Little Russia
[Eastern Ukraine] should first form a national federation with them [the Galician Ukrainians and White
Russiansl which was independe:nt of Great Hussia and
Pola:na..62
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The Lithuanians might like to join the union.

It was not

improbable that at a later date this new federal state might
enter into a voluntary union with either Poland or Great Russia
provided that the equality of the member states were guaranteed.
In conclusion, Bakunin was anxious to convince the
assembly (1) that the restoration of the Polish state, even
under a republican democratic government, was not desired by the
Ukrainians., White Russians, and Lithuanians who had experienced
Polish rule; and, (2) 'that Russian power politics would come to
an end if the oppressed nationalities were granted the right to
national self-determination and to the creation of independent
states.

~ae

question is whether the reorganization of F.a.stern .

Europe, as envisioned by Bakunin,would really have made an end to
the Great Russian hegemony.
Evidently, Bakunin expected that the new buffer state
between Poland and Great Russia would lean towards a union with
Great Russia.

He emphasized that there would be no obstacle to

a union with the thirty-five million Great Russians once
centralization in Great Russia was destroyed.

Consequently, a

weak Poland would be faced with a formidable union in which the
leadership of Great Russia, based on its larger population and
the Asiatic dependencies, would be safeguarded.

The· Poles would

still be burdened with the question of national security.
seems to indicate that Bakunin's plan for the. temporary

This
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creation of a buffer state was devised to isolate the Poles.
Apparently he still consj_dered Polish aspirations, v1hich were
supported by the progressive Western Europeans, as the greatest
danger to the Great Russians.
Bakunin was especially concerned with the agitation of
the German socialists for the restoration of Poland.

He warned

the Poles that the German socialists had no real interest in
Polish liberty.

The German socialists, who condemned the

oppression of the Poles by Russia, did not oppose German rule
over the Poles.

They did not agitate for the partition of the

Prussian state although its expansionist aspirations endangered
the Ruropean peace as much as Russia.

This proved, said Bakunin,

tha.t the German socialists were not enemies of the centralized
state wh:Lch stood for "violence, oppression, exploitation,
injustice. 11 63

and

He implied that their policies wore not different

from those of Tsarist Russia.
Bakunin repeci.ted his demand that the centralized state
should be abolished and that Europe should be reorganized on the
basis of a voluntary federation of individuals, adLlinistrative
units, and nationalities.
liberty to the Eu.ropeans.64

Only this would guarantee peace and

r
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When the members of the IJeague did not support BaY.:unin' s
extremist federalism, he withdrew from the organization in
September, 1868, two months after he had become a member of the
International.

Meanwhile, he had organized a workers' association,

the International Social Democre.tic Alliance.

In mid-September

the Central Office of the Alliance petitioned the General Council
of the International for admission as a separate branch.

When

this petition was rejected, the Central Office dissolved the
All~Lance

in February, 1869, and its sections were then admitted

into the International.

Bakunin joined the Committee of the

Geneva section of the International of wh:Lch Philip Becker was
a leading member.
Balrnnin's entrance into the International deepened the
old hostility between him and Marx.

Ultimately this contributed

to the dissolution of the First International.

A brief encounter

in London in November, 1864 between the tr!O men, which Ma.rx had
solicited, had not improved their relations.

While Bakunin

became increasingly concerned with Fia.rx' s anti-Russia.."1 agitation
in the International, Ma.i"'x, on the other hand, could not have been
expected to v1elcome Bakunin's concept of absolute decentralization
nor his insinuat:Lon that the German socialists were less
revolutionary than the Slavs.
From the beginning, when Bakunin entered the Internation'L\
Marx and Engels regarded him as a dangerous

opponent.:~-~i.:~~jno

L,. . """'--~~-=-=-=-.,,,,,,=~-...,_.,..,,,,,__
""""'_....
___ .........._____
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must be eliminated.

They suspected Bakunin of plotting to

overthrow the constitution of the International with Becker's
help and wishing to become
movement. 116 5

11

the dictator of the working-class

In his letter to Marx of July 30, 1869 Engels

suggested to undo the influence of the "fat Bakunin" by asking
the question:

"Can a Pan-Slav be a member of the International

Workingmen's Association? 11

Engels added:

"He should not think

that he can play the role of the cosmopolitan communist with the
workers and the fanatically nationalist Pan-Slav with the
Russians. 1166
Several weeks later, at the fourth Congress of the
International, held from September 5-6, 1869 in Basel, Wilhelm
Liebknecht, a friend of Marx, spread the old slander that
Bakunin was an agent of the Russian government. 67

After the

Basel Congress Borkheim continued the defamation of Bakunin, and
Moses Hess, another acquaintance of Marx, published an article
against Bakunin in the Paris newspaper B§~ on October 2, 1869.
b3cf:l:ra.rx 1 s letter to Engels, July 27 1 1869 1 and Engels's
letter to Marx, July 30, 1869, in~' III74, ~13, 215.
·
66

~, III/4, 215.

67Wilhelm Liebknecht, 1826-1900 German socialist. From
1849-61 he lived in London, v1here he collaborated with Marx.
After his return to Germany he became a member of Ferdinand
Lassalle 1 s Arbeiterverei]l• When Lassalle had died, Liebknecht
became the C1ii0:fCOl"'Iai)Orator of Marx and helped to spread the
influence of the International in Germany.
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Bakunin was convinced that Marx was responsible for the
agitation against him.

Yet, when he wrote a lengthy defense

for B,eveil,he abstained from attacking Narx and merely denounced
·"the German Jews 11 Borkheim and Hess.

Herzen, who disliked the

reference to "the German Jews, 11 prevented Bakunin from publishing
his article and wrote a moderate statement for Reveil.
Marx did not participate in the controversy.

In the

meantime, a new situation developed in Geneva which offered
an opportunity to weaken Bakunin's position in the International.
Late in the summer of 1869 Bakunin, together with his friend
Nikolaj Ivanovich
Narodnoe

D.EJ.£,

Joukovsk~,

in Geneva.

September 1, 1869.

had founded a Russian newspaper,

They edited only the first issue of

Bakunin soon left Geneva, and the following

issues were edited by two Russian exiles N. Utin and A. Trusov.
Utin, an ambitious young man, did not shrink from intrigues
against Bakunin in order to become the leader of a Russian
section of the International which had originally been &.kunin's
aim, nor did Utin hesitate to utilize a part of the program
Bakunin had earlier composed when he planned to organize a
Russian section.

The passage concerningfue Slavic question was

copied almost word for word from Bakunin's text. 68
68Cf. Zemfirij Ralli 11 lfichail Aleksandrovic Bakunin.
Iz moich vospominanij 11 ~'Recoliections'~A Minuvsie G~_s!;y (Past
Years [st. Petersburg] ), October, 191b, pp. 1)3~, quoted in
Archives Bakou~, II, 1+32.
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Utin repeated Bakunin's accusation that Pan-Slav:Lsm
:Lmpeded the progress of the international socialist propaganda
among the Slavic working classes of the Austrian and Turkish
Empires who were still inclined to look to the Russian Tsar for
their liberation.

He also re1)eat.ed B.:"1.]_1.:unin' s condemnation of

the "policy of conquest" and of the oppression of Poland by
the Tsarist government.

All the Slavs were invited to organize

local unions and to join the International.

Only this

organization guaranteed the complete social and political
liberation of the Slavs because it would grant absolute freedom
of association to each individual, nation, and nationality.
On l1arch 8, 1870 Utin appealed to Becker and on March 11,

1870 to Jung, the corresponding secretary for Switzerland, to
support his petition for the admission of a Russian section into
the International.

On March 12, 1870 Utin also addressed an appeal

to :Marx in which he st;;i.tod that he was an opponent of Bakunin and
intended to fight him.
Twelve days later, on IvJ.arch 24, N.arx; in the name of the
General Council, info:r.med the Russian sectj_on in Geneva that it
had been admitted in:to the International, and that he was willing
to represent it in the General Council..

In reference to the

program of the Russian section which denounced the Russian
11

imperial yoke" as an obstacle to the political and social

liberation of Poles and Russians, Marx stated:
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You might have added that the brutal seizure of Poland
by Russia resulted in the formation of military regimes
- in Europe, including Germany • • • Therefore, the
Russian socialists who w:Lsh to break the chains of
Poland have assigned themselves an immense task: to
abolish militarism which is absolutely necessary as
a prerequisite for the general liberation of the
European proletariat.b9
It was paradoxical that Marx dj.d not object to the
propaganda for an extremist federalism in the Russian program
which Utin had adopted from Bakunino

Apparently Marx ignored

this propaganda because it came from Utin, as yet an insignificant
yolmg man who might become a tool in the fight against Bakunin.
In his official letter Marx did not abstain from indirectly
attacking Bakunin.
11

He admitted that Russj.a had begun to

participate in the socialj.st movement of the nineteenth century o ' 1

He mentioned the socialist Nikolai Chernyshevsky as one of the
foremost revolutionary Russians, and he e.dded that the socialists
in Russ:ta had helped to unmask ''the Russian optimism propagated
by the so-called revolutionaries on the contj_nent."
Evidently :Marx felt quite uneasy about_his collaboration
with the Russian section.

In a letter to Engels of March 24,

1870 he said tho.t he found hj_mself in an

···----c;"9~;;-~njJ,1_e, I~, 259~ Marx's letter to the
Russian section 111 Geneva was printed i11 ~rOdJ?._o~J?.ol_o (Geneva),
April 15, 18700 · He also wrote a confidentiaI'"'10tter fo the
Russian section which has not boen rediscovered. Cf. Archives

§..1Js..q~n.£, II, Lr32.

--
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odd position • • • as the representative of young
Russia. Man never knows which paths he may cross
and to which strange fellowship he must subject
· himself. 70
Marx informed Engels that in his letter to the Russian section
he had strongly advised the Russians "to work for Poland, that is,
to rid Europe of the Russian neighborhood, 11 and that he had
refrained from any particular reference to Bakunin.
Yet, in his ill-famed Confidential Communication of
March 28, 1870, which .Marx addressed to the Central Committee
of the German Social Democratic Working Men's Party in
Braunsch\~eig

himself .7 1

(Germany), he did not impose the same restraint upon
In this document Bakunin was portrayed as a

conspirator against the General Council, as a backward
and as a man who lacked personal integrity.
collaborating with a pseudo-socialist

11

Muscovite,'

He was accused of

Pan~·Slav

in order to receive their financial support.

party in Russia
Marx advised the

German socialists to shun Bakunin and to collaborate with the
11

honest 11 members of the Russian section of the International

whose main polj_tical aim \Vas "the fight against Pan-Slavism,"
and who would soon unmask Bakunin's intrigues.

7D~,

III/4., 296.

71The German-Austrian socialist

Kat'l Kautsky J,?Ublished
this document for the first time in Die Neue Zeit, XX {1902),

1+72-80.
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Philipp Becker, the leader of the German section in
Geneva, welcomed the admission of the Russian section into the
International as the most significant event in the fight against
the despotic Russian Empire and its influence in Europe.

In a

letter of April 10, 1870 to the Russian section, Becker expressed
the hope that the section would help to destroy the Pan-Slav
propaganda, which the Tsarist government used to realize its
expansionist goals, and to bring about the fraternal alliance
between the Slavic and Western

Europe~m

workers.

In case of a

Western European revolution the Russian section would have the
task to organize an insurrection in the Russian Empire in order
to prevent any counter-revolutionary moves of the Tsarist
govex·nment. 72
When Bak.unin J::..new about the admission of the Russian
section into the Internatj.onal, he wrote to his friend Joukovski
that Utin had acted

11

af'ter the manner of Harx. 11

Yet, Bakunin

also welcomed the adm:Lssion as an important evente

The presence

of the Russians in the International vrould help to weaken the
reactionary forces in Western Europe which supported Russian
despotism ..

Bakunin-informed Joukovski that he agreed with the

basic convictions of Marx that (1) reaction in Germany could not
be destroyed un.less Russian despotism was also destroyed; and,
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(2) Pan-Slavism was nothing but a "latent despotism" propagated
by Russia with the intention to subject the Vlestern and Balkan
Slavs to Russian rule:
It must be acknowledged that our Slavic brothers promote
the Tsarist propaganda by their exclusive nationalism,
j_ust as the Prussians assist it in Silesia and our Poles
in Little-Russian Galicia.73
Bakunin added that the Russian socialists ought to fight this
evil.
Although he approved of Marx's _opinion concerning Russian
Pan-Slavism, he remained dissatisfied that Marx did not apply the
same severe critique to Germany or Pan-Germanism.
1870, when

P.§lrOd;tJ:£~

On April 15,

,Delo published the official letters of Marx

and Becker addressed to the Russian section, the newspaper also
printed a critique by Bakunin of Marx's views on Russia and
Germany.

Within the next two years &Jr,:unin' s opposition to

Harx!s political views reached a climax.
Bakunin had observed with growing apprehension the rise
of Prussian influence in Germany since 1866.

He had never had a

predilection for the Germans and. Germany, but after 1870 there
occurred a truly volcanic eruption of a burning hatred and
contempt for Germany.

The defeat of France in the Franco-German

War of September, 1870 and the subsequent unification of Germany
---73Zemfuij Ralli, "Bakunin," p. 155, quoted in Archives
~c,,o,uni]22., II, 433.
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under Prussian leadership on January 18, 1871 convinced Bakunin
that a strong Germany dimin:Lshed the possibility of the
liberation of the Slavs under German rule.

In the early seventies

Bakunin wrote a number of lengthy treatises in which in continued
his agitation for a voluntary federation of individuals,
administrative units, and nations as the only means to guarantee
peace in Europe and to solve the problem of German-Slavicrelations. 7L~

His treatises developed j_nto a formidable attack

upon Marx's political concepts, his policies in the International,
and upon the German Social Democratic Working Men's Party
founded in 1869 under the lee.dership of WiJ.liam Liebknecht and
August Bebel who were followers of Marx.
When discussing the posttion of a united Germany in
Europe, BaktnJin maintained that Germany was an expansionist power
L' emp:i.J:e-1sr1ou-tQ.:-l5~!~c;.nique et la.
In.-tlie same year-lie aiscussed ""the
ITG.i-iuan:'.S:favfC q1.l8Stion in an appendix to a pamphlet against
Giuseppe ¥J.CJ.zzini, ~.~~IE t £l~n~~:1£ ~..1, _!JE:~Eh-12..=h., . The appendix
remained unpublished, but tne parupnlet was :published as part one
of La theologJe 32olitique d.e Mazzini et 1 1 Internationale by the
Comrr1Issi"Oi1'd'Cl?ropat;8.i1cie:Sc>c1aJ3J11el.i1115'?'17'"15e ·EweerlF'ebruary 15
and March 11, 1872 Bakunin composed a long letter to the members
of the federation of the Jura sections of the International on
German~Slavic relations.
In }larch, 1872 Ba1nmin composed another
manuscript, wl)ich remaj_ned unpublished, ,!:~~~
commun:Lsme d'etat. In 1872 after the Hague Congress of "&he
:CD.Ternaf:i,0nar;1w composed his last lengthy manuscript of this
period, ~t~g.£P...:t£.2~.l':.£3;£;:>s, which also \'Jas not published at. the
time. Bakunin consj_dered this m&i.:n.uscript as the continuation of
b' ~mpi;t.:,e..lgi~<?];"t_O_:-~g~e,rng_p.,:1.9.11.£.

, . ··--74111

~~871~0 rmblished

revolution sociale in Geneva.
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r.I1he recent German policy of conquest towards

France disproved the contention of Marx and his supporters that
the despotic Russian government was the greatest threat to
European liberty.

Germany \'ms far· more dangerous.

Only Germany

had the sufficient material power to threaten the independence
of the European nations, including Russia, through an aggressive
war.

Bakunin claimed that Germany, str·engthenec1 by its

political unification, would certainly embark upon an expansionist
policy on a large scale.

According to him Bismq.rck aimed at the

completion of his "gigantic [political] projects" through the
creation of a Pan-Germanic state which would have no equal
in Europe.75

But Bakunin's assumption was not born out by

Bismarck's political career.
According to Bakunin the German character revealed a
basic brutality which predestined the Germans to create a very
powerful stci.te.

'rhe Germans, said

Ba.~unin,

had always been an

aggressive people because they had never experienced true

liberty~

The cult of the state, introduced by Protestantism, prepared the
Germans to submit willingly to the despot:Lsm of the

governments~

It was in Germany where, since the seventeenth century, militarism
and the cult of authority had developed, and it was Germany which
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became the "permanent school of the despot:Lsm of the Euro1')ean
states," not Russia.

Even in the nineteenth century the Germans

had not abandoned the cult of the state.

Germany was not unj_ted

through a revolution of the people but by the despotic Prussian
state, the "epitome" of aggressiveness.

In Bakunin's opinion the

Germans were "a people enslaved by their orm choice and presently
the greatest threat to the liberty of the Ymrld. 11 76
Bakunj_n claimed that the collaboration of the Jews with
the German state increased the danger of German·aggression.

He

believed that the Jews held a pov;erfuJ. position in Western
Ifuropean economic and cultural life, particularly in Germany.
The Jews were the natural allies of the Gorman bourgeoisie with
whom they shared the cult of the centralized state and the lust
for power.

.According to Bakunin the Jevrs used their influence

in Germany in order to prevent the libere.tion of the Slavs from
German rule.

Desiring to extend their economic povrer, they

supported the German

~-P.2£.J:_ .9.~~' Pan~Germanism,

and the

complete Germaniz.ation of the Slavs as they had done j_n 1848.
Bak.tmin was convinced that an aggressive German policy

v10uld result in a terrible clash between Germany and Russia.

But

Germany, not Russia., as :Marx and his followers mainte.ined, would
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be responsible for it.

AJ.1y attempt to create a centralized Pan-

Germanic state and to completely Germanize the Slavs under
German rule would help the Russian government to rally the Slavs
under the Pan-Slav banner.

The Western Slavs would collaborate

with Russia not because they were pro-Russian but because they
assumed that Russia's backwardness would save them from the completB
destruction of their national identity.

However, in the eyes

of Bakunin a victory of Germany or Russia vmuld be equally
disastrous, leading to the despotic hegemony of either the one
or the other state in Europe.

Euro1Jean progress would be ended

by German militarism or Russian barbarism.

Europe could only be

saved from such a disaster through the liberation of all the
Slavs, including the Russians, and the creation of a "great
federal republic o 11
According to &Jw.nin a yj_ctory of the German socialists
would not solve the problem of German-Slav relations.

Therefore,

it would not end the danger of a clash between Germ.any and Russia.
Bakunin maintained that the German socialists were supporters of
territorial expansionism because they were influenced by

~rx

who

was a "partisan of the sate, 11 that is, of the policy of conquest.
On the basis of his observations of Marx's policies in
the International, Bakunin had come to the conclusion that Marx
was a German nationalist who tried to introduce principles into
the organization vrhich were foreign to its true spirit.

According
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to Bakunin the majority of the socialists fought for the
solidarity of all the Europec:i.n people and for the "economic
emancipation of the workers."

Marx, instead, in his Inaug_Ufal

Addre§_s, had combined the demand for the conquest of political
power by the workers with an explicit Russophobia and an implicit
Slavophobia.

Although :Marx condemned Russian expansionism, he

did not demand the abolition of the centralj_zed state which alone
vmuld end territorial expansionism..

This proved, said Bokunin,

that Marx was a supporter of the centralized state and of the
policy of conquest but wished to reserve the right of conquest
to ttthe nations representing modern civilization," foremost
to Germany 77
0

Marx's policy was typically German and would be

disastrous for Europe should the German socialists ever stage a
successful revolution in Germany.
Bakunin's concern with German forej.gn policies under a
socialist government was reflected in his repeated attempts to
analyze the impact of Marx's and Engels 1 s ideology upon the
organization of a future socialist stateo

The two friends had

always refrained from definite statements on this problem.

They

s1)oke about the socialist revolut:Lon in which the workers would
achieve thej_r liberation through the seizure of political power
and the creation of a people's state, and they predicted the
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withering of that state leaving a big gap between the tvro phases.
Bakunin accused Marx and Engels that the core of their ideology
was not a yearning for liberty but for the conquest of power.
According to Bakunin, Marx and Engels were strongly
influenced by the traditional German cult of the state.
was shown by their interpretation of history.

This

They maintained

that the rise of the absolutist state, that is, of the centralized
state, had definitely marked a progressive phase in the development
towards the ultimate liberation of the people because it helped to
further the social revolution by promoting the economic growth
of society and the rise of new classes.

In Bakunin's opinion

the absolutist state had not benefited humanity.

Its only aj.m

was to preserve and increase its power which resulted in a greater
enslavement of the people.
What was true of the centralized monarchical state,
would also be true of the people's state because the very nature
of the state was an obstacle to liberty.7 8

Contrary to the

contention of Marx and Engels it would not bring about the
emancipation of the workers.

Marx's political progre.m, said

Bakunin, vms
a framework for strongly centralized and very
authorite.rian economic and politica.1 institutions,
without a doubt sanctioned like all the despotic

II, 203.

l
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institutions of modern society by universal suffrage,
but nevertheless subjected to a very strong government,
to use the expression of Engels, the alter e.rs£ of Marx. 79
In a people's state the common man would be enslaved to
an even greater degree than in the monarchy because the government
would be extremely complicated and central:Lzed.

The government

would not restrict itself to the political rule over the masses
and the administration of justice.

It would also control

the production and distribution of wealth, the
cultivation of the land, the establishment and development of factories, the organization and management
of commerce, and finally, the use of capita1 for
production, the state being the only ban_'k:er. 80
The people's state would be under the rule of ttthe man of science?
the most aristocratic, the most despotic, the most arrogant, and
the most contemptuous of all regimes .. 11

He added:

There will be a new class, a new hierarchy of real and
fictitious scholars, and the world will be divided into
a dominant m:Lnority and an immense ignorant majority in
the name of science.
.And then look out, you mass of
j.gnorants. 81
Bakunin quoted Engels as having said that the new government would
noed a strong army to keep these millions of j_JJ.i terates, who
would wish to destroy progress, subjugated.

Tho people's state,

said Bakunin, would not only continue to exploit the masses but
also the expansionist foreign policy..

Decades before a commun:Lst

r

state was established in Europe,

Ba....~unin

predicted the essential

nature of that state--j.ts super-centralization and oppressivenesswhich was described by the Yugoslav communist Milovan Djilas in
his work The New Class published in· 1956.
Bakunin implied that Marx and Engels were fully aware
of the consequences of their political program.

They devised

it not to bring about the emancipation bf the European workers
but to establish the "German hegemony in Europe. 11

Bakunin accused

Marx and Engels of applying the Darwinian law of_ the "struggle
for survival 11 to the races.

This was contrary to the socialist

principle. of the solidarity of all the European workers.

According

to Bakunin,. Marx and Engels believed that only the Germanic race
was

cap~ble

of progressing, and that it was "the legitimate

representative of humanity. 11

Consequently, they wished for the

creation of a large German state which would not only include
the Slavs, presently under German rule, but also all the
territories inhabited by the people of Germanic descent--"Holland,
a great part of Belgirnn, three quarters of Switzerland, and all
of Scandinavia. 1182

The two friends were convinced that the

greatness of the German state ·was the supreme condition of the
emancipation of the whole world, and that "the national and
political victory of Germany • • • [was ]a victory for humanity. 11 83

-
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On the basis of his analysis of Marx's political

program, Bakunin arrived at the conclusion that there was a great
affinity between the authoritarian aristocrat and monarchist
Bismarck and the authoritarian social democrat and republican
Marx •. Although the two men believed in·different forms of
government, they shared the same "cult of the state," the love
for power, and the desire to found a "great unitary and PanGermanic

s~ate~

11

Bakunin stated:

"Both men are eminently

nationalistic, and they meet in this political nationalism
without wishing or searching for it. 11 8L~
According to Bakunj.n the only difference between the
two men

Wafi

that Bismarck,

11

the greatest statesman in contemporary

Europe, 11 had a better understanding of European politics than
Marx.

Bismarck carefully avoided any conflict with Russia because

he needed it as an ally against France, and he supported the
anti-Polish policy of the Tsarist government and Russian
expansionism in Asia in order to prevent any further increase
of Russian influence in Europe, but Marx and his followers
condemned Bismarck's realistic approach to foreign political
questions.

They preferred to provoke Alexander II by

agitating for the partition of the Russian Empire.
84nAux. c·ompagnons de la federation jurassienne," ·in
II, 30.

Archive~__l.?.~ls.2~'
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Bakunin's \Vritings from 1870 to 1872 promoted a veritable
encirclement of Germany.

Bakunin reversed Marx's propaganda.

Instead of Russia, Germany was ousted from the family of progressive
:E.'uropean nations.

Bakunin was conv:Lnced that all the Germans

from the ruling clnsses down to the workers were in favor of
authoritarianism and expansionism, and that no progress in liberty
could be expected from Germany even if socialism were
victorious. 85
When Bakunin discussed the party program of the German
Social Democratic \Vorking Hen's Party, issued in 1869, he pointed
out that its foremost demand was the creation of a "free people's
state. 11

This proved that like Marx the German socialists were not

interested in the liberation of the people.
were two contradictory terms.

State and freedom

The state meant power, and this

power would always be used by a small minority to dominate and
-· .
"B5Ti~;·-~stion of liberty and of a foreign policy in the
German Social Democratic Party, led by Wilhelm Liebknecht and
August Bebel, vms discussed by the German social democrat Susanne
Miller in her book Das Problem der li'reihej_t im Sozialismus.
lt,rej_hei t, Sta.at und......He°Vol\if:Con 1i1"cte1~Pro~JJt de!; = So~;ialdemokratie von Lassalle bis zum Revisionismusstreit
(Frankfurt am Main: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 196Li-), pp. 12Li-133. l'Jillor's analysis disproves Bakunin's assumption that the
political conv:i.ctions of Harx and the German socialists were
absolutely identical~ Thus, for example, while Yiarx and Engels
approved of German unification under Prussian leadership in the
belief that this.would further the German revolution, Liebknecht
remained its violent opponent because Prussia was the enemy of
liberty.
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exploit the masses.

According to Bakunin the program had two

defects:
As an essentially political program it subordinates
the social to the political question and again places
the workers under therule of the bourgeoisie, and as
an essentially patriotic program it destroys internationSJ.1 solidarity and threatens to Germanize the
Slavs.C56
Bakunin concluded that the German socialists were nationalists
e.nd Pe.n-German:l.sts.

They vrnre not different from Marx who tried

to impose his political program upon the. International in order
to further the German hegemony in Europe.
After the unification of Germany Balrnnin watched with
growing concern the policies of the German socialj_sts in the
Austrian Ei'mpire,

Previously he had been inclined to believe that

the Austro-German socialists were willing to reject German
nationalism and to join the Austro-Slav workers in the common
fight for liborty and equality.

In the spring of' 1869 Bakunin

had expressed his enthusiasm about a
Austro~German

.=btE?...s_t£, issued

~!t.

by the

sociD.lists in May, which demanded the destruction

of the na.tiona.lity principle and the creation of a united
socialist organization in the Austrian E.mpire to assure an
effective revolutionary collaboration of all the workers--Germans
and Slavs--against the established government.87

'"'"86~ 1 Appen-dice Slavo-Allemand, 11 in Archives Bakounine,

I/1, 278.
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In September, 1871 Bakunin's vision of a peaceful
coexistence between the Slavs and Germans in Austrj_a in a socialist
setting faded.

On September 26, 1871, at a socialist meeting in

Vienna, the following resolution was passed:
That democracy which does not acknowledge historical
rights, only the rights of man, • • • condemns all the
attempts to restore ~:Q.cient states which belong to the
history of the past.~~
According to Bokunin this resolution meant the abandonment of the
earli.er gen·erous policy of the Austro-German socialists tovmrds
the Slavs.

He ascribed this to the influence of· the German

socialists who attended the meeting, among them Wilhelm
Liebknecht, the editor of the
Social Democratic Party).

~~~

(the organ of the German

Bakunin vras convinced that the Germans

had come to Vienna to agitate for the creation of "a great socalled democratic Pan-Germanic state," and that the Austro-German
socialists were willing to support that aim.

Bakunin insisted

that he was as opposed as the German socialists to the nationality
pr:Lnciple.

Yet, he would not hesitate to support it as long as

the Austro--Slavs were threatened by Pan-Germa.nism. 89

On the basis of his conviction that Marx and his
supporters favored the centralized state and Pan-Germanism,
BaJumin concluded that their support of the liberation of Poland

trs~;-L:1j,~;:~g (Brussels), October 5, 1871, in Archives

~~}:~UE.~££, I7'f; 3Li-3 •

89~~lol!l"~-l~ le. E.~H)i1.1!,!.l~hs_me ,.ri.t.,~l,

1?2,l~illf.,
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was not sincere:

First of all, :Marx and Engels vrnre not consistent

when they condemned the partition of Poland as a crime because
they considered the development of the absolutist and expansionist
state as a phenomenon which had furthered historical progress.9°
Besides, Marx and Engels were "ardent patriots" which precluded
their condemnation of the traditional German aim to conquer .
the whole area between the Oder,
Sea.

Niemen~

Dvina, and the Baltic

Bakunin asked \'That possible interest could Marx and Engels

have in a country like.Poland which was still predominantly
agricultural, not yet ready for their ideology.

Because of their

bourgeois leanings Marx and Engels had an "instinctive horror
of the peasants" and relied upon the workers in the to1ms,
"organized and even ruled by bourgeois social democrats," to stage
a successful revolution.
According to Bakunin the agitation of Narx and Engels
and of the socialists in Germany for the liberation of Poland was
only a means to cover their real aim--the complete absorption
9vBakunin maintained that Proudhon's attitude towards
Poland was more consistent than that of Marx and Engels. Proudhon
was an opponent of' the centralized state. Therefore, he was
against the restoration of Polando He was convinced that a
restored Poland would again be ruled by the privileged aristocracy
and would merely increase the number of centralized states which
enslave the people. Unfortunately, said Bakunin, Proudhon did
not remain consistent when he dared to describe the policies
of the Tsarist government as representing triumphant social
democracy. Cf. Ecrit con...~r~ 1'~~r2s_, in Archives Bakounine, II, 1990
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of Poland.

This would remove the barrier which for centuries

had prevented the "civilizing invasion" of E-:1stern Europe by
the Germans.

Once in power, the German socialists would not

surrender any part Of the former Polish provinces.

In support

of this stat0ment Bakunin ref erred to the declaration of a
Prussian socialist leader, Dr. Jacoby, that the Germans could no
longer undo "the political consequences" of the Polish partition
although it hci.d been a crime.
Bakunin remarked that the German socialists were as
insincere as the lj_beral Russian patriots in their support of the
liberation of Poland.
the other side.

Each party was only concerned with weakeni.

The Germans would like to restore the former

eastern provinces to the Poles, while the Russians would prefer
a Poland extending from the Vistula far into Germany.

Actually

neither the Russians nor the Germans would ever seriously try
to rest.ore Poland, not even partially, because this involved too
many risks.
If Russia granted independence to the Polish Kingdom,
the revolutionary unrest in the former eastern Polish provinces
v1ould flare up again and endanger the unity of the Russian Empire.
On the other hand, Germany would face an even more critical
situation should a. socialist government support the reconquest
of tho former eastern Polish provinces from Russia and the
extension of Polish power to the Black Sea.

There was no
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certainty whether a strong PoJ.ish state would become Germany's
ally.

It was rather to be expected that the Poles would try to

seize the Baltic Sea coast from the Germans.

They might also

attempt to become the leaders of Pa·n-Slavism and to unite all
the Slavs in the fight against German domination.

Moreover,

the restoration of Poland with German help might have even more
dangerous consequencesfbr Germany.

It might cause a Russian

revolution which, being "essentially socialist and anarchist,"
might help to destroy the new oppressive Polish state and arouse
the Slavs under German rule to fight for their liberation from
the "Pan-Germanic prison."
Bakunin concluded that there was st:ill another
alternative.

The German socialists, when speaking of the

restoration of Poland, might mean the creation of "a kind of
branch establishment of German domination under a Polish name,"
that is, of a German satellite.

In any case, as long as the

centralized state was not destroyed, the Polish people would not
enjoy lib0rty.

Under the present circumstances only two

possibilities were open to them--to become either Germanized or
Russianized.

If the modern trend towards the elj_mination of

independent states was not checked in time, it would

le~d

to

"the formation of immense military dictatorships, • • • the last
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logical phase of the historical principle of the sta.te. 11 91

This

would be the end of liberty.
Bakunin's analysis of the nationality problem in
Central Eastern Europe struck at the core of this question.

Since

the mid-sixties Bakunin had become convinced that the liberation
of the Slavs in Central Eastern Europe would not solve the problem
of liberty.

He said that it would be impossible to draw just

ethnographic borders either between the Germans and the Western
Slavs in Bohemia and Moravia or between the Poles and the Germans
in Poznania, West and East Prussia because Germans and Slavs were
intermingled.

Consequently, said Bakunin, the liberty of the

people would not be safeguarded by restoring the former western
Polish provinces to the Poles or by carving new Slavic states out
of the Austrian Empire, a statement which has been verified by the
reorganization of Central Eastern Europe after the Second World
Bakunin argued that while in a German state the Slavs were

Ware

dominated and oppressed, in a Polish or Czech state the Germans
viOuld be "dominated, sacrificed, and natj_onalized. 11

The

centralj_zed state would always mean the triumph of one national
groupo

The liberation of the people in the areas with a mixed

population could only be guaranteed by granting full autonomy and
the right to voluntary federation to the communes •

.

--~---

9 "Aux cornpagnons de la fedcfration jurassienne," in
42.

Ar chi V!7§.. Bak.C?EniJlf., II,
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The polemic against l'.tarx, which Bakunin carried on in his
treatises early in the 1870's, was the accompaniment to the
controversy between Marx and Bakunin in the International.

The

struggle between them had been briefly interrupted by the
Franco-German War, but it flared up again in 1871.

Farly in 1871

Utin, who wished to see Bakunin excluded from the International,
declared that the Geneva section of Bakunin's Social Democratic
Alliance, had never been formally admitted into the International
by the General Council.

This was not true.

When it took the

General Council three months before confirming the credentials
of the Alliance, Bakunin suspected that Marx was behind Utin's
move.
_ At the London Conference of September,

1871, which was

held instead of the General Congress planned for this year, and
which was only attended by 23 delegates, among them Utin, Marx
and E.'ngels continued the fight against Bakunin and his supporters.

A resolution was passed which forbade sections of the International
to call themselves by sectarian names • • • or to
form separate bodies under tho na.me of sections of
propaganda, etc., pretending to accomplish specj_al
missions distinct from the common puriiOse of the
Association.92
·
This resolution was particularly directed against the Geneva.
section of the Alliance which just before the London Conference

92Cf.-fustruggle over the organization of the

International in 1 1 Internationale: documents et souvEmirs,
ed. by James Gu:!,ll'a1.~r2vois:T-J?aFIST-.soc·r73-:r<.f1Tou:V'8Tiede
~~~:=>:m>t_,~2~~~~,..!J~:252~~~~~:-.=-Md~O~..,_,,.,.,
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had adopted the name:

Section for Propaganda and Social

Revolutionary Action.
After the London Conference Bakunin initiated a formidable
fight against "the authoritarian" Marx and his "Pan-Germanic
agency," the General Council.
Federationr•~composed

which he controlled.
so-called

He was supported by the Jura

of the sections in northwestern Switzerland-Late in 1871 the ·Federation drew up the

Sonvi;!J.i~F- Cir£Ulc:!,

in which the Bakouriinists maintained

that the General Counc,il must be deprived of the dictatorial
powers it had usurped and turned into "a simple office for
correspondence and statistics."93
In his letter to the Jura Federation, which Bakunj.n
composed in February and March, 1872» he repeated the demand
of his supporters that the General Council must be reorganized
because it had become an autocratic institution.

Bakunin

maj_ntainod that Marx had packed the London Conference with his
followers in order to finally impose h:i.s "commu:nisme d'etat"
~'>A<."'\:h.ll'Olli~..Y~~--

(dictatorial communism), which disregarded liberty, upon the
International.

Through the adoption of Marx's political concept

the International ·was transformed into an "irrmwnse and monstrous
state 11 under the dictatorship of the General Council, "that is,
of Marx."

Bakunin warned that this was merely the preparation

r
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for the realization of Marx's ultimate plan to turn the
International into "an instrument of the greatness and future
power of Germany. 11

He concluded that in case of a victory of

Marx's followers in Germany, this c·ountry would doubtless become
the center of the International which would threaten the liberty
of Europe, particularly of the Slavs.
In his letter to the Jura Federation Bakunin once again
glorified t-he Slavs.

He informed his supporters that they

should not fear the reactionary expansionist

Pan~Slavism

of the

Russian government because the antipathies among the Slavs, their
different traditions, social structures, and languages represented
a definite ·obstacle in the realization of a Slavic union.

Besides,

the Slavic people would never desire to create a powerful
centralized state.

The Russian Empire had not been organized by

the Slavic people but against them..

Bakunin assured his friends

that the recent rise of a modern Slavic movement among the young
Austrian and Balkan Slavs would prevent the realization of
Russian Pan-Slav aims because the young Slavs aimed at the
abolition of the state.

Bakunin invited all the Western European

socialists who were truly interested in the liberation of the
workers and their fraternization to collaborate with the Slavic
people, not

wit~

were reactionary.

the German socialists \'!hose political concepts
He claimed that only the Slavic people were

truly revolutionary, while the German workers lacked their

r
'
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burning love for liberty.

Bakunin still expected the salvation

of Europe from the Slavs.
At the time when Bakunin stated these arguments, he had
definitely become convinced that the question of German-Slavic
relations was the central question in the International, and
that the future of this organization depended upon the
satisfactory solution of this question.

He maintained that as

long as Marx held a dominant position in the General Council,
the International could not work for the peaceful coexistence of
the nations, including the Germans and the Slavs.
represent the true spirit of the Internation8.l.

Marx did not
His support of

authoritarianism and of the domination of the progressive nations
over less civilj_zed ones was in flagrant opposition 1o the
federalist and anti-state socialism to which the majority in the
International adhered according to Bakunin.
While Bakuntn agitated for the removal of Marx from the
General Council, Marx was busy preparing the expulsion of Bakunin
from the Inter11ationa1 .. 94

When, aft0r an j_nterval of three

years, another General Congress of the International met in The
Hague on September 2, 1872, the final phase of the long drawn
out controversy between Marx and Bakunin, which had centered on
the Slavic question, was reached..

Bakunin had been unable to
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trB.vel to The Hague..
momentous meeting.

But Narx and Engels were present at this
It was the first and last time that they

attended a General Congress of the International.
The majority of the delegates to the Hague Congress were
supporters of Marx's policies.

Against the opposition of the

Bakuninists the decentralization of the.International was
rejected and the importance of poli tj_cal action by the workers
was reaffirmed..

In spite of this victory) Marx knew that he

was in a precarious position because of the rising influence of
Bakunin's teachings, particularly in Italy and Spain..

Moreover,

not only the Jura Federat:Lon had expressed a strong opposition
to the General Council; the opposition had spread to Belgium,
Holland, and even to England.

In order to destroy the influence

of the Bak.uninists, Engels, in the no.me of Marx and other
delegates, proposed to transfer the General Council to New York.
His proposal was carried by a narrow majority.

This meant the

end of the International.
Marx's final action was to bring about Bakunin's
expulsion from the International.

At his instigation Bakunin was

charged with having attempted to organize a secret society in
order to disrupt the International through the propagation of
principles which did not agree with those of the International.
When this did not convince the delegates, Bakunin was accused
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of having been involved in a fraud.

~'h:i.s

was not true.

However,

the accusation finally led to his expulsion.95
After the Congress in The Hague Bakunin composed his
/

last long treatise Ecrt_i cont.:£2 Marx.

He accused Marx of having

packed the Congress with his own men in order to defeat the
grow:.tng opposition j_n the International.

Bakunin insisted that

his own agitation for the destruction of political power
and of the state, that is, of

11

power constituted by the

bourgeoisie," was in perfect agreement with the basic policies
of the International.
Marx and Engels.

The real enemies of the International were

They would not understand that the vmrkers,

whom Marx called the

"!;urny~11J2.!'.21£.t~:J§._t.,"

were not interested

in the _conquest of political power but in the question of economic
equality.

At the Congress in The Hague, said Bakunin, Marx

fought for the reaffirmation of his political program and
succeeded, but his insistence upon the polj_tical question had
endangered the existence of the International.

In the_opinion

of Bakunin this proved that Marx was only interested in increasing

his own power and had no regard for the wishes of the workers.
The Congress in The Hague vras
the battle and surrender of Sedan and the triumphant
invasion [of the International] not by Bismar-ck.i.an
but Marxian_Pan-Germanism, imposing the political
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program of the German authoritarian communists or
social democrats and the dictatorship of their leader
.upon the proletariat of all the other countries in
America and Europe.96
Bakunin had fought an arduous fight against Marx's
political program.

He believed that the program would not bring

about the peaceful coexistence between the Germans and the Slavs,
and would not help to solve the central problem of the Slavic
question--the liberation of the Polish and Russian people.

He

was convinced that Marx's ideology was devised in order to
increase German power and to turn Germany into the center of a
socialist Europe to the detriment of all the Slavs, including
the Poles.

Marx's fight against Bakunin had been as arduous

because Marx, in turn, held that Bakunin's ideas endangered the
European revolution and Germany in particular.

No compromise

between the two parties was possible.
The death of the International marked the end of the
long drawn out controversy over the Polish question in radical
circles.

In the following years Marx (d. in 1883) and Engels

(d. in 1895) rarely turned their attention to Poland in spite
of the socio-economic. changes in that country.

The Polish

question had definitely lost its attraction as a major problem
in the reorganization of Europe.

The interest in the Polish

96Ecrit contre Marx, in Archives Bakounine, II, 180.
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question briefly flared up again in the Second International in
the mid-1890's, when Marx and Engels and their old opponent
Bakunin were no longer alive.

This was the beginning of the

search for the true meaning of Marx and Engels's views on the
Polish question.

CONCLUSION

In the mid-nineteenth century tpe Polish question was
considered by the European Left as a part of the question of the
reorganization of Europe leading to the destruction of the monarchical and aristocratic structure of the European states and the
liberation of the people.
and Engels.

This was also the conviction of Marx

However, from the beginning they took an isolated

stand on the question of the liberation of the oppressed people
due to their ideology and their interest in a strong Germany.

This

had an impact upon their attitude towards the Polish question.
Although Marx and Engels paid lip service to the need for
the solidarity of the European people, their ideology emphasized
the concept of leadership.

Under the influence of Hegel they

differentiated between the historic and the non-historic nations,
between the progressive and backward nations, and stressed the
right of the former to dominate the latter.

The concept of

leadership was extended to the revolutionary fight.

According

to Marx and Engels the industrial proletariat, predestined to

381

382
effect the final liberation of man, had the task to lead the
rural proletariat in the communist revolution, while the
revolutionary nation had the right to dominate the reactionary
·one.

Marx and Engels were convinced that the communist revolution

would be initiated in the progressive West and then engulf the
backward East.

In the 1840's and 1850's they ascribed the

leadership of the revolution to England and after the 1850's
to Germany.
From Marx's an·d Engels' s viewpoint the Poles belonged to
backward Eastern Europe.

They would not play a decisive role

in the communist revolution.

Their final liberation would depend

upon the eyents in Western Europe.

Consequently, the agitation

of the .Poles for the creation of a peasant democracy had only a
relative significance in the eyes of Marx and Engels.

At the

...

utmost a peasant democracy might help to prepare the communist
revolution.

Marx's and Engels's interest in a Polish peasant

democracy was shortlived.

After the Revolution of 1848 it was

dropped, partly because Marx and Engels became definitely convince
that the peasants were a reactionary force, and partly because
they gave up hope for internal changes in Poland.

In the

following years they did not show any interest in the economic
development of Poland which foreshadowed social changes.
On the whole the Polish question interested Marx and
Engels mainly as a foreign political question .which could
wm....___.,..,www_....,._ _ _ _

""'"'~-
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conveniently be exploited to ridicule political opponents, to
agitate against the reactionary powers Prussia, Austria, and
Russia and against the foreign policy of the Western European
·states towards Russia, and, above all, to fight Pan-Slavism.

As

a result, the German question emerged as a major factor in the
discussions on the question of Polish liberation.
Marx and Engels were convinced that in the past not only
the foreign policy of Prussia but also that of the Western
European powers towards Poland had contributed to the rise of
Russia and thereby to the weakening of Germany.

They wished for

the strengthening of Germany through the creation of
GrossdeutsGhland which would include the Austro-Slavs.

They

feared that the Austro-Slavs might be attracted to Russia, and
that Russia might create a Pan-Slav union which would weaken
Germany to an even greater degree.

In order to save Germany from

a Slavic encirclement, Marx and Engels insisted upon the necessity
for Polish liberation, and the collaboration of the Poles with the
Germans.

Simultaneously, they condemned the agitation of the

Austro-Slavs for their liberation from German rule.

Marx and

Engels were quite aware of the inconsistency in their approach
to the question of national liberation and were anxious to explain
that the Poles had a right to national liberty because they were
a historical nation.

Yet, this inconsistency permitted the

1
[ii,1
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speculation, which was exploited by Bakunin, that at any moment
Marx and Engels might reverse their support of Polish liberation.
Certainly, Marx's and Engels 1 s ultimate intentions
·regarding the territorial extension of Poland could only have
been revealed if during their lifetime a German revolution had
occurred followed by the establishment of a communist government.
But there is ample evidence that as defenders of a strong German
state they.would not have ceded to the Poles the Grand Duchy of
Poznania and West Prussia.

The rest is open to .speculation.

Under certain political circumstances they might have helped
the Poles to restore the historical eastern borders of 1772, or
they might· have come to an agreement with the Russians to form
a Polish buffer state between Germany and Russia, two possible
solutions which E-ngels had envisioned early in the 1850 1 s.
Apart from the question of the territorial extension of
Poland it is very probable that a communist Germany would have
pursued the same policy towards a Polish state as did the Soviet
Union which turned Poland into a satellite after the Second
World War.

As Bakunin pointed out, the political concepts of

Marx and Engels did not contain any safeguards against the
increase of the power of the state and its expansionist policies
wh.1ch would be detrimental to the liberty of the individual and
of small nations.

'
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